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Introduction
This volume offers an updated analysis and discussion on some of the most debated
theoretical, epistemological, social and ethical issues within that very young field
of study called “philosophy of ethology” or “philosophical ethology” (Lestel 2001;
Lestel, Brunois, Gaunet 2006; Chrulew 2014; Buchanan, Bussolini, Chrulew 2014;
Bussolini 2016; Marchesini 2016; Celentano 2018).
As its name suggests, this field of investigation compares philosophical reflection
and ethological research into the questions raised by one of the most important
scientific breakthroughs of our times: the discovery that, besides Man, many other
animals can think, invent new techniques, develop cultural traditions and manifest
individual differences in their aesthetic sensibility and expressive ability.
This book has three main aims:
• to contribute to the development of a philosophy of ethology and an ethical
reflection based on a both post-genocentric and post-anthropocentric approach;
• to promote an overcoming of the traditional division between life sciences and
humanities;
• to attempt a critical (and self-critical) integration of these two scientific traditions.
We believe it is necessary to develop ethology as a comparative study of the
behaviour of all the living species (not just animals), aimed at fully overcoming the
mechanistic and predominantly nativist setting of classical ethology and develop a
critical approach to the study of psychic and cultural phenomena that could archive
the prejudices of anthropocentrism and anthropodenial (de Waal 2016) and open up
to a horizontal (non-hierarchical) comparison between human minds and cultures
and all other, past or present animal minds and cultures.
The first part of the book which presents three essays by Celentano, illustrates this
approach by likening it to the historical progression from Darwinian proto-ethology
to cognitive and cultural ethology, and from neo-Darwinian formulations of a theory
of evolution to its most recent renditions in light of the discovery of epigenetic
inheritance and the birth of Evolutionary Developmental (Evo-Devo) Biology.
The first chapter reconstructs the process which led from Darwin’s revolution to
contemporary ethology, emphasizing the topicality and fruitfulness of the pluralistic
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approach to the explanation of the animal and human mental evolution that Darwin
assumed from the 1870s.
The second chapter focuses on the analysis of the affinities and bonds between
the two different attempts to reformulate Darwinian theory in a “cognitive” way
which have profoundly renewed evolutionary studies: Evolutionary Epistemology,
first promoted by ethologist Konrad Lorenz in the 1970s, and Extended Synthesis, or
the post-genocentric synthesis of Darwinism, towards which a large part of contem-
porary evolutionary biology is converging. An ongoing synthesis to which, in the last
three decades, authoritative members of the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution
and Cognition Research (Klosterneuburg—Austria), such asWerner Callebaut, Gerd
Müller and Massimo Pigliucci have made important contributions.
The third chapter illustrates the projects of Interspecific Cultural Studies: a meta-
disciplinary area which aims to contribute to a self-critical refoundation of both
humanities and behavioural sciences, as well as to a new organization of university
and post-university education and basic and applied research enabling it to offer the
development of skills that are transversal to the traditional bipartition between human
and life sciences. The first goal of Interspecific Cultural Studies is in fact to train
generations of scholars capable of profoundly renewing the Humanities, critically
inserting the brief history of human cultures into the much longer history of animal
ones, which has endured for hundreds of millions of years (differentiated cultural
traditions are in fact already observable in bony fish that have existed for more than
400 million years). In various respects, this is a project very close to the radical self-
reform of humanities proposed in Martinelli’s Manifesto of Numanities (Martinelli
2016) that, precisely because of this affinity, in our opinion finds its ideal location,
and a precious source of comparison, in this Springer editorial series specifically
dedicated to the Numanities, to which we are very proud to contribute.
The second part of the book entitled Knowledge, Subjectivity, and Intelligence
in Non-Human Animals, presents three essays by Marchesini and tries to clarify
the methods and contents of a holistic and post-mechanistic approach to the study
and understanding of animal minds. The chapter delves into three deep funda-
mental aspects of animal life: (a) learning process, (b) subjectivity and (c) intelli-
gence. The phenomenon of learning represents one of the most important processes
of behavioural identity development in animals. Starting from the mid-nineteenth
century, there have been many explicative proposals and models aimed at describing
this process. Nowadays we are faced with a number of models, often forcedly juxta-
posed evenwhen incompatible: thiswas the casewith associationist, psychoenergetic
and cognitive models. The question is whether this abundance could be replaced with
a unique model able to subsume the different occurrences and resolve the inconsis-
tencies still present in all these explanations. As a second aspect, this chapter wants
to show how the issue of animal subjectivity has been addressed in many ways over
time: the different explanations had come from the anthropomorphic assimilative
interpretation, supporting a projective view by which animality is just a declina-
tion of being human, to the break operated by René Descartes, who assimilated the
animal condition to mere res extensa, thereby annihilating any hint of its subjec-
tivity and depicting the non-human as a mass of deterministic mechanisms. I would
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like to deal with the issue of animal subjectivity avoiding any recourse to a mere
projection through which conscience is considered the decisive element that causes
subjectivity to emerge out of nothing, like a rabbit out of the hat. Finally, we come
to intelligence: despite its multiple possible interpretations, Western tradition has
restricted the act of knowing to a principle of disjunction from corporeality, in a sort
of detachment and contemplation of the world ascribable to the res cogitans and to
the exclusion of mere fruition. Knowledge, understood as a neutral and objectivizing
act, as something neither participatory nor emerging from the relational predicate,
has engendered a diaspora between the knowing and the known: a dichotomy that
reflects in a fractal producing other dichotomies in turn. The author tries to develop
the last path described here, referring to Lorenz’s view on the adherence of cogni-
tive tools to the configuration of reality. The issue is also to try to understand how to
reconcile an interpretation based on an animal being’s subjectivity, full of perspective
protagonism in any interaction with the world, with an epistemological framework
that accounts for the phylogenetic declination as a given dimension.
The third part of the book discusses the contributions of ethological research and
behavioural epigenetics to furthering the exploration of two topics that the authors
consider equally important for contemporary ethical debate. One is the critique
of the anthropocentric moral tradition by contemporary anti-speciesist ethics; the
other is the refutation of the theoretical presuppositions of behavioural, social and
moral determinism re-proposed in recent years by leading exponents of evolutionary
psychology, now sanctioned by the developments of the research on epigenetic
inheritance.
The aims to which the studies here presented are oriented imply, in fact, together
with the effort to understand both human and non-human minds and cultures in
a non-anthropocentric and non-ideological way, the commitment to defend their
autonomous existence. In other words, the comparative study of human and non-
human animal traditions and forms of thought requires, as one of its indispensable
correlates, an active participation in the struggle to protect them and the natural
environments in which they have evolved from the destruction and extinction that
many of them are undergoing due to anthropic impact and dominant destructive
forms of economic exploitation of both human communities and natural resources.
The essay opening this part (chapter 7), written by Celentano and entitled Contri-
butions of Ethology to the Birth of a Post-Anthropocentric Ethics, documents the role
that ethological research has played in promoting the birth of post-anthropocentric
and anti-speciesist ethicalmovement taking on this fight. Therefore, this chapter high-
lights the historical and cultural link between two ongoing revolutions one scientific,
introduced by ethology and one ethical, proper of current anti-speciesism.
The eighth chapter, written by Marchesini and entitled A Re-evaluation of animal
interests starting from a critique of Maslow’s Pyramid, shall demonstrate that under-
standing the subject of interest as an intentional entity is not enough to infer sentiency
neither fromwelfare parameters norMaslow’s Pyramid, and compassion or sympathy
are not even enough, interpreted in the etymological way of “being of the same
dispositional feeling”. In order to preserve the interests of the non-human animal as
a subject, it is indispensable to: (1) accept the existentiality of him/her and avoid the
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mechanicism of heritage; (2) carry out an empathic approach, that is the ability to
reproduce a condition or an inclination different from ours, that requires a suspen-
sion of the anthropomorphism. It is possible to know the intentional dimension of
non-human animals if we apply Darwin’s criterion of adaptative resemblance and
distinction. But in order to do that it is necessary to strengthen scientific knowledge
and ethical reflection because neither approach explains how the interest subjectivity
emerges.
The ninth and final chapter, written by Celentano and titled Behavioral and
Cultural Epigenetics. Social Biologisms Refuted by the Developments in Biology,
aims to clarify that the theoretical framework of the contemporary evolutionary
biology, and the experimental evidence on which it is based, allows us to definitively
refute and dismiss all approaches to the study of animal and human behaviour based
on genetic determinism. In fact, much data accumulated over the past thirty years
show that, in the course of phylogenesis, three kinds of selection, heredity and varia-
tion, respectively, epigenetic, behavioural and cultural ones operated alongside the
slow processes of genetic variation, and much faster than it, in tight conjunction with
environmental inputs.
As far as our species is concerned, this data shows that, as already understood by
Darwin (Darwin 1871a), for a long time it has been human social history that has
guided and shaped human biological history, not vice versa. The analysis proposed
in this chapter shows that it is now anachronistic to hypothesize a “human nature”
rigidly codified at the genetic level and substantially unchangeable in its fundamental
mental and behavioural propensities, as some exponents of evolutionary psychology
still do (Pinker 2005; Tibayrenc and Ayala 2016).
A large amount of experimental evidence in fact demonstrates that social context
can, through experience and its epigenetic, behavioural and cultural inheritance,
either inhibit or implement the cognitive potentials and behavioural attitudes of its
members with effects that are transmitted from generation to generation.
In other words, we can finally refute old and new social biologisms, or ancient
and re-emerging genetic determinisms, with the tools of biology itself .
The authors wish to conclude this introduction by expressing their deepest grat-
itude to Springer editions, to Dario Martinelli, director of the Numanities Arts and
Humanities in Progress series, and to the scientific and editorial board of the series
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Part I
Towards a Critical Re-Foundation
of Cultural Studies
Chapter 1
From the Darwinian to the Ethological
Revolutions: An Ongoing Process
Marco Celentano
Abstract Like Darwin’s works and theories, the studies and discoveries produced
by ethology (a research area of which the great naturalist was the first promoter)
inspired not one, but two scientific revolutions. The second is still in progress. As
with the first Darwinian revolution, some of the theoretical, social and ethical impli-
cations of the first ethological revolution have long been distorted, partly even by its
own promoters. It has been arbitrarily used to support forms of behavioural deter-
minism according to which all aspects of animal and human minds and activities
are substantially regulated by hereditary mechanisms that are scarcely modifiable
through experience, education, culture and socio-environmental stimuli. One of the
goals of this book is to demonstrate that this form of ethological mechanicism and
social biologism can now be refuted with the theoretical and methodological, empir-
ical and experimental tools of biology and ethology themselves. To this aim the
present chapter contributes through a critical review of the two Darwinian revolu-
tions, of the first ethological revolution, and of some of their interpretations that had
a wide echo. It also introduces an analysis of some aspects of the second, ongoing
ethological revolution, and of contemporary evolutionary studies, which are further
examined in the following sections of the book, showing that developments in both
these areas are converging towards a post-mechanistic model of animal behaviour
and a post-genocentric explanation of evolutionary processes. In this chapter I try to
show that, with respect to these developments, the Darwinism of Darwin is demon-
strating a fruitfulness, a resilience, and an attitude to frame phenomena that at the
time of its formulation were unknown, far superior to that of all the “neo-Darwinian”
models which predominated in evolutionary biology after Darwin. That is to say that,
at least since August Weismann’s Germinal Selection (Weismann 1896), to Jacques
Monod’s Le hasard et la nécessité (Monod 1970), Darwin’s Darwinism, although
focused on the concept of natural selection, implied an explanatory pluralism and a
series of (albeit critical and cautious) openings to the possibility of “Lamarckian”
forms of inheritance rejected by subsequent neo-Darwinist models in defence of a
supposed Darwinian “orthodoxy” only to be once again re-evaluated by contempo-
rary epigenetics. In the following pages I attempt to summarize the outcomes both
of the two Darwinian and the first ethological revolutions, highlighting their nature
as flows of ensuing scientific-cultural events, the implications of which are in many
respects still at stake, open-ended and ongoing. The scientific revolutions discussed
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in these pages are in fact only mere stages of a long, single, internally conflicting
and composite revolutionary process that leads from Darwin’s proto-ethology to
contemporary ethology.
1.1 Introduction
Over the last sixty yearsmany scholars and disseminators have referred to the concept
of a “Darwinian revolution”, but Patrick Tort, one of the most authoritative historians
of Darwin and Darwinism has since the 1980s pointed out that it is more appropriate
to talk about not one, but two Darwinian revolutions.1
In this essay I welcome Tort’s suggestion and draw on his extensive reconstruc-
tion of Darwin’s research path and the social processes that influenced his recep-
tion. Nevertheless, I will advance some criticisms of Tort’s interpretation of the
“second Darwinian revolution” and the risks of an idealization or a “monumental”
reconstruction of the “civilization” process that in my opinion, it presents.
Like any other scientist and human being, Charles Darwin was of course not
immune to the ideological conditioning and social prejudices of his time and social
environment. Thus his theories are not lacking in limits, inadequacies, fluctuations
or ambiguities.
However, amonghis contemporaries disseminating and renewing “transformism”,
he was at once the most sober, radical, coherent and far-sighted. A man inclined to
subscribe to an optimistic faith in progress typical of his time, but also one of the
most lucid scholars in glimpsing crucial issues arising from the social and theoretical
implications of the genealogical perspective.
In a nutshell, asKarlMarxwrote to FerdinandLassalle in 1861, the firstDarwinian
revolution, consisting in the detailed exposition of the theory of natural selection
contained in The Origin of Species, gave “a mortal blow to teleology” (Marx inMarx
and Engels 1975–2004, 41: 246–247), making explainable the origin of all the living
species without resorting to finalistic principles.
With his second revolution, of which the works The Descent of Man (1871) and
The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872) were the heralds, Darwin
obtained at least three important results:
1Curiously, the wide diffusion of the concept of a “Darwinian revolution”, recorded in the last sixty
years, took its cue in 1959 from the title of a biography of Darwin, written by the historian Gertrude
Himmelfarb (1959), which radically opposed to the theory of natural selection and tried to refute
it. Since then, the formula “Darwinian revolution” has been taken up by numerous scholars and
advisers, appearing in the titles of many volumes and articles, predominantly but not exclusively
aimed at emphasizing the scientific relevance and the still current aspects of Darwin’s theories and
studies. I will limit myself to recall: Michael Ruse (1979), Patrick Tort (1983, 1992); Journal of the
History of Biology, 38 (1) 2005, entirely devoted to this theme with contributions pro and against
Darwin written by many well-known scholars, and David Sloan Wilson (2019).
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• the abolishment of the traditional metaphysical man-animal dichotomy, having
shown that almost all mental capacities for millennia considered exclusive to man
are also widespread in other animal species;
• the foundation of a new field of research: the comparative study of animal expres-
sion, behaviours and abilities, which also includes the human species, and their
evolutionary history;
• a critique and an overcoming of the ethological determinism, improperly referred
to as a “social Darwinism” (Tort 1999), which had become very widespread in
the previous decade.2 Darwin rejected the Spencerian belief that human moral
and social traditions were the product of a natural selection that only preserves
what is really “useful”, proposing the alternative hypothesis that, in the history
of human customs, education and social control have supplanted and replaced
“natural selection”, becoming largely autonomous from it (Darwin 1871: 404).
Of course, bothDarwinian revolutionary turns left some problems open. Undoubt-
edly, however, as a whole, Darwin’s work opened a new phase in Western thought,
helping to demolish prejudices rooted for centuries and, in some cases, millennia.
In fact, the Darwinian revolutions produced the effect of reconnecting humans to
other animals and to their natural history, introducing a change no less radical than
that caused by the Galilean revolution, reconnecting Earth and sky.
Daughters of the Darwinian ones have been the two ethological revolutions that
crossed the twentieth century:
• The first goes from the birth of classical ethology founded in the 1930s to human
and cognitive ethology, which arose in the Sixties and Seventies.
• The second, still in progress, is the transition to a post-genocentric and post-
anthropocentric turning point that in the last three decades has led to a new
“philosophy of ethology”, to important developments in cultural and cognitive
ethology, and to the emergence of new areas of research such as behavioural and
cultural epigenetics.
As is documented in the concluding essay of this volume, these changes, inherent
to behavioural sciences, converge with the concurrent developments in evolutionary
studies. Both indeedmove towards a vision of evolution that is not only characterized
by external selection and genetic mutations, but also by an organisms’ active search
for more suitable living conditions in driven by epigenetic, behavioural and cultural
inheritance forces of evolutionary processes.
Both in evolutionary and ethological studies, evolution is today conceived as a
selective process in which organisms are protagonists, and animals are considered,
2For a critical approach to “social Darwinism” and an analysis of its multifaceted character, see: La
Vergata (1999, 2001, 2005). La Vergata shows how social Darwinism became a pseudo-scientific
justification of different ideological positions. Among these, a prevalence was granted to those
supporting the “elimination of the unfit”, providing biologistic and pseudo-naturalistic justifications
to political cynicism and to economic exploitation of men and nature, but other brands of social
Darwinism existed, such as “a liberalist Social Darwinism, a statist-conservative one, a militaristic
one, and then one pacifist, one socialist, one anarchist” (La Vergata 2005: 21).
6 1 From the Darwinian to the Ethological Revolutions …
not as Cartesian “machines” or Dawkinsian genetic “robots”, but as sentient and
intelligent beings who learn from experiences, transmit them, and actively transform
their environments, orienting their ontogenetic and phylogenetic history.
The scientific revolutions discussed in these pages are actually stages of one,
ongoing process: a single, long, revolution, internally conflicting and composite like
any revolutionary process.
Developments are ongoing because of the immense scope of the yet to be studied
phenomena concerned and the ethical and social implications they bring about, too.
In fact, we now have a possibility that was previously not available: conducting an
empirical, experimental, theoretical and historical refutation of both anthropocen-
trism and gene-centrism, using instruments offered by developments in the very same
biological and behavioural sciences.
While we discover phenomena unsuspected until a few decades ago, such as the
existence of millenary and/or secular cultural traditions in other species,3 or the
complexity that animal thought can reach, we also live in an age characterized by
the daily devastation of ecosystems in which all wild animal species live perpetrated
by an anthropic development guided by a single logic: that of immediate profit.
Enormous industrial apparatuses linked to intensive breeding of animals for meat
production significantly contribute to pollution, foolish consumption and environ-
mental catastrophes. These phenomena thus pose new important ethical, social and
ecological challenges.
As shown in greater detail in the following essays of this volume, these are histor-
ical passages that call upon both human and natural sciences to undertake paths
of critical re-foundation of their own educational and research methods, calling for
epochal changes overcoming the traditional bipartition between humanities and life
sciences, creating scientific and professional training courses offering skills that are
transversal to these two blocks.
1.2 Darwinian Revolutions and Their Emancipatory
Effects
At the end of The Origin of Species, Darwin wrote: “When the views entertained in
this volume on the origin of species, or when analogous views are generally admitted,
3As already clarified in the third chapter, various sites and finds, discovered in the last two decades,
attest to the existence of very ancient animal traditions. In 2007, in Côte d’Ivoire, a coconut crushing
site that had been used by local chimpanzee populations for no less than 4300 years was discovered
(Mercader et al. 2007). The use of stone tools has also been observed in some anthropoid monkeys
and, in 2016, a site for crushing cashew nuts, used by local communities of striped cebi (Sapajus
libidinosus) for over 700 years was found in Brazil, in the National Park of Serra da Capivara,
(Haslam et al. 2016). Moreover, in 2014, an article by Catherine Hobaiter and her collaborators,
published in PLoSBiology, for the first time documented a phenomenon of transmission of a cultural
innovation consisting in the invention of a sponge made with leaves and mosses among a group of
wild chimpanzees (Hobaiter et al. 2014).
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we can dimly foresee that there will be a considerable revolution in natural history”
(Darwin 1859: 484).
He was well aware that his revolution in natural history would trigger a domino
effect in the whole domain of sciences, challenging beliefs rooted in a millenarian
tradition and forcing a drastic redefinition of the distinction on which the whole
Western system of knowledge was based: that between natural sciences and
humanities.
Darwin was of course not the first to refute the belief in the fixity of species, to
conceive living beings as products of an historical process and to affirm that man
descends from other animals. The same road had already been taken by Diderot,
Buffon, Saint Hilaire, Erasmus Darwin and other, more or less renowned scholars
since the seventeenth century. Thanks to Lamark’s theory and Spencer’s from the
1850s, an evolutionary perspective was rather common for the first decades of
the nineteenth century. Furthermore, in parallel with Darwin, Wallace had also
independently conceived a theory of natural selection.
Darwin’s approach was, however, unlike other any previous evolutionary models.
His was immediately perceived as subversive by the cultivated classes of that time.
Other evolutionists spoke of “vital forces” or of an “essential irreducibility” of human
mind to its material components. Herbert Spencer, the most notorious among them,
hypothesized an allegedly necessary “law of progress”, operating at each and every
level of reality (Spencer 1857). “A panoply of concepts that traditional Christianity
could accept in compromise, for they permitted a ChristianGod towork by Evolution
instead of Creation” (Gould 1977: 24–25). In fact, such models, although rejecting
some traditional religious dogmas such as the fixity of the species and the theory of
“separate creations”, still re-launched and strengthened other important aspects of the
Western traditions, amongwhich the teleological (and at times explicitly theological)
approach to the studying of natural phenomena and the anthropocentrism re-launched
by the image of Man as the maximum height of evolution. The difficulty to attempt,
in this historical phase, a passage from models that were clearly suspended half-way
between innovation and tradition to a rigorous genealogical approach is testified by
the fact that Alfred Russel Wallace himself, the joint discoverer of natural selection
withDarwin,made ample concessions toChristian dogmatism, describing the human
mind as “the only divine contribution to the history of life”, and human evolution as
a process led by a “superior intelligence” (Wallace 1870: 360).
Darwin took a firm position against him on this ground, although he himself had
not been completely immune to some lexical concessions to the religious orthodoxy.
In the final chapter of The Origin, for example, there is a reference to the moment
when “the first creature […] was created” (Darwin 1859: 488), though the Creator’s
possible role is confined to the appearance of the earlier living forms, in direct
opposition to the traditional hypothesis of the “separate creations”.4
4One of the explicit goals set by Darwin in The Origin of Species was to demonstrate the un-
sustainability of the dogma of separate creations, i.e. of the conviction, based on biblical sources
but debated at length in the sixteenth and seventeenth century, that each living species had been
called into being byGod through a separate act of creation. Such a doctrine is of course irreconcilable
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However, aside from this terminological concession to creationism in relation to
the origin of life on Earth, a topic that was not covered in the work, Darwin’s theory
explained the existence of all present species, including humans, as deriving fromone
or a few common progenitors through a process of selection and conservation of the
variants which were most adaptable to the environment. The strength and weakness,
simplicity and intricateness of the Darwinian concept of “natural selection” derives
precisely from this fact: it is presented by the author as a principle that is both
negative, i.e., privative, and positive, i.e., cumulative., thus being a principle capable
of giving rise to new useful solutions. Natural selection is the gradual elimination
of the less suitable, but also the “accumulation and strengthening of advantageous
variations” (La Vergata 2001: 208).
In short Darwin’s theory represented an explanatory model that, for the first time,
did not resort to making any allowances for the intervention of divine forces or
mysterious progressive tendencies in inherent biological and human evolution.
Exactly for this reason, as Marx and Engels pointed just a few months after the
publication of The Origin, Darwin’s approach inflicted “a fatal blow to teleology”
(Marx in Marx and Engels 1975–2004, 41: 246–247).5
As Friedrich Nietzsche (1868) and Ernst Haeckel (1868) reiterated a few years
later, Darwin, with his theory of “natural selection”, had invalidated the assertion
made by Kant in section 75 of the Critique of Judgment, according to which: “This
is so certain that we can boldly say that it would be absurd for humans even to
make such an attempt or to hope that there may yet arise a Newton who could make
comprehensible even the generation of a blade of grass according to natural laws that
no intention has ordered” (Kant 1790 [2005]: 185). In other words, Darwin paved
the way to a radical secularization of the problem of the descent of living species
and man. Human history was reunited with animal history, producing a paradigmatic
change no less dramatic than the Copernican revolution which had reunited sky and
Earth.
After Darwin, not only the traditional (implicitly or explicitly) theological and
teleological presuppositions of natural sciences, but also the anthropocentric preju-
dices on which human sciences had been founded for millennia, and the whole tradi-
tional philosophical field, from the theory of knowledge to ethics, was profoundly and
radically problematized. The investigation of man’s “spiritual” activities, emotions,
feeling and knowledge, as well as of human expressiveness and language, took a
different direction from that moment onwards. Without Darwin, many milestones of
Western culture would have simply not existed: from Nietzsche and Freud’s revo-
lutionary approaches to the exploration of the subconscious and the problem of
“discontents of civilization”, to the birth of new research fields like classical, human,
with Darwin’s genealogical perspective, according to which all existing species derive from few
common progenitors.
5The passage is taken from a letter written by Marx to Lassalle (January 1, 1861). Writing on the
same topic to Engels, a few days earlier (December 19, 1860) Marx had noted: “Although it is
developed in a crude English style, here is the book that contains the natural-history foundation of
our point of view” (Marx in Marx and Engels 1975–2004, 41: 231–232).
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cognitive and cultural ethology with the inclusion of non-human animals, or a part
of them, among subjects considered to have an intrinsic ethical value.
For his part Darwin himself, in the course of his entire scientific activity, assigned
a central place to the problem of the origin of animal and human “mental faculties”,
trying to construct a genealogical theory to explain the processes leading from the
appearance of the earliest organisms to the development of the human species with
their species-specific features.
Still as a young naturalist, since 1838, he conceived in his Notebooks (Darwin
Posthumous 2009) the ambitious project of a theory capable of explaining both the
origins of the anatomical,morphological and physiological features of living beings
and the appearance and transformations of the behavioural and mental animal and
human traits, freeing these research domains from theology and teleology.6 This
polemic motivation was at the origin of an extensive research project, which he later
abandoned, but continued to provide a general framework for his later studies.
While studies of morphological, anatomical and functional differentiation
between species were integrated twenty years later in The Origin of Species, the
behavioural parts were incorporated in Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 21 of The Descent of
Man (Darwin 1871) and in The Expression of Emotions inMan and Animals (Darwin
1872), these are now rightly considered forerunner texts of modern ethology. At least
from a general theoretical perspective, it is with these studies that Darwin completed
his revolutionary enterprise, obtaining an extremely shocking triple effect for the
culture of the time, proving that:
(a) it is indeed possible to explain the evolution of living organisms, from its
first steps to the appearance of man without resorting to any extra-natural,
teleological, or aprioristic factor;
(b) the so-called “superior” abilities that were traditionally exclusively attributed
to man are at least in part found in other animals and depend on organs and
apparatuses that we share with many other species.
(c) the theory of natural selection does not imply that human social behavior is
determined by hereditary factors in a non-modifiable way, because it is fully
compatible with the finding that, in human history, social environment and
education have gradually becomemore powerful selective factors than external
environmental selection.
1.3 Social Darwinism as a “Conservative Revolution”
He who proclaims a new idea never gets away with it. Moreover, if this idea is the Darwinian
doctrine of evolution, which, since the second half of the nineteenth century has become a
6In a letter to Wallace in 1867 Darwin wrote: “I want anyhow to upset [the] idea […] that certain
muscles have been given to man solely that he can reveal to other men his feelings. I want to try
& show how expressions have arisen” (Ch. Darwin to A.R. Wallace, [12–17] March [1867], in
Burkhardt and Secord 2005: 141).
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field for recurring polemics (the periodical character of which calls for deeper analysis) for
the simple fact that it challenged a body of dominant conceptions, one faces a twofold risk:
either having it repressed it in its entirety, or having it reabsorbed within that very system of
representations it had intended to overcome and demolish. (Tort 2000: 19)7
How was the critical and revolutionary potential of Darwinian theory channeled
and controlled? In which of the ideological trends associated to that period was the
reception of Darwinism, at least partially, reabsorbed?Onwhich internal elements of
the theory did such attempts leverage and which explicit Darwinian positions instead
had to be arbitrarily twisted or misrepresented in order to achieve these results?
There is no doubt that some theoretical elements that Darwin assumed in The
Origin of Species derived from the classics of liberal and liberalist thought. The
concept of evolution as a gradual ascendingprogress, very appealingduring theVicto-
rian age and already asserted as a scientific certainty by Lamarck and Spencer, was
certainly present, though restrained in Darwin’s work. Nevertheless, it is honoured in
the concluding pages of the The Origin of Species where Darwin wrote: “Hence we
may look with some confidence to a secure future of equally inappreciable length.
And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of each being, all corpo-
real andmental endowments will tend to progress towards perfection” (Darwin 1859:
489). But most of all, from a classic of the late seventeenth century liberalist litera-
ture, Malthus’s Essay on the Principle of Population (Malthus 1798), Darwin drew a
model which assumed an important role in his theory of natural selection: the model
asserted that the human population, in the absence of obstacles, tends to increase
more rapidly than the livelihoods it is able to produce, due to its geometrical increase
(1–2–4–8–etc.), whereas the latter increased arithmetically (1–2–3–4–etc.). On the
basis of some aspects already found in Malthus, Darwin extended this principle to
all living species and concluded that an insufficiency of resources would ineluctably
induce a “struggle for survival” among individuals of the same species and between
antagonist species.
The observations made as a naturalist during his voyage on the Beagle, the studies
on artificial selection carried out by livestock breeders and farmers and the works of
Adam Smith, another classical exponent of liberal thought, all suggested to Darwin
the idea that this struggle could gradually lead to a “selection of the fittest”.8 An idea
also supported by Spencer: a differential reproduction, favourable, within a species
or population, or between competing species, to the individuals or species best at
exploiting their environmental conditions. A process of adaptation that led to a slow
modification of the species and to the advent of all past and present species out of a
limited number of simple, primordial ancestors.
The concepts of natural selection and struggle for existence presented by Darwin
in 1859 undoubtedly indicated the liberal optimism about the regulatory effects of
a “free” competition for the hoarding of resources that was so widespread during
7This and all the other quotations from essays that have not been translated into English, contained
in this chapter, are my translations.
8Darwin adopted the expression “selection of the fittest” from Spencer, starting from the third
edition of The Origin.
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his times. It also favoured a utilitarian view of organisms, in which the behaviour
that every living being has to follow, in order to remain alive, is “conceived as
a variant of competitive, acquisitive, «egoistic» and calculating behavior that is
attributed to «rationality» tout court by the liberal theorists of classical and neo-
classical economics” (Cavazzini 2009: 5). However, Darwin’s approach changed, at
least in part in The Descent of Man, published eleven years and three months after
The Origin.
In fact, in this work Darwin argued that the moral rules oriented to mutual soli-
darity and to support the weakest had evolved in human societies from forms of
parental care and “social instincts” present in all the gregarious animals, to be
later rewarded by natural selection having proved useful in strengthening the group
(Darwin 1871: 166). In other words, according to the Darwin of 1871, in the most
recent stages of human history, social selection has increasingly taken precedence
over natural selection. It acts through the rules, traditions and educational processes
and has become the main driving force of conservation or changes in customs and
behaviour (Darwin 1871, I).
Assuming this hypothesis, Darwin distanced himself not only from Spencer, who
had criticized public aid to the less well-off by justifying the system of competition
between classes, nations, economic groups and individuals as an inescapable law
of nature, but he also distanced himself from the positions of all the other main
evolutionism exponents of the time, including his friend, T.H. Huxleywho postulated
a radical break between the moral sphere and the natural sphere. Neither did Darwin
endorse the biologistic justifications of eugenics advanced by his cousin Galton (to
which, however, especially in the final pages of The Descent of Man, Darwin made
some concessions9), nor the racist and colonialist ideology of the German “mastiff”
of Darwinism, E. Haeckel.
But despite this, the interpretation given by most of Darwin’s contemporaries
misunderstood the meaning and field of application of concepts such as “struggle for
existence” and “selection of the fittest”, arbitrarily extending their use to the anal-
ysis of human social history and economic reality. As Tort observes, “the mainframe
of European, and later American, interpretations of Darwin after 1860 is always
9Although fiercely taking position against slavery and other forms of social discrimination and
exploitation, Darwin was not entirely immune to eugenic concerns and not completely averse to
the promotion of some positive and negative eugenic measures. For example, in chapter V of The
Descent of Man, he writes: “We must bear without complaining the undoubtedly bad effects of the
weak surviving and propagating their kind; but there appears to be at least one check in steady
action, namely the weaker and inferior members of society not marrying so freely as the sound”
(Darwin 1871, I: 169). He adds then on the same page, a few lines later, this consideration: “In all
civilized countries man accumulates property and bequeaths it to his children. I know that they are
children in the same country. But this is far from an unmixed evil; for the capital the arts could not
progress; and it is chiefly through their power that the civilized races have extended, and now they
are everywhere, their range, so to take the place of the lower races” (Darwin 1871, I: 169).
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constant: themes such as competition, struggle for life, survival of the fittest, cumu-
lative transmission of benefits, elimination of the less fit and negative selection are
always underscored and applied to human societies” (Tort 2000: 19).
The model that inspired this so called “social Darwinism” was actually Spencer’s
evolutionary metaphysics and not Darwin’s theory, anthropology or political convic-
tions.10
At that time, the influence of this biologistic approach, which should be more
correctly called “social Spencerism”, became so pervasive, and widespread in so
many different currents of thought and disciplinary fields that we could compare its
success to a sort of “conservative revolution” ante litteram.11 Through this process
of interpretative distortion and theoretical flattening, Darwin’s theories of natural
selection were arbitrarily equated with the metaphysical principles of the gradual
emergence of the fittest and of the gradual progress towards the best, which the
Spencerism applied at a cosmological level.12
10Of course, emphasizing the differences between Darwin and the social Darwinists (even those,
such as Haeckel and Darwin’s cousin Galton, who were closest to him) I do not intend to present
Darwin as a man who was above all the prejudices of his time and cultural environment. As I tried
to show, the mentality then dominant in Great Britain and Europe was variously reflected in the
works of Darwin. However I find it necessary not to lose sight of the differences that allowed the
Darwinian theory of descent with modifications, to impose itself against earlier contemporary and
later genealogical models, for its superior scientific rigor, for the unprecedented attempt to do away
with theology, metaphysics and teleology and, finally, for its internal consistence, its adherence to
the observed phenomena and its explanatory power.
11As it is well known, between 1918 and 1932 the German culture was greatly influenced by some
theorists explicitly referring to Hugo von Hoffmanstahl’s idea of a “conservative revolution”. They
propounded the rediscovery of Germanic national traditions, an anti-modernism and an elitism of
a romantic brand, keen on theories of racial discrimination, and the exaltation of the heroic and
tragic element of life. Among the best-known exponents of this wave were the philosopher O.
Spengler and the philosopher/writer E. Jünger. Culturally close to the ideologies of part of the
nascent Nazi regime ideology, with which they initially collaborated, the main representatives of
the “conservative revolution” remained marginal after Hitler’s advent. They were close to some
aspects of the theories of the fathers of “conservative revolution” and to other intellectuals, such as
C. Schmitt, A. Moeller van den Bruck, M. Heidegger, Th. Mann, W. Sombart, M. Scheler and the
philosopher-psychologist L. Klages.
12In the books Progress, Its Law and Cause (1857) and A System of Synthetic Philosophy: First
Principles (1862), Herbert Spencer had theorized the existence of an evolutionary “law” of the
“selection of the fittest”, or “law of progress”, operating as a universal principle at all levels of
reality: cosmic, biological, social andmoral. In fact, according to the author, evolution can gradually
originate a growing amount of “happiness”, and this “law” acts identically both in nature and
in human societies. Economic and social differences, as the differences in development among
different cultures, are to be intended as the outcome of differential adaptability at an individual
and group level. On these grounds, and following Malthus, Spencer fiercely criticized the “Law for
the Poor”, or the earliest forms of social assistance in Britain, as well as the religious practice of
charity, specifically addressing the taxing of the rich in order to alleviate the sorrow of the poor; he
interpreted them as “obstacles” to the survival of the fittest (Spencer 1887). According to Spencer,
in fact, it is from the death of the “unfit” that Evolution receives its ascending character and those
who survive must in any case “be the chosen of their generation” (Spencer 1887).
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In this sense, natural selection suffered a fate analogous to that which, a few
decades later, was to fall upon the Nietzschean theory of the “Wille zur Macht”,
distorted by the promoters of the so-called “conservative revolution”, and later by
Nazism, in an exaltation of nationalism, an apology of expansionist policies and a
political anti-Semitism that were foreign to Nietzsche.
Apologists of this tendency were, together with Herbert Spencer, a large number
of European and American epigones of his approach (notable for his radicalization
of the Spencerian doctrine was William Graham Sumner), according to whom the
criterion of laissez faire should have ruled all aspects of social life and also provided a
model for governmental policies. They believed, in fact, that only a free competition
of forces would have led to a gradual elimination of the “unfittest” and to a world
in constant progress towards the better. The Darwinian “struggle for existence” in
which Kropotkin rightly saw both co-operation and competition among individuals
and species, was transformed by this radically reductionist interpretation into an
equivalent of Hobbes’ “bellum omnium contra omnes”.
Patrick Tort rightly emphasized the fact that Darwin, with his second revolution,
distanced himself from Spencerism and various other forms of “social Darwinism”
which had begun to spread after 1959. In fact, Darwin makes it clear in this work
that, in his opinion, since ancient times and then in an increasingly incisive way in
modern ones, behavioural, cognitive, social and “moral” human propensities have
been conditioned and oriented by a social selection and not by the natural one, by
“education” and social control, not by hereditary factors.
As Tort reiterates, from this point of view, Darwin’s anthropology achieves almost
a double revolutionary result: firstly, to abolish every metaphysical break between
human and other animals, rejecting the hypothesis that to explain the origin of our
mental and “moral” characteristics it is necessary to postulate the action of extra-
natural factors, asWallace stated. Secondly, to defend the hypothesis of a direct conti-
nuity between animal and human evolution, rejecting at the same time the hypoth-
esis of a “simple continuity” between them, in which natural selection drives both
natural and human history. This way Darwin arrived at an epistemological approach
that recognized the (at least partial) autonomy of social development from natural
selection, thus allowing credit for “the theoretical autonomy of the sciences of man
and society without breaking the historical-material continuum between «nature»
and «culture»” (Tort 2000: 53). It was a turning point, not less important than that
marked by the theory of natural selection. However, in obedience to the historical
“law” suggested by Tort (no great theoretical innovation escapes ideological distor-
tion), even in this case the anti-deterministic revolution introduced by Darwin with
The Descent of Man in some way paid its price to the ideological universe of the
time.
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1.4 Tort’s Interpretation of the Second Darwinian
Revolution
As I have alreadymentioned, in my opinion, the very important critical goal obtained
by the second Darwinian revolution presents, already in its original exposition
(Darwin 1871), and even in Tort’s interpretation, the risks of a “monumental”13
and idealized reconstruction of the process that they define as “civilization”.
In a nutshell, Tort claims that according to the conclusions reached by Darwin
in Descent of Man, “civilization” allowed human societies to gradually escape the
laws of survival of the fittest, and therefore the eliminatory function carried out by
natural selection in all the other species. In his opinion, in fact, within our species,
social “instincts” and behaviours of mutual support had proven, in the long run,
more advantageous than those exclusively based on mere individual competition and
had consequently been favorably selected. Since then, those groups and individuals
capable of promoting the values of “morality, “altruism” and solidarity in society
were favoured. This allowed a transition towards a new social effect: assisting the
weak instead of eliminating them. According to the thesis that Darwin exposes in
chapter V and takes up in various passages of The Descent of Man, the attitude of
mutual aid, already rooted in the social instincts of our ancestors, offered human
communities that practiced it most as an established custom a greater cohesion and
incisiveness and new opportunities in the struggle for survival.
According to this interpretation, the process of “civilization” (of which Western
culture has been the epicentre and driving force) coincides with a gradual imposition
of the tendency to extend solidarity to ever wider circles, and finally even beyond the
borders of our species. This process created, according to Tort, the conditions for an
overcoming or a “reversal” of natural selection, achieving the conditions to remove its
eliminatorymechanism. In other words, “civilized” human societies benefitting from
social solidarity have overcome the “struggle for existence” which requires the most
disadvantaged to succumb, creating rules for coexistence in which “the weak are no
longer eliminated (intending here all the individuals whose psychological, psychic
or social condition would have condemned them to death under the hegemony of
«natural» law, but are instead protected, cared for and defended” (Tort 2000: 25).
According to Tort it is in this reversal of the effects of natural selection that lies
the key to human “civilization” and in its identification does “the key to Darwinian
anthropology”, which was bearer of a “second revolution”, evenmore important than
that introduced with The Origin of Species, because capable of escaping the traps of
social biologism without failing in the rigor of the genealogical perspective.
13I use here the adjective “monumental” in the sense that Nietzsche gave to it in the II Untimely
Meditation, entitled On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life (Nietzsche 1874).
Nietzsche describes the monumental way of making history as a tendency to reconstruct the past, or
determined epochs, in a celebratoryway, removing all the aspects that do not give themselves to their
idealization, and reducing the narration to a mythicization of some historical phases or characters
in which “only a few embellished facts raise themselves up above, like islands” (Nietzsche 1874:
Sect. 2. My translation).
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Reaffirming that I consider Tort an undisputed master in his historical reconstruc-
tion and critical analysis of Darwinism, evolutionism, their reception and ideological
implications, and I find his enhancement of the second Darwinian revolution useful
and correct in numerous ways, I would like to summarize here some of the perplex-
ities that his reconstruction of the “civilization” process arouses in me. First of all, I
think it is appropriate to point out a gap, perhaps slight but not irrelevant, between
what Darwin states in this regard in The Descent of Man and the generalizing form
in which Tort sums up his position.
As a matter of fact, in the fifth section of The Descent of Man, Darwin stated that
solidarity within the group has been one of the propulsive factors of human social
evolution (Darwin 1871, I: 166) and has become a feature of “civilized” societies:
“We civilized men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of elim-
ination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we institute
poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of every
one to the last moment” (Darwin 1871, I: 168). However, he still recognizes that in
many cases this form of solidarity has developed in co-evolution with the activity of
war and the cultural dehumanization of other populations, as recent studies seem to
confirm (Choi and Bowles 2007). In fact, Darwin stated that in a “primitive” situation
“the tribes inhabiting adjacent districts are almost always at war with each other” and
“the social instincts never extend to all the individuals of the same species” (Darwin
1871: 85). They are only addressed to community members and, according to the
naturalist, for this very reason the greater internal cohesion and spirit of sacrifice of
individuals, controlled by social mechanisms such as “praise and blame”, offer more
opportunities in competition with other communities, towards whose members no
solidarity was expressed. It is thus not correct to assimilate this kind of behavior to a
generic, and generally universal, principle of solidarity. But without a doubt, as Tort
emphasizes, the interpretation of the civilization process as a gradual extension of
the “circle of solidarity” is present in the Darwinian text. The great naturalist states,
in the fourth chapter of the work, that feelings of sympathy and solidarity of human
beings for their fellows have gradually grown “to extend to the men of all races,
to the imbecile, the maimed, and other useless members of society, and finally to
the lower animals,—so would the standard of his morality rise higher and higher”
(Darwin 1871, I: 103).
According to Darwin, in the moral sphere “the elimination of the worst disposi-
tions is always increasing” both in the “lower races” and in the “civilized nations”
(Darwin 1871, I: 173). The main driving forces of this process overcoming the elimi-
nation of the less adapted have been and are, for him, “the approbation of our fellow-
men—the strengthening of our sympathies by habit-example and imitation-reason-
experience and even self-interest-instruction during youth, and religious feelings”
(Darwin 1871, I: 173).
As I have already explained, it is precisely in this interpretation of the process
of civilization that Tort identifies the turning point of Darwin’s thought towards
a “materialistic” and continuist, but at the same time non-mechanistic and non-
biologistic conception of the relationship between organic and cultural evolution,
natural and human social selection.
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Without wishing to neglect the importance of the causal factors highlighted by
Darwin and Tort, it seems to me that this kind of description of the process of
“civilization” results inadequate or incomplete, precisely in identifying the material
causes and socio-economic selective pressures that have oriented its development.
By this I mean that Darwin and Tort, presenting “civilization” as a process orig-
inated by motivations and changes of an almost exclusively ethical and intellectual
nature, and characterized by a progressive strengthening of sympathy, empathy and
altruism, leave in the shade a fundamental detail. The driving forces of that social
process which the Western culture has called civilization, in fact, have been rather,
in the first place, the brutal forms of exploitation of working classes imposed by
the advent of capitalism and phenomena such as colonialism, slavery, imperialism,
wars of conquest and the various forms of racial and sexual segregation that have
marked the modern and contemporary era. Processes driven by economic and polit-
ical interests opposed to those of mutual support, even if, from the time of forced
evangelization of nativeAmericans up to that of the armed “exporting” of democracy,
humanitarian values have always been called into question to ideologically cover the
pursuit of these interests. In short, inmyopinionDarwin andTort, intending “civiliza-
tion” exclusively as a gradual progress of the spread of solidarity attitudes, propose
an optimistic and unilateral, idealized and monumental reading of this historical and
social process, purging it from all its “dark” sides.
This is the same dark side of “civilization” that Nietzsche wanted to bring out
instead in his On the Genealogy of Morality (Nietzsche 1887). It will be enough
here to mention only some passages of the second essay of the book in which the
author, rejecting the hypothesis that altruistic behaviour developed spontaneously in
conjunction with the progress of intellectual faculties and human moral sensibility,
reminds us that “perhaps there is nothingmore terrible and strange inman’s prehistory
than his technique of mnemonics. ‘A thing must be burnt in so that it stays in the
memory: only something that continues to hurt stays in the memory’ – that is a
proposition from the oldest (and unfortunately the longest-lived) psychology on
earth” (Nietzsche 1887: II, 3).
It is not surprising to find a removal of these aspects and an optimistic-idealizing
conception of the history of human customs in Darwin, because it was typical of
the classical liberalism with which Victorian culture was imbued. But I confess my
bewilderment at the fact that it may have been accepted by a very lucid critic of liberal
ideology like Tort, and in an era like the early 1980s, in which the neoliberal winds
embodied by Reaganism and Thatcherism were already dismantling the system of
social rights and protections acquired by the masses in the previous cycles of social
struggles.
In my opinion, it can and should be acknowledged that some trends and currents
of modernWestern culture, in various historical phases and especially in the epochal
arc that goes from The Enlightenment to the social struggles of the 1960–1970s,
affirmed the possibility and the hope for social forms founded on the Kropotkinian
principle of mutual support to exist. Although they fought for this goal, this principle
has certainly not become the basis of our associated life.
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Unfortunately, this is demonstrated in a both brazen and tragicwaybyour epoch, in
which all the so-called “civilized” nations barricade themselves as fortresses against
themigratory waves that they have provoked with their centuries-old predatory inter-
ference in the African, Eastern, and South American countries. An era, indeed, in
which all nations flout the same solidarity principles written in their constitutive
national and international documents—such as providing aid to those in mortal
danger and the reception for those who flee from conditions of humiliation, abuse
and exploitation. Therefore, a historical phase in which all the States considered
beacons and champions of “civilization” betray and disregard the aspiration that Tort
seems to consider by them acquired and placed at the basis of social life: a social
and institutional organization in which the “weak […] are protected, cared for and
defended” (Tort 2000: 25).
The global data concerning the variations in the concentration of wealth in the last
centuries and decades also denounce a continuous widening of the gap between rich
and poor. That is to say: an opposite trend to a progressive enlargement of the circle
of human solidarity. Today, according to the data published by Oxfam (2019), the
richest 1% of the planet holds almost half of the total net aggregate wealth (47.2%,
to be precise), while 3.8 billion people, equal to the poorest half of the planet’s
inhabitants, can count just on the 0.4% of it.
As for the extension of ethical sensitivity beyond the boundaries of our species,
it certainly represents an important phenomenon of our time. But the anti-speciesist
movement, despite the generous forces it manages to mobilize, like environmental
protection movements, today still only represents a small group going against the
flooding river of a global society that is unfortunately responsible for a process of
environmental devastation and mass extinction of animals and plants as well as an
unprecedented level of exploitation of humans and animals.
Therefore, for the reasons summarized above, the paradigmdrafted byDarwin and
developed by Tort appears, from my point of view, a largely idealized reconstruction
of “civilization” and its ethical, political, and socio-economic outcomes.
Paradoxically, this vision is intrinsically vulnerable to an ideological mechanism
that Tort lucidly criticized onmany occasions: the presentation of the formal equality
of all citizens and of the principles of solidarity declared in the liberal-democratic
constitutions and international treaties as if they were the real fulcrum of the social
organization of the “civilized” countries and of their reciprocal relations. As if the
private ownership of the means of production, and their use for private purposes by
the ruling classes of every level that the current economic regime legitimizes and
protects did not render an effective large-scale implementation of those solidarity
principles structurally impossible. As if the capitalist economy had not yet been
sufficiently proved to be able to create merely temporary (and never guaranteed in
the medium or long term) improvement in the living conditions of the lower classes
in one area of the world only at the price of intensifying or extending the processes
of exploitation and social oppression in other areas of the globe.
The Kantian illusion that the spread of republican institutions would have led to a
“progress towards the best”, understood as the overcoming of war, social oppression
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and minority status human beings and the implementation of a “perpetual peace”
was demolished by the actual realization of these institutions.
Therefore, at least frommypersonal point of view, a society of solidarity described
by Tort, capable of protecting the weakest rather than exploiting or abandoning them,
appears today a very important goal for which it is necessary to fight and not consider
an existing result.
1.5 The Debate Between Genetic and Environmental
Determinisms and the Birth of Classical Ethology
From the early decades of the 1900s, the debate on the origin and modifiability of
human propensities was marked by a contrast between evolutionary innatisms and
environmental determinisms, “biologisms” and “culturalisms”.
A complex of philosophical hypothesis and ideological doctrines focusing on an
evolutionary nativism, grafting onto a furrow already traced by nineteenth “social
Darwinism”, contributes to offer a pseudo-scientific basis to the social exploitation
of humans and animals, for colonialist policies, racist and anti-Semitic tendencies,
with gender and social discriminations.
On the opposite front, the environmentalist one, two major schools were
developing:
• American behaviourism, which attempts to offer a scientific foundation to “demo-
cratic” propaganda in the USA through an approach based on the practices of
classic (and later, operating) conditioning.
• “Dialectical materialism”, as interpreted in the Soviet Union and in some currents
of contemporary Western Marxism.
Although different and indeed opposite in many ways, these two approaches had
in common a rigidly “culturalist” position, based on the conviction that the social
environment, if subject to a rigid top-down control, could produce radical and positive
changes in human psychology and behaviour in the turn of few generations.
At an ideological level, this principle played in both American behaviourism
and the “orthodox” interpretation of dialectical materialism a role similar to that of
nativism in the racist and authoritarian ideologies of the Nazi and Fascist regimes: it
legitimated extremely invasive practices of institutional intrusion in the life of individ-
uals and society. The two major figures of American behaviourism (J. Watson, since
1912–1913, and B. F. Skinner since the 1950s) scientifically validated the attempt
to develop a “technology of behaviour” through large-scale top-down programming
of activities and human response, based on the conditioning methods. Their goals
were ultimately not different from those of Lysenko, supported by Stalin from the
1930s to 1950s, and reflected, in turn, albeit in forms which were different from
those dominant in extreme right-wing regimes, a project of totalitarian control of the
masses.
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From this point of view, the frontal opposition between the different schools of
nativists and culturalists/instructivists14 hid a profound structural resemblance. On
the one hand evolutionary nativism served as a biologistic justification of social
traditions and political authoritarianism, on the other, culturalism served to justify
the “pseudo-democratic” (as Konrad Lorenz called it) stance of American liberalism
and the “pseudo-dialectic” one (as Theodor Adorno tagged it) of Soviet Marxism.
Contrasting theoretical models led to similar practical outcomes: the justification of
an invasive, manipulative, totalitarian use of scientific knowledge against the most
basic rights of the human beings.
Classical ethology was born as an independent scientific discipline, in the first
decades of the twentieth century, in a cultural climate characterized by these rigid
oppositions. How did ethological disciplines fit into this complex debate? What
innovations did they bring to it?
At the beginning its pioneers were definitely oriented towards a nativist approach.
Their innatism, however, unlike the philosophical one of Spencer, was based on a
deep knowledge of the behaviour of many species of wild animals in their natural
environment. In this respect, the ethological approach, based on field observation,
revealed an unknown world that had always been before our eyes but rarely studied
with the passion, diligence and attention necessary to understand it. Daughter or
niece of the Darwinian one, the first ethological revolution marked the third decade
of the twentieth century.15
“The key actors in the founding of ethology as a discipline were Konrad Lorenz
and Niko Tinbergen. It was Lorenz who was primarily responsible for laying the
field’s early conceptual foundations in the 1930s” (Burkhardt 2005: 4). According to
Lorenz, the first steps of ethologywere the result of a transfer of “Darwinian” theories
and methodologies from specific fields such as morphology and anatomy to the
comparative study of animal behaviour (Lorenz 1978 [1981]: 3). In the first decades
of their scientific activity, bothLorenz andTinbergenmainly focused their researchon
the identification and study of the “innate” components of behaviours. In truth, in that
phase, Lorenz had already discovered important phenomena of integration between
biological heritage and learning, i.e., imprinting.16 But, as he himself admitted, he
14I here intend instructivism as a not only pedagogical model, but also a political one (relating to
the relationship between ruling classes and masses) focused on the role of the instructor conceived
as a figure that must assume full control of what is to be learned and of the ways in which it is to
be learned, aiming to design the very same personality of the learners, conceiving them as passive
receptors of the conditioning programs they are subjected to.
15As I previously, the phase I call “first ethological revolution” embraces the arc of time that goes
from the foundation of classical ethology which occurred in the 1930s, to the birth of human and
cognitive ethology, between the Sixties and Seventies. The “second ethological revolution”, still
in progress to this day, goes instead from the post-genocentric and post-anthropocentric turning
point started in the ethological field in the Nineties, to the profound critical revision of the lexicon,
theoretical assumptions and methods of behavioral science that, in the last two decades, led to
important developments in cultural and cognitive ethology and to the emerging of promising new
research areas such as behavioral and cultural epigenetics.
16Imprinting is a kind of early learning that occurs in some “sensitive phases” of individual matu-
ration; it is based on an “open program”, or innate program for learning and involves an integration
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wasonly later to grasp its real relevance and significance, possibly as a consequenceof
his debate with the behaviorists, the British ethological school and some behavioural
scientists then operating in the United States such as Donald O. Hebb, Daniel S.
Lehrman and Theodore C. Schneirla (Lehrman 1953). This confrontation, and the
considerations it engendered, led Lorenz to write Evolution and modification of
behavior (in English—1965), in which he developed:
• The seminal concept of “innate instructors”, “open programs”, or
“phylogenetically adapted teaching mechanisms” (Lorenz 1965: 44; 80–81;
104; 1973 [1977]: 88–96);
• a “real self-criticism”, i.e., a criticism of the original underestimation of the
learning processes and of their importance, by himself and by the other pioneers
of ethology;
• a methodological and theoretical critique of behaviourism;
• a criticism of the theoretical “compromise” which, in his opinion, some authorita-
tive members of the British ethological school (such as Tinbergen and Hinde) had
reached with behaviorism regarding the distinction between innate and learned.
Nikolaas Tinbergen concurred with Lorenz on the key stages of classical ethology
and the definition of the concept of “instinctive behavior”17 which played a key role in
the theoretical framework of the new discipline. But moving to England, he modified
his position in consideration of criticisms of Lorenz’s nativism by Hebb, Schneirla,
Lehrman and other scholars.18 According to the “later” Tinbergen, most animal
behaviours depend, even in their “elementary units”, on both hereditary and learned
factors, albeit in greatly varying degrees according to their evolutionary levels, so that
the clear distinction between innate and learned behaviour is only to configure “two
extreme, however real, cases” (De Crescenzo 1975: 122). According to R. Hinde’s
somewhatmore radical position, all behaviours derive froman inextricablemixture of
genetic and environmental influences,whichmakes it practically impossible to distin-
guish the innate from the learned. Hinde goes as far as to reject such a distinction,
which he considered not only false, but also misleading and basically detrimental
between innate and learned information. Its discovery was extensively discussed by Lorenz already
in an essay written in 1935, Der Kumpan in der Umwelt des Vogels. This brought him, in the later
Taxis und Instinthandlung, written with Tinbergen (Lorenz and Tinbergen 1938) to hypothesize
that new motor patterns derive either from a recombination of different orders of hereditary motor
units, or from the interlocking of short hereditary motor sequences with short learned sequences
(the concept of Instinkt-Dressurverschraenkung).
17According to classical ethology, “instinctive behaviour” is defined by the correlation of four
phases: appetitive behaviour (Appetenzverhalten), the flexible component modifiable through expe-
rience; the innate releasing mechanism (IRM, or Angeboren ausloesmechanismus, AAM), species-
specific external stimulus; “hereditary motor co-ordination” or “fixed action pattern” (Erbkoordina-
tion), and “consummatory act” (Endhandlung), the latter coincidingwith the execution of hereditary
co-ordination, or its final part, and producing a discharge of tension.
18The first clear signs of this theoretical change are visible in Tinbergen (1955, 1963). The distancing
from the Lorenzian positions appears clearer in Tinbergen (1965, 1968), touching themes inherent
to human ethology, and to the polemics triggered by Lorenz’s essay On Aggression (Lorenz 1963).
See also De Crescenzo (1975: 119–131), Nisbett (1976: 158).
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to comparative research on behaviour.19 The largest part of these critiques to the
innatism of the Austrian ethologists was, in most cases, dictated by common sense.
They were intended to mark a distance from the “irrelational”20 concept of instinct
of the earliest Lorenz, i.e. from the idea that “instinctive behaviour” is resistant to the
any influx from experience and is rigidly non-modifiable in its pattern and devoid of
any relevant individual variations. This move also showed the English ethologists’
intention to find a kind of reconciliation with the behaviorists, with whom they had
been having a long-standing lively quarrel considered excessive, by many.
Nevertheless, Lorenz underlined that the denial of any distinction between innate
and learned components of behaviourwould bemetwith preventive censorship of any
relevant scientific research, mainly dictated by “diplomatic” concerns, and opposed
to the criticisms of his concept of “innate”, advanced from several fronts, a series of
countercriticisms.
According toLorenz, the hypothesis that every formof behaviour of any organism,
independently from its evolutionary status, is produced “in its elementary constitu-
tive units” by an interaction between inborn components and learning processes
can appear formally correct, because also the forms of individual modification of
behaviour found among the simplest existing unicellular organism are already clas-
sifiable as learning. In fact, ethologists define them as forms of “non-associative
learning” (Mainardi 1992: 49–50 and 66–68). But he underlined that these basic
forms of learning, or “habituation and its counterpart, namely sensitization, are the
only forms of adaptive modification of behaviour ever found in protozoa and in
organisms with a diffuse nervous system” (Lorenz 1965: 30). That is to say that in
unicellular organisms, characterized by a diffused sensitivity, it is possible to observe
only non-associative forms of learning. From an ontogenetic standpoint this means
that these organisms perform only hereditarily fixed action patterns throughout their
entire life cycles. In other words, they can learn to vary the intensity of their reaction
according to the frequency of an external stimulus, but cannot associate their reaction
different stimuli (associative learning). Finally, from a phylogenetic standpoint, this
means that, if life has existed for about three and a half billion years, as calculated
on the basis of the most ancient organic fossils (stromatolites and microfossils), for
most of this time (2830–2930 million years, or, from the appearance of the earliest
organisms to the advent of the first metazoans) the survival of living beings has
been exclusively due to genetically fixed reactive and interactive motor patterns and
habituation and sensitization processes.
But his deep knowledge of animal behaviour allowed Lorenz to demonstrate that
even among mesozoans, which are capable of very complex forms of learning,21 it is
possible to observe species-specific motor modules, the execution of which is poorly
19The divergences betweenLorenz and theEnglish ethologists, on the nature-nurture theme, touched
many other points that are not considered here.
20On the earliest “irrelational” phase of Lorenz’s theory of instinct, seeDeCrescenzo (1975, Chapter
I–IV), Brigandt (2003), Burkhardt (2005, Chapter III).
21Among multi-cellular animals, already “in the phylum of the plathelmynts, there is evidence of
associative learning” (Mainardi 1992; entry “apprendimento, capacità di”: 53. My translation).
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dependent on learned information. “There is not and there cannot be any argument”,
wrote the author in Evolution and Modification of Behavior, “about the fact […]
that a stickleback responds to the key stimulus ‘red below’ by performing the motor
patterns of rival fighting and that a male stickleback is indeed red on the ventral side”
(Lorenz 1965: 32). Indeed, even among mammals and birds, i.e. in those classes of
animals in which individual and social learning play, beyond doubt, a central role,
ethological studies have revealed the presence of rigid motor sequences (FAP: fixed
action patterns) which, although presenting little individual variation, are clearly
recognizable as species-specific, and are also performed by young individuals that
have not yet been able to observe them in others.22 The motor patterns of bone burial
observable in dogs, those of hiding nuts carried out by squirrels, the catching and
killing movements in various carnivores, the escape reactions in chicks and the alarm
signals in many bird species fall into this typology.
According to Lorenz, the substantial independence of this kind of behavioural
sequence from acquired information is demonstrable through an accurate use of the
deprivation or “KasparHauser experiment”23 and through someobservable processes
which he had already described in the early 1930s. In fact, in many animal species,
the prolonged absence of environmental stimuli capable of triggering some species-
specific motor patterns engenders phenomena of the lowering of reaction thresholds,
active search for stimuli or “vacuum activity” as in the case of segregated songbirds
performing courting motor sequences while facing a corner of their cage (Lorenz
1978: Sects. 5.9, 5.10, and 5.11).
In short, although the English ethological school had undoubtedlymade an impor-
tant move in overcoming the early Lorenz’s rigid instinctivism, the Austrian ethol-
ogist’s counter-critiques showed that the obtained result—the affirmation that all
behaviour is a mixture of innate and learned—was more of an academic compromise
to extinguish the controversy between psychologists and ethologists within univer-
sity departments and scientific meetings than a way to account for the knowledge
acquired in the ethological field up to that time.24
However, Lorenz in turn had to admit that the first generation of ethologists,
including himself, had simplistically opposed “the innate” to “the learned” and, in
22In humans, for instance, long rigid motor sequences, classifiable as hereditary are found in
the behaviour of infants (search for the breast suction, reflex of clinging to the maternal breast,
swimming) but are almost absent in adults.
23The protocols of these deprivation experiments have undergone severe criticism. Lorenz himself
in his 1965 essay raised several critiques of their unsound use (Lorenz 1965: 83–100). Criticisms
focussed on the difficulty of rigorous application and possible traumatic consequences for subjects,
particularly if experiments are invasively and inappropriately performed. Lorenz’s remarks were
mainly aimed to restrain their use to cases of real need and reduce the procedures, thus sparing the
animal cognitive and emotive damage.
24The two major critiques examined in the book are the following: (1) innate and learned are only
defined by reciprocal exclusion (Hebb 1953); (2) one cannot establish the innate character of a
behavioural module beyond doubt as “it is never possible to exclude learning in ovo or in utero”
(Lehrman 1953). Chapters 3 and 4 of the work are dedicated to the rebuttal of these critiques.
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doing so, they “were neglecting a most important function of the majority of the
phylogenetically adapted behaviour mechanisms: the function of teaching” (Lorenz
1965: 81). Or, as he specified later, the function of teaching to learn, to encourage
learning, to instruct behavioural programs made to receive further training from
interaction between the intra- and inter-specific environment. A very important
discovery on which also the great biologist E. Mayr would have later reflected (Mayr
1974: 650–659) and that Lorenz himself would have valued as an important integra-
tion to his “Natural History of Human Knowledge” in the work Behind the mirror
(Lorenz 1973).
1.6 Eibesfeldt and the Deterministic Approach of the First
Human Ethology
Between the sixties and the seventies, human ethology began to establish itself as a
specific research domain; its main spokesman was Eibl Eibesfeldt,25 one of Lorenz’s
earliest and later best known collaborators.
Undoubtedly, Eibesfeldt gave a great impulse and contribution to both field
research and the compilation of data related to human behaviour. He also had the
merit of having taken (at least in part) his distance from some metaphysical and
apologetic interpretations of aggression and biologistic justifications of war as those
voiced since the 1960s by authors such as Desmond Morris, Robert Ardrey, Robet
Fox, Lionel Tiger, Alain de Benoist.
However, despite clearly defining the field of ethology as the study of both the
hereditary bases of behaviour and the processes of learning, Eibesfeldt preserved and
strengthened his master’s innatist outlook. This is clearly reflected in the theoretical
framework of his wide-ranging research, mainly focused on the identification of
the hereditary components of human social behaviour as well as in some of his
public outings on problems related to peaceful coexistence between different human
communities.
According to Eibesfeldt, “biological inheritance determines human behavior […]
in precisely definable parameters” (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 3), including a spon-
taneous appetence to aggression, the tendency of appropriating a territory and
erecting barriers against intruders, the intolerance of coexistence with populations of
different habits or “physical-anthropological” tracts, the “predisposition to submis-
sion” and “rank aspiration”, a division of labour with assigned roles within the group
respectively to females and males.
25The birth of the International Society of Human Ethology and the first publication of a journal
specialized in this field dates back to 1978.
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He re-proposed the hypothesis, already sustained by Lorenz and Ardrey, that
there is in man, as in other animals, a specific appetence (Appetenz) for aggres-
sive behaviour, and that if repressed it accumulates to the point of uncontrol-
lably exploding.26 In this perspective, innate human aggressive tendencies cannot
be completely inhibited or eliminated through education. However, it is possible,
through ethos, recreational activities, sports and engagement in social usefulness to
channel them towards non-destructive forms of expression. Eibesfeldt argues that
our aggressive propensities, originally depending upon self-preservative functions,
are not to be assimilated with Ardrey’s “murdering disposition” or “killer instinct”
(Ardrey 1961), and nor Freud’s self-destructive “death drive” devoid of any func-
tion useful to life, as already observed by Lorenz (Lorenz in Evans 1975: 53–55).
According to these ethologists, in natural conditions aggressive behaviour plays an
important role in the survival of human and animal species. Its “pathological” degen-
eration and exponential growth shown in modern human societies are to be under-
stood, according to Lorenz and Eibesfeldt, as deleterious effects of inborn programs
originally performing a positive function in the preservation of species. Effects due
to the discrepancy between rapid cultural and technological development and slow
phylogenetic evolution, or to the living conditions created by industrialization and
to the manipulation of some inborn tendencies typical of our species implemented
by economic potentates, demagogues, and political parties.
Distancing himself from those who had tried to present war phenomena as some-
thing “inevitable” and deeply rooted in man’s “animal” nature, Eibesfeldt proposed
a distinction between “aggression”, which he considers “innate”, and “war”, instead
representing a product of human social history arising at a social level instead of
an individual one (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 402–422). In this perspective, if aggres-
sion is an inborn trait, war is certainly not: it is the “product of cultural evolution.
Therefore, it can be overcome culturally” (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 421). Eibesfeldt
agrees with Lorenz on the presence in man of an inborn inhibition against aggres-
sion and killing of conspecifics, and on its possible role as a factor in maintaining
social equilibriums, where aggression is not enhanced by cultural factors. To his
mind, therefore, the paradox of war is that “over the biological norm filter that
inhibits destructive aggression in man as in other creatures; a cultural norm filter
is superimposed that commands us to kill” (Eibesfeldt 1975 [1979]: 123). Peace
among men, according to Eibesfeldt, is therefore possible, provided some of their
drives are taken into account and balanced by adequate measures.27 But the means he
26As pointed out by Alexander Alland jr. (Alland 1972: 41–42), the experiments reported by Ardrey
(inwhich electrical stimulation of some cerebral areas elicits aggressive reactions) demonstrates that
animals undergoing such treatment are capable of aggressive reactions, not that these necessarily
have a spontaneous, endogenous, and cyclical character, as maintained by the author of African
Genesis and The Territorial Imperative. Such aggressive reactions in this kind of experiments are,
in fact, obtained through the very use of external stimuli, albeit directly applied to the brain, without
the mediation of the sensory organs.
27Although opportunely marking the difference between his own view and Ardrey’s thesis of the
“asocial and homicidal essence of man”, Eibesfeldt seems to re-introduce some elements of a
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proposes in order to secure peaceful relations among individuals and communities
appear rather traditional, almost reactionary: hierarchy and rank, within the social
group, barriers and safety distances among different ethnic groups (Eibesfeldt 1984
[1989]: 314–320). We are here taking into consideration one of the points on which
Eibesfeldt’s approach was more exposed to accusations of “racist implications”:
from his point of view, “cultural and religious diversity” conjures with different
“physical and anthropological characters”, making an integration and pacific coex-
istence between different human communities difficult, if not outright impossible.
Consequently, Eibesfeldt thinks that immigration, in these cases, is always a cause of
social tension and conflicts, inevitably triggering processes of marginalization and
self-marginalization, because it is perceived as an authentic “invasion”.
To both Eibesfeldt and Lorenz the hierarchic order also has an innate foundation
in our species: “The human disposition to form rank orders is based on our primate
heritage […]. Obedience and readiness to become subordinated are as innate in
humans as striving for rank” (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 314). The Austrian ethologist
also dedicates a similar analysis to “territorial” behaviour, which he considers, inman
as in other species, to have a hereditary basis: “Human groups occupy territories and
demarcate themselves territorially […]. Within its own region a group claims privi-
leges above those of others and therefore is dominant. Within group territories there
are subgroups (such as families) and individuals laying claim on their small zones,
marking them accordingly” (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 339). Eibesfeldt concludes that
territoriality may be assumed to be “a phylogenetically acquired trait”, however, he
“basically” agrees with Rada Dyson-Hudson and Eric Alden Smith stating that it
is something much less binding than a “genetically fixed trait”, in the sense of “a
fixed action pattern” (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 334). In fact, in marking his distance
from Ardrey, Eibesfeldt remarks how inappropriate it would be to refer to a “territo-
rial imperative”, and how “ethology has never equated territoriality and fixed-action
patterns!” (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 334).
Contemporary ethology has in many respects abandoned the substantially deter-
ministic and genocentric approach, characteristic of the conceptual framework of
classical and first human ethology, and later took to the extremes by two fathers of
sociobiology as Edward O. Wilson and Richard Dawkins.
But as it will be shown in the next chapter, in the seventies, Konrad Lorenz himself
was to become themain promoter of a profound theoretical renewal ofDarwinismand
neo-Darwinism, centered on the belief that every adaptation is a cognitive process,
that every organism plays in this process an “extremely active” role, and that the
whole process of phylogenesis can be understood as a cognitive increase, a process
of accumulation, differentiation and transmission of information useful for survival
which integrates embodied and acquired information, genetic and social components.
biologistic justification of war phenomena when he includes among the “innate tendencies” of our
species, not only defensive aggressiveness and exploratory trends, but also a “typical motivation to
fight and dominate, especially in the male”, or when he suggests a parallel between “exploratory
aggression, with which children and young people test their social behavioral liberties” and some
kinds of aggressive or expansionistic state policies: “Newly formed states use the same exploratory
strategy in international relations” (Eibesfeldt 1984 [1989]: 396).
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1.7 Darwin’s Darwinism Reconsidered Today
In 160 years of probing, Darwinian theory has reached an unquestionable scientific
maturity. Especially after its confluence with Mendelian Genetics which occurred
during thefirst half of the twentieth century, it has allowed considerable developments
in all the biological domains, and in every field related to the understanding of
living beings, revealing unsuspected horizons even to the reconstruction of human
proto- and pre-history. From a theoretical and explanatory point of view, Darwinism
to this day constitutes a fertile conceptual nucleus that in the last fifty years has
inspired ever-new formulations and issues, without appearing atrophied or obsolete.
Moreover, the need for a critical revision of the theory that allowed to overcome the
most mechanistic and deterministic aspects of Neo-Darwinian Synthesis has been
emerging for several decades: ongoing research which today takes shape in several
attempts to reach a “post-modern” or “extended” synthesis of the theory of descent
with modifications (Jablonka and Lamb 2005; Pigliucci and Müller 2010).
Asmentioned, this reworking of theDarwinian andNeo-darwinist theories, still in
progress both in the fields of behavioural sciences and evolutionary studies, is today
leading towards a both post-genocentric and post-anthropocentric approach. The
potential of Darwinian Darwinism as a scientific and cultural revolution, capable of
shattering the disciplinary boundaries between natural sciences and humanities and
of opening new roads toward the understanding of ourselves and other animals, finds,
in my opinion, its best enhancement in this theoretic and methodological develop-
ments.28 Yet in some areas of behavioural sciences such as evolutionary psychology
and sociobiology, mechanistic and genocentric explanatory models still prevail
despite the results of contemporary molecular, evolutionary and developmental
biology having made them obsolete.
These ultimately determinist models aim at supporting the idea that there is a
“human nature”, understood as a set of psychic and behavioural predispositions fixed
in a modular way (divided into behavioural modules or patterns independent from
one another), that is the result of natural selection, is transmitted through genetic
inheritance and remains therefore substantially impermeable to or hardly influenced
by environmental, family, cultural, and social influences.
Leading exponents of this school of thought such as Steven Pinker, Marc Hauser,
Jonathan Haidt believe that the development of personality and even of individual
moral, political and religious tendencies are substantially guided by innate char-
acteristics and that the living or training environment has little or no influence on
them (Boyer 2001; Pinker 2004; Alford et al. 2005; Hauser 2006; Haidt 2012). As
we have already seen, although having been proposed by scholars who like to call
themselves Darwinists or “ultra-Darwinists”, this thesis is the exact opposite of that
advocated by Darwin himself in The Descent of Man. Above all, this thesis is now
rendered anachronistic by developments in areas of research such as behavioural,
social and cultural epigenetics that are based on statistical, historical, empirical and
28With them I will deal a little more extensively in other two essays of this volume.
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experimental data. The latter in fact show that not only environmental stimuli and
personal experiences, but also the habits and experiences of immediately preceding
generations trigger processes of methylation and demethylation, or deactivation and
reactivation of the genes which influence the development of important attitudes such
as the propensity to explore and establish social bonds, the degree of exposure to
stress, or the mental ductility (Jablonka 2013, 2014, 2017).
Unsettling developments for every form of genetic determinism, which also
attest to their distance from those who, like Weissmann and Dawkins, Pinker and
Hauser, imagined hereditary material as something largely impermeable to external
influences, and the natural selection of genetic variants as the only law regulating
biological evolution, and the critical foresight of Darwin.
The latter is wisely collected in the few sentences with which Darwin concluded
the introduction of The Origin of Species: “I am convinced that natural selection was
the main cause, but not the only one, of modifications” (Darwin 1859: 5), and with
the same pluralistic spirit, in the Chapter V dedicated to the “laws of variation”, he
admitted that some “Lamarckian” factors (climate, nutrition, habits, use and disuse
of organs) had their weight in the differentiation of varieties and species (Darwin
1871: 211).
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to an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis
Marco Celentano
Abstract The first part of this essay reconstructs the scientific and philosophical
paths that led, between the 1940s and the late 1990s, to the formulation and develop-
ment of Evolutionary Epistemology (EE). This was an “open theory” and a research
program aimed at studying analogies and differences between biological and social
and scientific human evolution focused on the hypothesis that both can be consid-
ered as effects of a “cognitive increase”, or a process of knowledge. Konrad Lorenz,
Karl Popper, and Donald Campbell were the promoters of this approach and the
Altenberg Circle (Altenberger Kreis), animated by scholars such as Rupert Riedl,
Erhard Oeser, Franz M. Wuketits, was its forge. The second part of the essay shows
how the EE project continued to develop under different forms over the last decade,
despite being partly shipwrecked. In fact, thanks to its critical reworking and scien-
tific update promoted by members of the Konrad Lorenz Institute For Evolution
and Cognition Research such asWerner Callebaut, Karola Stotz, Massimo Pigliucci,
Gerd Müller, it acted as a basis for the formulation of a new scientific project: that of
formulating an “extended synthesis” of the Darwinian theory of descent with modi-
fications able to take into account the most important discoveries of the last decades
pertinent to developmental processes and epigenetic forms of inheritance.
2.1 Introduction
The two initial sections of this chapter examine the short but intense collaboration
between the young ethologist Konrad Lorenz and the philosopher Eduard Baum-
garten from which arose, between 1940 and 1941, a fruitful attempt to rework
the Kantian doctrine of knowledge in the light of the Darwinian theory of natural
selection.
The third section focuses on the “natural history of human knowledge” which
Lorenz proposed in his book Behind the Mirror (Lorenz 1973), developing the
hypothesis that every adaptation of organisms to their environment is the result
of a “cognitive process” (Lorenz 1973, 1983). The following three parts analyze
three main developmental stages of Evolutionary Epistemology: its foundation, by
Konrad Lorenz, Karl Popper and Donald Campbell, in the 1970s; the birth of the
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Altenberg Circle, and later of the Konrad Lorenz Institute; the “constructivist turn”
of EE promoted in the 1990s by Rupert Riedl.
The seventh section focuses on the impact the reformulations byRiedl of the “body
plan” concept from pre-Darwinian morphology in an evolutionary and systemic key
in the context of contemporary evolutionary biology.
The following section illustrates the contributions some of the members of the
Konrad Lorenz Institute gave to a critical re-examination of EE and shows that, since
2007, this project has been merging with the attempt to reach an “extended synthe-
sis” of the Darwinian theory, capable of integrating the most important discoveries
emerging in contemporary eco-evo-devo (ecological, evolutionary, developmental)
biology.
The tenth section attempts to clarify, in a nutshell, how the anti-mechanistic
and etho-centric model that emerged in the field of evolutionary and ethological
studies presented in the previous sections allows both an anti-deterministic and anti-
biologistic approach to the study of human behaviour and social evolution and a
critical reflection on their effects.
Finally, in the brief open conclusions, I propose some reflections oriented to the
elaboration of a post-anthropocentric and a post-genocentric, inter and trans-specific
concept of knowledge.
2.2 The Meeting Between Lorenz and Baumgarten
and the Project of a “Darwinian” Re-formulation
of the Kantian Apriorism
On September 2nd of 1940, Konrad Lorenz arrived in Königsberg, Immanuel Kant’s
hometown. He had been offered to chair Comparative Psychology at the Albertus
Universität, where the great Illuminist philosopher had taught for almost fifty years.
Lorenz’s major sponsor there was Eduard Baumgarten, full professor of Kantian
Philosophy and pragmatically oriented thinker, follower of John Dewey and expert
in the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson, Nietzsche, and MaxWeber. He was interested
in a critical reworking of Kantian philosophy and went looking for “a second teacher
with gnoseological interests, but at the same time endowed with a solid biological
background” (Wuketits 1990: 60).1 In Königsberg, he “brought together very bright
scientists and men of letters for evening discussions, with the ambition of paving
the way to a theoretical and methodological synthesis of the two fields” (ibid.). In
the Institute he co-directed with Lorenz, “philosophical anthropology was combined
with comparative behavioural research” (Lorenz 1992: 75). At that time, they both
were active members of the Kant Gesellschaft Königsberg where they promoted
heated debates.
1This and all the other quotations taken fromessays that do not have anEnglish translation, contained
in this chapter, are my translations.
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Lorenz remained in Königsberg only thirteen months, after which he enlisted in
the army.2 In his brief time there, however, together with Baumgarten he sketched
a phylogenetic and “non-transcendental” revision of Kant’s theory of knowledge set
to become, in the second half of the twentieth century, the first pillar of Evolu-
tionary Epistemology. Lorenz summarized this theoretical position in the essay
“Kants Lehre vom Apriorischen im Lichte gegenwärtiger Biologie” (Lorenz 1941),
originally published in the Blätter für deutsche Philosophie.3
As Donald Campbell remarked later, in writing “Kant’s Doctrine of the A Priori
in the Light of Contemporary Biology”, “the young Lorenz creatively solved a major
epistemological puzzle” (Campbell 1974: 96) and, as Lorenz remarked in turn, this
puzzle had been evidenced by Kant himself:
«If one were to entertain the slightest doubt that space and time did not relate to the Ding-
an-sich but merely to its relationship to sensuous reality, I cannot see how one can possibly
affect to know, a priori and in advance of any empirical knowledge of things, i.e. before they
are set before us, how we shall have to visualize them as we do in the case of space and
time» (section 11 of Prolegomena to the critique of pure reason)
Kant was obviously convinced that finding an answer to this question in terms of natural
science was impossible. He found clear proof that our forms of ideation and categories of
thought, in contrast with what Hume and other empiricists claimed, are not the products
of individual experience; they are logically necessary a priori, and therefore cannot have
‘evolved’ (Lorenz 1973: 9).4
But building on Kantian premises, i.e. on a pluralistic realism acknowledging the
reciprocally independent existence of “external” entities and of a “subjectivity” that
experienced them, and on a theory of knowledge founded on the acknowledgment
of “a priori forms of sensibility” as conditions of possibility of experience, Lorenz
intended to demonstrate that a consistent response to Kant’s problem was made
possible by the Darwinian theory, or more precisely, by a specific interpretation of
it. The ethologist in fact wrote:
The system of sense organs and nerves that enables living things to survive and orientate
themselves in the outer world has evolved phylogenetically through confrontation with an
adaptation to that form of reality which we experience in phenomenal space. This system
thus exists a priori to the extent that it is present before the individual experiences anything
and must be present if experience is to be possible. (ibid.)
In other words, organisms are pre-adapted, already from birth, to the interaction with
a given environment, and the human mind itself is pre-adapted to this interaction,
but this condition is an a priori only for the individual, not for the species.
As noted by Franz M. Wuketits, Lorenz was attempting, with this first strategic
move, “a synthesis between Kant’s theory of knowledge and Darwin’s theory of
2Lorenz went to Königsberg on September 2, 1940 and joined the army on October 10, 1941.
3The essay was first translated in von Bertalanffy and Rapoport, A. (Eds.) General Systems, Year-
book of the Society for General Systems Research, vol. III, 1962: 23–35, and later reprinted in
Evans (1975: 181–217).
4The quotation by Kant, contained in the Chapter 11 of Prolegomena to the Critique of Pure Reason
(1783) is extracted from the 1973 English edition of Lorenz mentioned in the References.
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evolution” (Wuketits 1990: 83). A deep understanding of anatomy and behaviour of
organisms allowed him to provide new empirical foundations for a concept already
brought to philosophical clarity by Nietzsche: the true possibility of experience is
not to be found in a (non-existent) transcendental structure of reason, immutable and
free from historical and empirical influences, as maintained by the Kantians. The
real subject of experience is the human body, as a product of natural, social, and
individual history (Nietzsche 1882).
According to the philosopher Aldo Masullo this conception was already present
in the confutation of Idealism attempted by Kant in the second edition of theCritique
of Pure Reason (1787). Kant’s transcendental idealismwas primarily aimed at under-
mining the “immaterialism” and “spiritualism” upheld by Berkeley and Descartes.
It was meant to overcome that form of idealism which frames the knowing subject in
an incorporeal dimension and defines the known object as “mere subjective represen-
tation”. In this sense, “if never explicitly […] the theme of corporeality of subjects
constitutes the unifying focus of Kantian theoretical thought” (Masullo 1986: 34).
However, Kant’s failure to make this theme completely explicit had important
theoretical consequences, highlighted by Lorenz in his 1941 essay:
The only thing we can assert about the thing-in-itself, according to Kant, is the reality of
its existence. The relationship which exists between it and the form, in which it affects our
senses and appears in our world of experience […] is determined by the ideal forms and
categories of intuition. (Lorenz in Evans 1975: 182)
But these forms, in a Kantian theoretical horizon, cannot be related “to the laws
inherent in the «thing-in-itself» by abstraction or any other means” (ibid.).
What derives from this approach is a radical dualism, according to which the
value of a priori forms of reason is considered “in principle independent from the
laws of real nature, based only on the faculties of the subject, while the thing in itself
appears in principle unknowable” (1975: 183). For Lorenz, this approach generates
some questions that biologists “have to ask” Kant:
Is not human reason with all its categories and forms of intuition something that has organi-
cally evolved in a continuous cause-effect relationshipwith the laws of the immediate nature?
Can an organ that has evolved in the process of continuous coping with the laws of nature
have remained so uninfluenced that the theory of appearances can be pursued independently
of the thing in itself, as the two were totally independent from each other? (ibid.)
Lorenz’s second stepwas to translate theKantian concept of “a priori formof sensible
intuition” in that of a historical state of pre-adaptation of the organs, produced by
selection and heredity (the “experience of the species”), which is a necessary condi-
tion for both existence and experience for each and every individual. This means
that, to Lorenz, the conception of the “a priori” as an organic function “means the
destruction of the concept: something that has evolved in evolutionary adaptation to
the laws of the natural external world has evolved a posteriori in a certain sense”
(ibid.).5
5Lorenz’s formula “what is a priori for the individual is a posteriori for the species” was not an
absolute novelty in the post-Darwinian debate. In a 1876 anthology of earlier journal articles, St.
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The third theoretical step, in the final section of the essay, consists in an attempt to
demonstrate that some categories, or central conceptual nexuses such as causal rela-
tion, may have also originated from genetically and physiologically based learning
programs, i.e. the conditioned reflex. In fact, for Lorenz, human understanding
“does not prescribe the laws of nature” (1975: 186) because, quite like a horse’s
hoof, it continually stumbles over “unforeseen changes in its task, highlighting the
inadequacy of its hypotheses” (ibid.):
[…] the fundamentals of pure reason are just as imperfect and down to earth as the band saw,
but also just as real. Our working hypothesis should read as follows: everything is a working
hypothesis. This holds true not only for natural laws which we gain through individual
abstraction a posteriori from the facts of our experience, but also for the laws of pure reason.
The faculty of understanding does not per se constitute an explanation of phenomena, but
the fact that it projects phenomena for us in a practically usable form onto the projection
screen of our experiencing is due to the formulation of working hypotheses; developed in
evolution and tested through millions of years! (ibid. 199)
According to Lorenz, precisely the fact that human beings, since they exist have had
to interact with beings and phenomena that do not passively submit to their efforts
to “shape” them, precisely the experience of these “resistances” from the external
environment, accumulated in the biological and cultural patrimony of our species
ensure that we can indeed rely on the capabilities we possess, albeit within our
species-specific and historical limits.
Despite the unbridgeable gap introduced by these theoretical shifts, Lorenz did
not ignore many points of a substantial convergence between Kant’s transcendental
idealism and his own genealogical materialism. Like Kant, he opted for a “critical
realism”, while distancing himself from any form of “naïve realism”:
[…] we are perfectly aware that what exists in itself will never be completely at hand, except
within the limits imposed even to theoretically higher living forms by the categorical forms
of our thought, […and] even if we as natural scientists are in a certain sense naïve realists,
we still do not take the appearance for the thing in itself, nor the experienced reality for the
absolutely existent! (ibid. 191)
Compared to theKantianmodel, Lorenz’s approach both strengthened andweakened
human pretensions in the cognitive field. Whereas Kant’s transcendental idealism
stated the impossibility of a positive knowledge of real aspects or features of things,
according to Lorenz’s hypothetical-critical realism “evolutionary success does not
entail that all our innate hypotheses be true, but only that they cannot be completely
false” (Vollmer 1983: 49). As Riedl later remarked, no organism could survive if its
sensory organs and relationalmodalities did not put it in the condition of detecting any
real feature of the elements it really deals with in its own environment (Riedl 1980:
George Mivart wrote, criticizing Scottish sensism: “in this way Mr. Spencer conceives that what
is a priori to the individual is but a posteriori to the race and he thus claims to have reconciled
the two schools of thought, namely, those who assert and those who deny the derivation of our
ideas exclusively from sensation and experience”. He went on: “As it is manifest, however, he gives
the substantial victory entirely to the sensists, and denies to all ideas any higher origin than mere
incipient sentiency” (Mivart 1876: 425).
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56). In this perspective, the very fact that organisms can interact with other entities in
a way that is functional to their survival demonstrates a positive know-ability of real
entities or processes and an actual capacity of knowing, present in different forms
and degrees in every living being. About human knowledge, it shows that the relation
“between the real within and the real outside ourselves” is “explorable in principle”,
but always and only indirectly, through an understanding that is constantly putting
to test vis à vis every day acting and living, and which is not absolutely true or false,
but rather more or less useful to face the needs, the circumstances and perils of life.
2.3 Toward a “Natural History of Human Knowledge”
It was only a quarter of century later, with Behind the mirror (Lorenz 1973), that
Lorenz tackled again the question of the genesis of animal and human forms of
knowledge. In this work, the genealogical approach to the theory of knowledge was
recast in amodel comprising, besides the phylogenetic version of apriorism, a critical
interpretation of Darwinism and neo-Darwinism: a re-formulation of the problem of
understanding, but also of the theory on the origin and transformation of the species.
In the “Epistemological Prolegomena” which opened the work, Lorenz subtly crit-
icized the position expressed a few years earlier by Jacques Monod in Chance and
Necessity (Monod 1970) by observing how “it is undeniably true, yet at the same time
misleading, to say that living organisms are at the mercy of purely random changes
and that evolution only takes place through the elimination of the unfit” (Lorenz
1973: 27). In his polite rebuttal of Monod’s claims, Lorenz was marking his own
distance from a specific interpretation of the neo-Darwinian canon, linked to the then
dominant approaches in molecular biology. In a nutshell, the interpretation consists
in the idea that evolution is essentially based on the interaction between two factors:
“chance”, embodied by favourable genetic mutations, and “necessity”, embodied by
external selection. Lorenz, instead, stressed a third factor, namely, the “extremely
active” care of their living conditions which all the organisms manifested through
their behaviour and physiology.
In other words, his interpretation implied that living beings search in an “emi-
nently active” way and tend to accumulate “both a fund of energy and a stock of
knowledge, the possession of the one being instrumental to the acquisition of the
other” (ibid.). According to Lorenz the lack of appreciation for this “exploratory”
aspect of behaviour makes it impossible to account for two fundamental features of
the evolutionary process, its “speed” and its “directness”, without resorting to meta-
physical and finalistic hypotheses. If evolution “depended simply on the random
elimination of the unfit, then the period of a few thousand million years which has
been calculated by physicists as a few thousand million years based on the rate of
decay of radioactive substances would hardly be enough for man to have evolved
from the most primitive organisms” (1973: 28). By the same token, the appearance
of beings endowed with a growing degree of organic complexity and behavioural
capacities, which Lorenz considered an established fact, can be explained, without
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resorting to teleology and ultimately to theology only by acknowledging that life is
also a process of acquisition of “information”.
The history of living systems can be described as a process of knowledge acquisi-
tion, meaning that in order to survive and reproduce, organisms have had to learn to
distinguish the things that have an impact on their physiological condition and their
likelihood of survival so as to exploit or avoid them. This means organisms have
turned their own living conditions and the factors influencing them into objects of
knowledge, however indirect, without this process implying any form of predestina-
tion. Organic evolution “does not follow a predetermined plan” but derives its direc-
tion from the reciprocal selection among organisms, from their attitude to explore
both the external environment and their behavioural capabilities, from their active
search and construction of specific internal and external conditions.
Lorenz’s organic history can thus be understood without reference to any kind
of determinism, be it finalistic, genetic or environmental. In Behind the Mirror,
the ethologist was therefore proposing a general reinterpretation of Darwinism in
which differentiation and preservation of living species are conceived as effects of
a “process of acquisition of knowledge” in the sense of an increase, selection, and
differentiation of “information” embodied and potentially embeddable in organisms
themselves, and usable to the survival of individuals and species.
From this perspective, whatever its level of internal complexity may be, a living
organism can never be considered as an entity simply undergoing an external
selection: it must at the same time be considered a selecting agent.
The behaviour of organisms must be therefore analyzed as both a product of
phylogenetic, social and individual history and as one of the main selecting factors
orienting phylogeny itself and the history of the species with it.
2.4 The Project of an “Integrated Theory” of Evolution
The earliest version of Evolutionary Epistemology sprang from the integration of
three independently developed approaches, those of K. Lorenz, K. Popper and D.
Campbell. The latter, back then less known than the others, was a psychologist
interested both in the theoretical aspects of Lorenz’s approach and in the evolutionary
reinterpretation of the falsificationism propounded by Karl Popper since the 1960s.
It is to him that we owe the invention of the formula “Evolutionary Epistemology”
(Campbell 1974). Campbell conceived EE as a research program targeted to an “inte-
grated theory”, whose was to identify analogies and differences between biological
and socio-cultural human evolution, biological adaptation and scientific progress. In
the perspective of its founders, EE implied first of all “the hypothesis that biological
evolution in itself represents a cognitive process, independent from the appearance
of the human species” (Somenzi 1996: 238) and the conviction that the human
condition is a “product of biological and social evolution” (Campbell 1974: 413).
The common denominator among processes of such diverging order, complexity,
and origin is to be found, according to EE, in a process based on “trials” and
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selective preservation of efficient solutions, which underlies both natural selection
and individual associative learning. This process would have its most meaningful
precedent and functional analogue (not teleologically oriented and not responding
to any conscious immanent or transcendent design) in the “positive” interaction
between genetic variance and environmental selection, which neo-Darwinism took
as themoving force of biological evolution. The process of natural selection, favoring
in terms of differential reproduction the organisms best fitted to their environments,
produces effects analogous to a learning process, unrolling through trials and errors.
In other words, natural selection and descent, without being pre-oriented in any
direction, have de facto triggered a process leading to the elimination of errors,
seen as inefficient solutions to the problems of survival and reproduction, and to
their replacement with more efficient forms of behaviour and internal organization.
According to Lorenz, Campbell and Popper, in the course of phylogeny, all individual
learning configurations, from the simplest to the most complex, have developed and
differentiated starting from this first form of “learning of the species”.
But despite these important points of convergence, and Campbell’s attempt to
mediate them, Lorenz and Popper’s theoretical positions presented irreducible differ-
ences (Stanzione 1984; Celentano 2000, 2011). Popper’s approach to Evolutionary
Epistemology was founded on “genetic dualism”, a theoretical formulation admit-
tedly very close to “a mind-body dualism”. It presupposes the possibility of iden-
tifying, even in “very simple organisms” and a fortiori in more complex ones, an
organization based on “two distinct parts: roughly speaking a behaviour-controlling
part like the central nervous system of higher animals, and an executive part, like
the sense organs and the limbs, together with their sustaining structures” (Popper
1972: 273). Each organism, then, would be divided into an “aim-structure” and a
“skill-structure” and, according to Popper, in the course of phylogeny, the devel-
opment of teleological structures has preceded and favoured that of performative
structures, thus endowing evolution with a course ever less subject to happenstance
and progressively characterized by orthogenetic developments.
Once a new aim or tendency or disposition, or a new skill, or a new way of behaving, has
evolved in the central propensity structure, this fact will influence the effects of natural
selection” and this, to Popper, meant “that the evolution of the executive organs will become
directed by that tendency or aim, and thus ‘goal-directed’. (1972: 278)
Lorenz’s mastery of comparative anatomy made him aware that this hypothesis was
untenable in the case of “lower” organisms, devoid of a centralized nervous system.
Popper’s dualism arbitrarily extends to all or almost all living organisms a model,
derived from the neurophysiologic organization of ‘higher’ animals endowed with a
central nervous system (a level of organization arising only in a very advanced phase
of phylogeny). Cognitive performances of some complexity are, instead, observable
in the protozoans or lower metazoans, whose physiological organization shows no
trace of the division between two different mechanisms devoted to central coordina-
tion and executive performances, adumbrated by Popper.6 But, according to Lorenz,
even for “higher” organismsPopper’s dualisticmodelwas valid only in part. In almost
6In coelenterates (medusa) we find groups of cells with specialized perception, sensitive to light and
to position equilibrium. A type of cephalic specialization, still very far from a centralized nervous
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all his works, Lorenz remarked how nervous structures originated from the integra-
tion of “already functioning” parts, with a certain degree of reciprocal autonomy,
and that the integration is only partial at each stage of evolution and never devoid of
dysfunctions.
Popper instead opted for the inclusion of all animals in the genetic-dualismmodel,
to the point of denying the distinction, at the time common among biologists, between
the capacity to react to stimuli, or “excitability”7 considered present in all living cells
and “sensation”, traditionally restricted to the animal world. Onemust admit, consid-
ering present developments in plant ethology, that Popper was ahead of his time on
this point when he observed that plants “do have something like sensations or percep-
tions” (Popper 1990: 35).8 However, the point at stake here is mainly philosophical.
Even though hewas not arguing for “conscious” knowledge processes in other organ-
isms, Popper, following Kant, maintained that interpreting the behaviours of living
beings “as if” they acted according to patterns of finalistic reasoning, analogous to
that of humans, was the only way to underscore the active and selective character
of those behaviours. On the contrary, in all his works, Lorenz tried to interpret the
sequences that, in many different animal species, lead from appetitive behaviours
to the execution of a “consummatory act”,9 taking into account the fact that, to the
animal, each and every phase of the sequence is “self-compensatory” and acts as a
sort of “present aim” (Lorenz 1937: 298).
2.5 The EE and the Debate on Similarities and Differences
Between Natural and Social Selection
Even sharper were the differences between Lorenz and Popper’s approaches in the
interpretation of organic and human social evolution, and of the effects of modern
science and capitalistic economy. Lorenz was highly critical of the idea of an evolu-
tionary process generally following “the direction of a greater completeness of adap-
tation” (Lorenz 1983: 40) and offered a lot of empirical evidence against it. Despite
system, appears in the phylogenetic line with anellids. In these animals it is possible to observe “a
metameric system, with groups of nerve cells (ganglia) organized in pairs, in every ring” anterior
to the sense organs. In insects “besides metameric groupings, made more numerous by the fusion
of metameres […] it emerges a very advanced specialization of the system of cephalic ganglia,
anticipating the future development of a brain” (Fancello 1985: 110–111).
7“The capacity to react to stimuli (excitability) is a basic property of all living organisms, including
plants” (Nuovo Atlante Biologico, Milano, Garzanti, 1989: 339).
8For an updated overview of the sensory and perceptual plant systems see Baluška et al. (2007),
Mancuso (2018).
9A “consummatory act” is defined as the final sequence of a hereditary motor co-ordination,
as distinct from “appetitive behaviour” (active search of triggering stimuli) preceding it and “in
natural conditions, it leads to the disappearance of the pulsion” (Craig 1918). In complex motor
sequences, however, “an act may represent at once an ‘appetitive behaviour’ for what follows and
a ‘consummatory act’ for what precedes” (Heimer 1977: 32).
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his intention to correct some “mistakes” of neo-Darwinism, Popper instead found
himself in a general agreement with the idea that organic evolution was explainable
as a gradual and progressive emergence of “the fittest”, and extended this model
to the interpretation of human social, scientific and political evolution. For Popper
(and Campbell’s position was similar on the subject), the “evolution of scientific
knowledge is, in the main, the evolution of better and better theories” (Popper 1984:
395) and this is in every aspect “a Darwinian process. The theories become better
adapted through natural selection: they give us better and better information about
reality. They get nearer and nearer to the truth” (Popper 1984: 396). With these
passages, Popper let his original falsificationist position “slip”, as he put it, from the
methodological to the theoretical domain, making it a model for the interpretation of
the whole history of Western science as a gradual progress towards better theories.
Unfortunately, history does not seem to confirm this hypothesis: for centuries compe-
tition among scientific theories led to outcomes far different from those imagined by
Popper. The fact that some scientific theories hindered an adequately critical study
of empirical phenomena, instead favouring superstition and social privileges, has in
many instances been the very reason of their success. On the contrary, the fact that
certain theories offer tools for validating truths towardswhichmassmedia controllers
are hostile lead even today to their boycott, as shown by numerous sources. Popper’s
model, therefore, seems highly simplified and idealized, inasmuch as it arbitrarily
removes the processes of conscious and unconscious manipulation of information
and processes of social selection of knowledge not aimed at the critical development
of knowledge itself, but rather subordinated to other individual or collective goals,
such as social control or profit.
After all, Popper extended his optimistic model of organic evolution and modern
scientific progress to the political sphere: taking the US system as a model, he main-
tained that we are actually living in the best possible world, and that “democracies
are always open to ideas, especially those coming from the opposition. Far from
being masked dictatorships, democracies are always open to self-doubting” (Popper
in Arrigoni 1991: 226).
Lorenz dissented from this idyllic approach, which in the last years of his life the
same Popper had doubted (Popper and Condry 1994), arguing that human socio-
cultural evolution, especially in the age of advanced capitalism and triumphant
technocracy, was led by selective processes different from those regulating organic
evolution. In The Waning of Humaneness, he elaborated a perspective in which the
“creative selection” underlying organic evolution “has ceased to influence humans.
Creative selection has been replaced by intra-specific selection” (Lorenz 1983: 12).
It is intra-specific, social selection, Lorenz argued, namely the selection of man by
man, that now determines the “direction of development” of human evolution, and it
is “our present technocratic world order” that sets this social selection (1983: 13). For
these reasons, to Lorenz, not just dictatorial regimes, but also the present democratic
systems were taking on “more and more totalitarian aspects” (1983: 187) and the
increasingly pervasive power to manipulate individual and mass behavior offered
to the powers in force by today’s technologies represents one of the most serious
dangers that humanity has to face.
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2.6 Riedl’s “Constructivist Turn”
The developments of EE can be divided into three main phases.
The first lasted from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s and includes the constitution
and developments of the Altenberg Circle (Altenberger Kreis), around the ethologist
K. Lorenz, the biologist R. Riedl and the philosopher O. Oeser. This circle was
an ever-growing interdisciplinary group of scholars, who regularly met at Lorenz’s
house inAltenberg, to discuss the theoretical implications and possible developments
of the “evolutionary and cognitive” approach.
The second phase began after the death of Lorenz (1989), covered the 1990s and
marked the transition to the foundation of the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolu-
tion and Cognition Research (1990–1991), culminating in the turning point toward
a “constructivist extension of EE” propounded by its first director, Rupert Riedl
(Riedl 1995). These developments contributed to introduce EE in the contemporary
international debate about the “naturalistic” approach in epistemology, and about
the emergent eco/evo/devo (ecological, evolutionary and developmental) approach
in biology. On the other hand, they opened the theory to many different explanatory
models and presumptive domains of application causing a considerable weakening
of its internal consistency between basic assumptions and developments.
The third period started with the new millennium but was anticipated by the new
research project expressed in the programmatic paper Lean Evolutionary Episte-
mology (1998) in which philosophers Werner Callebaut and Karola Stotz attempt a
radical reform of EE and a more rigorous formulation of its basic assumptions. This
project in the following years converged into an even more ambitious one: that of an
“extended synthesis” of the contemporary theory of evolution, aimed at going beyond
the Modern Synthesism and integrating the recent results of disciplines as molecular
archaeology, genetics, epigenetics, neurophysiology, cognitive and cultural ethology
in a systemic eco/evo/devo approach (Pigliucci and Müller 2010). An attempt which
is still in progress. After having analyzed the first phase of this process in the previous
sections, we will now describe and discuss the other two.
Towards the mid-1970s, the time was ripe for the convergence program, of widely
diverging perspectives, interests and theoretical orientations in the EE research
program. In 1975, only a year after Campbell’s programmatic essay Evolutionary
Epistemology, German physicist Gerhard Vollmer,10 in his Evolutionäre Erken-
ntnistheorie (Vollmer 1975), tried to “design the structure of an «Evolutionary
Epistemology» with a view to the whole” (Riedl 1980: 3).
According to EE, “evolutionary success does not entail that all our innate
hypotheses be true, but only that they cannot be completely false” (Vollmer 1983: 49),
because neither the human being nor any organism could survive if their sensorial
organs and their relational modalities did not grasp any real aspect of the elements
with which they have to deal with in their own environment. Both the EE founding
10Born in 1943 in Speier, Rheinland,Vollmer studiedmathematics, physics and chemistry inMunich
and Berlin. After an early career in theoretical physics, he moved on to linguistics and philosophy,
focusing on logical and gnoseological issues.
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fathers and the members of the Altenberg Circle shared this hypothesis, but Vollmer
reworked it in a way that aroused some perplexity among the Circle. According to
Vollmer, the cognitive modalities that we have inherited from our phylogenetic past
prove to be valid in the “world of medium dimensions” (Welt der mittleren Dimen-
sionen), or “mesocosm”, that would correspond to the environment with which man
has had to deal with during his prehistory. Developing this approach, Vollmer ended
up supporting an adaptationist justification of both human common sense and scien-
tific knowledge, on the basis of the assumption that our hereditary cognitive appara-
tuses are well adapted to the world of average conditions, against which they were
refined during phylogeny, and only fail when they are taken away from such a world.
In other words, they prove inadequate only when our experiences look beyond the
threshold of the mesocosm, as happens, for example, in sub-atomic physics exper-
iments. Science, however, through its means of research, verification and control,
may overcome these inborn limitations of the cognitive apparatuses, allowing us to
“know something not only about ourselves, but also about the world (the thing in
itself). This is the reason why objective knowledge is actually possible” (Vollmer
1975: 189).
This stance delved into a subtle, but theoretically not irrelevant, divergence
between Vollmer’s approach and that of the Altenberg Circle. In fact, it risked
nullifying the differences between a traditional “objective realism” and the “critical-
hypothetical realism” that Lorenz, Popper, andCampbell had considered a theoretical
pillar of EE, according to which to every representation of reality that we enact, from
the perceptive to the theoretical one, from an epistemic point of view we can only
assign, the value of a “working hypothesis”. Therefore, Vollmer’s position exposed
itself to the already mentioned criticisms that Lorenz had addressed, in 1941, in
perfect agreement with Kant, to every “naïve” realism: “even if we, as natural scien-
tists, are in a certain sense naïve realists, we still do not take the appearance for
the thing in itself, nor the experienced reality for the absolutely existent” (ibid.). In
fact, the EE approach, as originally conceived, implies the idea that the relationship
between our phenomenal representation and the external reality is a real interac-
tion between real entities (human beings and their environments), and that it is “by
principle investigable”, but does not allow the belief that the scientific study can
be resolved, to a certain degree of its development, in an objective mirroring of the
studied entities, process or events.
The philosopher Erhard Oeser and the biologist Rupert Riedl, two scholars at
that time very close to Lorenz, would have contributed in the following years to re-
launch, in a constructivist key, this approach, the development of which continued,
after the death of the ethologist (1989), through the foundation of the Konrad Lorenz
Institute for Evolution and Cognition Research, currently based in Klosterneuburg,
near Vienna.
In that same year, a criticism of the adaptationist approach, prevalent in the first
formulations of the EE and particularly inVollmer’s version of the same,was exposed
by the philosopher Eve Marie Engels in the book Erkenntnis als Anpassung? Eine
Studie zur Evolutionären Erkenntnistheorie (Engels 1989). Engels argued for the
impossibility of explaining the complexity and variety of the mental, social and
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cultural human evolution through the biological concept of “adaption”. This criticism
led the promoters of the Altenberg Circle to clarify the non-exclusively adaptationist
assumptions implicit in the EE that some years later would have found a program-
matic expression in Riedl’s paper “Deficiencies of Adaptation in Human Reason”
(Riedl 1995). In that essay the author explicitly called for a “constructivist extension
of Evolutionary Epistemology”, aimed at:
a. integrating the concept of external selection with that of self-organization, and
the adaptationist approach with the systemic-constructive one;
b. offering an evolutionary explanation, not only of the resources, but also of the
limitations and “deficiencies” of our cognitive apparatuses, clarifying that those
defections occur because we live in an environment which is now profoundly
different from the one in which our species evolved, that is to say, in an almost
totally anthropized world.
Not by chance, Riedl had been the first, within the Altenberg Circle, to try a
rapprochement between selective and constructivist models and, more precisely,
between the concept of “natural selection” introduced by Darwin and the hypothesis
of an “internal selection” (innere Selektion), a kind of selectionwhich is intra-specific
and intra-organismic, relatively independent from the inter-specific one, already
introduced by heterodox scholars such as Lancelot Whyte and Sewall Wright (Riedl
1975). Species are at first transformed in response to changes in the environmental
contexts in which they live, and therefore under the pressure of “natural selection”,
understood as a set of selective processes that take place in a given ecological context
(of which each species, group, individual is both an object and an active participant).
Instead, according to Riedl, the selective pressures that lead to the stabilization
and conservation of species-specific characteristics, or of those of larger taxonomic
groups, although conditioned by a wider ecosystem context, depend to a large extent
on processes of intra-specific trans-generational self -regulation. Processes in which
each species draws information from itself and becomes a selective environment for
itself. In other words, in Riedl’s model, if the external environmental selection is the
main cause of the transformations that the species have undergone in the course of
their history, “internal selection” is, on the contrary, the main cause of the stability of
their anatomical and morphological basic characters, of their preservation over time,
and of the resistance to changes that phylum, classes, genera and species manifest.
According to his hypothesis, in fact, the basic characteristics of taxonomic groups are
fixed “more by the internal systemic conditions of the organism than by the external
environment” (Riedl 1975: 297) and are protected by constraints which make drastic
changes of their load-bearing structures during embryonic development extremely
improbable. “The order of the living”, that is the stability of the taxonomic groups
that organic evolution has produced and the irreversibility of the process that led to
their differentiation, depends on these constraints.
To clarify the nature and functions of internal selection, Riedl took up and
reworked, in a systemic-evolutionary key, a concept strongly rooted in the tradition
of pre- and post-Darwinian German biology from Goethe, to Haeckel, to Uexküll:
that of a body’s “structural”, “anatomical”, or “development plan” (Bauplan) which
44 2 From Evolutionary Epistemology to an Extended …
guides the development of each individual organism. As Günter Paul Wagner was
later to write, according to Riedl’s approach the structural plan is something like
a “spectrum of adaptive degrees of freedom within the plan itself” (Wagner 1996:
20), the genesis of which must be explained in a historical phylogenetic, anatomical-
morphological and probabilistic perspective. Thismeans that the stability of the basic
structures that characterize each clade depends on the role of conditions of possibility
of all the further stages of development they played during the evolution and still play
in every process of ontogenesis. In other words, during the course of evolution, the
development of these structures has become a conditio sine qua non for the formation
of an ever-greater set of characteristics and functions, in turn indispensable for the
further development and operation of organisms. This has made any modification
of these first, crucial phases of cell differentiation more and more unlikely, because,
given the enormous complexity of the inputs and processes that depend on them,
every slight variation from their stabilized pathway could cascade over all others,
compromising performance.
As an instance of Riedl’s evolutionary and systemic concept of Bauplan, Günter
Paul Wagner refers to the structural organization of vertebrates being completely
disposed (gruppiert) around the spinal cord. This conformation has a specific coun-
terpart in the process of embryonic development: all the signals “that are necessary
to the development of axial organs” and thus for the rest of the body, in fact depart
from the construction of the spine. As Wagner writes the spinal column “is a struc-
tural plan, in that nearly all the other characteristics of a vertebrate depend on its
presence” (ibid.).
As Waddington had already shown (Waddington 1975) the crucial development
phases of these load-bearing structures are encoded allowing them to be restored in
their course even after disturbances or anomalies, provided that these are not too
drastic. As Riedl argued, these resetting mechanisms have the important function of
protecting species, populations, and individuals from genetic mutations or changes
in the epigenetic regulation of genetic expression that would affect a large number
of the functions of an organism, with likely drastic or lethal consequences. Or, as
Gerd Müller wrote in the early 1990s: “In the case of vertebrate limbs, where most
of these mechanisms were studied, it is difficult to imagine any kind of novelty that
could not be readily and automatically integrated by the epigenetic cascade” (Müller
1990: 119).
2.7 The Concept of “Body Plan” Today
Riedl’s conception of “internal selection” as a function that presides over the stabi-
lization of body plans and regulates the process of development, limiting “the ability
of the phenotype to evolve” and binding it “to follow a determined path”, was taken
up and reworked by many researchers in the ensuing years. Only four years after the
first edition of Die Ordnung des Lebendigen, the two eminent scholars Stephen Jay
Gould and Richard Lewontin, in the well-known essay The Spandrels of San Marco
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and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Program (Gould and
Lewontin 1979), praised Riedl’s “integrative” model as a useful attempt to over-
come the unilateral adaptationism of modern synthesis and widen the horizons of
evolutionary theory. Later, numerous scholars engaged in different research areas
contributed to test and develop concepts such as “body plan” and “internal selec-
tion”. The geneticist Wallace Arthur, the physicist-philosopher-engineer William C.
Wimsatt, the social psychologist Jeffrey C. Schank, the cell biologist Stuart Newman,
the evolutionary geneticist Günter Paul P.Wagner, the expert of vertebrate limb devel-
opment and evolutionGerdMüller, the philosophers of scienceWerner Callebaut and
Massimo Pigliucci are just some of the best known.
Wimsatt and Schank, already since the 1980s, had reworked Riedl’s notion of
Bauplan by developing the concept of “generative entrenchment” and defining it as
follows:
The generative entrenchment of an entity is ameasure of howmuch of the generated structure
or activity of a complex system depends upon the presence or activity of that entity. It is
argued that entities with higher degrees of generative entrenchment are more conservative
in evolutionary changes of such systems. (Schank and Wimsatt 1986: 33)
In the 1990s Arthur proposed a model in which internal selection is considered a
“selection for co-adaptation” which “presides over the co-evolution of genes and
their products, in order to select genes «downstream» according to their ability to
adapt to those «upstream» in the morphogenetic process” (Caianiello 2013: 115). In
his picture, “the reason that some character combinations are fitter than others may
sometimes be determined primarily by the prevailing environmental” but “often the
«internal selection» that drives co-adaptation is also important” (Arthur 2004: 285).
Newman, professor of cell biology and anatomy at the New York Medical College
and editor-in-chief of Biological Theory, the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution
andCognitionResearch scientific journal, has taken up once again the problems faced
by Riedl, studying development and evolution in systemic terms. That is, as multi-
level phenomena that must be analyzed with a multi-scalar approach. Particularly
interesting it is the fact that Newman, documenting the relevance of environmental
and epigenetic factors in evolutionary processes, uses the anti-genocentric perspec-
tive, which Riedl introduced to explain the stability of morphological and anatomical
structures, to explain evolutionary changes instead. In fact, the biologist, starting
from an analysis of the physical-chemical constituents of organisms, and of the
constraints that their characteristics impose on both individual and species-specific
morphogenesis, attempted to reconstruct the processes that led from the explosion
of biological forms, peculiar of the Cambrian, to that bottleneck narrowing which
later led to the circumscribed number of body plans existing now (Newman 2014).
According toNewman, this processwas influencedmore by changes in the epigenetic
structure (phenomena concerning the regulation of gene expression that in no way
modify DNA sequences) than by genetic mutations, as the Synthetic Theory argued.
In fact, as Newman writes and as it is today demonstrated, “heritable morpholog-
ical changes were seen to be capable of occurring abruptly with little or no genetic
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change” (Newman 2014: 2403). We know that they require a “significant involve-
ment of the external environment and, in several documented cases, appear to be
not purely happenstance as the neo-Darwinian approach predicted, but oriented in
preferred directions” (ibid.).
Gerd Müller, who along with Newman has produced important and innovative
essays (see, among others, Müller and Newman 2003, 2005; Newman and Müller
2010), observes in this regard: “the majority of novelties arise as secondary by-
products of epigenesis that appear when quantitative modifications of developmental
processes reach a threshold of the affected system” (Müller 1990: 124).11 Some of
the consequences of this approach appear relevant for a consistent overcoming of the
genocentric one:
If morphological novelties are initially epigenetic by-products, which arise as a consequence
of threshold properties in development, it follows further that it is not necessary to evoke new
genes for their origin, as had been proposed on previous occasions […]. Rather, we may find
at the genome level an epigenetically induced, modified activation of existing genes. This
does not exclude the possibility of later genetic assimilation of the new character […] and its
exposure to natural selection, but genetic mechanisms will not of necessity have to be held
responsible as initiating causal agents. In addition, it is noteworthy that the three properties
of development discussed - threshold phenomena, intermediate structures, and sequential
transition of mechanisms - share the capacity to produce discontinuity within brief periods
of time. (Müller 1990: 123)
Müller, who had already anticipated these ideas in the early 1990s when epigenetics
and the evo-devo approach were in their infancy, in the following decades, together
with scientists-philosophers such as Werner Callebaut and Massimo Pigliucci, gave
important contributions to the most ambitious tasks that contemporary life science
had set itself: to insert the new concepts and discoveries emerging from fields such
as “molecular biology and evolutionary developmental biology, the recognition of
ecological development, niche construction and multiple inheritance systems, the
‘-omics’ revolution and the science of systems biology” in a “renewed and extended
theoretical synthesis” (Müller 2017: 1) of the theory of descent with modifications.
2.8 The Project of an Extended Synthesis
Werner Callebaut was born on October 7, 1952 in Mechelen, Belgium, and in 1983
obtained his degree in philosophy at Ghent University. Three years later, he became
one of the protagonists of the international debate on Evolutionary Epistemology
by organizing an important workshop in Mechelen connected to the one promoted
two years earlier in New York by Donald Campbell and Alex Rosen. Together with
Rik Pinxten, he was later become editor of the collective volume which contained
the proceedings of that meeting: Evolutionary Epistemology: A Multi-paradigmatic
Program (Callebaut and Pinxten 1987).
11G. Müller, Le origini della novità morfologica, cit. p. 270.
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In the following years, Callebaut worked at the universities of Brussels, Limburg,
and Ghent where he became professor of philosophy in 1995. Then, after two periods
as “visiting professor” at the Konrad Lorenz Institute for Evolution and Cognition
Research, in 1999 he became, its scientific manager and later, its scientific director.
What sort of contribution was the philosopher giving to the EE debate in those
years?
During the 1990s, as a diversity of interpretative models proliferated under the
“umbrella” of Evolutionary Epistemology, the conceptual vagueness of its theoretical
core (the idea of an indissoluble relationship between “life” and “knowledge” and
between evolution and cognitive increase) became ever more apparent with a lack of
a rigorous set of procedures for the control and falsification of assumptions and the
inadequacy of the EE approach to the study of human social, cultural and scientific
evolution. This situation convinced Werner Callebaut that EE needed to be radically
re-founded. He worked on the project with the philosopher Karola Stotz and in 1998
they published “Lean Evolutionary Epistemology” (Callebaut and Stotz 1998): a
sort of manifesto-essay conceived as a comprehensive review of the potentialities
and limits of EE and a revision of its main theses.
Presenting EE as a descriptive, rather than normative, theory, and as an open
research program based on a “multi-paradigmatic” approach and a methodological
pluralism, the authors declared the dual intent to both go back to its roots and to renew
it. Summarizing these goals in the introductive section of the essay, they wrote:
What we recommend instead is a critical reflection on the naturalistic roots of EE (the quest
for a scientific, that is, anti-transcendent and anti-transcendental epistemology for limited
beings) which we hope may inspire a version of EE apt to face the future. (Callebaut and
Stotz 1998: 11)
In fact, Callebaut and Stotz deemed it necessary to clarify and re-assert the corner-
stones of the earliest versions of EE, proposed by the founding fathers Popper, Lorenz
and Campbell, but also to overcome them towards a naturalistic but not genocentric,
modular but not only adaptationist, selectionist and at the same time constructivist
model of the evolutionary processes. Therefore, they proposed the rejection of every
dichotomy between internal and external causes in favour of an integration between
“interactionism” and “constructivism”, or selectionism and self-organization-based
models, already attempted by Riedl, enriched with the new discoveries about epige-
netic inheritance systems acquired in the 1990s. In a far-sighted way, they empha-
sized the importance of the then very recent discovery that what distinguishes the
morphology of a fish from that of an insect or amphibian is not the presence of
class-specific or species-specific genes, but rather the way in which the expression
of some genes which are common to all these classes and species is regulated trough
processes of methylation and de-methylation (Callebaut and Stotz 1998: 19). A key
point in their approachwas the acceptance of a fundamental, although never absolute,
autonomy of the epigenetic and social evolutions, changes and developments from
the genetic mutations.
The authors’ orientation towards an overcoming of the genocentric approach
clearly emerged also in their critique of the apodictic and popularized version of
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the “central dogma” of molecular biology, according to which the phenotype is a
faithful execution of a program already entirely written in the genotype. Referring,
back then, to important studies by Jablonka and Lamb (1995), Müller and Newman
(1999, then in press) and others, Callebaut and Stotz explicitly affirmed the centrality
of the interaction between the cellular system and the external, environmental stimula
for themodulation of gene expression during embryonic development and in the later
stages of the life cycle.
This way they offered a model of both evolutionary and developmental processes
which “treats non-genetic developmental resources as equally important to the course
of evolution as genetic resources” (Callebaut andStotz 1998: 19), and that is grounded
in a “«constructivist interactionist vision of ontogeny and phylogeny»” (Oyama 1999
quoted in Callebaut and Stotz 1998: 20).
In short, the critical reviewof EEproposed byCallebaut and Stotz gathered several
important questions that would become crucial to the bio-evolutionary research of the
following two decades. However, at first their invitation to a collective re-elaboration
of the EE program obtained a scarce echo and in the following years the project
seemed destined to fail. With the death of Riedl in 2005, and the coeval closure of the
six-monthly scientific journal Evolution and Cognition, official organ of the Konrad
Lorenz Institute, a cycle seemed to be closing and the reworking of EE seemed to stall.
However, the most active members of the Institute did not give up and produced an
important breakthrough to their scientific activities. They began to converge towards
a complete reworking of the theory of descent with modifications capable of taking
into account what, in those years, was being discovered on the interactions between
development and evolution, internal regulatory factors and environmental influences,
selective and constructive processes, both in the biological and social sphere. In a
few years, in fact, important steps forward had been made in this field.
In 2005, Eva Jablonka and Marion Lamb had published their revolutionary book
Evolution in four dimensions, prompting a wide debate (Jablonka and Lamb 2005).
The book appeared aimed at enhancing, in all their theoretical scope, the discoveries
and “conceptual changes” which had deeply renewed almost all the branches of
biology in the previous decades, in view of an overcoming of the “genocentric”
approach. Discoveries and changes that the two authors summarized, in the prologue
of the work, in four points:
• there is more to heredity than genes;
• some hereditary variations are non-random in origin;
• some acquired information is inherited;
• evolutionary change can result from instruction as well as from selection.
(Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 1)
The new outlook that they introduced was relevant and able to solve the aforemen-
tioned classic “Darwinian dilemma” (Celentano 2013) already formulated in 1867 by
Fleeming Jenkin (also known as Lord Kelwin): the hypothesis advanced by Darwin
in The Origin of Species (1859) that the slow accumulation of random hereditary
favourable variations produced by natural selection is the “main” spring of evolu-
tionary changes can hardly explain the origin of complex organs such as the eye or
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the brain, at least because the time since the emergence of life on earth to today
would be too short (Jenkin 1867; Lorenz 1973).
Jablonka and Lamb documented the fact that, in the course of phylogeny, along-
side the slow processes of genetic variation, three other kinds of selection, heredity
and variation, respectively defined epigenetic, behavioural and cultural, cooperated
with the first reciprocally producing phenotypic adaptations independently of genetic
or genomic mutations. In Chap. 4, they described four different kinds of Epigenetic
Inheritance Systems (“Self-sustaining loops” or “memories of gene activity”, “struc-
tural inheritance” or “architectural memories” and “cell structures”; “Chromatin
marking systems” or “chromosomal memories”; “RNA interference” or “Silencing
of theGenes”)whichhave in common the ability to transmit frommother to child cells
information “that is not related to DNA” (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 402). Already
present in the protozoa, fundamental to the evolution of multi-cellular organisms,
EIS are indispensable to every kind of organisms in dealing with rapid changes and
contiguous variations of their living and social environments. They are triggered by
behavioural habits and/or environmental stimuli, and can preserve or modify, within
very few generations, food preferences, immune systems, cognitive abilities, psycho-
physical and emotional attitudes. The book reported a rich documentation on cases of
transmissions of food preferences taking place before and independently of any form
of induction or imitation learning, in animals as rabbits, rats and humans (Jablonka
and Lamb 2005: 203–207), also illustrating cases of epigenetic transmission of the
effects of stress and traumatic experiences and immune deficiencies through cellular
memory. It also describes cases inwhich new phenotypes are produced in the absence
of any DNA modification (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 339) and cases of no random
geneticmutations whether induced by stress or changes in the environment (Jablonka
and Lamb 2005: 97, 99, 109, 115–116).
The rapidity withwhich the process of differentiation and stabilization of the body
plans took place, still a mystery within the theoretical framework of the “new synthe-
sis”, according to which evolutionary changes depend almost exclusively on slow
accumulation of random favourable genetic mutations then “rewarded” by natural
selection is in this way finally explicable.
Not surprisingly, in the concluding dialogue of the work, Mistabra, the imaginary
interlocutor with whom the authors discuss at the end of each chapter, observes:
But of more general interest are the implications your version of Darwinism has for the
dynamics of evolutionary change. It implies that evolution can be very rapid, because often
an induced change will occur repeatedly and in many individuals simultaneously; there is
also a good chance that such a change will be of adaptive significance, since it stems from
already-evolved plasticity. Even without selection, evolved plasticity will bias the direction
of evolution, simply because induced variations are non-random. However, as I see it, one
of the most important implications of the version of Darwinism that you have espoused is
probably that when the conditions of life change drastically, it may induce large amounts of
all sorts of heritable variations. The genome, the epigenome, and the cultural system (when
present) may all be restructured, with the result that there can be rapid evolutionary changes
in many aspects of the phenotype. (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 350, 351)
As of 2006, the research project carried out by the Konrad Lorenz Institute for
Evolution and Cognition Research, previously focused on a critical redefinition of
50 2 From Evolutionary Epistemology to an Extended …
Evolutionary Epistemology, has increasingly come to converge with this project of a
post-genocentric synthesis of Darwinian genealogical theory, and several members
of the Institute have given significant contributions to this collective effort. In addi-
tion to the aforementioned biologists Gerd Müller and Stuart Newman, the protag-
onists of this phase were two philosophers of science such as Werner Callebaut,
scientific director of the institute, who unfortunately died in 2014, and Massimo
Pigliucci, professor of philosophy at the CUNY- City College of New York. In 2006,
together with Müller, Callebaut founded the scientific journal Biological Theory and
became “an early supporter of the extended version of evolutionary theory currently
in the making, having himself contributed to it with his conceptualizations of biolog-
ical modularity (Callebaut and Rasskin-Gutman 2005) and the organismic Systems
Approach (Callebaut et al. 2007)” (Müller 2015: 2). In July 2008, Pigliucci, Müller
andCallebaut organized an important international workshop inAltenberg, involving
“a group of 16 prominent evolutionary biologists” (Pigliucci and Müller 2010: VII)
in the discussion of the ambitious project. The proceedings of the meeting would be
published a couple of years later, in the collective volume edited by Pigliucci and
Müller, Evolution—The Extended Synthesis (Pigliucci and Müller 2010).
The evolutionary model they proposed presents some notable differences if
compared to the classical Neo-Darwinian one.
To highlight only a couple of the qualifying points:
• it envisages a both functional and evolutionary autonomy of each level of the
biological organization and evolution, particularly of the epigenetic, behavioural,
social and ecological level from the genetic one. Therefore, this model imposes
the need to study changes that occur, or have occurred, in each level (from the
molecular to the social) using the spatial and temporal scales appropriate to it
(Callebaut 2009, 2012);
• it does no longer place genes and genetic mutations in the role of unique or
principal driving forces of evolution, but in the role of “followers” of evolu-
tionary divergences that start from the epigenetic and ethological spheres. That is,
from the differentiation of environmental contexts, uses, and habits between indi-
viduals and between populations of the same or related species, in biologically
relevant contexts such as diet, explored and frequented niches, mating rituals,
communicative traditions (Jablonka 2006; Pigliucci and Müller 2010).
In this regard, in the book Pigliucci wrote that today “genes could come to be seen as
«followers» rather than leaders in the evolutionary process” (Pigliucci in Pigliucci
and Müller 2010: 370) and “the pre-eminent role that behaviour plays in directing
evolutionary changes” (2010: 371) is now undeniable.
In short, if the mechanistic model of development proposed in the late nine-
teenth century by Haeckel and re-proposed in the following century with updated
languages by different versions of genetic determinism affirmed that “phylogenesis
is the mechanical cause of ontogeny”,12 the approach of contemporary scholars such
12E. Haeckel, Anthropogenie, oder Entwickelungsgeschichte des Menschen. Engelmann, Leipzig
1877, ed. or. 1874, p. 7, my translation.
2.8 The Project of an Extended Synthesis 51
as Callebaut, Müller, Pigliucci and Newman, as noted by Salvatore Tedesco, comes
rather to the opposite hypothesis: “ontogenesis creates phylogenesis”.13
Meanwhile the work aimed at offering a “postmodern” synthesis of the Darwinian
theory of descent withmodifications has become a collective international enterprise
in which the efforts of many scholars specialized in different disciplines, and living
in different countries, are converging.
2.9 Towards a Post-Genocentric Conception of Human
Behaviour and Social Evolution
The post-genocentric approach nowadays prevailing in both ethological and evolu-
tionary studies offers innovative answers to another vexata quaestio that accompanied
the history of Darwinism and evolutionism:
Towhat extent are humanmind and behaviour the product of inherited adaptations
fixed in an irreversible or scarcely modifiable way in all members of our species?
To what extent, are they instead influenced by economic, social and cultural selec-
tion, by tradition, institutions and communication, and can therefore develop signif-
icant, useful or harmful, changes in the rapid times in which these kinds of social
factors operate?
The old question now seems through the developments of genetics and epige-
netics, molecular and developmental biology, cognitive and cultural ethology, to the
detriment of the genetic determinism that dominated the theories of inheritance and
evolution in the twentieth century. The reasons for this change are easily under-
standable even to non-experts. The theoretical framework of the “modern synthesis”
suggested that social environment and cultural influences had not been able to make
significant modifications in the human phenotype and in its physiological, psychic
and behavioural propensities. The phenotypic conformation was, in fact, considered
the result of the faithful execution (except for random errors) of a program entirely
written in the DNA and hardly influenced by the environment. Therefore, significant
phenotypic modifications were considered possible only in the long times required
by relevant genome mutations, that is, over millions of years. The empirical and
experimental evidence discussed in this essay instead allows the corroboration of
opposite approaches and conclusions: as Darwin and Lorenz had already guessed, in
human social evolution, the influence of selective pressures exerted by social envi-
ronment on individualmental and behavioural orientations has been growing over the
years, to detriment of the influence of the selective pressures exerted by the natural
environment and the inter-specific context. The social selection of behaviours and
propensities has increasingly replaced that interaction “of everything with every-
thing” through which natural selection in a Darwinian sense is regulated. The envi-
ronment in which the selection of human behaviour takes place has already for
13S. Tedesco, Introduzione, in A. Pinotti, S. Tedesco, Estetica e scienze della vita, Parte seconda,
Evo-Devo e morfologia, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano 2013, p. 188.
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millennia been and become an increasingly anthropic environment. An environment
in which the conditions for survival and success are socially produced by our species.
Today the developments of epigenetics enable us to demonstrate that, generation after
generation, this social context inwhich experiential and selective dynamics take place
selects orientations and contents of emotions, sensations and propensities, cognitive
and health resources and deficits, paths of mental and behavioural development,
not only in the individual, but also in their immediate descendants, thus triggering
the inhibition and/or reactivation of the expression of certain genes (Jablonka 2006,
2013, 2017). Thus, we can now affirm that:
• for millennia, the most important biological modifications taking place in the
human organism, those that channel and guide the development of main aspects of
the emotional, cognitive and social attitudes, are shaped by inter-specific selection,
by the social environment, and by the rules and living conditions that they impose,
more than by “natural selection” understood in the Darwinian sense;
• the effects of these ethogenetic and epigenetic inheritances are transmitted not
with the slowness of genetic modifications that require millions of years to set
new characters, but with extreme rapidity. In fact, as we shall see in greater
detail in the final essay of the volume, it is today possible to demonstrate that the
experiences and lifestyles of every single generation have an immediate impact
on morphogenesis and organization (micro-geography and functionalities) of the
brain’s and organic apparatuses in immediately ensuing generations.
In other words, today biology and ethology themselves show that our “inside”, under-
stood both as organic profile and subjective experience, is to a large extent a social
product, a product of the human, social, economic and cultural system in which it
takes shape. As Jablonka and Lamb pointed out in their book, this makes anachro-
nistic every claim to explain the “social-behavioural status quo” of contemporary
humanity as an expression of innate tendencies irreversibly fixed in our genetic code
millions of years ago (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 424–427).14
After all, in the last fifteen years, the developments of this field of research
made increasingly evident the close correlation between EIS (Epigenetic Inheritance
Systems) and BIS (Behavioral Inheritance Systems), leading to the birth of a new
scientific discipline or sub-discipline: behavioural and cultural epigenetics (Jablonka
2013, 2017; McGowan and Szyf 2010; Champagne and Rissman 2011). Its task is
“the investigation of the role of behaviour in shaping developmental-epigenetic states
and the reciprocal role of epigenetic factors and mechanisms in shaping behaviour”
(Jablonka 2017: 42). This development of behavioural and cultural epigenetics open
the possibility of a social history of human biological evolution and condition based
on an anti-separatist but at the same time anti-deterministic approach.
They invigorate and raise the need of that two-stage evolutionary model that
had already been introduced in 1987 by the philosopher Erhard Oeser (1987) in
the context of EE, according to which behavioural and perceptive habits, mental
categories and expectations, interactive modes and evaluative criteria develop in
14Ivi, p. 473.
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the human individual, over the course of life, thanks to so-called “open programs”,
that is to say innate learning programs, of which Lorenz and Mayr had already
spoken.15 In other words, through a series of sensitive phases of biological and cogni-
tive maturation, marked by species-specific forms of active research of the stimulus
leading individuals to assimilate mental and behavioural models from society, from
the behaviour and teachings of con-specifics, from the parental and socio-cultural
figures of reference through some key phases of psychic development. According
to this perspective, cerebral and cognitive formation of every human being starts,
inevitably, from an assimilation and a re-elaboration of inputs, models, behavioural
patterns, emotional reaction norms, drawn from the social environment, which in the
first years of life take place in a largely unaware form. The brain and psychic devel-
opment is thus configured as a “biographical path” that leads to the structuring of
“a hierarchy of dynamically interdependent layers, in which the component of mere
adaptation progressively decreases, giving way to constructive elements that take
over in an ever more incisive manner” (Oeser 2000: 338). Callebaut and Stotz also
referred to thismodel in their aforementioned 1998 essay, framing human thought and
behaviour as socially produced and individually learned and re-elaborated expres-
sions, starting from an interactive cultural and linguistic environment that exercises
training functions on them. As we have seen, today studies aimed at the formulation
of an “extended” or “post-modern” synthesis of Darwinian theory, reaching a full
recognition of the autonomy of socio-cultural evolution and individual behaviours
from direct and binding genetic influences. Moreover, the research of contemporary
ethologists such as Frans de Waal, who for over twenty years investigated the phylo-
genetic and historical origins of “morality”, also led to a similar recognition. In fact,
the long de Waal study confirms the decisive influence of social factors and early
experiences on the development of moral codes and ethical choices (de Waal 1996,
2006; Celentano 2013) and clarifies an important concept: in our species, the innate
components which guide the development of ethical evaluations and choices mani-
fest themselves not as innate rules or principles as some evolutionary psychologists
have recently argued (Hauser 2006; Pinker 2008), but as learning programs. Not by
chance, on this matter the ethologist writes:
We are born not with any specific social norm, but with a learning agenda that tells us which
information to imbibe and how to organise it. […] In a sense, we are imprinted upon a
particular moral system through a process that, though hundreds of times more complicated
than the imprinting of birds, maybe just as effective and lasting. (de Waal 1996: 36)
So, in a nutshell, today it is exactly the same sciences that every genetic determinism
has traditionally used to argue the (still unproven) hypothesis that human behaviours
are prescribed in a binding way by our genes that contribute decisively to proving the
opposite. They thus prepare us for a task from which contemporary culture can no
longer escape, if not at the risk of compromising its own ability to produce critical
15See K. Lorenz, Evoluzione e modificazione del comportamento, tr. it. Boringhieri, Torino, 1971;
E. Mayr, Behavior Programs and Evolutionary Strategies: Natural selection sometimes favors a
genetically “closed” behavior program, sometimes an “open” one, American Scientist, 62, 6, 1974,
pp. 650–659.
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self-reflection: understanding what consequences have derived and are deriving from
the fact that the society, and no longer nature, in its inter-specific wealth, produces
the environment in which the “human” is selected and cultivated, in an increasingly
pervasive way.
This target implies a triple commitment that, in my opinion, should today concern
transversely all the scientific disciplines:
• to contribute to understanding the ways in which intra-specific selection and
social context impose developmental constraints and directions on the biolog-
ical, behavioural and cognitive expressiveness of individuals, populations, and
species, i.e., to develop a comparative, synchronic and diachronic study of the
“canalizations” (Waddington 1975) that social evolution imposes on biological
evolution;
• to contribute to explain how human biological history has evolved and is evolving
within human social history and under the dominance of intra-specific human
selection. Trying to understand which transformations social life has inscribed
and is inscribing in physiological, sensory and cognitive activities, as well as
in the “appetences” and propensities of humans. To develop a synchronic and
diachronic comparative study of the structural constraints and evolutionary orien-
tations that currently dominant development models in human social organization
are imposing on humans themselves, on almost all the other organisms and on
our and their living environment (Jablonka and Bronfman 2014; Jablonka 2017);
• to contribute to the scientific identification and concrete social removal of all
those forms of discrimination, exploitation and social manipulation of human
beings, and of other sentient beings, which, as we know today thanks to cultural
epigenetics, leave scars, wounds and traumatic effects not only in those that suffer
them in a direct way, but also in their descendants.
2.10 Genealogical Perspectivism: Towards an Ethological
Conception of Knowledge
Like fish capable of exploiting undulating motions of water so as to move and live in
it, or birds, able to fly, hunt and sometimes sleep gliding over air currents, we only
possess knowledge without “truth”. We can elaborate complex forms of schemati-
zation of the “entities”, “elements”, “processes” or “events” with which we interact.
These allow us to survive in the environments we colonize, as the fish does in water
and the bird in air, but we hold no “truths”, if we intend them in the traditional, strong
and emphatic sense of the term, that of metaphysical laws, or laws of nature that are
universally valid in space and time. The “knowledge” we incorporate through inher-
itance and learning never translates into statements that can be considered unques-
tionably true or exact from any point of view and that remain so over time. Our
cognitive activity, not unlike that of any other body, is never resolved into an objec-
tive and neutral reflection of what we come into contact with. Rather, it manifests
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itself always and exclusively as a production of behaviours, of forms of assimilative,
exploratory, transformative and self-regulating interaction with what coexists with
us.
As some prominent contemporary scholars have reiterated, this limitation
concerns not only the ability of discernment of other living beings and our common
sense, but also our scientific knowledge. In fact, even the latter cannot overcome these
limits. This finding led contemporary scholars like Ronald Giere and Werner Calle-
baut to assume an epistemological position they called scientific perspectivism (Giere
2006; Callebaut 2009, 2012; Celentano 2018). Its basic theses can be summarized
as follows:
• Eachdetection system,whether biological, technological, or hybrid, responds only
to a particular and limited set of signals. Like our organs, scientific “instruments
are sensitive only to a particular input and blind to everything else; and their output
is a function of both their input and their internal constitution” (Callebaut 2012:
76).
• No system, whether organic or artificial, offers a mere neutral mirroring of data,
because all the detection systems process the collected data according to criteria
intrinsic to their own structure, and not (or not only) to the entities or processes
they detect.
• Different sensor organs and instruments receive and represent the same
phenomena in different ways.
• The scientific hypotheses and theories are “models of aspects of theworld”, and the
so-called natural laws are highly generalizedmodels “that characterize a scientific
perspective” (ibid.).
• “As a consequence, we cannot transcend our human perspective” (Brandon 2007).
Starting from them, I would like to propose, in these concluding pages, some reflec-
tions on the possibility to elaborate an ethological conception of knowledge and
to clarify the basic concepts of a perspectivism that is not only scientific, but also
genealogical. Or rather, of an ethological and genealogical approach to the problem
of knowledge which affirms, not only that every human and not human form of
knowledge is based on a limited perspective andmakes only certain aspects of reality
perceptible, or conceivable, but also that these limits are essential tomake this knowl-
edge useful for the survival and for the modification of the living conditions of the
organisms. This approach radically modifies the concept of “knowing”, which was
intended since the age of Aristotle until the contemporary one. In fact, it sets the eval-
uation parameters and criteria for putting to test our knowledge, no longer with the
pretense of progressively approaching the formulation of alleged immutable “natural
laws”, or to chase an impossible exact representation of the “in itself”, but solely in its
concrete, practical effects. That is, in the qualitative and quantitative modifications,
in the protection or in the worsening, of the living conditions of acquaintances and
known subjects that this knowing produces.
Cognitive activities are always simultaneously self-regulative interactions, forms
of energetic and informative exchange with the species-specific and inter-specific
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environment, and exploratory behaviours or forms of testing and implementation of
the practical skills of an organisms.
The forms of the perceptive, mental and symbolic representation of the reality we
elaborate, may bemore or less functional to the resolution of practical, individual and
collective problems, more or less useful to develop certain systems of representation
of reality that we use in our forecasting and calculation operations, but not absolutely
true.
In fact, as Nietzsche pointed out, the existent does not, in itself, have an aspect. It
can take on an aspect, it can present itself under certain forms and characteristics, only
in relation to a living being that perceives it and to the different situations in which
this happens. Therefore, we don’t have to establish a difference between the way we
perceive something and the way that something would appear “in itself”. Rather, we
must take note that every existing “x” must necessarily appear in as many different
ways as they are the organs, apparatuses or instruments engaged in understanding
and interacting with it and the different circumstances in which this interaction takes
place.
Every existing entity, or ongoing process will thus necessarily appear differently
to the many species of organisms that will interact with it because each species (and
to a lesser extent each population and individual) has developed different percep-
tive and cognitive apparatuses in relation to particular vital needs and evolutionary
contingencies.
A similar argument also must be applied to human abilities: our cognitive organs
developed their skills over the course of phylogeny and of social, cultural and indi-
vidual history. This means that they acquired and modified their shape not only
through a mental representation of the external environment, but also through a
material interaction with it.
Consequently,weneed a complete overcomingof the traditional concept of knowl-
edge as a form of compliance of human ideas to external things, or adaequatio
rei et intellectus, and of the idealistic conception of the cognitive apparatus as a
set of functions delegated to perform a mere mental representation of the external
environment.
The brain, or eye, as the fin of a fish, rather than merely representing an external
environment, serve to move in it, to interact with it, to implement vital and social
functions in a determined (but changing) ecological context. In this sense, we can
affirm that a cognitive activity primarily manifests itself in all living beings as the
ability to produce body plans and behavioural forms suitable enough to guarantee
their survival and reproduction as an individual, populations or species. This is the
core of an ethological conception of knowledge.We can today recognize that not only
human beings, but all organisms, in order to stay alive and reproduce need to carry
out and exercise cognitive activities within the limits imposed to them by their own
evolutionary and ontogenetic history. These cognitive activities manifest themselves
as a production of physiological and behavioural forms and activities which place
crucial self-regulating functions and are capable of implementing qualitative changes
in the physiological states and life conditions of an organisms.
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But to what extent is it possible to affirm that organisms are capable of acquiring
and transmitting, in ways that go from the genetic to the cultural heritage, informa-
tion that is useful to the survival or to the qualitative improvement of their living
conditions?
Fromagenealogical point of view,we could answer that the cognitive endowments
of the organisms have proved to be useful enough to ensure that life, for more than
three billion years (that is from the moment of its appearance until today), has not
died out. We could not allow more than this, with regard to their degree of reliability,
but it would be difficult to deny them at least this degree of “utility”. The organisms
“know” some factors of the real world just enough to survive and reproduce in some
of its areas. This is what we can say about the “validity” of the systems of codification
and decoding of reality developed both by other living beings and by ourselves.
This also means that, even though we cannot reach absolute certainties, each of
our cognitive resources, from sensation to emotion, from perception to imagination
and theories, just like the skills of other organisms, can be put to the test. In fact,
we could test their real effectiveness on the condition that we modify as a yardstick
of our knowledge, by placing it no longer on the horizon of an alleged progressive
approach to the perfect correspondence between things as they actually are and their
scientific representation, but rather exclusively in terms of its practical effects. That
is, in terms of the damages or benefits it entails. Knowing serves to live, to face life.
We can’t demand more.
The first consequence of this approach is that claiming a cognitive methodology
is more valid than any other, and therefore preferable under all circumstances, is as
vain as expecting a microscope to be equally useful for observing microorganisms as
to avoid the dangers of a car-filled street and studying the stars. In fact, the utility of
a presumed knowledge or methodology is detectable only in relation to the specific
area of problems that they are called upon to face and resolve.
In conclusion, genealogical perspectivism is based on an ethological conception
of knowledge according to which cognitive processes are not reducible to mere
processes of assimilation of information or mere activities of perceptive, mental or
symbolic representation of known “objects”. In fact, they always imply an effective
interaction between the knowing subject and the known “object” (which of course
may also be one or more other living beings) that transforms them both and that is
indispensable for the environmental monitoring, self-monitoring and self-regulation
that every organism must perform to keep itself alive.
Moreover, according to an ethological conception of knowledge, as the fathers
of the Evolutionary Epistemology already guessed, we can include in the cognitive
activities not only processes that allow individual organisms to monitor the environ-
ment and interactwith it, but also those that regulatemorphogenesis, ontogenesis, and
phylogeny. Living being learnwhile taking shape, both physically andmentally in the
first place.Organisms acquire knowledge by transforming themselves and the context
in which they live, and this is true both for the homeorhetic processes (Waddington
1975), or the vital parabola of individuals as well as for trans-generational processes
that allow the species to preserve and/or change. Therefore, development and evolu-
tion are both cognitive processes, inextricably intertwined, in which living beings
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play an eminently active role, contributingwith their intelligence to shape themselves
shaping and to the evolution of the environments in which they live.
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Chapter 3
Interspecific Cultural Studies
and Numanities: The Comparative Study
of Animal Traditions Beyond
the Separation Between Humanities
and Life Sciences
Marco Celentano
Abstract The introductory part of the chapter will display its whole purpose and
topic. First of all, this section of the book aims to clarify the situation of both human-
ities and behavioural sciences after the discovery of animal thought and cultures.
In other words, after the fundamental theoretical assumptions of these two scien-
tific traditions were empirically refuted: the idea of man as the only thinking and
cultural animal and other animals as mechanically explainable entities. From this the
need for a critical and self-critical re-foundation of both humanities and behavioural
sciences arises. A process which is in fact already underway but is still not reflecting
enough on the level of theoretical elaboration and on the practical level of a reform
of scientific training and research. This need for a new organization of university
and post-university education, transversal to the bipartition between human and life
sciences, and of meta-disciplinary forms of organization of the basic and applied
research, on which the chapter aims to focus, is in various respects close to the
goal of a radical self-reform of humanities proposed in Martinelli’s Manifesto of
Numanities (Martinelli 2016). In this specific case, the pivot or pillar of this “rev-
olution” of humanities is identifiable in the attempt to reorganize the humanistic
field as Interspecific Cultural Studies. That is, as a meta-disciplinary area able to
assume a post-anthropocentric approach towards its topics and collaborate, each
sector starting from its own specificity, on an enterprise that we are attempting in
our age for the first time: to insert the study of past and present human cultures
into the broader context of a comparative study of all animal cultures, existing and
existed. This enterprise would imply, as its indissoluble condition, the commitment
to protect the survival of these animal cultures and of the natural environments
in which they have evolved. The following section presents, in extreme synthesis,
the state of the art of cultural ethology. The third section introduces, in an equally
concise way, the emerging etho-centric approach to the explanation of evolutionary
processes in contrast to the geno-centric one, recognizing not genes, but explorative
and cognitive behaviours, experiences and cultural traditions as the main driving
forces of animal evolution. The fourth section illustrates the basic characteristics of
the meta-disciplinary area indicated in the chapter as Interspecific Cultural Studies
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(ICS) and their close affinities with the program of Numanities. The fifth section
focuses, within the ICS framework, on a particular project and object of research:
the study of the cases of Interspecific Cultural Convergences (ICC). These are cases
in which a technique, an invention, a discovery, an expressive form or use have
been independently developed not only by different populations of the same species,
but also by societies and traditions of different animal species. The last part illus-
trates one of the best-known ICC cases: singing. A widespread expressive form in
all human cultures and in primates genetically and phylogenetically quite distant
from us such as Hylobatidae, Tarsius, Indri and Callicebus yet not among our sister
species (chimpanzee, bonobo, gorilla). An expressive form developed by animal
species as diverse and from a genetic, phylogenetic, morphological and ecological
point of view as different as birds, mice and whales. The diffusion of singing in
so different clades and environments obviously cannot be explained as a case of
homology (similar characteristic inherited by common ancestor), because the ances-
tors common to birds and mammals did not sing, just as as those common to insects
and birds did not have wings. It is instead the result of mutually independent, but
in some aspects similar, evolutionary processes and social or ecological selective
pressures. It can be adequately understood only by identifying and comparing the
biological and social functions that this kind of expression plays, and the forms it has
assumed, in all these animal communities, just as is commonly done by comparing
human singing traditions and performances. In the ICS perspective, this approach
can be extended to the study of all aspects of animal cultures and of all cases of ICC
found.
3.1 Introduction
FromAristotle’s time to thefirst half of the twentieth century, studying past or existing
cultures, reconstructing their history, analyzing and comparing their languages,
productions and traditions signified dealing exclusively with human culture, as Man
was considered the only “cultural animal”.
Today, just over half a century since the beginning of that scientific revolution
which, in the 1960s led to the discovery of different traditions in various species of
primates, cetaceans and birds, cultural ethology is still a very young discipline, but
we can affirm that the existence of non-human cultures is widely proven and the
hypothesis that all existing species of mammals and social birds have, over millions
of years, developed their own uses and dialects is highly probable.1
1How are the concepts of “culture” and “tradition” in the ethological field defined today? Ethologists
are in broad agreement on a trans-specific notion of “culture” that implies, as its necessary and
sufficient conditions, the existence of systems of transmission of experiences and uses to other
individuals and generations, through learning/teaching processes (de Waal 2001: 11; Martinelli
2011: 230). They “refer to as ‘cultural traits’ those behavior patterns shared by members of animal
populations that are to some degree reliant on socially learned differences between individuals,
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It is also demonstrated that this differentiation of uses and languages, handed
down through social learning in different populations of the same species, is not
an exclusive prerogative of mammals and birds. Research performed over the past
forty years has highlighted the existence of intra-specific local traditions in various
species of teleost fish, particularly among species that live in the coral reefs (Helfman
and Schultz 1984; Bshary et al. 2002; Laland et al. 2011), and this fact reinforces
the hypothesis that analogous phenomena can be found in all aquatic and terrestrial
vertebrates that derive from bony fish.
Therefore, the world of animal cultures appears to us, today, as an immense,
yet almost completely unknown universe, because so far, humanity has lived next to
it without recognizing it as such. At the same time, it presents itself to our eyes as
a world whose survival is increasingly threatened by anthropic impact, or rather by
our models and processes of economic and social development.
In our age the greatest mass extinction of animal and plant species ever recorded
is currently underway and consequently, almost all existing animal cultures are, in
fact, hunted cultures, from which larger and larger portions of living environment
are subtracted on a daily basis for purposes related to human profit.
In my opinion, it is exactly this interweaving of ethological, ecological, socio-
cultural, philosophical and ethical problems, that anyonewho studies animal cultures
is used to facing, that today requires a full development in the field of research
indicated in this essay as Interspecific Cultural Studies. An area to be understood not
just as something completely new that the author of this paper would like to propose,
but rather as the set of heterogeneous skills, transversal to traditional disciplinary
blocks, necessary to investigate a new object of study, about which we began to learn
just sixty years ago, such as animal cultures. The problems inherent in their study, in
fact, can be adequately addressed, to a theoretical level, only by attempting a critical
overcoming of both the anthropocentrism and anthropo-denial rooted in the humanist
tradition and mechanistic approaches to the study of the evolutionary processes and
animal behaviour, rooted in the biology and behavioural sciences of the twentieth
century. They can be adequately addressed, on a practical level, only through a
radical reform of paths of scientific training and organization of basic and applied
research. Reform that must aim at overcoming the bipartition between humanities
and life sciences and educating generations of students, scholars, environmental,
social and cultural operators to manage skills that are transversal to those offered by
these two traditional disciplinary blocks. This overcoming undoubtedly implies a not
easy, individual and collective effort of self-renewal and dialogue, a willingness of
all the ‘actors’ involved to explore fields other than those of their traditional sector,
to exercise a self-critical reflection on one’s disciplinary, methodological, theoretical
and conceptual traditions. It appears, however, indispensable for safeguarding and
re-launching the critical vocation, the social relevance and reliability of the sciences
and of their forms of application.
observed within or between populations, that are to some degree attributable to differences in what
they learned socially. We treat tradition’ and ‘culture’ as synonyms” (Laland et al. 2009: 178, 179).
64 3 Interspecific Cultural Studies and Numanities …
The objective of the ICS is to outline graduate and post-graduate training programs
and research methods aimed at providing and applying the intertwining of etholog-
ical, ecological and socio-cultural competences that is today necessary to critically
connect the comparative study of human cultures and the comparative study of the
cultures of other animal species.
For humanities, first of all, this task requires the effort to insert, acknowledging
the facts, the history of human cultures in the much older and broader history of
animal cultures, the comparative study of human cultural productions and of their
forms of diversification and contamination, within the immensely wider, but still
debutant, field of the comparative study of animal cultures and of the processes that
lead to their birth, differentiation, dissemination and contamination.
The project to overcome traditional didactic and scientific paths, fromwhich these
pages are inspired, presents evident points of convergence with that of Numanities,
outlined by Dario Martinelli in the volume Arts and Humanities in Progress. A
manifesto of Numanities (Martinelli 2016). The need to “defend and promote crit-
ical thinking” proposing a reflection on “the position of the humanities in modern
society” and on their “crisis” (Martinelli 2016: 11) and the effort for “working on
relocating and redefining the humanities” (Martinelli 2016: 9), which the author indi-
cates as the global goals of Numanities, are also fundamental to the ICS program,
as provisionally outlined in this chapter. The method focused on discussing “the
current crisis of the humanities and its possible solutions, in a spirit that should be
both critical and self-critical”, based on very “Multi/Inter/Cross/Trans-disciplinary
dialogues between humanities and social and/or natural sciences”. The attention to
“the context, dynamics and problems of current societies” (Martinelli 2016: 9), that
the “Manifesto” proposes also characterizes the ICS approach.
The effort to promote a transition of humanities beyond the anthropocentric
approach and rethink them as Interspecific Cultural Studies, or as a set of disci-
plines devoted to the comparative study of all existed and existing cultures (not only
human), should be part of the programmatic objectives of Numanities and could
constitute the specific contribution of the ICS to their development.
To give a pair of non-random examples, I think that today, in any university course
and whatever its disciplinary field may be, it should not be considered tolerable that
students can finish their studies without having taken courses and topics that allow
them to develop an awareness of the current global environmental crisis and of
the global and local ecological problems linked to their field of study, or of the
environmental impact of the production and distribution cycles that concern them.
In fact, it is unthinkable that there are now areas of knowledge that can be called
out of the problems linked to the devastating effects of the anthropic impact on the
environment, onmillions of animal and plant species, on all the human beings. Social
ecology, as Murray Bookchin called it (Bookchin 1980, 1990), represents, therefore,
an area of study that our age must consider transversal, and necessary to all the forms
of knowledge and formative paths.
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Similarly, inmyopinion, no disciplinary field should today endorse that traditional
kind of human mythology according to which “man and culture originated simulta-
neously, by definition” (White 1959: 5), because it is now adequately demonstrated
that this is not the case.
Contributing to the de-mythologizing of this atavistic anthropocentric arrogance,
and to a transition of the humanistic culture beyond it, also means contributing
to the search for models of society and forms of social and scientific development
alternative to those in force (descendants of that haughtiness) and capable of reversing
their course showing respect towards the environmental, social and cultural disasters
they have provoked.
In fact, the ability of human and natural sciences to preserve their social relevance,
exercise their critical role rise to the challenges that await themwill also depend on the
ability of the present generations of scholars and students to question themselves and
to overcome secular prejudices and obsolete paradigms, trying to boost a collective
critical and self-critical re-establishment of human knowledge.
3.2 From the Discovery of Animal Cultures
to Contemporary Cultural Ethology
In the second half of the twentieth century developments in ethology led to one of
the most revolutionary discoveries of contemporary science: the existence of animal
cultures.
This falsified (in the Popperian sense), or empirically refuted one of the funda-
mental assumptions of our philosophical and scientific tradition, that of man as
the only “cultural animal”. Therefore, it questioned the same founding partition of
western sciences: the division between humanities, conceived as sciences of culture,
and natural sciences.
Two field studies, introduced to the scientific community in the mid-1960s,
allowed this amazing discovery. The first, directed by Junichiro Itani, Shoji Kawa-
mura andMasao Kawai, disciples of the Japanese ethologist Kinji Imanishi, began in
1948 on the island of Koshima, where a community of macaques (Macaca fuscata)
lived then and still does today. The second, promoted by Louis Leakey, the most
authoritative anthropologist of the time, began in 1960 and was carried on by Jane
Goodall, who was the first scholar to study the behaviour of chimpanzees in their
natural environment, in the Gombe Stream Chimpanzee Reserve, in Tanzania.
In 1953, the observation ofmacaquesmade SatsueMito, an inhabitant of Koshima
aide to the three ethologists, the first human witness to the birth of a tradition within
a community of non-human animals (de Waal 2001). Western scientific community
became aware of this discovery in 1965, when Kawai published a paper about it in
the scientific magazine Primates (Kawai 1965).
Meanwhile, in 1960, Jane Goodall had begun studying the chimpanzees at the
Gombe Stream Chimpanzee Reserve, a site that, thanks to her efforts, would become
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a protected area from 1968. She was the first scholar to discover several important
aspects of the social, emotional and cognitive life and material culture of chim-
panzees: their ability to build wooden tools and exploit them to obtain food, the
techniques used to open coconuts by choosing, carrying and using different stones
in the form of anvils and hammers, the existence of cultural differences between
groups, the complexity of their social structures and the differences in sensitivity,
intelligence, character and preferences in every single individual.
But, in the 1960s, also another sub-field of ethological research began to contribute
to the birth of cultural ethology: the study of the communicative systems of singing
birds. It led to the discovery of “dialects”, which are regional and macro-regional
differentiations of songs within a species. In fact, Peter Marler and Miwako Tamura,
pioneers in this development, had in the early 1960s already discussed “Song
«Dialects»” (Marler and Tamura 1962) and “culturally transmitted patterns of vocal
behavior” by sparrows (Marler and Tamura 1964).
The debate on the philosophical and scientific consequences of these discov-
eries began to develop in the 1970s and intertwined with the discussions on animal
minds arisen by some comparative psychologists who studied the ability of “higher
primates” to learn man-made languages as the ASL, or American Sign Language
(Miles 1994; Fouts 1997; Patterson 1999), and other techniques of interactive use of
human lemmas or symbols (Premack 1986; Savage Rumbaugh 1977), to recognize
themselves in the mirror (Gallup 1970; Povinelli 1987) and solve several cognitive
problems (de Waal 2016).
Despite their methodology, based on observations in captivity and initially set up
assuming the anthropocentric presupposition of the Cartesian matrix which equated
the intelligence of other animals to their ability to acquire and use human language
or tools, these experiments opened up a window on an unpublished scenario: the
translation into human languages of the thoughts, moods and experiences of other
animals like chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas, orangutans and parrots, made by the
animals themselves (Warren et al. 1996; Patterson 1999; Pepperberg 2002).
Between the 1990s and the next decade, a new philosophy of ethology oriented
both in a post-anthropocentric and post-genocentric direction began to emerge, inter-
secting with Animal Studies and the rising Critical Animal Studies. Books like
Visions of Caliban (Peterson and Goodall 1993) and Species of Mind (Allen and
Bekoff 1997) gave a first significant boost in this direction. Then, ethologists, philoso-
phers of ethology and zoo-anthropologists such as Marchesini (Marchesini 1999),
Lestel (2001), de Waal (2001), Despret (2004), Martinelli (2007), Best (2007) and
Nocella et al. (2014)—to name but best known—contributed to set the compara-
tive study of animal minds, cultures and societies on new both post-mechanistic and
post-idealistic bases.2
Cultural ethology has since then gained increasing media attention to the extent
that no adequately informed scholar now denies the existence of animal cultures.
2Though it circulated mostly in Italy and Austria, I would include my Etologia della conoscenza.
Per una teoria critica del comportamento umano (Celentano 2000) in the list of texts indicative of
the birth of contemporary Philosophy of Ethology.
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However, the legacy of anthropocentric traditions and ontological separatisms is still
crawling in studies that defend the thesis according to which cultures of non-human
animals lack relevant characteristics such as active teaching, cooperation, imitation
in the strict sense of the word, syntactically organized languages, which would be
exclusive to human cultures (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Heyes 1993; Tomasello
1994, 2014).
Other scholars, such as Laland, Kendal and Kendal, while contrasting these theses
and highlighting data that suggest their fallacy, underline that it is very difficult
to document on the field, in wild species, processes of active learning correction,
forms of cooperation, or even more the birth of new traditions, and believe that, for
now, only imitation can be considered fully proven (Laland et al. 2009). However,
a conspicuous number of studies has provided empirical and experimental evidence
of these characteristics in different animal cultures (for a first approach see: de Waal
2001, 2016).
Weknow, for example, that forms of active orientation of learning throughdiscour-
agement or encouragement and even more complex educational processes are docu-
mented in many species of mammals. Each mother “cat (Felis catus), through a
complex procedure that requires the succession of many different phases, teaches
her cubs to hunt” (Mainardi 1992: 63),3 and behaviours with similar instructive
value have been studied in other felines as tigers, cheetahs, and desert lynxes. Chim-
panzees and bonobos dissuade puppies from manipulating dangerous objects such
as attractive but inedible fruits. Scenes in which chimpanzee mothers correct their
offspring’s attempts to break coconuts with a wooden stick, taking the branch away
from them and re-placing it in their hands in a functional position, were filmed by
Christophe Boesch (AA.VV. 2006). Experiences of multi-decade studies on chim-
panzees living in semi-captivity conditions have provided surprising evidence of their
capacity for cooperation (Fouts 1997; de Waal 2016). If scholars like Tomasello still
doubt that chimpanzees can spontaneously develop or adopt cooperative behaviours
(Tomasello 2009, 2014), Roger Fouts, in his Next of kin (Fouts 1997), already over
twenty years ago, described the attempted escape of a group of chimpanzees placed
on an island surrounded by a fence, in terms that left little doubt about any cooper-
ation. The observation of this event, gained by spying on the chimpanzees from a
closed window, still represents a precious testimony for at least four good reasons:
it documents a case of cooperation not induced by man; the chimpanzees took turns
in carrying out the laborious task of twisting the final piece of the heavy net that
surrounded the colony: when one got tired, another took its place; the cooperation
concerned both the performance of this task and its dissimulation, or the immediate
suspension of activities when the chimpanzees were observed by men; the attempt
lasted for several days, making thus further clear its character as a planned and agreed
action (Fouts 1997: 180–181).
More recently, several experiments have confirmed the remarkable cooperative
capacity of our close relatives. In a study published in 2016 in Proceedings of the
3This and all the other quotations from essays that have not been translated into English, contained
in this chapter, are my translations.
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National Academy of Sciences, Frans de Waal and his collaborators demonstrated
both the cooperative abilities of chimpanzees and a series of social constraints or
dynamics that reinforce them. They wrote on the subject:
Our species is routinely depicted as unique in its ability to achieve cooperation, whereas our
closest relative, the chimpanzee (Pan troglodytes), is often characterized as overly competi-
tive. Human cooperation is assisted by the cost attached to competitive tendencies through
enforcement mechanisms, such as punishment and partner choice. To examine if chim-
panzees possess the same ability to mitigate competition, we set up a cooperative task
in the presence of the entire group of 11 adults, which required two or three individuals
to pull jointly to receive rewards. This open-group set-up provided ample opportunity for
competition (e.g., freeloading, displacements) and aggression. Despite this unique set-up
and initial competitiveness, cooperation prevailed in the end, being at least five times as
common as competition. The chimpanzees performed 3,565 cooperative acts while using a
variety of enforcement mechanisms to overcome competition and freeloading, as measured
by (attempted) thefts of rewards. These mechanisms included direct protest by the target,
third-party punishment in which dominant individuals intervened against freeloaders, and
partner choice. (Suchak et al. 2016: 10215)
Other studies have clarified that among chimpanzees cooperation is enacted not only
between related individuals but that adults who have known each other for a short
time also cooperate to obtain advantages or alleviate discomforts (Langergraber et al.
2007; de Waal 2016).
Moreover, sharing and cooperation have been documented, both in captivity and
in nature, even among non-anthropomorphic monkeys: “Cooperation is common,
for example, among capuchin monkeys. These monkeys are not only willing to help
others obtain resources, but are more likely to share with individuals who help them”
(Brosnan 2010: 11).
As for the birth and spread of new traditions in animal societies, if in the 1960s,
the aforementioned birth of a new tradition among the macaques of the island of
Koshima caused a sensation, further empirical evidence has been accumulated over
the following decades. To limit ourselves just to a few examples, in 2007, in Côte
d’Ivoire, a coconut crushing site that had been used by local chimpanzee popula-
tions for no less than 4300 years was discovered (Mercader et al. 2007). The use
of stone tools has also been observed in some anthropoid monkeys and, in 2016, a
site for crushing cashew nuts, used by local communities of striped cebi (Sapajus
libidinosus) for over 700 years was found in Brazil, in the National Park of Serra da
Capivara (Haslam et al. 2016). Moreover, in 2014, an article by Catherine Hobaiter
and her collaborators, published in PLoS Biology, for the first time documented a
phenomenon of transmission of a cultural innovation consisting in the invention of a
sponge made with leaves and mosses among a group of wild chimpanzees (Hobaiter
et al. 2014).
Regarding the structure of the languages used by different cultural species,
and their differentiation through habits handed down for social learning, studies
conducted on cetaceans, on hundreds of species of songbirds and on some singing
primates show a tendency that is receiving continuous confirmation: the more our
technical abilities to record and analyze these languages increase, themore they reveal
a structural complexity, expressive variety, a network of relationships and local and
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regional divergences comparable in various aspects to those of human verbal and
singing languages (Campan and Scapini 2002; Naguib and Riebel 2014).
As for the capacity of social learning through imitation, its spread among not
only so-called “higher animals” but also in different species of invertebrates is now
established. As early as 1992, an essay published in Science by Graziano Fiorito and
Pietro Scotto spread the discovery that octopuses are capable of learning by imitation
(Fiorito and Scotto 1992). More recently, Lars Chittka and other researchers from
the Queen Mary University in London have published, in the same scientific journal,
a study in which they demonstrate that bees are able of solving complex problems by
imitating and improving on the behaviour of others that they have observed (Alem
et al. 2016).
3.3 Behaviour and Cultural Innovations as Driving Forces
of Animal Evolution
As I tried to clarify in the previous chapters, the developments of cognitive and
cultural ethology and those of evolutionary studies today seem to converge towards
a both post-genocentric and post-anthropocentric interpretation of the behaviour and
history of organisms.
In the perspective of contemporary ethology, behaviour is framed as a self -
regulative and cognitive interaction of organisms with their inter- and intra-specific
environment.
“Self-regulative activity and cognitive interaction” means that all organisms, of
every species at any time need to maintain or restore internal processes and physio-
logical states which allow them to stay alive and perform this function through explo-
rative and energy trading activities, absorbing and transforming matter and energy
present in the external environment and modifying both the latter and themselves.
What does “cognitive” mean here? In the perspective of contemporary ethology,
we can call “cognitive” all activities through which organisms explore their survival
chances and test their ability to actively change or regulate their physiological
and/or perceptual states. Each “cognitive” activity is in this sense, a production of
behavioural forms, or of self -regulative internal and external interactions, enabling
the performance of an organism’s life cycle. In this perspective, cognitive activities
are notable not only in animals, but in all organisms, because the simple fact that
organisms are able to survive constitutes evidence of their ability to make an object
of knowledge out of their own living conditions (Lorenz 1973; Riedl 1980; Celentano
2000, 2017).
These self-regulating and cognitive activities are obviously channeled and limited
through constraints imposed by the anatomy and morphology of the species,
intra-specific and interspecific context, individual characteristics and contingencies.
However, all this allows us to understand both the history of each existed and existing
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species and group, and the history of each body as an active and selective exploration
of their environment, and an active construction of their ecological and social niche.
This post-mechanical conception of behaviour has since the 1990s assumed, a
relevant role in both field and laboratory ethology, as well as in newmodels of evolu-
tionary biology derived from the developments of epigenetics and the introduction
of the evo-devo perspective.
In particular two notions, previously introduced by two eminent scholars of
the twentieth century like Conrad Hal Waddington and Jean Piaget, began to find
consensus and gain relevance through experimental findings such as “behavior
as motor of evolution” (Piaget 1976), and the existence of non-genetic hered-
itary systems capable of producing phenotypic modifications much faster than
genetic mutations (Waddington 1975; Piaget 1976), which we now call Epigenetic
Inheritance Systems (Jablonka and Lamb 2005).
What does it mean, in this new context, that behaviour is a “motor of evolution”?
To conceive behaviour as a driving force of the differentiation of organismsmeans
that when encountering environmental changes that endanger their survival or offer
them new growth opportunities, individuals, populations and species do not passively
wait for a favorable genetic mutation that will allow some of them to overcome
those obstacles or exploit those resources. Organisms, in the face of any change,
engage all the innate and/or learned cognitive and physiologic, social and (possibly)
cultural resources they possess to take advantage of it. Thismeans, in turn, that except
for rare cases in which they derive from significant genetic mutations, evolutionary
divergences start from the sphere of behaviours, fromchanges in ethological attitudes,
which are active responses to changes in an environmental, social or individual
context.
This approach to the comparative study of behaviors and evolutionary processes,
which in contrast to the genocentric one could be defined as etho-centric, also allows
us to recognize the role of input that cultural differentiations can play in the processes
of animal speciation and phylogeny. Scholars such as Jablonka, Lamb, Whiten, van
Schaik, Dugatkin, Beans have recently suggested that animal cultures, by passing on
and differentiating behaviour, can influence the evolution of species in various ways:
cultural innovations as tools or tactics to avoid predators and social processes that
stimulate the ability to learn, preserve and transmit useful information can increase
the chances of survival and reproduction of certain populations compared to others
(Whiten and van Schaik 2007). The development of complex languages and social
interactions can stimulate, as many scholars believe happened to our species, the
evolution of higher dimensions and performance of the brain (Dugatkin, 2001).
I personally think that it is fully correct to hypothesize that cultural differentia-
tions, modifying niches, diets and habits have also contributed to the differentiation
of somatic and physiological characteristics, to the processes of speciation, to the
differential reproduction. But, in my opinion, the possibility that this process will
continue to occur today and in the future is drastically limited by the effects of
anthropic impact. At least one million non-domesticated plant and animal species
and, among these, most cultural animal species are currently at high risk of extinction
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due to human intrusiveness, that is, the processes of destruction/anthropization of
the environments in which they lived (Ceballos and Erlich 2018).
At the time being, we can therefore consider highly probable, and partially proven,
that an incalculable number of animal traditions, such as many human cultures, has
disappeared, is disappearing or is living in conditions of regression, dispersion and
homologation, due to the human impact. Most existing animal cultures are now
living a hunted existence, seeing their traditional habitats eroded day after day. Of
course, this trend is not absolute. Some social species that manage to effectively para-
sitize humans, such as rats, are probably experiencing phases of increasing cultural
differences and culturally transmitted information. But, from a global point of view,
these few processes of differentiation are in no way comparable to the rhythms and
vastness of the processes of destruction of animal societies and impoverishment of
animal cultures induced by the anthropic impact in the last century, and currently
underway. This is also attested by a study conducted over ten years on 144 groups
of chimpanzees of central and southern Africa by a team of more than seventy
primatologists whose results were then compared with those collected in other 100
communities of chimpanzees in the Pan African Programme: The Cultured Chim-
panzee. The study, coordinated by primatologist AmmieKalan, led to the cataloguing
of 31 cultural behaviours and also showed that in groups of chimpanzees that live
in closer contact with human settlements the probability of encountering cultural
behaviour is 88% lower than in groups established in “low-impact areas” (Kühl et al.
2019: 1453). Practically, the chimpanzee groups that live closer to our species have
preserved 3 behavioural patterns handed down through social learning at most,
while the communities located far from human settlements show between 15 and 20
cultural behaviours.
3.4 Interspecific Cultural Studies (ICS) and Numanities
The discovery of animal thought and cultures has forced the humanities to begin
a self-critical review of the anthropocentric assumptions on which their tradition
has been based, for millennia (man as the only cultural, thinking, linguistic animal,
the one capable of feelings, cooperation, inventions, innovations etc.). The goal of
an adequate development of the comparative study of animal cultures, languages
and forms of thought required however much more effort: a comprehensive reform
of both scientific education and research organization oriented towards a full over-
coming of the division between life sciences and humanities. This means towards the
development of a meta-disciplinary area capable of combining biological, etholog-
ical and ecological skills with the cognitions andmethods ofmodern anthropological,
social, linguistic, aesthetic, and more generally humanistic studies in the contents of
a comparative study, not only of the human uses and traditions, but of all known and
knowable animal cultures. It is this meta-disciplinary which, as a first approxima-
tion, I indicate as being the field of Interspecific Cultural Studies. Its development
is, in many ways, a process already underway. In fact, as I explained, the attempt to
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develop this area should not be understood as the proposal of something completely
new that the author of these pages intends to introduce to the scientific field. Rather,
it is a project aimed at gathering, in both the fields of education and research, the set
of heterogeneous skills, transversal to the traditional disciplinary blocks, required by
a new and very complex subject of study which Western sciences began to address
only sixty years ago: animal minds and cultures, their history, their expressive forms
and productions.
For the humanities, a sector with which the study of cultural processes and
phenomena has traditionally coincided, this change implies an extension of their
field of study, a critical renewal of their theoretical and methodological tools and
an integration of their formative methods. That is: a (self) critical re-founding of all
their sectors aimed at inserting, in a coherent and competent way, the comparative
study of human cultural activities in the virtually much bigger but from a scientific
point of view, still nascent field of the comparative study of animal cultures.
In some areas of the human sciences this transition has now been underway for
quite some time; in others, the resistances to these transformations and extensions
are much wider. For example, not surprisingly, the post-anthropocentric turn we
discussed is clearly perceptible in a branch of the human sciences that since the
eighteenth century has been the closest to life sciences: anthropology. Today, in
fact, by anthropology we no longer intend only the study of man, as it traditionally
took place, because the anthropological field has increasingly merged with those
of primatology and cultural ethology (Rodman 1999). One of the skills currently
required for a good anthropologist is the ability to frame the comparative study of
past and present human cultures within the broader horizon of the comparative study
of the societies and cultures of our pre-human ancestors and of our sister species: the
great apes traditionally referred to as “anthropomorphic”. In turn, the comparative
study of anthropomorphic cultures finds its historical and genealogical placement
within the bigger horizon of a study of all the societies and cultures belonging to the
great suborder of Anthropoidea. Finally, the latter goes into the wider horizon of a
comparative study of all the animal cultures. Anthropology and human ethology are
thus closely related to cognitive and cultural ethology and evolutionary studies. It is
not by chance that, within the anthropological sector, the greatest resistance to these
contaminations is recorded, albeit with some exceptions, in the specific sub-field of
philosophical anthropology, particularly in the continental area and, within the latter,
by the Italian tradition. That is, in the disciplinary areas and in places that have been
cradles and emblems of the humanistic tradition.
Even the psychological sciences today include among their competences the
ability to compare the human mind with that of other animals and, even between
traditional resistance and cyclical counter-offensive, manifesting a tendency to over-
come both the anthropocentric and deterministic-biologistic approaches, which are
the two major paradigms that have competed in the past for the supremacy in this
field.
A similar situation, which sees at the same time the development of openings to
the interspecific sphere and the persistence of resistances and closures towards it,
can also be recorded in the context of contemporary linguistic and semiotic studies,
in which zoo-semiotics have gained their niche but only partially have managed to
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trigger a collective work of re-foundation of the basic concepts and methods of the
sector.
A third example of a humanistic discipline that has opened itself up, in recent
decades, to fruitful though still insufficient contaminations with cultural ethology
can be identified in the musicological field. In the last decades, with the birth of
zoo-musicology, the comparative study of human musical traditions has begun to
be rethought, re-elaborated and integrated by starting from a comparative study of
the traditions and productions of all animal species that practice an “aesthetic use
of communication sound” (Martinelli 2011). A study that implies the analysis of
the social and biological functions that these expressive traditions perform in the
animal societies that exhibit them, the reconstruction of the processes that lead to
their genesis and the comparison of the structural and formal aspects of their prod-
ucts. This contamination, or rather integration, offers to ethno-musicology, under-
stood as the comparative study of the human musical traditions, the possibility to
develop solid zoo-musicological and ethological bases and, at the same time, allows
cultural ethology and zoo-musicology to take advantage of the immense patrimony
of research and reflection developed by ethno-musicology and other branches of
musicological studies.
This integrative or contaminative approach can be extended to many disciplinary
sectors that deal with cultural activities and productions, therefore, to many fields
related to humanities.
From the comparative study of the learning processes, or of the techniques for
finding, using and transforming raw materials and energy sources, to the analysis
of languages, dances, songs, and processes of ritualization of behaviors, from the
study of the phenomena of dissimulation, deceit and espionage between members
of a group to that of the forms of resolution of social conflicts, or of dissemination
of innovations, there is almost no sphere of social and cultural action in which the
comparison between human societies and the community of other animal species is
not revealing instructive and surprising discoveries.
This comparison, however, will be adequately developed only if our university
systems are equipped to offer training courses and research structures capable of
integrating biological, ethological and ecological skills with the knowledge and study
methods developed by the humanistic tradition.
In other words, a research area such as the Interspecific Cultural Studies, and the
training courses suitable for its implementation, can be adequately developed only
when they become the object of a collective effort of the scientific community and
a structural pivot of university organization. Its implementation requires profound
and both practical and theoretical upheavals, which can be consolidated only through
a reallocation of several sectors of humanities within an interspecific comparative
perspective and a meta-disciplinary operational context. Moreover, they require,
in the field of the behavioural sciences, the overcoming not only of the traditional
dualisticCartesianmodels, but also of the “psycho-hydraulic” andmechanisticmodel
of classical and early cognitive ethology (Marchesini 2016), of the genocentric one of
“classical sociobiology” (deWaal 2001), as well as of the substantially deterministic
approach still today dominant in evolutionary psychology (Lieberman 2013).
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Listed in an extremely synthetic way, the main goals of Interspecific Cultural
Studies can be summarized in the following ten points:
• To promote a full overcoming of the division between life sciences and humanities
in the organization of both scientific training and research, aimed at training
generations of citizens and workers equipped with skills transversal to these two
traditional blocks and useful to tackle some of the new important scientific and
social challenges posed by our era;
• to revolutionize the traditional forms of human self-representation, paving the
way for post-anthropocentric forms of self-understanding in which man is just
one of the cultural animals, and to refound the methodologies, epistemological
references and narrative background of the humanitieswith a post-anthropocentric
and interspecific setting.
• to refocus ethology and behavioural science on a post-genocentric, post-
deterministic and post-mechanist approach, which considers all organisms as
selective agents capable of cognitive and explorative activities and cognitive and
selective behaviour as one of the main driving forces of evolution.
• to learn to compare human and non-human cultures and societies without falling
into the traditional opposition between anthropomorphism and anthropodenial;
• to collectively construct, through research, comparisons and debates, a meta-
disciplinary lexicon capable of attributing to concepts such as “culture”, “tradi-
tions”, “invention”, or “singing”, “dance”, “ritual”, meanings usable in reference
not only to humans, but also in non-human contexts;
• to critically insert the (chronologically) short history of human cultures into the
greater history of animal experiences, traditions and cultures spanning hundreds
of millions of years;
• to increasingly correlate research on animal cultures with a commitment to protect
them and the natural environments in which they are rooted;
• to increasingly implement the extension in the fields of cognitive ethology and
animal psychology of ethical rules that guarantee the non-invasiveness of study
methods and respect for the freedom of the subjects studied as in in the fields of
human ethology and psychology;
• to contribute to form new generations of teachers and scholars, students and socio-
cultural or environmental operators equipped with theoretical and practical skills
transversal to the traditional bipartition between humanities and life sciences and
capable of using them to adequately understand the environmental and social
impact of human activities;
• to contribute, as far as possible, starting each from their own specific field of study
or work, to the search for models of social and scientific development that are
alternative to those now dominant and capable of reversing the line promoted by
them that led to the environmental and social disasters now underway.
The program outlined in these ten points to me seems to converge, on several points,
with the intent of Numanities “to discuss the current crisis of the humanities and its
possible solutions, in a spirit that should be both critical and self-critical”, trough
very “Multi/Inter/Cross/Trans-disciplinary dialogues between humanities and social
3.4 Interspecific Cultural Studies (ICS) … 75
and/or natural sciences”, and “in the context, dynamics and problems of current
societies” (Martinelli 2016: 9).
ICSs follow in the wake of the proposal of Numanities to enhance humanistic
skills in new or broader research fields (in this case, the comparative study of
animal cultures), and at the same time promote a radical renovation of their methods,
theoretical assumptions and empirical contents.
The objective of contributing to the transition of humanities beyond anthropocen-
tric prejudice (and related mechanistic way of seeing all other organisms), which
characterizes ICS, in my opinion should in fact constitute the distinctive and char-
acteristic factors of Numanities, to the extent that I believe it should be made even
more explicit in a possible revision of their programmatic points, presented in the
Manifesto of Numanities (Martinelli 2016: 11–83).
In favour of the idea that this orientation could aim to, imagining a under construc-
tion Numanities building of, the metaphor of a master wall on which to graft its
various articulationswould represent, inmyopinion, the same intellectual and profes-
sional path of its main promoter. Indeed, the meta-disciplinary attitude that guided
Martinelli’s studies led him to make important contributions to the development
of areas such as zoo-semiotics (Martinelli 2007, 2010, 2017) and zoo-musicology
(Martinelli 2009, 2011) and to an updated criticism of anthropocentrism. His anti-
hierarchical sensibility very soon pushed him towards anti-speciesist ethics. In short,
his whole intellectual path attests to the centrality that the father of Numanities
recognizes to the anti-anthropocentric commitment, with all that it entails in terms
of criticism of modern and contemporary human societies and their models of
development.
Finally, although this aim is not particularly emphasized in the programmatic
points, the centrality that the post-anthropocentric approach plays in the Numanities
project is especially signaled by the fact that the case studies 2A and 2B, proposed in
the second part of Arts and Humanities in progress, are focused precisely on it. They
respectively regard the alleged “special specificity” of man, or human uniqueness
(Martinelli 2016: 144–160), and the relationship between “language and interspecific
communication” (Martinelli 2016: 161–201).
The ICS approach aims at overcoming the traditional man-animal dichotomies
on the direction of a post-anthropocentric and at the same time post-genocentric
approach to the study of animal (and therefore also human) behaviour and evolution.
They represent an attempt to contribute to promoting forms of self-understanding of
human beings and societies emancipated from developmental myths and based on a
global ecological-ethological perspective that takes into account the interests of the
community of living beings in which we are immersed and the repercussions that
human activities have on it.
Indeed, contributing to the overcoming of the anthropocentric approach means,
today, also contributing to a radical criticism of the goal of an ever more total domi-
nation, and of an ever more indiscriminate exploitation, of all human and non-human
natural resources that the modern and contemporary societies continue to pursue,
even though it has proved patently unsustainable. For the same reasons, to contribute
to the research, testing and spreading of ethical parameters and models of social and
scientific development in opposition to those that predominate today seems to me
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the most important and ultimate objective which the attempt to promote a transition
from Humanities to Numanities should aim for.
3.5 Interspecific Cultural Convergences (ICC): A New
Object and Project of Study
Among the objects of InterspecificCultural Studies, a particular group of them should
occupy a privileged place for its relevance to both evolutionary and ethological
perspectives: the cases of cultural convergent evolution among different species, or
Interspecific Cultural Convergences (ICC).
In ethology, as in morphology and in the anatomical area, cases in which, during
phylogeny, different species have developed similar structural and/or functional traits
that are not inherited from common ancestors are called convergent evolutions, evolu-
tionary convergences, or simply convergences (Heymer 1977: 74; Mainardi 1992:
221–222). The wings in flying insects, bats and birds are a typical example.
I here suggest extending the concept of evolutionary convergence to the
phenomena inherent in cultural evolution, defining:
• as cultural convergences orCultural Convergent Evolutions (CCE) all (and exclu-
sively) cases in which it is historically proven that a technique, an invention, a
discovery, an expressive form or a use have been developed by different cultures
and populations in reciprocal independence4;
• as InterspecificCultural Convergences (ICC) all (and only) cases inwhich cultural
convergences occur not only between populations of the same species, but also
between societies and traditions of different species.
It should however be clarified that the concept of ICC so intended presents some
differences from that of “convergent evolution” normally adopted in evolutionary
studies: “Convergent evolution is typically defined as the repeated evolution of
similar traits in independent evolutionary lineages inhabiting similar environments”
(Harmon 2013). However, cases of ICC can also occur among species living in very
different environments. The case of singing is emblematic in this regard: from a
taxonomic point of view, singing is a phenomenon appearing in the animal world
in a miscellaneous way. It appears in species that are genetically, phylogenetically
and ecologically different from one another as cetaceans, monkeys as Hylobatidae,
Tarsius, Indri and Callicebus, as all human cultures spread over the planet, as the
mice and thousands of species of singing birds (Celentano 2016, 2018).
The fact that singing is developed in species so distant from each other means
that this convergence cannot be explained on the basis of “homology”, intended as
characteristics inherited through a common ancestor.
4This concept of CCE should not be confused with that of “Convergence Culture”, recently intro-
duced by H. Jenkins (2006), which refers to the effects of interactions between traditional and new
digital media.
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The diffusion of singing in so different clades and environments is therefore the
result of mutually independent, but in some aspects similar, evolutionary processes
and selective pressures. For this reason, it can be adequately understood only by
identifying and comparing the functions that this kind of expression plays, and the
forms it has assumed, in all these animal societies, just as is normally done in the
comparison of human singing traditions and performances. This approach can be
extended, in the perspective of ICS, to all the cases of ICC.
The cataloging of ICC cases and the research on the causes of these evolutionary
convergences are still at their first steps. To became able to deepen our knowledge
on these phenomena we will need to integrate the methodologies of the comparative
studyof uses and customs, communication systems and expressive forms, social regu-
lation devices and material techniques, developed by the humanities, with the obser-
vation and intra- and interspecific comparison methods of contemporary ethology.
We will also need to construct open databases to determine a methodical comparison
between products, forms and intra-specific differentiations of all the animal cultures.
I would like to conclude this section by proposing, in the following figure, a first
provisional mapping of the most common cases of ICC and of some of the factors
that may have contributed to their genesis. It is of course only a first sketch that can
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3.6 ICC: The Case of Singing
In this final section I intend to illustrate the biological and social functions singing
performs in different animal species and some converging aspects they present. I
chose to proceed in a way that may seem strange: comparing the functions that
ethologists have attributed to animal songs with those the traveler, ethnologist and
writer Bruce Chatwin attributed to the “songs of the ancestors” of the Australian
Aborigines (Chatwin 1987). The reasons for that are the following: the communi-
ties of Australian natives are those that longer than any other were preserved from
exchanges with others (practically, until Cook’s expedition in 1770). Singing played
a very important social role in their traditions. Finally, although some biologically
and socially important features of the songs, such as courtship, are not reflected in
his descriptions,5 Chatwin’s analysis in a surprising way illuminates some of the
features and uses of songs which can also be found in other animal communities.
Chatwin attributes three different functions to the songs of the ancestors:
• totemic memories of their clan and individual recognition documents. Indices of
the familiar and mythical roots from which an individual comes, the songs allow
the identification of each member of the group through his affiliation with his
“totemic” ancestors (Chatwin 1987: 4, 12–13).6
• Melodic and vocal maps of a territory, travel guides for migration or occasional
shifts, information vehicle about territorial features and boundaries that cannot
be crossed without risk (Chatwin 1987: 13, 14, 69, 134–135).
• “Pass”: sound attestations that allow to recognize a person as “the owner of that
path”; documents transmitted by cultural inheritance, in order to identify who has
the right of transit in a given territory and the right to give or deny to others the
transit permission on it (Chatwin 1987: 14, 70).
Is it possible to find equivalents of these three functions in the songs of other species?
Here is a brief analysis of these three points.
Songs as individual recognition ‘documents’, indices of the geographical
and family roots from which an individual comes, allowing mutual recognition
among members of a group or colony.
At the end of the 1950s, Weeden and Falls interpreted some duets between male
birds in neighbouring territories as exchanges destined to get to know each other
(Weeden and Falls 1959), and Marler suggested that the melodies of birds could
provide information for individual identification (Marler 1960). A decade later, two
studies conducted in different areas (Thompson andO’HaraRice 1970; Emlen 1971),
documented this feature in the song of the male of the Passerina Cyanea: in case of a
sound intrusion of new neighbors, males modified their singing adding to the specific
5Chatwin’s notes privilege,within a rich set of local songs, only a few.Hedid not aimat an exhaustive
cataloging of native songs, but the existence of courtship serenades in aboriginal traditions is attested
by other authors (Lockwood 1962; Englaro 1998; Gioia 2015).
6Similar cases of anthroponymic functions of songs are reported by other scholars concerning
Australian populations such as Warramunga (Bosi 1994: 116) and Aranda (Ibidem: 95–96).
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sequence of their species some individually differentiated final parts. The songs of
all the members of the group were so marked by a different end. Further studies
have shown that there are intermediate layers between the songs of a species and its
individual variations. According to Feekes (1977), the Cacicus cela emits colony-
specific songs that have the function of a colony password and similar functions are
found (Bailey and Baker 1982) in the Virginia quail (Colinus virginianus). Starting
in the 1960s, PeterMarler andMiwako Tamura (1962, 1964),William Thorpe (1961,
1972), Wolfgang Wickler (1986) and many others contributed to the early stages of
the study of local and regional dialects. The existence of “micro geographic (or local
dialects) and macro geographic differences (regional dialects)” (Martinelli 2011:
238) was in themeantime discovered in the communicative systems of other animals,
like cetaceans, and it is now regarded as a phenomenon widespread in mammals
and birds. For example, studying the songs of the Batis molitor in nine different
regions of East Africa, ethologists and zoo-musicologists found dialectal variations
that concerned two aspects in each of them: the presence of a sequence of three
descending sounds or of longer sequential sequences, and differences in the order
of the three base sounds, in which the middle height may be in the second or third
position (Wickler 1986: 76–77).
In many cases, the development of local song traditions is a prerequisite for the
invention of personal songs and their use for identifying individuals and reinforcing
parental or couple ties.We find an interesting example of this in the African Lanarius
aethiopicus major: “here, the members of a pair learn to perform duets with one
another and, while adopting certain phrases and rhythms which are characteristic of
the locality, work out between themselves the duets which are sufficiently individu-
alistic to enable a bird to distinguish and keep contact with its mate by singing duets
with it or, to be more exact, singing antiphonally with it in the dense vegetation in
which they usually live” (Thorpe 1972: 160–161).
These performances of the Ethiopian shrike revealed, in later studies, even more
complex interactions which include a dozen of different pair duets and many duets
between competing males and/or neighbors, both divisible, from a formal point of
view, into two subgroups: unisons and antiphonal duets. The latter, in the case ofmale
territorial duets, are, in turn, divided into exchanges of identical notes and varied
exchanges. There are also cases in which an individual sings by issuing two different
voices at the same time and cases where individuals who lost their companion, using
this technique, alone run the sequence they used to perform as a couple (Harris 2000).
Finally, there are songs that mix different dialects and cases of simultaneous running
of two different types of duet, one of courting or strengthening the couple tie, the
other as a sort of duet/duel with a rival (Wickler 1986).
Songs like melodic and sung maps of the territory, guides for migrations
and occasional or cyclical displacements, which transmit information about
resources and dangers and on “borders” that cannot be overcome without risk.
Well known in this category, are the cases of the Lira bird (Menura novaehollan-
diae), that includes in its own sounds environmental and animal sounds collected
from the surrounding territory, thus offering an acoustic mapping of it (Dalziell and
Magrath 2012), and that of the Australian magpie which exchanges information
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on food sources and migratory routes with con-specifics through songs (Rogers and
Kaplan 1998: 86). Alsowell-documented is the use of vocalizations with information
and referential functions in birds such as the northern royal gull (Larus argentatus),
or the Indicator indicator that use song to locate food resources.
With regard to whales, Roger Payne was the first to hypothesize, even if in a
doubting form, that “the humpbacks use their songs a bit like Australian aborigines,
whose songs contain descriptions of the road and the points where you are and tell
about the characteristics of the scenery you are in” (Payne 1995: 165). Martinelli
observed, in turn, that “migratory species of cetaceans use songs as geographic
maps, in a way that cannot help but recall Chatwin’s songs” (Martinelli 2011: 163).
Stimpert, Peavey, Friedlaender and Nowacek (Stimpert et al. 2012), conducting a
study on ten male individuals of humpback whale to which they applied multi-
sensors that allow deep recordings, have reinforced this hypothesis. Their research
led them to conclude that the choir repertory ofMegaptera novaeangliaemales does
not exclusively include courtship songs and does not only appear in the breeding
season. In the vicinity of the migratory season, the individuals they watched were
leaving for food, and using songs that were significantly different from those of
courtship to communicate remotely.
Songs as a “pass” that allow to recognize an individual as “path owner”: a
person who has the “right” of transit on that path that may enjoy the resources
that it offers and grant or deny to others transit.
The words “right” and “owner” that Chatwin chooses to describe this use of
songs, and the reference to the bargaining practices that take place through songs
exchanges, at a first glance would seem to preclude a comparison with non-human
cultures. However, we are here facing notions of “right” and “property” that are very
different from those used by the Western traditions. In fact, they do not sanction the
fixedproperty of a territory anddonot permanently interrupt the other’s right of transit
in it or of usufruct of its products. They only attest that someone has the privilege
of crossing it, practicing hunting, gathering or exchanging without being attacked
and receiving help when needed during this crossing. Looking at this profile, this
type of use of songs presents remarkable analogies with the “territorial” delimitation
function that ethologists have found in the song of the adult males of many of the
singing birds.
But to determine whether we can detect analogies or convergences with this use
of songs in other animal species, one should ascertain whether other animals can,
through intense gradients or formal differentiations of their singing, not only signal
the presence of an x male in a y territory, and also not only send a generic message
of transit prohibition or allowance. We should check as well:
• whether the resident male responses depend or not on the ability/inability of the
intruder to be individually recognized through their song;
• whether or not we can find any differences in the songs that the resident
male performs in the presence of intruders depending on their being unknown
individuals, new entries or long-term frequentations;
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• whether adjustments and “bargaining” actually occur between these animals
through singing or not.
Recent observations indicate that generally both the bird that enters the territory of
another and the one already allocated in it may adopt various communication strate-
gies that reduce or intensify aggressive reactions. These choices are manifested by
variations in the form and intensity of the song, or through options which consist
in overlapping or not on the other’s emissions. Recently, a study titled The Social
Interaction of Song in Song Sparrows introduced the concept of “acoustic ownership
marker” (Burt and Beecher 2008). The study shows that the songs of the resident
males can perform the function of deterrent to many varying degrees of intensity,
some of which seem to include the possibility of resolving small boundary controver-
sies between neighbors without any physical clashes, only through the exchange of
songs. According to the authors, these interactions appear like a continuous strategic
game of escalation and/or de-escalation of aggressive elements, driven by execu-
tive stench and other parameters such as the overlapping or not of the songs and
the repetition or variation of the verse performed on the other. Different dynamics
reveal the exchange of songs between “first-year neighbors” and “neighbors of long
time” (Ibidem). The authors suggest that the use of a certain kind of “conventional
matching”, which arises an agreement on repertoires that can be paired or alternated
(Ibidem, p. 89), can be attested between long time neighbors.
Territorial defense and recognition of the con-specifics that pass through the
exchange of songs are closely linked to the last group of the biosocial functions of
singing we have mentioned: those related to courtship, mating and strengthening of
the couple’s bond. Two are the main groups of non-human protagonists of the studies
about this kind of song: singing birds (for an introduction, Marler and Slabbekoorn
2004: 39–78; for an update, Naguib and Riebel 2014) on Mysticeti (for an intro-
duction, Payne 1995; for an update, Suzuki et al. 2006). More recently, these model
species have been added to others. For example, individual differences and local
dialects have been identified in the male-female couple duets of the crested gibbon
(Geissmann and Nijman 2006; Thinh et al. 2011). The courtship vocalization of
mice, brought to frequencies which are audible and distinguishable by human ears,
revealed melodic qualities comparable, for beauty and complexity, to those of the
birds (Chabout et al. 2015).
Among Mysticeti, the species whose song has been most studied is Megaptera
novaeangliae. Payne and McVay (1971) were the first to decode the structures and
functions of their songs. Thanks to their efforts, it is today well-known that the male
humpback whale produces melodies which are differentiated by geographical area
and are renewed year after year or, more drastically, in multi-year cycles. They have
complex structures, composed by different parts or “themes”, consisting of ascending
and descending sounds, lasting between 20 and 30 min, and can be repeated several
times. Recently Suzuki, Buck and Tyack (Suzuki et al. 2006), examining the songs
of 16 male humpbacks and thanks to a specifically designed software, have analyzed
their basic structures. The algorithm has mathematically confirmed the hypothesis
of Payne and McVay which states that humpback whales have their own syntax and
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that their song, like human speech, is based on a hierarchical language, consisting
of lengthy sound blocks with increasing complexity, inserted into each other as in a
system of Chinese boxes. A syntactic system, in many respects, analogous to human
verbal language with its subdivisions in phonemes, phrases, words, propositions and
periods is being found in an ever-increasing number of social mammals and birds.
The same conclusions have led to the analysis of the vocal languages of cetaceans
such as dolphins and “killer whales”, of mice and especially of sparrows and other
birds, from which new confirmations come continuously. Among the latest, a study
on the song of the Parus minor (Suzuki et al. 2016).
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Part II
Knowledge, Subjectivity, and Intelligence
in Non-Human Animals
Chapter 4
Animal Learning: An Epistemological
Problem
Roberto Marchesini
Abstract Learning is one of the most important processes in the development of
animal behavioural identity. Since the mid-nineteenth century, and especially during
the twentieth century, there have beenmany explanatory proposals andmodels aimed
at describing this process. In particular, the North American behaviourist school and
the Central European school of ethology have produced two strongly structured—but
incompatible—traditions in termsof their explicativemodels. In the secondhalf of the
twentieth century, the mentalist interpretation increasingly succeeded in explaining
some aspects of expressive intentionality. Today, there are several models that are
often forcibly juxtaposed, even when they are incompatible: this is the case with
associationist, psychoenergetic and cognitive models. The question I will address is
whether this abundance could be replaced by a single model capable of subsuming
and resolving the contradictions that still exist in all these explanations.
4.1 Premise
The evaluation of learning processes in animals combines the three following aspects
of the ontological analysis of animal beings. (i) The adaptive protagonism of the
animal in its interface with the outside world, in its extraction of problems from
it, and in its formulation of answers that are helpful in solving the problem. (ii)
The meaning of the endowment realized through learning and, in particular, whether
this endowment should be considered an automatism that drives the individual and
therefore presents a relationship of cogency between structure and function, or if
it is rather an instrument used by the animal. (iii) The relationship between phylo-
genetic (i.e. innate) resources and ontogenetic (i.e. learned) resources, especially if
related to different domains and within a ratio of inverse proportionality, or if mutu-
ally dimensioned and therefore directly proportional. These are three central topics
in the ontological definition of animality, from which one can draw two essentially
different ways of considering the status of the animal being: (i) the idea that the
animal is a totally passive entity, driven by automatisms that are analytically respon-
sible for its behaviour, with the different elements and factors in question presenting
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a specific domain of intervention; (ii) the idea that “animal-being” involves owner-
ship of one’s endowments, a systematic and emergentist view of the predicates, and
protagonism—not only in the intersection with the world, but also in the construction
of the endowments themselves.
It is evident that each learning process is placed at the centre of the three points
outlined above, tilting the scale toward one of the two possible ontological inter-
pretations. However, it is undeniable that all animals are always called to learn:
in fact, phylogeny is unable to achieve definitive adaptation, because the world is
constantly changing. The life of every animal is indeed a constant challenge: it is
necessary to identify important phenomena as opposed to background noise, to act
andbe differently involved in various situations dependingon their relevance, to know
how to interpret events based on their risks and opportunities, to develop strategies
and specific tactics for each type of problem, to anticipate events in order to react
promptly, to find the appropriate solution to the challenges of each situation, and so
forth. It is a matter of creating a kind of interior/exterior mirror, just as the leaf orga-
nization in a tree crown depends on the specific lighting conditions, which enable an
indispensable adjustment of position even in situations of unchanging environmental
conditions foreseen by phylogeny.
Today we know that there is something in nature called the “principle of singular-
ity”, as specified by several authors, including Ilya Prigogine: in other words, reality
may respect the dictates of similarity and repetition, but never identity. In spite of
Laplace’s demonic hypothesis, it is therefore necessary to also employ diachronic
and historical analysis in physics. Mirrored adaptation is thus complicated by the
fact that the environment varies naturally due to various factors. These include: (i)
environmental factors because, despite the geological stability of a given environ-
ment, there are significant variations in all parameters; (ii) factors related to the niche
and the food chain, because here too some mechanisms that influence fitness, like
competition, predation, parasitism, are not stable; (iii) factors that cannot be reduced
to mutations within the population to which the individual belongs. Phylogenetic
selection certainly produces a sort of adaptive textbook: an approximate scheme that
puts the organism in the best conditions to face its survival challenges. However, it
is also undeniable that organisms must constantly adapt their profile and the various
apparatuses that compose it. Ontogenetic adaptation differs from phylogenetic adap-
tation, even if the two processes are not clearly separated: (i) Today we know that
some properly somatic experiences can produce effects that can be passed on epige-
netically to subsequent generations; (ii) Furthermore, it is obvious that individuals,
through their behaviour and, one might say, through their discoveries and creative
results, can influence selective pressure and thus indirectly intervene in phylogenetic
screening.
Therefore, individual responses are crucial throughout the adaptation chain, with
learning processes, i.e. the subject’s ability to introject experiences bymodifying their
behavioural canon, playing a central role. This brings me back to highlighting the
link between the evaluation of the learning process and the ontological considerations
concerning the animal condition. Learning is first and foremost about the concept
of challenge, that is, a discrepancy between the animal’s internal needs, which are
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oriented towards pleasure, and the characteristics of the external environment, that is,
everything that surrounds this individual in terms of risks and opportunities.However,
learning has got to do with another discrepancy as the motive for adaptation efforts,
namely the gapbetweenwhat the animal seeks and themeans to sustain it.Wecan then
say that every learning process aims to narrow this gap. In summary, the behaviour of
the individual is assessed in terms of its parameters of effectiveness/efficiency with
regard to the relationship between two aspects. The first is the problematic context
with its objective challenges, when it confronts the subject with the urgent need to
intervene in order to safeguard their state of well-being, or vice versa, becoming
a field of possibilities to be seized, i.e. possible objectives that require solving a
subjective problem. The second is the attempt to work on distance, in the sense of
moving away from risks or getting closer to goals through responsive or propositional
solutions, evaluating the consequence of one’s intervention, i.e. how the context has
changed following the operation implemented in a given behaviour. Learning means
acting on both fronts.
If, instead, we consider the context as objectively problematic—that is, as a stim-
ulating entity in itself—and the response as formulated in an equally objective-causal
way, we can hypothesize that learning is the result of a close association between
a state S (a stimulus) and an action R (a response) consolidated by a valid conse-
quence in terms of effectiveness/efficiency (reinforcement). This is the explanatory
option traditionally preferred in the description and explanation of animal behaviour,
which happens in one of two ways. One involves embracing a mainly reflexogenic-
associative view, as in the case of the North American Behaviorist school. The other
relies on amore species-specific perspective, involvingGestalt and elicitative settings
prior to the stimulus and consequent choreographic responsive predefinitions—this
is the case with the Central European psychoenergetic view. The two schools, which
are divergent and sometimes antinomical in their epistemological model, share the
negation of any protagonism or subjectivism in the individual-world interface. Both
explanatory mechanisms deny the animal any presence-will in the management of
its here-and-now. As if to say: animality is a simple reactive function, like the flow
of a river or the fall of a body, regulated by the interaction of internal/external objec-
tive variables that lead to rigidly determined flows-waterfalls, sometimes in a linear
way, sometimes through exponential progressions or recursive circuits. One of the
topics, or perhaps the main topic, of this debate is the animal’s ability to learn from
experience, or to adapt its behaviour not only to specific circumstances, but also
by virtue of previous events, introjecting their past experience. This biographical
becoming of animal individuality is what’s at stake in the explanatory models of the
two approaches mentioned: on the one hand there is behaviourism, which claims to
infer a universal law of learning beyond the species boundary; on the other there is
classic ethology, which instead regards learning as a further element of adherence
to a common ethos, that is, as participation in a social style aimed at intraspecific
homologation and trans-specific disjunction. This is undoubtedly where we need to
start in order to discuss the desubjectivation of the animal, so as to understandwhether
these explanatory models can account for the diversity of animal learning processes
or, conversely, whether it is time to reconsider this entire explanatory paradigm.
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4.2 The Debate on the Animal Mind
Since the 1970s, there has been a substantial debate about the animal mind and
the different levels of intentionality in non-humans, mainly thanks to the research
in primatology and later also in various animal categories. The debate on animal
intelligence had already begun at the beginning of the twentieth century: some of
its forefathers include disciples of Charles Darwin like George Romanes (1912).
The topic was later developed through observational and experimental sessions and
based on very different epistemological assumptions, such as the holistic approach
of Gestalt psychologists like Wolfgang Köhler.1 In the dialogue between the reflex-
ogenic hypothesis and the hypothesis of an intellectual act, the topic of learning has
been the focus of discussion from the very beginning, as evidenced by the debate on
insight or by the case of Clever Hans (Sebeok and Rosenthal 1981; Despret 2015).
However, even following Lloyd Morgan’s extension of the parsimony canon, it was
preferred to follow the reductionist and reflexogenic path inaugurated by Ivan Pavlov
(1927).
Things changed in the second half of the twentieth century, when the elaborative
model of the cognitive approach began to take hold in human psychology and the
first research was carried out on the resolvent processes put in place by animals
in the face of precise challenges. The cognitive approach owes much to the rise of
computer science, from Claude Shannon and Weaver’s information theory (1963) to
the development of computational models and applications by Alan Turing (1950)
and John Von Neumann and Kurzweil (2012). The dualism of “hardware and soft-
ware” brought to the fore mentalist theories that understand the mind as a packet of
information or as an organization of the substrate (for example, the synaptic network,
but not only) based on a particular connection scheme that, like software, is capable
of processing input data. Thus, the point was to move from an associative to a “pro-
cessing” view of data, which inevitably separates the endowment (the software) from
the functional outcome, since several functions can be obtained with the same appli-
cation. Hence a third interpretative model of animal learning, called to explain all
those behavioural modifications that cannot be accounted for by the two traditional
approaches. This is the situation we find ourselves in today, and the complications
that this entails are beyond question.
The problem is not only descriptive and explanatory, but also epistemological,
because there is no doubt that the current tripartite division is a redundancy, in
addition to bearing ambivalent and contradictory aspects and obvious contradictions.
Therefore, I will try to find a model that brings together all the evidence we have
in the various areas of animal learning. As for the choice of model, I will refer
to some basic epistemological aspects: (i) the subsiding principle, i.e. a model’s
ability to explain several phenomena or to keep apparently different events under the
same explanatory umbrella; (ii) the guiding principle, i.e. a model’s ability to solve
1For a presentation of the Gestalt theory, a psychological current developed in Germany at the
beginning of the twentieth century, whose privileged field of investigation was perception, see W.
Köhler (1970).
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inconsistencies found in other explanatory models, bringing exceptions back to the
rule; (iii) the parsimony principle, i.e. a model’s ability to use fewer explanatory
tools or tautological concepts; and (iv) the falsifiability principle, i.e. a model’s
ability to present its assumptions in a clear way, so they can be subject to rebuttal or
counter-evidence.
4.3 The Analytical Approach in the Explanation
of Learning
Finding correlation links (every time x happens, y also happens) or causation links
(if I act on x, y happens) between different stimuli or between stimuli and responses
appears to be an adaptive priority for the individual. At first glance, this conjunc-
tive grammar does not seem to follow any other rule than putting together events
with spatial or temporal contiguity, as the philosopher David Hume already pointed
out (1896). Learning, in this sense, would mean nothing other than establishing
connections between contingencies, with the only limitations to total freedom of
association being: (i) as regards the stimulating entities, possible sensory accesses;
(ii) as regards the responses implemented, the performative potentials made possible
by a given somatic structure.
According to a reflexogenic interpretation of behaviour that was en vogue at
the beginning of the twentieth century in the light of Ivan Pavlov’s research on
conditioned reflexes and Jacques Loeb’s theories on tropism, learning is interpreted
as a mechanical act in which a stimulus is strictly, linearly, and atomically connected
to a reaction. The associative-behavioural view undoubtedly has some advantages:
(i) it is easy to refute and can be reproduced under controlled, quasi-experimental
conditions; (ii) it does not appeal to constructed entities or, better, is based on concepts
that strongly adhere to objectively verifiable entities, such as the relationship between
reinforcement and food reward; (iii) it is intuitive with respect to the hedonic and
survival principles of the individual, since the idea that repeated useful behaviours
produce pleasure appears obvious; and (iv) it responds to the canon of explanatory
simplicity, in its direct connection between the stimulus input and the response output.
For these reasons, the reaction mechanism became the predominant explanation
model in the first half of the twentieth century and still exerts considerable influence
today. The stimulus-response link here takes on the title of “behavioural automa-
tism”, i.e. an imperative that moves the animal-puppet like a thread, renewing the
Cartesian dictate. We find it in the psycho-energetic mechanism, which according to
classical ethology produces the innate instinctive expression through the key signal,
but above all in the animal learning model that underlies the concept of conditioning.
This approach found a coherent and seemingly exhaustive formulation in the episte-
mological framework of behaviourism, promoted by John Watson in 1913 and then
supported in an even more paradigmatic way by Burrhus Skinner (1957).
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If we analyze the findings that followed one another from Pavlov to Thorndike
(1965) in the late nineteenth century—in the wake of Charles Darwin’s continuative
proposal made in the essay The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
(1873) and then resumed in an even more poignant way by his disciple George John
Romanes—we will find a need for a reductionist counter-reform. Learning could
be traced back to very different events. For example, it could be attributed to the
quantitative remodulation of an innate response to given stimuli, that is, not to the
construction of new associations, but to intervention in the response index, as is
the case with addictive or sensitizing phenomena, hence the term “non-associative
learning.” Or else, it could be traced back to building new associations, new ways of
responding to particular stimuli through links between a stimulus and a response in
such a way as to create specific responding and operating associations. The reflex-
ogenic view found a degree of coherence with the reductionist need that, after the
case of Clever Hans, gained full legitimacy in Conwy Lloyd Morgan’s canon.
In the first decades of the twentieth century, a reductionist viewwas advocated that
ignores thementalistic dimension of the animal in its different stages of intentionality.
This paradigm also embraces an atomistic conception of behaviour, explained on the
basis of automatisms that are believed to autonomously produce animal expression
through a trigger mechanism. I would like to clarify that this analytical approach
not only fails to refer to mentalistic concepts at the various levels of awareness, but
starts from the assumption that every behaviour, however complex, is nothing but
the result of a sum of switches acting in a disjointed manner.
The real victim of this approach is not consciousness, but the systemic concep-
tion of the explanation. Learning is obviously evaluated—and in animals it cannot be
otherwise—on the basis of the behavioural changes it produces. However, this model
transforms an epistemic need into an ontological principle and into an epistemolog-
ical canon, hypothesizing that animal behaviour is the result of individual associative
elements (atomistic model). These elements are assumed to function autonomously,
albeit interacting with one another, ignoring the principles of complexity, i.e. all the
predictions that exist in a system—for example, the organizational characteristics of
complex systems, the emerging qualities, and the threshold systems. In other words,
referring to the mind does not mean ipso facto admitting introspective arguments
or appealing to consciousness, but rather considering behaviour in terms of expres-
sion—from the Latin exprimo, in the sense of clarifying or bringing out the functional
result of a system—using models based on complex systems.
After all, it is obvious that a synaptic network or neuromodulation is more similar
in its dynamics to a complex system than the mechanisms of a clock. In a complex
system, qualities do not depend only on the ingredients, but also on the informa-
tion—one could say on the recipe—that organizes or brings together the ingredients,
not only in compositional-functional terms but also in an interactive-emergent sense.
The elements work together: (i) in a global-partial way, depending on the situation,
giving rise to a plurality of functional states; (ii) on different hierarchical levels, and
not in a horizontal chain, realizing functional molarities that supersede on molec-
ular pluralities; and (iii) on a multitude of functional conjugations, so that the 1:1
ratio between structure and function is never possible. Among other things, ignoring
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the fact that information is carried on a network—like the synaptic one—means
deliberately not taking into consideration the characteristics of the neurobiological
substrate. Therefore, I believe that the real weakness of the analytic paradigm lies in
its cybernetic genealogy, which is based on direct feedback and does not take into
account what we know about systematics.
The behaviourist model, ignoring all that is not directly observable, considers the
mind as awhole and all the variables referable to it as a “black box”, i.e. as entities that
can only be inferred. Therefore, such elements cannot be part of an explanatory theory
aimed at responding to the canons of objective and simple verification—a criterion
formulated in the so-called “Ockham’s Razor”, taken up by Lloyd Morgan’s “law of
parsimony”. Learning, in this sense, would be nothing but the construction of new
automatisms that link a stimulus to a response in a direct and imperative way, in a
1:1 relationship between structure and function. Hence the mechanistic cogency and
the predictability of inference, in a universal grammar of learning that does not allow
for variations of order-degree, but above all makes no reference to a systemics and a
functional plurality of structures.
The behaviourist model also excludes: (1) references to the species-specific
dimension of behaviour because, as said, it claims to construct a universal grammar
and an environmental prevalence; (2) any deductive elements in the performance of
actions, also because it denies the resolvent approach to challenges, preferring the
reactive one based on random attempts; and (3) the molarity of behaviour, through
the denial of any form of teleology in any response that involves complex strate-
gies and dedicated tactics, whereas complexity is seen as a linear sequence of S-R
atomic elements. Undoubtedly, this is a very structured epistemological framework,
responding to a cybernetic explanatory model: learning is like a course correction
made by reinforcing mechanisms that act on blind, purposeless expressions, and
through random attempts that are neither directed at anything nor based on pre-
existing skills. Behaviourism embraces research on habituation, sensitization and
conditional reflexes, but its real workhorse is operant conditioning, first developed
by Edward Lee Thorndike.
The American psychologist working at Columbia University formulated the three
laws of learning in the first decades of the twentieth century, based on research in
animal psychology: (i) the law of exercise, whereby learning is gradual and improves
with repetition; (ii) the lawof transfer,whereby a response acquired in a given circum-
stance can be generalized in similar situations; and (iii) the law of effect, whereby
learning takes place according to the consequences of a given behaviour (Thorndike
1971). And it is thanks to this last law that behaviourists developed the process
known as “operant” or instrumental conditioning, much more coherent with the US
cultural climate. The fundamental concept in the explanation of operant conditioning
is that of “reinforcement”, aimed at assigning a binary arithmetic or quantitative value
to the consequence, where: (1) +(positive) reinforcement increases the probability
of a given behaviour; (2) −(negative) reinforcement, vice versa, decreases it. This
dichotomy was later re-elaborated, transforming the reinforcement into a factor that
always increases the probability of a given behaviour, and inserting theword “punish-
ment” to define something that decreases the probability of repetition. Therefore, the
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+ and− signs were used both in the reinforcement and in the punishment to indicate
the act of administering something (+) or subtracting something (−), thus reaching a
fourfold view of the consequential event. The principle of operant conditioning then
gave life to a complex set of methodological and explanatory possibilities, such as
chaining, shaping, etc.
To understand the foundations of the behaviourist approach it is essential to start
from six “explanatory principles”, which cannot be traced back to the law of effect,
but rather to the conceptual framework of the law itself. The principles are the
following. (1) The external world is made of objectively stimulating entities and
not of a complex background of entities-events that the individual must investigate,
experiencing them in a subjective way. (2) The context is objectively problematic in
demanding a response, because problems do not come from a subjective distinction
between objectives-expectations and available operational resources, that is, from a
perceived gap to be filled. (3) The reinforcement is an unexpected event, the unpre-
dicted final point of the process: envisioning a goal at the alpha/omega of the process
would mean falling back into a teleological and mentalistic view. (4) The attempt
is always random and not chosen on the basis of the specific characteristics of the
problem: claiming otherwise would imply an introspective and resolvent view of
the learning process. (5) The grammar of learning is universal and can be applied
as such without any species-specific difference: claiming otherwise would entail a
non-objective and non-environmental view of the learning process. Finally, (6) the
construction of complex behaviours is based on linear chains of stimulus-response
(S-R) links, but there are no complex or Gestalt structures with systemic character-
istics and no hierarchical levels or behavioural molarities that can be translated into
strategies/tactics.
As we can see, so as to avoid falling into mentalistic and elaborative outcomes,
the behaviourist model does not only refer to the law of effect, but builds a very rigid
explanatory model. The goal is to eliminate any appeal to elements such as: objec-
tives and expectations, evaluation and judgment of one’s condition, understanding
and attribution of a problem, the choice of resolvent recipes useful to reach an objec-
tive, intuitions or solutions that are neither gradual nor approximate, and the species-
specific dimension. Consequently, the behaviourist explanation leaves no room for
elaborative models, as found in the proposals of the early twentieth century like those
made by Jean Piaget (1955),WolfgangKöhler (1970), LevVygotsky (2004), or Fred-
eric Bartlett (1951). For all these authors, learning means evaluating and modifying
a framework of interpretation-operativity related to the context, that is, constructing
an elaborate endowment and not an atomic association between a stimulus and a
response. One can say that the two explanatory models are antinomical to each
other, like the Ptolemaic and the Copernican paradigm, because one believes that
learning creates automatisms—SR links—whereas the other assumes that learning
constructs endowments freely available to the subject.
I wish to underline this aspect because lately we have been trying to somehow
combine the two models in an attempt to find a field of convergence or a common
domain of validity. However, the hypotheses of non-associative learning, Pavlov’s
conditioned reflex and the law of effect refer to mechanisms that can fall within a
4.3 The Analytical Approach in the Explanation of Learning 97
systemic view of learning. On the other hand, this is not the case for the analytical
view entailed by the model of operant conditioning, unless we stretch the epistemo-
logical framework to such an extent as to make it, in fact, unrecognizable, by failing
to fulfill its basic presuppositions. That model, in fact, is not only based on the fact
that the world has an arousing effect on the individual, that the latter responds to it
through attempts or approximations, or that the consequences of an action encourage
or discourage a given behaviour. More fundamentally, it is based on the idea that:
(i) learning is carried out in compliance with the six explanatory principles outlined
above; (ii) learning gives rise to an endowment that can be compared to an automa-
tism. That is why I say that thesemodels are incompatible—certainly not with respect
to all the other aspects and to the evidence found in the experimental studies of the
behaviourist school, which on the contrary represent a precious wealth of findings
to better understand the law of effect.
At the same time, the North American behaviourist tradition has always been
profoundly antithetical to the Central European ethological school, which, while not
formulating explicitly elaborative models, underlined the importance of the molarity
of behaviour. This predicate was recalled: (i) in the Gestalt structure of the key signal,
capable of eliciting specific behaviours; and (ii) in the configured structure (pattern)
of the expressed behaviour, which was very different from the atomistic-sequential
model of the S-R chain. Moreover, for the ethological school it was fundamental: (1)
to refer to the innate endowments structured by phylogeny; (2) to bring learning back
to the species dimension, with the trends and constraints determined by it; and (3)
to underline the importance of the social context. Another fundamental aspect was
the meaning given to the learning process: the behaviourist school emphasized its
environment-related individuality while the ethological school focused on its species
dimension, i.e. its belonging to a species-specific behavioural style.
In the second half of the twentieth century, both within the behaviourist school2
and in the ethological school,3 there was a post-paradigmatic phase which aimed at
reconciling the two traditions by revisiting their explanatory models. This attempt,
however, seems somewhat incongruent and the reason is very simple: the twomodels
are, in fact, one the opposite of the other in their explanation of both how and why
learning happens. In an attempt to integrate the two views, scholars have thus sepa-
rated the innate and the species dimension, interpreting them according to etholog-
ical models, from the grammar of learning to the individual dimension, in which
the concepts of respondent and operant conditioning remain valid. Also for this
reason, above all given recent neurobiological findings—through theworks of Joseph
LeDoux (2003), Jean Pierre Changeux (1997) andGerald Edelman (1987)—I believe
we must overcome the old dichotomy between innate and learned by virtue of a
recomposition that requires an epistemological rethinking.
2Cf. Clark Hull’s (1943) and Edward Tolman’s (1932) views on organic-intervening variables and
on purposive behaviour.
3Cf. Klaus Immelmann (1980), William Thorpe (1969) and Robert Hinde (1970), who sought to
mitigate the psycho-energetic approach.
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4.4 The Dichotomy Between Innate and Learned
When reconsidering the explanatory models called to describe and explain animal
behaviour, one of the most important aspects concerns the relationship between
learning and the phylogenetic dimension. Due to the custom of considering the two
spheres—innate and learned—as disjointed, a dichotomy-based determinism has
been created, whereby the innate is the outcome of phylogenetic selection based on
the principle of fitness, while the learned is the outcome of an ontogenetic selection
determined by the environment. This dichotomy is aimed at restoring an analytical
view—i.e., a view free from any evolutionary or metamorphic conception of the
endowment, within a systemic-overall logic where individual profiling is a conjuga-
tion of belonging. Moreover, this conception has also created a further dichotomy
between individual singularity and species belonging. The result is therefore twofold:
(i) the innate is considered exclusively binding or even hostile to the variability of
learning, thus defining a relationship of inverse proportionality between the two
terms; (ii) individuality is regarded as a disjunction with respect to belonging and
not as a conjugation of it. The question that we must ask ourselves, therefore, is how
the species-specific identity is realized in the individuality of each animal, creating
both singularity and belonging.
By “singularity” I mean those aspects of identity that point to the uniqueness and
unrepeatability of the subject, while by “belonging” I mean the shared qualities by
which individuals of a particular species resemble each other. One would be inclined
to believe that belonging is due to biological or innate determination—being born
a lion and not a gazelle—while singularity is constructed through the individual
experiences made by the subject in the contingency of their life. In reality, we know
that both these predicates of identity are realized through relational and experiential
processes that connect the subject with the outside world and make them undertake
a unique evolutionary path. In other words, identity singularity can be achieved
precisely because and insofar as one belongs to a species. But what is the role of
learning in the construction of this belonging? And how does belonging to a given
species influence and define the learning processes?
In behavioural analysis, the traditional approach entails a sort of dichotomy
between innate and learned. The first refers to a rigid determination of characters that
cannot be changed or refined by interacting with the context. The second is instead
left undetermined in the name of a free association between stimulus and response in
line with the law of effect—i.e., the consequential value of the stimulus-referenced
expression. According to this view, beyond a generic appeal to social learning, the
species dimension is detached from the acquisitive grammar and mainly belongs to
the context of the innate, whereas individuality is founded in the unspecificity of
free associations that accompany the unique and unrepeatable life of the subject.
The overlap between innate and species-dimension and, on the other hand, between
learned and individual-dimension is not only intuitive, but goes back to the ancient
philosophical dispute about the concepts of a priori and a posteriori.
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Consequently, even today, while recognizing a degree of collaboration between
innate and learned and likewise between species identity and individual identity, we
are inclined to consider the two contexts as disjointed dimensions—like water and
oil—that atmost canwork side by side in amosaic-like view of identity. In fact, rather
than following from a lack of investigation or explanatory models, the persistence of
a disjunctive understanding of the two areas seems to be due to an epistemological
obstacle: that is, the forced cohabitation of two antinomic paradigms—the associa-
tionism of the behaviourist tradition and the psychoenergetics of classical ethology.
As I said, both schools sought convergence in the second half of the twentieth century,
but they are inevitably difficult to integrate, because they are based on divergent and
sometimes contradictory assumptions. There is a sense that the aim of this explana-
tory patchwork is essentially to (1) maintain a mechanistic view of heterospecific
ontology as dominated by innate (instincts) and learned (conditioning) automatisms;
(2) not to question explanatory models consolidated by a long tradition.
For this reason, even when admitting that innate and learned cooperate in the
construction of identity, one inevitably ends up considering them: (a) juxtaposed,
that is, resting on each other without mutually changing or affecting each other;
(b) complementary, that is, aimed to fill mutual gaps and therefore inversely propor-
tional. Furthermore, learning, as a specific topic within the larger discourse of animal
behaviour, has been mainly addressed by the behaviourist school and translated into
training techniques. For this reason, there is a certain negligence in assessing the
relationship between learning and species dimension. Not to mention that the asso-
ciative grammar, in its simplicity, seems to be made to toy with Ockham’s razor
without actually using it. The stimulus-response association mechanism developed
by Ivan Pavlov and the selection of useful operants discovered by Edward Thorndike
are undoubtedly perspicuous, and yet they risk hiding the most interesting aspects
of how the species dimension interweaves with learning, thus falling into tautology.
And this negligence is supposedly compensated for by making partial and occa-
sional reference to intervening variables or to releasers, while keeping the associative
grammar of conditioning unchanged. In short, the underlying assumption remains
that learning, for an animal of any species, means associating a stimulus with a
response.
Thus conceived, learning is freed both from phylogenetic information—that is,
from the highly detailed specification of the evolutionary matrix of the neurobiolog-
ical system—and from the species dimension within which the evolutionary subject
learns. The greater our knowledge of embryology (that is, regarding the structure of
the central nervous system and even the intimate refinement of the synaptic network),
the more we discover that it is actually made to collect experiences and be influenced
by them through a specific evolutionary organization. Ignoring this species-specific
disposition and continuing to view phylogenetic data in a deterministic way—i.e.
as antithetical to a universal, nonspecific, associative grammar that only depends
on the stimulus-response link—means creating an explanatory discrepancy between
neurobiological findings and the models that seek to explain animal behaviour.
Today, this view is contradicted by the new interpretation of genetic translation,
according to which the genes’ modal expression is strongly linked to the specific
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context, thus refuting the juxtaposition and complementarity of innate and learned:
we are moving towards a dimensional interpretation. What does this mean? First of
all, that genes and environment do not act on separate contexts and through disjointed
mechanisms, but are part of the same process. For this reason it is not enough to over-
come the traditional antinomical view in the name of co-factoriality: it is necessary
to reject the idea that the two terms are inversely proportional. The dimensional inter-
pretation considers innate and learned as: (i) directly proportional and (ii) blurred in
their intimate structure. It is thanks to the potentiality of the innate that the context
can express a high variability of outcomes, so that innate complexity corresponds to
complex learning.
Experience thus becomes what makes gene expression possible. So, we find that
the experiential quantum of a species is directly proportional to its phylogenetic
heritage and its hereditary education. It is certainly important to reconsider inher-
ited semantics as functional modulation and as a process whereby the definition
of when/where/how is translated into the related protein and into the role it plays
in the environment for the activation of translational cascades, in order to avoid the
close and deterministic correlation between gene and character. However, in the same
way, it is indispensable to overcome the indeterministic concept that the behaviourist
model attributes to the experiential process. As said, experience defines the expres-
sive modulation of the gene, which is not at all like writing on a blank sheet. Indeed,
every dispute about attribution—innate or learned—actually hides a misinterpreta-
tion of the two terms. Consequently, it is not possible to still view learning in terms
of associative grammar and ignoring the species dimension. Rather, it is necessary to
approach learning according to evolutionary models, which take into consideration
the innate as a matrix and development organization that uses external information
as a growth coordinator, but within specific fields.
The complementary view (whereby learning is called upon to fill the gaps
of the innate) and the juxtapositional view (whereby learning simply exists next
to the innate) reveal a compromise between the classical ethological school and
behaviourism: this lies in attributing different scopes to the two explanatory models.
In other words: (1) the ethological paradigm is used to describe fairly standardized
innate behaviours and learning processes aimed at standardizing the individual style
in a given species dimension; (2) the behaviourist paradigm is called to explain
individual learning, context-related ontogenetic variability, and the learning of new
performances. Observing the combination between the heritage and the information
acquired in the morphological process, we can see that not only genes use the context
to express themselves, but epigenetically stored information also uses genes to shape
a given form. If we then broaden our gaze on the whole ontogenetic process, we will
immediately realize how illusory the dichotomous explanatory claim is.
The “innate vs learned” dichotomy can also translate, albeit in a fallaciousmanner,
into the “nature vs culture” dualism, finding further support in the humanist paradigm
that separates the human (Promethean, that is, predominantly cultural) dimension
from the animal (Epimethean, that is, predominantly natural) dimension. It is no
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coincidence that humanism, fromGiovanni Pico della Mirandola to Arnold Gehlen,4
had to hypothesize scarce innate equipment in order to celebrate the openness and
self-determination of human beings. As can be seen, two hypotheses are taken for
granted here: (1) that the heritage determines the expressive characteristics of an
individual, acting as a blind, pre-determined, but above all fixed or non-evolutionary
wisdom; (2) that heritage is hostile to learning processes and to the singularity that
produces individuality.
Thus we have come to define the human condition in terms of freedom, will,
and self-determination insofar as it is deficient in its hereditary endowment—unlike
the animal, which is totally determined. This logic of explanatory mechanism used
to describe animality is fertile soil for the hypothesis of operant conditioning, as a
further automatism in behavioural ordinariness. In the second half of the twentieth
century, however, the complex behaviour found mainly in the ethographic anal-
ysis of mammals and birds5 induced scholars to hypothesize new forms of animal
expression. This was based on cognitive maps, simulations, prefigurations, evalu-
ations, productive thoughts, as well as articulated levels of intentionality—whence
the concept of “sentient being”. Thus, if the two traditional approaches (associative
and psychoenergetic) are not able to explain expression and learning in complex
contexts—or else if some behaviours are simply human-like—then cognitivity is
magically pulled out of the hat. It’s as if, on all other occasions, the mind abdi-
cated from its functions. The tripartite model thus encloses the animal being within
disjointed expressive fields pertaining to specific domains: the innate as instinct, the
learned as conditioning and the processing capacity as strictly bound to the levels of
intentionality.
Conversely, I wish to note a few points. (i) The innate does not necessarily indicate
an already predefined expressive model but a range of possibilities that take one
configuration or another depending on the specific experiential context. (ii) Many
of the species’ behavioural standards require an apprenticeship phase, i.e. the innate
has to go to the school of experience to realize the species dimension. (iii) Any form
of experience and learning is realized within the range of possibilities established
by innate information and development processes, which are coordinated by the
epigenetic dialectics within the species dimension. Finally, (iv) learning is more like
the re-adaptation, re-finishing, assembly, and configuration of present elements rather
than the ex-nihilo construction of resources. This means that explaining learning
4Just think of Pico della Mirandola’s manifesto of humanism. In his De hominis dignitate, the
author compares man to a chameleon characterized by freedom and changeability. The human
being, therefore, would be endowed with free will, which would allow him to break away from
the transience of earthly life so as to rise up, without constraints and conditions, to God. Cf. Pico
della Mirandola (2012). This conception of the animal as complete from a predicative point of
view, and therefore totally immersed and confined within a precise existential dimension, underlies
both Arnold Gehlen’s theory of incompleteness and Martin Heidegger’s idea of the animal as
poor-in-world. Cf. Gehlen (1988) and Heidegger (1995).
5But not only: think of the studies on cephalopods, as well as research on social hymenoptera by
Randolf Menzel (2012) and Giorgio Celli (1962), who engages in several studies of the kind over
the years.
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while maintaining the dichotomy between the two paradigms means ignoring the
points outlined above, namely that learning depends on the phylogenetic legacy that
establishes the dimensionof learning itself. I therefore believeweneed aparadigmatic
rethinking that can bring together these different contexts, keeping in mind that the
innate is a processing matrix that can evolve, and not a simple drive. Indeed, the
innate gives rise to new elaboration endowments that are realized through different
levels of awareness, up to the unconscious or preconscious, where consciousness is
never the conditio sine qua non through which the elaborative event takes place. But
to do this it is first necessary to refute the behaviourist epistemological model of
operant conditioning.
4.5 Critique of the Behaviourist Model
So, let’s examine once again the model and the presuppositions of the behaviourist
school. According to the traditional theory of instrumental conditioning, learning is
based on the two following principles. (i) If a behaviour achieves a pleasant outcome
(reinforcement), the animal is more likely to re-propose it. (ii) If the consequence is,
vice versa, unpleasant (punishment), the expressive probabilities of such behaviour
will diminish. The law of effect is linked to the intuitive principle that whatever
yields pleasure is re-proposed and, on the contrary, unpleasant situations are avoided,
based on the need for hedonic orientation. What dictates the instructive coordinates
is therefore the environment—as already underlined by Watson—while pleasure
becomes the mark of conformity. Needless to say, it is not possible to question the
“phenomenon of effect” as such—i.e., learning by consequence—as it is confirmed
by innumerable findings in observations and training, which also apply for the human
being. The objection that I wish to raise here is about the explanatory model called to
explain this phenomenon, translating it into a paradigmatic construction that sounds
somewhat tautological.
I’ll explain. The hedonic principle is undoubtedly the basis for the orientation of
every species and is founded in the satisfactionof needs.Life itself, in itsmost elemen-
tary expressions and in its constitution as an open and dissipative system, requires a
continuous fulfillment of energy needs and the safeguarding of vital endowments. It
follows that all the systems of monitoring of and acting on the world have been regu-
lated by phylogeny according to the utilitarian dictate, which can be summarized in
the maxim “increase the good”. Therefore, it is quite obvious that there is a hedonic
orientation as well as a mnestic system capable of remembering what behaviours
have favoured the achievement of said good (obtaining pleasure or escaping danger).
What I want to challenge here is the epistemological framework of behaviourism.
Let’s analyse its underlying assumptions. They are based on three hypotheses.
The first is that (i) the law of effect is exhaustive i.e. able to explain all the processes
of operational learning and never falsified by the findings: amplifying effects result
from reinforcement and mitigation results from punishment. The second is that (ii)
making an attempt is characterized by responsive passivity and randomness, as it
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is not oriented by the species dimension; also, the individual is a neutral entity
under the cognitive profile of perception, only influenced by its sense organs and
therefore exposed to the stimulating context. Finally, the third assumption is that
(iii) the outcome of the learning process is an automatism that is strongly correlated
to the context and is stimulus-referred: it is not an endowment that the subject can
use in other analogous situations. If these assumptions fall, the framework as a
whole needs rethinking. In this section I will analyze the first assumption, i.e. the
alleged exhaustiveness of the law of effect—the cardinal principle of the behaviourist
paradigm. I will then discuss the other two points in the following paragraphs.
The assumption “i”, in its strong form, implies two consequences. (1) Whenever
an expression increases its probability one can infer that it was reinforced: there
must have been a dialectic between a problematic condition, a number of random
attempts and a pleasant consequence to the magnified expression. (2) If a behaviour
is reinforced it should increase, while if it is punished it should decrease. These two
aspects form the basis of operant conditioning, and represent different aspects in
terms of the validation of the framework and its domain of validity. In relation to
point (1) I will ask whether there are learning conditions that do not follow the law
of the effect, i.e. if there can be operational (non-reactive) learning that does not
fall within instrumental conditioning. In relation to point (2) I will ask if there are
situations in which the concepts of reinforcement and punishment are falsified, so
that reinforcement is followed by a decrease while punishment by an increase in a
particular behavioural expression. To be clear, should there be significant evidence
contradicting points “1” and “2”, I will not speak of a falsification of the law of effect
per se but rather of its domain of validity, which necessarily implies that the law is
not exhaustive and, consequently, the behaviourist model is not immune.
(1) The law of effect, as formulated by Edward Thorndike and then summarized
in the canon of instrumental conditioning, does not deal with a mere response to
a stimulative situation, as in the case of classical or Pavlovian conditioning. In the
latter case an unconditioned reflex (salivation in front of food as an unconditioned
stimulus) is associated with a new type of reflex (salivation at the sound of a bell)
with the stimulus to be conditioned (the bell) preceding the unconditioned stimulus
(the food). Instrumental conditioning is also defined as operant because the subject
puts in place an operation to overcome a challenge or reach a particular target.
Of course, in its paradigmatic formulation—that is, in accordance with John Watson
and Burrhus Skinner’s refusal of any mentalistic assumption—there is no mention of
orientation or of some objective and, consequently, of tactics or strategies. Any useful
behaviour—which, producing pleasure, is reinforced—is achieved through gradual
approximations expressed at random. In the paradigmatic or orthodox behaviourist
tradition, reinforcement is neither an objective nor an expectation, and attempts are
not based on orientations, but are absolutely random. Furthermore, the subject has
no understanding of the problem nor any awareness of getting closer to the solution,
since these aspects would imply a mentalist-cognitive element.
As early as the 1940s, this interpretation was revised, producing the idea of a
post-paradigmatic behaviourism in authors such as Clark Hull and Edward Tolman,
who emphasized the importance of intervening variables and expertise in formulating
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responses. Obviously this has paved the way for a review of the theory in general.
In particular, in addition to emphasizing the role of intervening variables, such as
to question the direct link between the stimulative condition and the formulated
response, Tolman noted the molarity of the behavioural response. This explana-
tory shift had important consequences. It introduced (1) the Gestalt structure of
behavioural expression, a concept that not only could resonate with the ethological
idea of pattern but also with the systemic emergent effects included by the response,
in line with Kölher’s idea of insight. It also posited (2) the hierarchical difference
among behavioural expressions, subdividing the responses into molecular acts and
molar acts, and paving the way for the “tactics and strategies” dialectic which would
then be addressed by proponents of the cognitive approach.6 Furthermore, Tolman
emphasized prefigurative aspects in the idea of purposeful behaviour, which is there-
fore intrinsically oriented: for all these reasons, Tolman can be considered a precursor
of cognitivism.
In his adaptive view of the organism, in addition to underlining the importance of
independent variables, Clark Hull also stressed the need to consider the objective-
dependent meaning of the learning processes. One should also address the structure
of behavioural expertise, which plays a role in the formulation of responses—this
idea would resurface in the cognitive concept of “heuristics” introduced by Herbert
Simon (1961).With Tolman andHull the law of effect lost its crystallinemechanicity,
because intervening variables, purposes or objectives, the hierarchical structure of
responses and behavioural expertise had narrowed down—through specifications and
correctivemeasures—its domain of validity. But themost interesting aspect concerns
Tolman’s observation that mice, if put in a maze, learn its configuration without
receiving any reinforcement, something that Tolman summarized in the concept of
“latent learning” (1951). Here it is not only the concept of reinforcement that is being
questioned, but also that of synchronicity in the affirmation of the operant.
At the same time, ethological research shifted the attention on several other aspects
of learning that inevitably further delimited the behaviourist claim of an acquisitive
universalism based on the stimulus-response association. First of all, starting from
the concept of “imprinting”,7 that is, an innate preadaptation of newborns to follow
a model, it was highlighted that the learning process develops along precise innate
evolutionary coordinates. These therefore not only orient ontogenesis towards some
learning paths, but also go on to select useful stimuli, disproving the idea of a blank
sheet. Furthermore, ethologists highlighted other forms of learning, not linked to the
reinforcement mechanism, such as: (i) learning by mimesis, i.e. adopting a style by
observing the othermembers of the group; (ii) learning by vicariance, or the tendency
6As for example in the cognitive model TOTE, standing for “test – operate – test – exit”. This model
was described in its functional aspects by psychologists George A. Miller, Eugene Galanter, and
Karl Pribram in 1960 as signifying the testing between subject status and target status, with the
two resolvent functions being defined with the word operate (on) and exit (off). According to the
TOTE model, the system does not close through reinforcement but through the achievement of the
objective, as Noam Chomsky already emphasized in 1957 by questioning the behaviourist concept
of reinforcement. Cf. Chomsky (1957).
7Defined by Oskar Heinroth (1911) and Konrad Lorenz (1952).
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to choose winning behaviours with respect to objectives set by other individuals.
In other words, in addition to demonstrating pre-adaptation to forms of learning,
ethology underlined the importance of social learning (Bandura 1986).
(2) Research has therefore acquired important evidence that some learning
processes cannot be properly classifiedwithin the behaviourist frame, in its claim of a
pure association between a stimulus and a response. This has progressively narrowed
down the latter’s domain of validity. At this point one may ask a second question:
is there evidence capable of falsifying the amplifying assumptions of reinforcement
and inhibitory ones of punishment? The idea that complex behaviour is nothing but a
domino series of S-R atoms in a linear sequence—such that R1 in turn becomes S2 for
the next response—was questioned already in the 1950s by physiologist Karl Lashley
(1955). He demonstrated that this model could not explain some phenomena, such as
the reactivation of a response and anticipatory errors. Equally important objections
were made by Noam Chomsky from the methodological point of view, as regards the
terms stimulus, response and reinforcement. In particular, he noted: (i) the lack of
clarity as to how the term stimulus differs from environmental complexity and other
entities defined as neutral; (ii) some generalism in the definition of response and in
the generalization of the operants; and (iii) the risk that the concept of reinforcement
may be an elegant way to hide a petition for intentionality.
In other words, according to Chomsky, Skinner’s theorywas vague and circular, in
that it was based onwhat it purported to prove. The principle of space-time contiguity
of the stimulus-response-reinforcement triad, similarly to the one formulated by
David Hume, encountered criticism in many views. These included the concept
of latency of the evolutionary process, Piaget’s dialectic between assimilation and
accommodation, and the emergence of insight as a sudden composition of elements
introduced earlier in the Gestalt approach. In all these views, the emphasis was not so
much on the existence of other types of learning: rather, what was being questioned
was the very validity of the explanation based on an alleged self-sufficiency and
objectivity of the stimulus-response-reinforcement triad.
We can therefore summarize these criticisms in the following points. (i) The defi-
nition of stimulus is tautological: everything that causes a stimulation is considered
a stimulus, as opposed to everything that is accessible to the individual’s sensory
organs; therefore the stimulus is not an objective reality but a construct made by
the subject. (ii) The response does not emerge from random attempts but follows
well-defined patterns that are presented in a molar form in discreetly organized
configurations (not through atomic and continuous graduality); these patterns are
used as such in new contexts or are redefined through adjustments. (iii) There is
no temporal contiguity in the stimulus-response relationship, especially in complex
behaviours, because a response often emerges by merging previously introjected
elements (insight) and because, in sequential behaviour, an act can be anticipated,
demonstrating the existence of a mental level (preactivation). (iv) In a challenge,
the reinforcement is nothing but the overcoming of the challenge or the achieve-
ment of the target and therefore reinforcement is a different name—tautological and
redundant—for the target.
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Now, a central aspect of the behaviourist framework is the fact that reinforce-
ment increases an operant whereas punishment diminishes its expressive frequency:
if this presupposition falls, the whole law loses solidity. Let’s start with the objec-
tive property by which reinforcement increases behaviour. All trainers know that if a
behaviour is followedwith certainty-punctuality by a rewarding event, said behaviour
will follow a bell-shaped curve: at the beginning it will show a rapid increase, then it
will stabilize itself and finally decrease. This is the reason why, after the first phases
of training, we follow the path of the so-called variable reinforcement instead of the
fixed one. This is a phenomenon that the law of effect, in the behaviourist frame-
work, cannot explain and that, vice versa, is understandable if instead of the word
“reinforcement”—as suggested by Noam Chomsky—we use terms like “objective”
(possible target to be reached) and “expectation” (presumable target to be achieved).
For the subject, both the objective and the expectation are goals that respond to the
mechanisms of value attribution. The first mechanism involves (i) correspondence
to the specific needs of the subject’s here-and-now and therefore to the “organic
dependent variables”, to use Hull’s definition (1943), but also to the mental state
variables. The second concerns the objective’s, (ii) importance in the subject’s here-
and-now, in terms of emotions and connected representations, its coherence with
other prefigurations, and its standing out with respect to other distracting factors.
The third one is about the (iii) value attributed to the objective-expectation based
on its availability, its rarity, the languor it arouses, and lack of saturation events. It
should therefore be obvious why fixed reinforcement not only loses its value as a
behaviour amplifier, but also paradoxically takes on a negative value.
The point is that if in place of reinforcementwe use terms like objective or expecta-
tion,we inevitably refer to a prefigurationof the subject, i.e.we are forced to formulate
a mentalistic explanation. However, it is not possible to stretch the law of effect by
means of explanatory epicycles—and the notion of variable reinforcement, in fact,
is exactly that—when the factors involved demonstrate a clear insufficiency in the
causal determination of a phenomenon. We find a similar problem with punishment,
which, strictly speaking, should decrease a behaviour if it systematically follows its
expression. However, it is easy to see that many punished behaviours not only do
not diminish, but paradoxically even go so far as to increase. The research on attach-
ment carried out by Robert Hinde and John Bowlby (1988), as well as the harsh
experiments conducted by the Harlow on small macaques (1958), have shown that
the behaviour of search for a “secure base” and shelter did not diminish but grew if
followed by punishment.
In the same way, research in animal behavioural medicine has shown that if we
punish particular expressions, such as phobic, anxious, hyperactive, or conflicting
ones, we are going to increase them and not decrease them. Even the discouragement
of behaviours on amotivational basis, which should be seen as a form of punishment,
actually amplifies behaviour rather than inhibiting it. From this we can infer that the
law of effect, as it appears, is not wrong in terms of associative possibilities, but is
certainly mistaken in its epistemological framework. In other words, it is wrong in
conceptual terms and in the causal presuppositions called to explain the associative
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event. And this also applies to the post-paradigmatic formulations provided by neo-
behaviourists, as it is the explanatory core of this view that does not bear scrutiny. I
therefore believe that the law of effect can be subsumed within a broader theory of
learning, capable of better defining its domain of validity and therefore of explaining
both the situations where the law of effect is falsified and the paradoxical effects.
4.6 Learning and the Species Dimension
Moreover, it is not possible to understand the learning process without considering
the species coordinates—that is, those development events regulated by the trans-
lation of the information contained in the heritage. Indeed, the species coordinates
establish the evolutionary stages and how the subject deals with the experiential
context and responds ontogenetically by forming new neural networks. A fortiori,
consider the following points. (i) The orientation and susceptibility to external stimuli
is phylogenetically determined in the different evolutionary periods (sensibility) and
in the consequent structure of species-specific belonging, as shown by the research
carried out in ethology and psychology on prototypical stimuli and key signals. (ii)
The responses implemented by each species concern collections of operants and
heuristics strictly defined by the phylogenetic heritage, such that some behavioural
expressions not only emerge without reinforcements but also take place regardless
of the contingent presence of stimuli.
Of course, identifying a theory of learning able to combine dimensional coordi-
nates (belonging to a given species) with adaptive needs (correlating to the charac-
teristics of the context)—without separating the innate and the learned—makes it
essential to start from the species-specific identity, that is, from the elective param-
eters that it defines. By electivity, I mean four aspects. The first is (1) susceptibility
to particular elements present in the external context (perceptual electivity). The
second is (2) a tendency to implement specific responsive and proactive behaviours
with respect to the problematic context (expressive electivity). Then there is (3) speci-
ficity in joining particular contextual findings to very precise and defined behavioural
expressions (conjunctive electivity). And finally there is (4) a mode of identification
of challenges in the context (epistemic electivity). But before going into the exami-
nation of these four points, it is necessary to better specify what is meant by species
dimension and how this dimension is realized by keeping the individuals that belong
to it within a precise range of expressive variability.
The species dimension, also defined by the term “ethogram”, should not be seen
as an ideal or standard species model, but rather as a field of ontogenetic possibilities,
defining the index of variability that the subjects of a given species present. It can first
be noted that the more complex the phylogenetic heritage of a species, the greater
the field of ontogenetic possibilities, or the value of the variability index—a further
argument to emphasize the direct proportionality between innate and learned. On the
other hand, as we shall see, it is precisely the species with a wide range of variability
(for example mammals and birds) that require the greatest external information to
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strengthen their belonging, decreasing the identity drift for example through parental
care. This is especially true in some areas, such as social behaviour.
In this sense, one can say that the species dimension in these animals is reached
through complex heritage information, which in turn requires a complex external
contribution not only in terms of occasionality but also of apprenticeship. This evolu-
tionary articulation can be ascribed, in addition to the previously mentioned cascade
effects of the development environment, also tomore properly intersubjective factors.
These include: (i) the prenatal care of gestation and hatching; (ii) parental care that
also transfers species-specific behavioural patterns; (iii) the self-active and dialogic-
interactive dimension of social play; (iv) the sedimentations of culturalmodelswithin
a particular population.
If we took away even just one of these elements, which could be defined as
“intraspecific dialogics”, from the ontogenetic process, the species dimension would
be incongruent. Reaching the species dimension is therefore an evolutionary goal,
much like adapting to the context: for this reason we can conclude that learning
does not always aim to achieve individual variability by singularly specifying the
expression of the heritage. In mammals and birds, learning also aims to reduce
individual variability, limiting the virtuality or range that would be determined if the
individual were exposed exclusively to environmental contingency. In this case one
can say that a complex innate not only allows for complex learning, but “requires”
standardized learning, capable of favoring the development of codes of belonging
and limiting the uncertainty of experiential processes.
So let’s go back to the parameters of electivity. To belong to a given speciesmeans:
(i) to have a body conformed in a peculiar way, which predisposes it to favour some
behaviours over others; (ii) to be endowedwith sensory organs that enable a particular
access to the world and therefore a specific immersion in reality; (iii) to be interested
in some targets and inclined to implement particular behavioural styles; (iv) to have
a given socio-relational dimension as part of a dialectical-referential domain; (v) to
be equipped with a neurobiological system capable of processing the findings that
come from the external world and from the body in a specific way, giving rise to
an emerging representation. Electivity therefore means reconstructing one’s world
starting from the elements available, where concepts such as stimulus, response,
association and reinforcement cannot be objective terms.
(1) Perceptual electivity—As far as this point is concerned, one can say that a
subject belonging to a particular species is already predisposed by the evolutionary
dialectic between phylogenetic and ontogenetic contributions to pay attention to very
specific stimulatory patterns, i.e. to data accessible to the sensory organs that present
specific configurations in space-time. In line with Gestalt psychology, studies in the
neurobiology of perception show that the stimulating body is reconstructed inside
the brain on the basis of particular compositional grammars. And these grammars
have got more to dowith species-specific adaptive objectives—i.e. with the history of
the species—than with an objective translation of the external world. The perceptual
translation system is therefore wired to provide a functional reconstruction of the
external world. Since each species has been calibrated according to specific selec-
tive pressures, alongside common functional overlaps—for example it is useful for
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many animals to have a processor able to realize an amodal completion—there are
also specific cognitive processes at play in the functional reconstruction of the data.
What recalls and evokes a given behaviour is not an objective reality, but an elective
reconstruction starting from non-stimulating elements.
It is not only the sensory organs that define filters that make only some stimuli
accessible,while obscuring others. It is the very act of processing and,more generally,
emotional and motivational susceptibility that does so. This specificity does not only
affect the reconstruction of the data—for example the attribution of illusory margins,
completion, the definition of continuity and correlation, etc.—but also other aspects
such as salience or persistence as well as the evaluation of the order of magnitude or
perspective. In psychology we define “prototypical” a stimulus that can emerge from
the context and is perceived more easily than others: this stimulus corresponds to a
sort of ideal unit of measurement, and is retained more easily in memory. There are
also stimuli capable of provoking an emotional response both in terms of arousal, that
is, activation, and of appraisal, that is, specific evaluation or attribution: for example,
the silhouette of a hawk causes fear in hens, partridges and pheasants. Moreover,
perceptual electivity can be related to motivational systems which can be referred
to the lifestyle of the species. These systems define different aspects, including: (i)
the subject’s preferential orientation towards the key signal or hypersignal, which
can be achieved with a puppet by magnifying some aspects of the key signal; (ii)
the close correlation between perception and expression of particular behavioural
patterns, most often strongly standardized in the innate dimension; (iii) the subject’s
varying susceptibility to the key signal according to the overall motivational state
experienced at the given time.
Also, we must not forget the relational dimension of perception, especially in
animals that engage in parental care and carry out their evolutionary process within
attachment. In these cases, the secure base is not only a perceptual counterpart, but
a filter capable of orienting-configuring the perception of the young. The world is
perceived through the mother, who defines the different entities on the basis of three
aspects. The first is (i) orientation, i.e. which phenomena must be paid attention.
The second is (ii) expression of arousal, i.e. with respect to which phenomena we
must activate in a particular way. Finally, there is (iii) attribution of meaning, i.e.
the type of decoding that is assigned to a given phenomenon. The relationship with
the mother therefore allows the young to lean on the secure base to build a first
experiential interface capable of operating a stimulatory matrix. Next to this there
is the direct experiential process which, by equipping the subject with knowledge,
in turn modifies their access to the world (knowledge being a tool for perception)—
whence the recursive nature of experience. All this shows that the behaviourist claim
that the individual is exposed to the stimulating context—understood as an objective
element to be simply acquired—is mistaken, because in fact it is the subject that
builds their own world.
(2) Expressive electivity—It is equally evident that each species has an elective
behavioural expression, both when it is called to respond to external solicitation
and when actively proposing operations on/towards the world. This expressive elec-
tivity can be traced back to three main coordinates. The first is (i) the way in which
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the subject responds to stimuli that affect the emotional or motivational environ-
ment. Then there is (ii) the way in which the subject relates to their own kind.
Finally, there are (iii) the behavioural manifestations that the subject puts in place
even in the absence of specific evocative stimuli. Looking at individuals of different
species, it is unquestionable—as shown by all ethological research—that there are
behavioural configurations (displays, patterns, choreographs) typical of each species,
whose origin can be traced back to the serial and process-like dialectics of ontoge-
netic configurational flows. To think that the behaviour expressed in a particular
situation—especially if it represents a challenge—is random, like a mutation in the
transcription of the genome, means not taking into account that each species has its
own responsive, proactive and resolvent a priori in terms of operant and heuristic
responses, can be attributed to the phylogenetic heritage.
The behaviours that a subject puts in place are always species-specific and never
start from scratch, not even when the experimenter places the individual in front of
an unusual problem-context for their species dimension. In these cases the subject,
through a sort of exaptation, uses or tests the operants or heuristics that seem conge-
nial to the problem. Obviously this implies a series of design, evaluation and recon-
figuration processes of the operants and heuristics, processes that go beyond simple
random attempts. Even though it ought to be redefined altogether, a much more
coherent explanation is provided by Piaget’s model of “assimilation”, that is, the use
of a pattern for new situations or targets, and of “accommodation”, i.e. the redefini-
tion of the internal scheme of the pattern.8 If an animal were to solve a problem by
using expressive randomness it would never reach a target or overcome a challenge.
When we confront an individual of a given species with a problem, that is, with
a situation capable of evoking goals or expectations, we find the implementation of
peculiar behaviours that are then adapted through successive approximations, up to
reaching the solution. These attempts are never purposeless and random, but always
purposeful and made on the basis of internal coherence as “useful resolvent recipes”.
Furthermore, the chosen behaviour does not appear as a motor atom, but follows a
precise Gestalt pattern, which is random but depends on a pattern borrowed from the
style of the species. As we will see, the final configuration becomes an “operating
model” capable of working next to the heritage operants and heuristics, ready to be
used whenever a similar problem-situation arises.
If a person teaches their dog to sit down—approximating a behaviour that is
already present in the dog, though not as a social but as a parental heuristic—when
they present the dog with a new problem, as a first option, he will not make random
attempts but will try to sit down and will then continue with the other heuristics
learned in the relational context. The idea that expressive or resolvent behaviour
is random is only justified within an epistemological framework which, in accor-
dance with the absolute principle of the stimulus-response association, denies several
8In assimilation, any information present in external reality can be assimilated to the cognitive
system where, in a complementary manner, the existing cognitive structures are accommodated,
though a sort of internal recognition that allows the system to be reset by virtue of the new integrated
elements. See Piaget (1955).
4.6 Learning and the Species Dimension 111
aspects. These include: (i) any form of reflection on the part of the animal, even a
simple review of the operational options; (ii) a fortiori, the concepts of objective,
evaluation, and reconfiguration. It is clear that in such a paradigm there is no room
for appeals to processing activities, whether they are intended to give a meaning
or a judgment, to formulate internal simulations, or indeed to account for sudden
solutions (insight).
For this reason, even if it is true that the achievement of a goal produces pleasure,
thereby stabilizing the effective behaviour in relation to the given purpose—hence
the confirmation of the reinforcement effect—, it is the epistemological framework
around it that cannot be accepted. The behaviour that is reinforced by success was not
random, but due to a cognitive selection between several useful operational-resolvent
options to be reconfigured ad hoc: alternatively, it even emerges from a creative
process aimed to produce a new solution altogether. Furthermore, the expression
of a given behaviour involves a process of prefiguration (definition of a goal-state)
and evaluation (definition of the gap between the present state and the goal-state).
Also in this case it is useless to say that both the prefiguration and the evaluation
depend on the species dimension that defines the range of possible objectives and
the coordinates for calculating the gap. In this sense one can say, borrowing the
concepts of Piaget’s theory of learning, that every behavioural expression is always
an epistemic evolution: the emergence of the new starting from the old, though not
ex-nihilo.
(3) Conjunctive electivity—With respect to this point, the behaviourist hypoth-
esis imagines a free associative process, linked only to contingency and therefore
to sensorial relevance or temporal proximity. This involves two things: (a) the stim-
ulus to be conditioned immediately before the unconditional stimulus in the corre-
sponding conditioning; (b) the reinforcement/punishment comes immediately after
the behaviour to be crystallized in operant conditioning. Instead, ethological obser-
vation has shown that there are elective conjunctions at play in the process. The
associative behaviourist principle is based on the free associative grammar between
the world of stimuli and the world of responses, but while it is very easy to teach a
rat to push a lever to get food, it is almost impossible to teach it to press the lever to
avoid an electric shock.
We can imagine conjunctive electivity as an a priori and sometimes exclusive way
of bringing together the stimulative and responsive elements. This occurs following
four main coordinates: (i) combining two stimuli to build forecasting prospects (y
follows x) to act promptly; (ii) defining useful predicates as referential operators (if
x then y) in order to extract an entity through a reference; (iii) creating implicative
correlations (only if x then y) able to determine distinction processes with respect to
similar but not significant events; (iv) identifying effective interventions to achieve
given objectives (if x, then act y). The conjunctive relationship emerging from these
coordinates can refer to four behavioural functions that are indispensable to the
survival of the subject. These are: (i) anticipating the event (y) so as to reach an
opportunity or escape danger faster; (ii) finding some categorical qualities (x), i.e.
possible prey or predator, to make generalizations about other animals (y); (iii) iden-
tifying a quality (x) to distinguish between similar entities (y); (iv) understanding
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what the best strategy (y) is every time a situation (x) arises, assuming a cause-effect
relationship between the two variables.
Also in this case, the conjunctive factor does not depend on contingency. However,
on the one hand (a) the time factor facilitates the composition, since there are biosemi-
otic universals—such as the synchronous movement of body parts—which, beyond
the species-specific perspective, create associations based on the temporal frame, able
to establish relations of antecedence (1), synchronism (2) and (3), and consequence
(4). On the other hand, (b) the stimulus is striking, for example in its novelty or in
its respondence to sensory characteristics: these elements are capable of activating
both the arousal and appraisal systems, and inevitably facilitate the acquisition of the
elements to be joined as well as the very act of composition. On a neurobiological
level, the synchronous ignition of a neural set makes it more likely to evoke the same
set in the future. This increases: (i) the possibility that stimulating an element of the
set leads to the reactivation of the entire set; (ii) the possibility of synchronous evoca-
tion of the same set even in the absence of evocative elements. In the same way, we
know that the compositional intervention can have different levels of stability—from
the operative memory to the hippocampal one and from the latter to consolidation.
Also, memory retention is deeply linked to the arousal/appraisal stimulation caused
by the event. In other words, I do not deny the importance of the temporal factor and
the degree of strikingness of the stimulus in the conjunctive process. What I deny is
something else: i.e., the idea that any conjunction is possible or that the elements at
play do not have precise conjugative joints.
The alleged associative equipotentiality professed by the paradigmatic approach
has been questionedmainly by ethologists. The latter have shown that the conjunction
of a stimulus to a consequence attributable to a given behaviour or the link between a
stimulus and a response are very different in various species: in other words, it is not
possible to associate any stimulus with any response. In fact, we find that (i) some
associations are carried out even in the absence of present reinforcement, as if the link
were set up so that themere presence of a stimulus acts as a releaser for the conjunctive
process. On the contrary, (ii) some associations are never realized even though the
subject is repeatedly exposed to the same experience and all the rules in terms of time
and strikingness are respected. However, (iii) associations respond to the dictates of
an overall compositional scheme which is always species-specific: the final result of
a learning process that can be superimposed on teaching varies in different species.
Finally, (iv) associations are realized in different ways depending on the state of
the subject—for example age, motivational status, emotional set-up—giving rise to
different outcomes.
Points “i” and “ii” represent the polarities of a phenomenon that is always present,
i.e., the varying probability that a particular association be realized—a parameter that
is always species-specific and which therefore cannot be referred to simple environ-
mental variables. Points “iii” and “iv” refer to the fact that the behavioural outcome
is never a simple association between two atomic elements, normally defined by the
terms “stimulus” and “response”, but a composition of elements that can only be
defined within a complex choreography. This composition implies: (i) elements of
positional status, such as the level of arousal, the emotional attitude, and the active
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motivations of the subject; (ii) elements of operational status, such as praxis and
heuristics; (iii) elements of bodily motion in the given context and situation. This
final scheme responds to two basic coordinates. The first is (1) the species-specific
dimension of the behavioural choreography that results from the conjunction of the
elements, such that even when the didactic situation overlaps there is no overlapping
of results in individuals of different species. The second is (2) the individual-specific
dimension of the outcome that is always correlated to the evolutionary age, to the
positional state of the subject, and to the cognitive and experiential status of the
subject. In other words, the behaviourist claim of an association that is primarily
dependent on the external environment is denied by the evidence we have. Also,
it requires explicative epicycles that are often forced to define “noise” that which
instead marks the specificity of the outcome.
(4)Epistemic electivity—Let us nowconsider the alleged objectivity of the setback
to which individuals would be exposed regardless of their species. The law of effect
envisages the presence of a stimulative condition, capable in itself of activating a need
for a response. This, in my opinion, is a source of many errors of assessment since,
most of the time, those who do not respond to a state that is considered objectively
problematic are immediately stigmatized as stupid. When we speak of a setback
or a challenge we refer to a problem for the subject, with respect to the canons
of desirability or to the objectives of the subject itself. The setback can therefore
differ according to different parameters: (a) its valence, in terms of risks (which the
individual must avoid) versus opportunities (which the individual must be able to
grasp); (b) the type of problematicity, for example if it is an obstacle to be removed
or a gap to be filled; (c) the mode of intersection for the individual, ranging from
simple distracting search up to connotations of urgency or even cogency; (d) the
type of operative and resolvent actions that it involves, in terms of praxis, attitudes,
cognitive functions; (e) the consistency of the possible resolvent practice with respect
to the normal expressive canons of the species.
Behaviourism starts from an assumption that cannot be ignored, i.e. that the
context objectively puts the subject in the condition to operate and therefore to
formulate a response. In reality, the context is simply a space of agency for the
subject and not an objective setback condition, if not to a very partial extent. The
setback arises from the relationship between the internal condition of the individual—
in terms of motivations/emotions on the one hand and operational resources on the
other—and the constraints-opportunities that the context presents potentially, not
objectively and blatantly. For this reason it is necessary to measure the setback from
two perspectives that are strongly focused on the subject. The first (i) is the subject’s
positional dyscrasia, i.e. the distance between the motivational involvement (which
translates into desire, projection, languor, participation in the here-and-now), and
the resources in terms of knowledge-competence that can be translated into useful
actions to achieve the objective. The second (ii) is exploratory availability, i.e. the
tendency to go beyond the appearance of the context to bring out its opportunities
and understand the constraints that the environment presents.
We can essentially admit that there is an epistemic principle that brings out the
challenge: this principle is the protagonism of the animal, not only in the ability
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to solve a problem, but also in constructing and bringing out the problem in the
first place. Each species has its own epistemic dimension because each species has
different motivational and emotional characteristics capable of investigating reality,
as well as equally different resolvent tendencies. It is obvious that a dog approaches
problems in a very different way compared to a cat, and that animals that are highly
prone to manipulation, such as primates, face situations of challenge in a different
way from, say, ungulates. Often there are differences in approaching the problem
even among apparently similar animals, such as chimpanzees and bonobos.
One can say that in order to learn, even before developing a congruent-effective
response, it is necessary for the subject to be in a challenge condition which solicits
an investigative action. However, neither the emergence of this problematic condition
nor the way in which the problem is faced can be traced back to a universal grammar,
regardless of the species dimension, the biographical-individual profile and the here-
and-now of the subject. As said, the knowledge acquired modifies the subject’s prox-
imal plane of experience, that is, the way in which the individual epistemically inter-
sects the external world. Therefore, to think that the individual responds passively
and randomly to objective stimulations of the environment means to ignore that there
is no problem without a goal. However, objectives are not universal: claiming other-
wise would mean throwing away the notion of behavioural diversity among different
species along with the very principles of adaptive ecology.
4.7 The Cognitive Approach to Learning
At the beginning of the 1960s, a new epistemological framework was established
thanks to authors such as Ulric Neisser (2014), George Miller (1956), and Kenneth
Craik: the cognitive approach. This was in line with the Information Processing
paradigm, which saw learning as a modification of the subject’s processing schemes
when intersecting the external reality. Two main ideas emerged: that of “subjective
experience” in the interactionwith the world and that of a “functional representation”
of reality, taking up the Kantian dictate of internal or non-objective processing of
external reality. As I said, this approach is rooted in the psychological field (besides
the already mentioned Gestalt psychologists, one has to mention the legacy of Piaget
and Vygotsky) and in the philosophical field (besides Kant, one cannot fail to refer
to Nietzsche). On the other hand, the elaborative view proposed by the cognitive
approach can claim a degree of continuity with Konrad Lorenz’s essay Behind the
Mirror (1978), as well as with Karl Popper’s interpretation of the episteme in the
hypothetical-critical approach. According to the cognitive conception, the ontolog-
ical view of the animal being is very different: instead of being exposed to the world
and passively subjected to an associative grammar, it has its own perspective and is
epistemologically oriented towards the world.
What changes is not only the idea of perception as a reconstruction of one’s
own world—which in the convergence between von Uexküll (2010) and Nietzsche
becomes no longer the acquisition of data but the emergence of agency—but also the
4.7 The Cognitive Approach to Learning 115
idea of orientation, i.e. of construction of the problem. This is done thanks to a deep
immersion in the meshes of reality (intus-legere) in order to bring out: (i) present or
possible opportunities; (ii) the constraints or risks that separate the projection from
the here-and-now of the subject; (iii) the nature of the problem, both of attributive
order and in its structural requirements; (iv) potentially useful solutions to be used
in a heuristic way; (v) the evaluation resources with respect to the consequences
of the operation. One of the first models to be developed, as we have seen, was
the one defined by the acronym TOTE (which stands for: test-operate and test-exit)
elaborated by Miller, Galanter and Pribram in 1960 to define the binary cognitive
action of execution and monitoring. The model adopted a representative logic that
replaced the behaviourist principle of random attempts with an interpretation of
behaviour based on orientation, expectation and monitoring by which to measure the
result of the action performed by reducing the gap.
We can therefore say that the animal strives for an expected goal, which is prefig-
ured and not just manifested in the target to be reached. Indeed, the animal has
an expectation, a sort of “map of the territory” that allows it to choose the most
appropriate action and to assess the consequences of its actions. In this sense, rather
than requiring a response from the subject, the eveniential elements are subjected
to internal processing—one could say, a cartographic reconfiguration—on the basis
of the subject’s endowments, which can be thought of as utilities or applications
that organize the external reality according to a need and by virtue of map contents.
These representational structures, in turn, do not respond either to the dictates of
objectivity or to those of knowledge as an end in itself. Rather, they are instrumental
to the orientation, so that they fall into the flow of subjective experience and respond
to it. This does not translate into some sort of epistemic relativism, but rather into
the subjective tendency to probe the depths of reality so as to bring out possible
configurations and viable ways to satisfy the phylogenetic motivational orientations.
The elaborative-representational paradigm inevitably proposes a view of learning
based on a systemic conception, where the individual, the bearer of subjective expe-
rience, cannot be fragmented into independent atoms of reactivity. The set of elabo-
rative endowments actualizes a singular overall perspective, whose genealogy must
be identified throughout the diachronic path of the individuation process—to take up
Carl G. Jung—which leads to the convergence between the “genius of the species”
and personal experience. These endowments bring out an inner state, of which the
given behaviour is nothing but an expression. The cognitive model therefore is not
based on an imperative and direct connection between a stimulus and a response,
as implied by associationism, but assumes the presence of internal—elaborative and
evolutionary—entities that, like maps, predispose an external framework “fit for
the subject”, i.e. reformulated on the basis of meanings or representations that are
attributed to some situations.
The experienced world is therefore no longer a collection of stimuli that objec-
tively require a reaction, but becomes a field of viability, investigable in terms of
opportunities and constraints with respect to objectives and purposes inherent in the
individual, understood as an intrinsically desiring entity. In the cognitive approach
the animal plays an active and protagonist (though not necessarily conscious) role
116 4 Animal Learning: An Epistemological Problem
in its orientation towards the world and in its active research activity in the world:
it is therefore part not only of the solution to the problem, but also of the construc-
tion of the problem itself. The protagonism of the animal depends on the heritage,
i.e. on the elaborated endowments, and on the positional conditions referred to the
here-and-now. Both are responsible, on the one hand, for the specific orientation of
the desires and objectives that give the world a representation of practicability; on
the other hand, for the resources required to address a challenge or face a problem.
Learning, according to the cognitive approach, means immersing oneself in a
problematic condition. (i) The subject is a desiring being, since the problem lies
not in the world but in the relationship between the objectives that one sets oneself
and the resources available to overcome the obstacles. (ii) The subject resorts to
internal endowments capable of providing evaluation, understanding and solution
frameworks. In this sense, the internal endowments cannot be automatisms, but are
tools or structures that can be used for multiple functions, therefore not in a 1:1
ratio between structure and function. Learning, in other words, does not produce an
automatism that drives the subject—as posited by conditioning—but rather a useful
tool for the individual that has functional ownership of it, using it in a range of
possible situations. All this points to a shift in the very concept of knowledge.
It is true that the cognitive approach of the second half of the twentieth century
suffered from the influence of the earlier psychological and philosophical perspec-
tivism, which had been hastily banned by behaviourist extremism. However, it is
equally true that the authors who, starting from the 1960s, have offered explanatory
models in this sense, relied on very concrete simulation systems provided by the
computational revolution. The computer model can, in fact, use machines to repeat
processing events, where the input data takes on a different meaning depending on
the internal processing that it receives. That is, the data loses its objective relevance,
because the centre is no longer the environment with its response imperatives, but
the subject with its objectives and maps. And these elements inevitably transform the
context into a field of viability and the intersection with the world into a genealog-
ical perspective. According to these authors’ approach, learning is a process aimed at
reaching a proposed solutionwith respect to a setback experienced subjectively by the
individual. The endowment therefore does not only have a map value, instrumental
to the realization of a function but not superimposable to the function itself—like
a word processing software with respect to a text. It is also an evolutionary entity,
a bit like the concept of “genetic algorithm”. Learning occurs when the internal
endowment requires a structural review—very similarly to what Piaget suggested in
his model of genetic epistemology (1997)—because it would be otherwise unable to
find a solution and lead the operational work to the state of “exit”.
We can then see how the cognitive approach is able to subsume the two tradi-
tional models—behaviourist and psycho-energetic—under some common ideas. In
fact, it believes (i) that the innate represents the basic endowment of the individual,
i.e. the set of evaluational (appraisal) and operational (coping) resources thanks to
which each subject intersects the external reality, transforming it into an experien-
tial field of agency. It also believes (ii) that learning takes place not through an ex
nihilo construction of resources, but following processes of epistemic enlargement
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of the endowments, which are adapted by virtue of the individual’s specific experi-
ences. And the cognitive approach did not only redefine the model of what learning
produces—a tool versus an automatic response—but also the very way in which
learning takes place. According to it, in order to learn it is necessary to do a number
of things. The first is to (i) construct a representational image of external reality,
based on a transformation of the context into a map of useful and individual-related
information. The second is to (ii) set objectives with respect to individual goals that
emerge from the various dimensions of subjectivity, such as the species dimension,
memories, the present motivational status, etc. Then it is necessary to (iii) evaluate
the structural requirements of the problem, i.e. the distance from the target or the
obstacles thatmust be overcome.After that, one has to (iv) propose solutions coherent
with the characters of the challenge using resolvent recipes previously experimented
as effective (heuristics) and producing new resolvent models (insight). Finally, one
has to (v) carry out a continuous test with respect to the results obtained from the
execution of resolvent operations.
This revolution undermined the interpretative models of human learning, but had
a low impact on the explanation of animal learning, which remained strongly tied to
the models of behaviourism and psychoenergetics. Due to a mistaken obedience to
the parsimony principle, it was considered more convenient to continue to explain
animal learning processes through the associative model, appealing to cognitive
interpretation only for complex behaviours or high levels of intentionality. This led to
a confusing cognitivemodel of intentionality, so that cognitive ethologywas believed
to assume different states of awareness. In reality, the term “cognitive” does not mean
“conscious” or “aware”, but refers to a different epistemological model concerning:
(i) how the learning process is carried out, i.e. through a phase of problematization
and solution; (ii) what produces the learning process, i.e. an elaborative tool available
for several functions, and not an automatism.
The intense discussion about animal consciousness that developed in ethology
and primatology starting from the 1980s, especially thanks to the work of Donald
Griffin (1994), thus determined a misunderstanding that equates the cognitive model
with a reference to consciousness. This, in my opinion, has considerably delayed the
epistemological revision of the descriptive-explanatory paradigm of animal learning.
By “knowledge”—whence the etymology of the term “cognitive”—the cognitive
approachdoes notmean the intentionality of the process but the following explanatory
principles. (1) The individual is an entity that dialogues with the outside world, based
on inherent orientations, and therefore presents a sort of intrinsic purpose. (2) Innate
and learned endowments are instruments, i.e. maps or applications, where the ratio
between structure and function is no longer 1:1 but 1:range, like a map that can
produce several routes. (3) Every learned endowment is an evolution of a previous
endowment, through a process of adjustment, so that the innate-learned relationship
is one of direct proportionality. (4) Learning means broadening one’s experiential
horizon through greater agency on the context, which not only produces a more
effective-efficient resolvent capacity, but also broadens the very interface between the
individual and the world. Finally, (5) experience has a strong subjective connotation,
since the endowments give the external world a functional representation.
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Unfortunately, focusing on levels of animal awareness did not help to question
the prevalent paradigm. Thus a third explanatory model was inserted in ethology
manuals, next to the two previous ones—with the exception of habituation and sensi-
tization processes. As a result, today animal learning is explained by referring to three
different paradigms, depending on the type of acquisition. The first is (a) associative
learning,with reference to the two types of conditioning (respondent or Pavlovian and
instrumental or operative): this model is therefore still informed by behaviourism.
The second is (b) social learning, linked to the relationship with conspecifics, which
contemplates imprinting, mimesis, vicariance, and is explained by referring to tradi-
tional models of ethology. Finally, there is (c) intuitive or resolvent learning, which
takes up Köhler’s insight, Tolman’s construction of cognitive maps, formation of
representations, memory research, etc. Frankly, this solution seems redundant and
misleading, in addition to being nominalist, considering that learning processes take
place within the neurobiological substrate itself. Furthermore, these three models
cannot be integrated, creating a situation of explanatory confusion with respect to
the topic that was supposed to be described and explained.
4.8 Reviewing the Explanatory Framework
So, it is not possible to demolish an explanatory model without providing a coherent
alternative thatmeets certain requirements. Asmentioned, the first is (1) “explanatory
completeness”, i.e. the ability to explain the phenomena of the learning process that
are inexplicable according to the associative model. Then there is (2) “explanatory
parsimony”, i.e. the ability to reduce inconsistencies through a framework that, as a
whole, is more parsimonious than the epicycles added to trace any incongruity back
to the model. Finally, there is (3) “explanatory subsumption”, i.e. the ability to keep
within the same explanatory framework learning events that are currently explained
by different explanatory paradigms. It is therefore necessary to assess whether these
critical issues are present in the behaviourist paradigm, which today presents itself
as the reference model for animal learning—even though it comes alongside other
secondary forms of learning and is sometimes partially amended through intervening
variables. Secondly, it is necessary to present the cognitivemodel in its basic structure
and show how it is able to overcome the critical issues present in the associative
approach.
Explanatory completeness—Let’s start from the indisputable fact that the associa-
tive model is totally incapable of explaining some forms of learning that do not lend
themselves to the stimulus-response link. This incapacity can be deduced from the
simple fact that important aspects, such as social learning and intuitive learning, are
always treated separately by the behaviourist paradigm. Moreover, while associative
learning is explained to the smallest details, constructing amodel that aspires to trans-
parency and quasi-mathematical completeness, when it comes to these two forms of
cognitive acquisition it is merely stated that the phenomenon is variable. This yields
a very modest explanatory result: an animal learns by observing its conspecifics or
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by inventing new solutions. If one analyzes the texts dedicated to social learning
or intuitive learning one will see that descriptive aspects abound, for example high-
lighting the different forms in which a transfer of knowledge between a demonstrator
and an observer takes place. On the other hand, no explanatory model is given; at
best an attempt is made to include the phenomenon within an improper explanatory
model—the attention paid to the stimulus, the reinforcing effect of the demonstrator,
etc.
In fact, it is evident that even in the simplest forms of social learning, such as
motivational stimulation or orientation on a particular object, it is not possible to
magically include the phenomenon in a paradigm that posits the objectivity of the
stimulus and the randomness of the response. Not even by referring to intervening
variables—such as the demonstrator—can one explain an event that involves the
intervention of emotional and motivational components, the attachment process and
a social relationship, or the predetermination due to innate components. For example,
we have seen that the learned mobbing behaviour was significantly lower if a plastic
bottle was used as a target (Poli and Prato Previde 1994). In the same way, other
studies have shown that conspecifics can induce the fear of snakes in other macaques,
but the same does not hold for other targets (Cook and Mineka 1987).
Then of course there are more complex social learning phenomena. There is
(i) mimesis, i.e. the acquisition of an observed pattern; or (ii) vicariance, i.e. the
proposition of winning behaviours. There is (iii) emulation, i.e. learning the objective
to be pursued; or (iv) tradition, i.e. stabilizing a species-specific style. Finally, there
is (v) culture, i.e. acquiring the peculiar style of a population within the species. It
is really difficult all these aspects work within the behaviourist paradigm. First of
all, such behaviours are learned in a molar way, i.e. as a whole, and not through
sequential assemblages of molecular elements; secondly, the acquisition is always
immediate and does not happen through gradual approximations, therefore it cannot
be attributed to the trial and error model. Also, it is hard to find reinforcing events
in mimesis, and it cannot be denied that there is an evaluative and decision-making
element in vicariance. Likewise there is an inventive performance in emulation,which
is never the simple repetition of the observed behaviour. In many apprenticeship
events, for example in chimpanzees’ attempts to break nutshells with a rock, the
first approaches are often followed by consequences that should be assigned to the
category of punishment, sincemost of the time they are hurt by crushing their fingers.
Yet, the behaviour is encouraged.
In the same way, intuitive learning cannot be traced back to the behaviourist
scheme for a set of reasons. First of all, (1) there is the molarity of the process,
which does not lend itself to being translated into a linear sequence but presents
a Gestalt structure and involves hierarchical plans. Then, there is (2) the timing of
the resolvent processes, which do not manifest themselves by approximation but
according to “canons of expertise” referring to specific situations such as heuristics
or insight. Furthermore, one should consider (3) the non-direct link between the
present stimulus event and the response (provided one can even use such terms) as
well as the occasional nature of reinforcement mechanisms. Finally, there is (4) a
need to appeal to complex memory processes that relate operational memory (also
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referred to as short-term memory) to noetic or conceptual memory (also referred
to as long-term memory). In no case does an animal approach a problem through
random attempts because, if it did so, it would never get past the challenge.
It is therefore clear that a behaviourist explanation cannot account for a solution
reached thanks to heuristics. An even more complex situation arises in relation to
insight because, in this case, there isn’t even a gradual approximation by trial, but
rather a predefined and global solution. We find the same situation when we consider
basic logical functions in the life of an animal, such as categorizing or distinguishing.
In the case of categorization by family, that is, when more targets are correlated not
because they present a common character, but because they manifest a collection of
characters that are variously shared—such that the evocative response input cannot
be referred to by a common denominator—it is clear that the association is of no help.
To understand how a categorization by family occurs, it is indispensable to resort to
a “scheme” model, that is, a structure capable of bringing out the response whenever
a given number of elements are present. It therefore emerges from an internal pattern
like the hidden entities of connectionist models.
As we know, categorizing means giving the same response to different stimuli
while its opposite, distinguishing,means giving different responses to similar stimuli.
Also in the case of distinction it is essential to construct a discriminative scheme,
meaning the ability to isolate those configurations of elements that allow one to
attribute the target to a specific element requiring a particular response. If then we
consider conceptualization, i.e., the response to abstract elements such as same or
different, big or small, old and new, it is clear that we need to refer to concepts of
hidden or internal entities, that is, representative structures and not associations. In
the construction of a problem-context to which to give a resolvent response, where
learningmeans building a new resource to remove the setback condition, it is clear that
the solution to a problem implies certain things. First of all, there is (i) the ability to set
goals even when these are not directly perceptible, and therefore the ability to adopt
a specific behaviour, which entails the negation of the behaviourist model. Secondly,
there is (ii) the property of assessing the challenge in terms of space and structural
requirements of the problem. Then, we find (iii) the ability to test the evolution of the
challenge based on the resolvent behaviours implemented. Finally, there is (iv) the
need to considerably reduce the field of useful resolvent options: a random attempt
would lead to a combinatorial boom of possibilities, therefore the individual needs
to recall useful resolvent recipes, which even in this case cannot be explained in
a non-mentalistic theory. From all this we can deduce that the behaviourist model
inevitably leaves out two very important chapters of the learning process, thus being
forced to resort to new explanatory frameworks.
Explanatory parsimony—The second objective of an epistemological paradigm is
to reduce inconsistencies through parsimonious models. The behaviourist approach
has been modified over time to account for the many incongruities that piled up in
experimental tests. Latent learning, pre-activation, targeted behaviour, intervening
variables, the presence of molar expressions, etc. are only some examples of the
inconsistencies that have been resolved by correcting the paradigm, without however
questioning its basic model, which remained the one formulated by Burrhus Skinner.
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Even the phenomenon of overshadowing or blocking demonstrates the absence of the
alleged evocative objectivity of the stimulus in the learning processes as explained
according to the behavioural canon. Indeed, the decrease in a learned behaviour that
is continuously reinforced is itself an incongruity, because such a behaviour should
instead become more likely.
The proposals that have been made to bring these inconsistencies back to the
behaviourist paradigm recall the “epicycles” introduced by ancient astronomers to
reconcile the inconsistencies of the Ptolemaic paradigm with the actual motions
of the planets. Just like the Ptolemaic epicycles, these corrections weigh down the
behaviourist explanatory model, making it far from parsimonious. The misunder-
standing about the parsimony level of the cognitive model is based on the idea that
“cognitive” means conscious and, likewise, that functions of awareness imply a high
level of explanatory resources. I am not going to discuss consciousness, the resources
used in the explication processes and the different levels of intentionality. However,
without denying the importance of these aspects in the learning process, I want to
clarify that the cognitive approach does not ipso facto refer to different levels of
awareness. It is rather an explanatory model that can be used also and above all with
regards to elementary functions, based on the concept of elaborative scheme.
A model is always an approximation and there is no doubt that feedback, within a
given epistemological paradigm, is extremely useful to go beyond the paradigm itself.
The associative view has brought to light some evidence that must certainly be dealt
with and that must be accounted for by any alternative explanatory model, including
so-called exceptions. Indeed, it is precisely the numerous inconsistencies between
the associative explanation on the one hand and the observational and experimental
evidence on the other that point to the need for a new epistemological framework.
The latter must be capable of combining: (i) neurobiological findings, which thanks
to neuroimaging techniques and clinical research are increasingly consistent with
the phenomenal investigation of behaviour as an objectively verifiable manifesta-
tion; (ii) individual and species-specific identity. This model should therefore avoid
any juxtaposition between innate and learned: in the light of the genetic-epigenetic
process, doing so appears anachronistic and misleading but, unfortunately, cannot
be avoided in the traditional explanatory tripartition.
For now I will refrain from analysing complex functions such as awareness and
self-awareness, which—as reiterated by the psychology studies on the cognitive
unconscious (Pelli and Tillman 2008; Berlin 2011)—are not necessary to construct
elaborative schemes. I believe that the explanatory model of learning processes is
always the same: i.e. the construction of a processing scheme as a readaptation of
a previous scheme available to the subject. In this sense, the phylogenetic (innate)
legacy, as a set of elaborative endowments predefined by natural selection on the
basis of species-specific adaptive needs, represents a sort of evolutionary matrix
originating the knowledge that the subject acquires through the various experiential
events. At the same time, each learning process changes the condition of the matrix
itself and therefore the range of further evolutionary possibilities of the subject. Ulti-
mately, I believe the time has come to completely abandon the epistemological and
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psychoenergetic associationist frames, so as to construct a new explicative synthesis
that considers learning as a modification of the subject’s processing interface.
In my opinion, what invalidates the full affirmation of the cognitive framework in
the explication of animal behaviour and learning is a misinterpretation of the prin-
ciple of parsimony itself. The appeal to cognitive models only to explain learning
processes concerning complex areas—such as identifying solutions through inven-
tions, learning symbolic or arbitrarymeanings, using or constructing tools, building a
representationalmapof a particular environment, etc.—starts froma specific assump-
tion. This assumption can be referred toMorgan’s canon, i.e. the idea that it is possible
to appeal to higher faculties only if the explanation that refers to lower faculties is not
sufficient to account for the event in question. One can then note an epistemological
distance between Ockham’s razor and Morgan’s canon, since the former refers to
the explanatory model while the second transforms or superimposes the explanatory
structures with the evaluation of the faculties in question. The parsimony principle,
as it is usually applied, would make sense if we indissolubly bound together a cogni-
tive explanation and the appeal to awareness. In reality, the cognitive paradigm,
first developed in the 1960s, has nothing to do with the introspective and projective
mentalistic perspective of the early twentieth century.
In this regard, let’s ask ourselves, which is more parsimonious: (i) a paradigm that
uses three models to explain the same phenomenon or one that is able to subsume
them? (ii) a paradigm that needs to resort to explanatory epicycles, such as the concept
of variable reinforcement, or one that can dowithout such things, by simply resolving
its inconsistencies? (iii) a paradigm that creates a sharp disjunction between innate
and learned or one that is able to bring the two back to a single domain? So, which
is more parsimonious: (iv) the analytical and horizontal model, which proposes an
endowment for each function (which is the case of automatism), or one that assumes
that every endowment can performmore functions, as in the case of the tool? In other
words, which is more parsimonious: a map or a collection of itineraries? (v) a model
that does not take into account the characteristics of the substrate, limiting itself to
phenomenal findings, or a model that is coherent with the network structure of the
substrate, based on a systemic-functional conception?
Also in terms of falsifiability, it is evident that today it no longer makes sense
to refer to the mind by using introspection, since information technology, while not
being superimposable on neurobiological functions, helps us propose models that
can be subjected to confutation. The explanatory model based on the “elaborative
scheme”, in fact, can find in computation (that is, in data processing schemes) a
model that does not necessarily require recourse to intentional states. The “elaborative
scheme” model therefore can replace the “associative scheme”, not only because it is
effective in accounting for complex behaviours, but also because it is more efficient
(more parsimonious) in explaining two main things The first is (1) how learning
is determined because, if we consider the act of learning as a way to deal with
a setback, a resolvent structure that works through heuristics rather than through
random attempts is much simpler, as it involves a smaller number of operational
sessions. The second is (2) what learning produces because, if we consider the
functional availability, a map from which to derive an itinerary is much simpler than
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a set of linear routes. Moreover, the elaborative approach allows us to explain (i) the
passage from an innate to a second-order processing structure through readjustments
of thefirst basedonnewprocessing information. It also explains (ii) the compositional
or multiple-possibilities character of the configurations of representational processes
as is the case in connectionist models of neural networks. Finally, this approach
accounts for (iii) the relationship between the neurobiological system and the other
physiological systems, because every organic process, due to its systemic character,
can be transformed in an informative pattern rather than in a simple stimulus.
Last but not least, the traditional approach creates a sharp disjunction between
the behaviour of the human being and that of other animals—a dichotomy that can
only be considered laughable by scholars of comparative anatomy and that no longer
makes sense if we consider Darwinian thought, and in particular the concepts of
homology, analogy, and universals. Instead, the cognitive model is consistent with
the principles of similarity and difference that characterize the phylogenetic special-
ization.While the behaviourist approach presupposes the idea of a universal grammar
of learning, the cognitive approach considers learning as one of themany expressions
of the genetic perspective capable of introjecting phylogeny and ontogenesis. The
endowments, in fact, are the result of a programming or development of processing
resources that inevitably assimilate the experiential and adaptive differences over
time. In other words, the cognitive approach replaces the SR atomic model with
a scheme structure that some define as a representation, although not necessarily
iconic, i.e. strictly related to an entity. This structure is capable of: (1) working with
other schemes to give rise to systems of a higher hierarchical level, such as mental
states or mental flows; (2) assuming multiple configurations, such as the hidden enti-
ties of the connectionist systems, varying the internal conjunction between the parts;
and (3) changing over time and creating new schemes.
The scheme is blatantly more parsimonious than a linear S-R sequence, and at
the same time it is able to account for the inconsistencies previously mentioned
without having to appeal to further elements external to the model. If one admits
implicit learning both in humans and in other species, without having to refer to the
“awareness” factor, the scheme model is undoubtedly more parsimonious, simply
because it resolves inconsistencies in a more direct way than the associative model.
This means that it does not make sense to relegate the cognitive explanation only
to those phenomena that cannot be explained through the associative model: this
approach is based on the false assumption that the cognitive model is more complex.
Explaining animal learning processes through the scheme model does not imply any
reference to more costly elements than those of the associative model. At the same
time, indeed, it dramatically reduces the number of factors involved in explaining
the learning process.
Let us now consider the most important inconsistencies that can be solved by
the scheme model. (i) The molarity of behavioural expression is explained by the
systemic character of the scheme,whose value is not given by the sumof the elements
but by the systemic predicates which the endowment takes as a whole. (ii) The hier-
archical value of behavioural acts—for example between strategies and tactics—can
be explained through the compositional effect of the schemes, for example the TOTE
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subunits. (iii) Some effects such as overshadowing and the blocking effect can be
explained by the irrelevance of the additional stimuluswith respect to the construction
of meaning. (iv) The drop in the reinforcement value if proposed in a continuous way
is explained if, as Chomsky suggests, instead of the term reinforcement we use the
word goal or expectation, whose value obviously decreases with repeated achieve-
ments. (v) The preactivation effect is explained if the behaviour put in place does not
follow a linear sequence, continually dictated by the consequences, but a scheme or
plan, where some steps can be put forward in advance. (vi) Latent learning can also
find a convincing explanation if one admits that the subject learns by constructing
patterns of reality, such as a cognitive map. Finally, (vii) the factor of the intervening
variables is explained if one admits that the expressed behaviour is the result of a
specific configuration that translates input factors of different nature, and not S-R
automatisms that, given S, produce R.
Explanatory subsumption—Agood explanatorymodelmust be able not only to be
parsimonious and to explain otherwise unexplained events, but also to subsume the
other explanatory models or to offer a summary framework capable of reducing the
gap between observed and described phenomena. In this sense, behaviourist experi-
ences and the law of effect may very well fall within a cognitive scheme; indeed, in
many application proposals there is more and more talk of a cognitive-behavioural
model. Also, many cognitive theories are derived from previous behaviourist
approaches, and some cognitivemodels, such as the connectionist one, are sometimes
confused with the associative model. The cognitive approach does not conflict with
most behaviourist experiences: it simply interprets them by using a different model
than the S-R link and by redefining the concept of reinforcement. On the other hand,
as we have seen, the cognitive model does not deny learning by consequences but
sees it as an explanatory review. (i) The stimulus is not an objective entity that has
value in itself, but is built based on specific schemes of the interface endowments and
of the here-and-now of the subject. (ii) The behaviour put in place is not a random
attempt, but something that the subject does by addressing the given challenge with
the possible resolvent recipes available. (iii) The achievement of the objective is
what reinforces a given behaviour, and the reinforcing effect has value to the same
extent as the value of the objective. (iv) The process gives rise to a new cognitive or
applicative endowment (assimilation), i.e. a scheme finds new areas of applicability
or a new structural order (accommodation), being modified in accordance with a new
utility of the system.
Evenwith respect to themodel of classical ethology, the cognitive approach, unlike
the behaviourist one, enables considerable overlaps and subsumptions. Behaviourist
models are undoubtedly foreign to the ethological analysis, and in their claim of non-
specificity they hinder the development of new explicative frames based on species-
specific cognitivity. Phenomena like imprinting, expository learning, the releaser
effect, learning by mimesis and vicariance, insight and other forms of resolvent
learning require a new explanatory framework that puts autopoietic coordinates at the
centre of species-specific learning. Here the logic is not that of building links but that
of transforming innate patterns. Every individual learns by flexing reality within their
own species dimension and by adapting their innate styles to the particular situations
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of ontogenetic development in which they find themselves. Therefore, more than a
simple associative logic—where an objective “x” entity comes with another equally
objective “y”—this is a transformation of the interpretative and operative schemes
prepared by phylogeny.
The cognition of every species has been calibrated by natural selection, exactly
like all other functions, in order to define specifically adaptive performances.One is to
(1) monitor the context, or acquire findings and interpret the events occurring around
the individual with respect to a model of existence that intersects said events in a
peculiar way. Another is to (2) refine the operational practices, that is, the modalities
of intervention in reality and of solution to challenging situations, starting from the
innate styles and adapting them to the situation of the given context. Every species,
therefore, is born with its own interpretative and operational schemes, which should
not be considered as rigid, unchangeable structures but as “evolutionary schemes”
that are capable of adapting to the conditions of growth and, indeed, were designed to
be adapted. In recent years, the cognitive model has developed tools, such as genetic
algorithms or neural networks, which show how new software can evolve from a
starting configuration and adapt to the specific conditions of a particular context.
The cognitive model therefore allows one not only to account for innate functions,
such as elaborative schemes configured by the natural selection process, but also to
explain how these innate configurations can evolve or be readapted and generate new
processing functions.
If the concept of pattern, inherited from Gestalt psychology, lends itself to a
cognitive interpretation—that is, to a scheme model—it is not so for the behaviourist
paradigm. The problem of the SR model lies in two general aspects. The first is
that (1) it does not take into account the starting matrix, considering learning as the
construction of an association based on nothing and not as amodification of a scheme,
taking the species and individual dimensions as simple variables intervening in the
process. The second is that (2) it does not give rise to a systemic-molar endowment,
and therefore it is incapable of interpreting learning as the realization of an organized
scheme that allows the individual to monitor the world and act in a comprehensive
manner. To deal with reality it is essential to transform it into a set of useful coor-
dinates intersecting the specific ontic condition of the subject, in its species-specific
and individual dimensions. Association, unlike a scheme, is not able to transform
the data into information—something that any software can do—but merely creates
a mechanical link between two entities.
One of the strongest inconsistencies between the ethological and the behaviourist
interpretation concerns the concept of motivation. In psychoenergetics we consider
motivation—I speak of course of intrinsic motivation—as an internal drive or energy
(hence the psychohydraulic model) that demands to be used by virtue of a phasic
or latent accumulation pouring onto a chosen target. The psychoenergetic view was
questioned already in the 1970s by research in neurobiology, since the expression
of a behaviour is the result of the activation of a synaptic network that leads not
only to the behavioural output, but also to the strengthening of the network itself,
making that behaviour increasingly probable over time. And it is not just a question
of evaluable feedback on the substrate. If it were true that a behaviour is mitigated
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through expression by consumption, we should expect an inverse effect with respect
to the exponential growth of a trend through repetition. If, on the other hand, we
consider motivation as a compositional entity that is increasingly rooted through
experience, i.e. if we apply a connectionist model, the facts are easily explained.
On the other hand, being intrinsically oriented—for example, a predator is oriented
towards any moving target—motivation can explain the intrinsic teleology of the
animal being, i.e. its desiring condition that underlies its continuous formulation
of objectives, which in turn are the flywheel of setbacks and challenges to address
through learning processes. The cognitive approach allows us to consider motiva-
tions as “compositional copulas” or binders which, just like verbs-actions, give rise
to propositional expressions, resulting from several predicative elements of a repre-
sentational and emotional order. A motivation, in fact, in order to be translated into
action, must connect expressive specifications—for example in the four coordinates
ofwhat, how,where, andwhen—and specifications of an emotional and arousal state.
A simply associative view, unlike the connectionist model, is not able to translate
behaviour into a propositional attitude.
Finally, we must not forget neurobiological research, which increasingly shows
that the learning process involves several brain areas and not only the organs respon-
sible for gathering sensory information. It also shows that the learning process gives
rise to neural configurations that are more reminiscent of a composition—a painting
or a map—than a direct link between the collection areas of sensory stimuli and the
areas of motor processing. If one thinks, for example, of memory mechanisms—also
involved in the acquisition and not only in the retention and the subsequent evocation
of data—onewill realize that several areas of the brain intervene in operativememory,
in the transformation that involves the hippocampus and in the subsequent cortical
consolidation. Memory is perhaps what best suits the interpretation of the scheme
proposed by Frederic Bartlett and Endel Tulving (2014). Learning processes also
involve emotional and motivational areas, not as variables but as essential compo-
nents of the memory configuration. Also in this case, the cognitive model appears to
work much better than other explanations with the characteristics of the neurobio-
logical structure and its functions, which today can be viewed through the techniques
of neuroimaging.
4.9 In Conclusion
To conclude, I believe that the behaviourist paradigm must be overcome not only
in the so-called “not merely associative” learning areas, but also in the explanation
of the learning processes that are ordinarily placed within the category of “associa-
tive learning” and defined as respondent conditioning and instrumental conditioning
(Marchesini 2013). Learning implies knowledge, not conditioning: the difference
between these two terms lies in the automatism of the second and in the elaborative
endowment of thefirst.An elaborative endowment is not a thread that cogently defines
a function but a map structuring coordinates that lend themselves to different types of
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functional outcomes. Furthermore, I believe that the “innate vs learned” dichotomy
must be abandoned in the name of a dimensional and non-complementary under-
standing of the two terms. Learning is called to re-adapt the innate input by processing
schemes, and at the same time its very configuration involves the intervention of the
learning process.
A processing-compositional theory is better suited to explaining these processes,
which are both functional and evolutionary, since they structure a specific config-
uration when they are activated, so that each output becomes in turn an input. The
schemes are called upon to process the two main types of information: (1) that about
monitoring, which concerns both the acquisitionmodel, since not everything is useful
and important, and the interpretativemodel, i.e.what a particular phenomenonmeans;
(2) that of an operational nature, which concerns both the assessment of the chal-
lenge, i.e. the structural requirements of the problem, and the identification of the
operators useful for achieving the subject’s objectives. Rather than making use of
atomic links between a stimulus and a response, the individual therefore uses type 1
processing schemes coupled with type 2 schemes, thus achieving greater flexibility
and molarity in the overall response. However, this model implies a noticeable shift
with respect to associative epistemology. First (i) the dual action of the two schemes
breaks the automatism between acquisition and response, that is, it sees them as
two processes with their own autonomy, based on the expertise reached by every
scheme in data processing, so we can talk about knowledge as opposed to condi-
tioning. Secondly, (ii) the processing scheme model considers species-specificity,
as well as other dimensions of subjectivity (individuality, particular physiological
states, mental images in the here-and-now) not as variables that intervene in the SR
link but as specific configurations of the processing schemes (of type 1 and 2) and
as specific couplings of the same, explaining some highlighted predicates such as
peculiarity, variability, flexibility.
Ultimately, the scheme model represents an explicit overturning—exactly like
the Copernican revolution—of the traditional view of animal learning. In the scheme
model, the centre of learning is the subject, with its functional-configurational state
of mind and its ability to build an interface with external reality. Just as the sensory
organs represent a physical filter of access to reality, in the same way the cognitive
endowments define specific methods of processing the findings. An aspect that is
not always taken into consideration is that if the animal were nothing more than a
set of innate and learned automatisms, certainly its consciousness—in its intentional
character of “being aware of”—could not bring out any kind of subjectivity: a torch
cannot shed light on missing furniture in a room. In order for subjectivity to be
possible, it must precede consciousness. I therefore believe that it is meaningless to
maintain the analytical approach, based on automatisms, and then add a phantom
consciousness to an entity otherwise explained as a puppet moved by threads. And
it is equally clear that only a model that does not overlap the structure of an endow-
ment with its function can explain the ownership of endowments that is the basis of
subjectivity.
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Chapter 5
The Obscure Object of Animal
Subjectivity
Roberto Marchesini
Abstract The issue of animal subjectivity has been addressed in many ways
over time. On one hand there is the anthropomorphic assimilative interpretation,
supporting a projective view according to which animality is just a conjugation of
the human being. On the other, we find the break operated by René Descartes, who
assimilated the animal condition to amere res extensa, thereby annihilating anyhint of
subjectivity and turning the non-human animal into a bundle of deterministic mecha-
nisms. In away, theCartesian postulate has remained on the background for centuries,
despite being criticized by many philosophers (especially Michel de Montaigne); it
then regained some epistemological and applicative strength as a counter-reformist
reaction to the continuity theory supported by Darwin and his followers. In the
twentieth century, the reductionist project—promoted, among others, by Martin
Heidegger, misinterpreting or stretching Jakob von Uexküll’s analysis—gave birth
to a mechanistic paradigm according to which behaviour is due to innate and learned
automatisms, de facto reviving Cartesian assumptions. Thus, animals were subjected
to a de-subjectivizing process that annihilated any trace of self-presence. On the one
hand, (i) Darwinian evolutionism, with its inherent morphopoietic plurality and the
activity of the organisms, was amended in the sense of the applicative dichotomy
between “chance and necessity”, as put by Jacque Monod. On the other hand, (ii)
Konrad Lorenz’s heritage was purged of any aspect of self-presence in the construc-
tion of one’s epistemic perspective; the only thing that was kept was the Psychohy-
draulicMetaphor.Nevertheless, in the secondhalf of the twentieth century, something
seems to have changed, particularly in the ethological debate: intellective activity is
now recognized as the centre of animal ontology, admitting various levels of inten-
tionality when talking about sentience. In this essay, I would like to deal with the
issue of animal subjectivity while avoiding any recourse to mere projectivity—i.e.
banal anthropomorphism—or to any explanatory cycles or forms of petitio principii,
by which consciousness is the decisive element that makes subjectivity appear out
of nowhere, like a rabbit in a top hat. I think that the issue of subjectivity today is
the main topic of ontological analysis, not only for non-humans, but also in relation
to the challenge of human ontology itself: traditional dualistic explanations keep
losing ground, whereas the performative concept is erasing any distance between
living beings and machines. This is why it is necessary to focus on the concept of
subjectivity: all too often it is made to overlap with other predicates.
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5.1 Premise
The post-Cartesian view of animals as automata undoubtedly represents a great break
in the Western tradition: for the first time, human beings were seen as opposed to
animals in a sharply disjunctive sense, because of their exclusive access to the dimen-
sion of res cogitans. The Cartesian presupposition, in its alleged mathematization
of animality, provides a rational and applicative tool to the attempts at assigning
non-humans to the predetermined and deterministic domain envisioned by humanist
anthropocentrism. However, the first humanists still posited a fil rouge of underlying
continuism between man and animal. The Cartesian paradigm, instead, undoubtedly
marks a “qualitative leap”, albeit in the wake of a process of separation already initi-
ated by its conceptual precursors starting from the Platonic, Aristotelian and above
all Stoic schools—think of the genealogical division between the Promethean and the
Epimethean, or the definition of man as a “zóon logòn échon”.1 This trajectory was
rooted in a rigid and predefined rank attribution, depriving the non-human of any
life-protagonism and eventually reaching the Cartesian de-subjectivization, which
questions even the animals’ ability to suffer and desire. Only by retracing this path
is it possible to understand the explanatory frames that, in spite of Darwinism, took
hold in the twentieth century.
The explanatory assumption does not dare to challenge the alleged passivity of the
animal condition—Morgan’s canon goes beyond the intentions of its inventor—so the
evolutionary process itself is brought back to the dialectic of chance and necessity.
This entails the annihilation of any animal protagonism, whereby the individual
loses any value in the dynamics of selection, stuck between an a-priori heritage
and an environment aimed at dictating possible ontopoietic changes. There is no
doubt, however, that even Konrad Lorenz’s thought has been extensively amended
by the prevailing reductionism, in order to trivialize its epistemological contents, in
line with the mechanistic idea of instinctive automatism and psychohydraulics. In
reality, the Austrian ethologist had left us some unforgettable pages on the epistemic
protagonism of animal subjectivity, responsible, in his opinion, not only for the
construction of a single perspective on the world, but also for actively intervening in
the evolutionary dynamics of fitness and selection.
The mechanistic view therefore denies the animal’s presence: in this perspective,
its behaviour would be nothing but a domino sequence of automatisms, a blind flow
with no will or purpose. Indeed, Descartes warns us that any attribution of protag-
onism to the non-human is an undue form of anthropomorphism. The reductionist
project, in the humanist parable of Western culture, has at least three powerful allies
on its side. The first is (i) anthropocentrism, which transforms the human being
into the ultimate ontological fulcrum, making other entities instrumental to man’s
full realization and therefore lacking any inherence of their own. Then there is (ii)
the scientific paradigm which, ever since the seventeenth century, has favored a
1It was Aristotle who defined man as zóon logòn échon, meaning animal endowed with language.
Indeed, language has historically been one of the intrinsic qualities of the human rational animal,
cutting off any continuity between humans and non-human animals.
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mechanistic, determinist, and reductionist approach, epistemologically oriented by
Ockham’s razor to the simplification and rejection of any form of teleology and
anthropomorphism. Finally, there is (iii) the stigma of pantheism that, since the
Middle Ages, has been placed on anyone who attributes a creative force to nature, as
demonstrated not only by themisfortunes of somephilosophers (think of the emblem-
atic cases of Baruch Spinoza and Giordano Bruno), but also of naturalists like Jean-
Baptiste de Lamarck. In this sense the denial of animal subjectivity was achieved not
so much by finding a predicative (ontic) difference between the human being and
the other species—aimed at establishing the specificity of the human condition—but
rather by establishing a metapredicative (ontological) distance between the human
dimension and animality. The goal was to affirm the special nature and primacy of
the human, translating it into the idea that the human being is not an animal.
The metapredicative analysis conducted by humanism has always privileged
oppositional meaning, useful to bring out the human through a background oscil-
lation rather than trying to understand what the animal condition means. Animal
being, in its various understandings, has always been interpreted by focusing on
some distinctive ontological foundation of the human, leading to several views. One
sees (i) animals as machines, deprived of that presence and decision-making power
which represents the human’s proprium. Another regards (ii) animals as a reproduc-
tion of characters predetermined by nature, lacking self-determination: this is viewed
in opposition to human Prometheanism, the character of becoming which inaugu-
rates the historical dimension. Then there is (iii) the animal as poor-in-world, stunned
in fruition, incapable of contemplative distancing or of prospective evaluation and
epistemic multiplicity. Another paradigm is that of (iv) the animal as an expression
of ancestrality, a mirror of the past, a resonance indicating the old path of the human
being, not as a specialization of but as the emancipation from the animal condition,
and consequently synonymous with regressiveness and repression. Of course there
is also (v) the animal as a brute, that is, as devoid of yearning, of verticalization
with respect to physiological instincts and needs, destined to impulsiveness, irra-
tionality, aggression, selfishness. Finally, there is the view of (vi) animals as devoid
of language, representation, explication and declaration of its own state, stuck in the
instantaneousness of its action, whence their absolute lack of retrospection on past
events, of any real reference to the present and of any projection on the future.
Therefore, it is far from easy to make a case for animal subjectivity: too many
conceptual biases have been accumulating in our culture over the centuries, fueled
by different sources or intentions. These biases force those who venture along this
path to operate a long and complex deconstruction. Indeed, it is necessary to remove
the canvas from such rooted, infiltrative and convoluted conceptual frames—and this
is so hard that it is easy to lose one’s thread of argumentation and even one’s central
speculative theme. If, for some, the reference to an animal subjectivity appears to
be almost an oxymoron, for others it is taken for granted. And yet it would seem so
simple to observe the parental care of a mammal, the aerial acrobatics of a bird, the
impressive coordination of a school of fish, the meticulous work of a spider and to
deduce, even just intuitively, that an overall design is undeniable in such behaviours.
Surely, one feels, there is an evaluative anddecision-making subject in place, pursuing
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an objective within a vast field of viability. But the simplest way is not always the
correct one. Indeed, one could say that, if the world followed the coordinates that
are dictated by immediate intuition, we would not need science. Are we really sure
that performative qualities are a useful indicator to discuss subjectivity? Machines
should make us think twice about that.
So let’s try to take up this analysis from where it has run aground with Descartes,
i.e. in the relationship between the entity and the predicates that define its mani-
festation. In Aristotelian philosophy, the subject is what lies below the predicates
(subiectus) and in so doing supports accessory qualities, interpreted as accidental and
contingent; in this sense the subject is constitutive (substantia), i.e. that which lies
‘underneath’ its connotations and makes up their ontological foundation. I consider
this view important to define an animal condition that describes animal-being as
a general condition, beyond the characterizations of species and individual. To go
deeper into the theme of animal subjectivity we will therefore have to move beyond
the traits that diversify the various species, so as to focus on the common condition
that defines animality. In other words, considering biodiversity as a collection of enti-
ties endowedwith predictive differences, one could say that the subiectus of an animal
being defines a metapredicative condition, and it is precisely this dimensionality that
the discourse on subjectivity is about.
In modern thought, the term subject is contralateral to object, referring to the
activity of the first (which acts, owns, obtains, thinks) as opposed to the passivity
of the second (which is enacted, owned, obtained, thought of). This dichotomy is
clarified in theCartesian dualismof res cogitans and res extensa, charging subjectivity
with further metapredicative meanings such as the concepts of freedom, interiority,
certainty, transcendentality, as opposed to the counterparts of necessity, exteriority,
uncertainty, unknowability. Furthermore,Descartes opened up the path of ontological
anthropocentrism by claiming that participation in the res cogitans is reserved for
humans only. Hence the mechanical character of all that is not human, combining
animality with other natural phenomena such as the gravitational fall of a body or
the flow of a river. But can we honestly believe that there is nothing but mechanistic
articulations behind the behaviour of an animal?Consider a deliberative act expressed
by an animal, which for the most part includes processes of planning, evaluation,
simulation, feedback-based correction, and knowledge acquisition: can we really say
that it amounts to a simple cascade of switches turning on and off?
In fact, overlapping the performative expression—whatever the level of excel-
lence or intentionality that characterizes it—with subjectivity as the actual presence
of an animal in its present leads to a series of interpretative drifts and to often
deceiving epistemic results, such as tautology and infinite regress. If, in fact, we
follow the dualistic assumptions, we inevitably fall into extrinsic teleology, having
to imagine an external entity that presides over the—programming, evaluative or
decision-making—projection. Indeed, it is obvious that, when we speak of a being
who intersects the external reality in a perspective and copulative way, the res extensa
must necessarily rely on a second entity, however it is defined. Every layer of the
onion we remove, defining it as a variable environmental stimulus—be it the world,
the body, the brain or whatever—supposes a nucleus that does not exist or, better,
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a nucleus that is not identified and that, nevertheless, supports the whole line of
reasoning.
Overlapping subjectivity with predicates does not help either, because if it were
so, then a hypothetical machine capable of implementing and even surpassing our
own performances should lead us to the conclusion that said machine is more human
than we are—whatever the meaning of this statement may be. And yet we are certain
that an elevator does not worry about our health when it keeps the doors open to
let us through, that a thermostat ignores the temperature that it maintains within an
environment, that a computer does not know the laws of mathematics despite being
able to carry out complicated calculations better than us or, more prosaically, that a
coffee maker does not have the goal of greeting us in the morning. We experience
this everyday: there are functions related to contexts or to results, and therefore
mechanically intelligent, which do not necessarily imply a mind in action. There
are machines that work by feedback mechanisms, according to the coordinates of
cybernetics—the thermostat is an example of this; others perform the dictation of
an algorithm on the basis of hardware and software (for example, all computer
systems work this way). But when it comes to analyzing animal behaviour we face a
sort of explanatory crisis, polarized between a mechanical simplification and trivial
intuitionism.
Undoubtedly, regardless of all the operations of distancing and repression, we feel
that this is something that strongly concerns us. In this sense we are inclined to look
for a mind in action wherever there is some impressive performance: from the radial
perfection of a spider web to the precise orientation of migrating birds, from the
architectural wisdom implicit in a beaver dam to the mimetic oscillatory movements
of a stick insect. But what if it wasn’t like that? What if the mind is revealed more in
uncertainty than in fluent realization, in hesitationmore than immediate execution, in
approximation and imprecision more than in full correspondence?What if it is found
in the flexibility of functional co-optation—i.e. in an expedient that roughly adapts to
a singular needmore than to a coherent and standardized response? Certainly, it is not
in the function itself that the subject emerges—i.e. that the individual shows a glimpse
of their subjective presence in reality—but in the ability to master these functions,
adapting them to specific situations. So, if it is true that performative perfection
arouses marvel, it is also undeniable that even an embryogenic event marks executive
phantasmagories, seemingly pursuing a final objective and not simply being the result
of a cascade of events prepared by information packages accumulated in phylogeny.
And yet we would never feel authorized to see a mind in action behind the formation
of an organism, explaining it in teleological terms.
At this point, a first doubt concerns the very nature of the explanation: when
we speak of subjectivity, do we mean perhaps to bring back extrinsic teleology?
Or is there a third way, able to avoid this risk, while rejecting the paradigm of the
animal as a machine? This, in my opinion, is the challenge that opens up before us
and that should be food for thought to anyone who aims to question the Cartesian
concept of animal-automaton. For a serious critique of explanatory mechanism, it
does not help to appeal to feelings or to complex elaborative functions: Morgan’s
canon is not the real obstacle to the admission of subjectivity. The real enemy is
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the explanatory model itself. Perhaps it is a question of following in psychology the
same path indicated by Gödel in mathematics, demonstrating the incompleteness of
the mechanistic formalization. On the other hand, I want to immediately clear the
field of possible misunderstandings. In speaking of subjectivity and rejecting the
mechanistic paradigm of Cartesian origin, in order to explain the expressiveness and
above all the condition of animal-being, I do not mean to refer to any form of dualism
by assuming that there is some transcendent principle at play in machines.
My intent is, on the contrary, to understand the animal condition in two ways: (i)
in a systemic view, i.e. in a mentalistic reading that takes into account the evo-devo
coordinates (Minelli 2009); and (ii) in an active conception of the individual as a
protagonist, instead of considering the animal dimension as the condition of being
totally stunned in one’s function. The mechanistic assumption, in fact, does not deny
the complexity—let alone the intersection between the individual and the world—
of the animal, but proposes to attribute the latter’s expression to an endowment-
mechanism that acts like a switch, determining the function itself. Therefore, the
focus of the discussion does not lie in the complexity of the function: we are not
endowed with subjectivity if we are able to achieve impressive performance results,
but if and only if we are the protagonists of our intersection with the world—if we are
able, that is, not only to be in the moment but to own it. To overcome the machinic
reduction, i.e. the reduction of animals to objects, it is not necessary to appeal to
some other or transcendent entity, but it to admit a system that denies the claim of
analytical exhaustiveness, and involves various levels of supervenience with respect
to the functional canon or to the heritage recorded in the individual. As can be seen,
the mechanistic view denies both point “i” and point “ii".
In order to speak of subjectivity, on the contrary, it is indispensable (i) to admit
the globality of the individual, in that it cannot be divided into single autonomous
elements; this means rejecting the analytical conception of expression and condition.
It is also necessary (ii) to assume the factive presence of the individual, a being-there
in the intersection with external reality, so that the entity is capable of not simply
undergoing reality, but of creating, redefining and conceiving a new perspective on
theworld, albeit on the basis of their heritage. This viewobviously requires a different
level of analysis than the ordinary one which has implicitly taken on the Cartesian
dualist dialectic and simply extended it to other animals. In other words, rather than
an appeal to a transcendent res cogitans, albeit revisited perhaps in the concept of res
informatica or in a dichotomy between automatisms and consciousness, my inten-
tion is to bring back cognitivity—i.e., knowledge as a “creative and inventive” rather
than passive and proactive act—to global embodiment. My goal is to trace the inter-
section back to the realm of protagonism, but not by hypothesizing some control
system watching over the whole thing—a sort of homunculus—but rather by placing
cognition within a systemic and dynamic conception of animal presence. The latter
coincides with the condition of “being-a-body”, being capable of emergent predi-
cations which go beyond the endowment repertoire and the already-given. There is
subjectivity wherever there is a surplus in the comparison between the individual’s
expression-condition and the synchronic correspondence to their inherited endow-
ment. A subjective being is expressed not in coherent or performative excellence,
but in any singular and creative expression, even if ineffective.
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We are therefore talking about a non-overlap between the heritage, i.e. what that
particular individual has received from phylogeny or matured with experience, and
their way of dealing with their here-and-now. Emergence, in fact, is what allows
for the supervenience of the specific characteristics of the single endowments—that
is, the internal functional and structural contents or the contents prior to the act of
intersection itself. An animal being, in its intersectionwith theworld, goes beyond the
already-given, going beyond itself every time it dialogically interacts with external
reality and consequently redefines its perspective. Cognitive emergence can explain
the different levels of intentionality that characterize the non-stunned presence of the
animal, from the processing unconscious to self-consciousness. Now, any paradigm
that wants to bring the principle of subjectivity back into the animal expression-
condition must be aware of two things: on the one hand, it is misleading to bypass
the issue of embodiment through the deus-ex-machina of dualism; on the other, it is
insufficient to trace consciousness back to a set of endowments formalised according
to the coordinates of the res extensa.
To understand the shift required by a subjective view of animality, in my opinion,
it is necessary to compare the animal condition with the machinic one, in order to
bring out the differences between them. We should move from the humanistic oppo-
sition of “human vs animal” to the post-humanistic one of “animal vs machine”,
trying to understand the differences between the two terms. However, there are
some “metapredicative qualities of animality”—that is, qualities that are not about
belonging to a species but to the condition of “animal-being”—which are not found
in the machinic conception. I will examine three of them in this essay: (1) owner-
ship, that is, self-belonging and owning one’s endowments; (2) desiring, that is, being
open towards the external world, not being ontologically contained; (3) sentience,
i.e. being a body that, on a multiplicity of levels, is connected to and depends on
dialectic factors. If a machine can ever be said to have these characteristics, then
maybe it will be an animal. But make no mistake: if that moment comes we will have
no power over that machine. This is why the animal-being has an intrinsic finality,
i.e. self-belonging and being-there as a projection towards one’s own realization. It
is a self-ownership that forces us to re-read subjectivity in terms of will, inherence,
partiality, infidelity, dialogue—in a word, life. Let’s start with these metapredicative
characteristics to address the topic of subjectivity—without, of course, claiming to
be exhaustive.
5.2 The Ownership Principle
We need to overcome the anthropocentric prejudice, which attributes a surplus to
the human condition with respect to animality—that is, we must avoid tautologies
or epicycles to attribute our Dasein to something external/extraneous to the animal
condition, be it the res cogitans, the soul or language. On the other hand, we still see
the human as a specific conjugation of animality. Therefore, it follows that we need
a new model with respect to the res extensa, i.e. the mathematical and mechanical
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translation of being. Animality, in fact, becomes something that concerns us globally,
no longer representing a backdrop or a partiality, a vestigial presence or an origin to be
placed in a remote past. Animality thus takes on the role of the matrix of our human-
being, the principle we use to explain the predicative characteristics of the human.
The humanistic opposition is basically a convenient trick, because in the dialectical
game of opposites it allows one to stay on the surface of the predicative argument,
i.e. the question where the human comes from. If, in fact, we talk about freedom or
autopoiesis as opposed to a rigidly determined condition, we avoid looking either
into what it actually means to be an animal, or into the inspirational or even basic
coordinates of anthropopoiesis.
Instead,we should embrace an “animalist” ontological perspective—paraphrasing
humanism one could exemplify it as “nothing animal is alien to me". In other words,
we must understand that the human is not a counter-term of the animal but one of
the many expressions of this dimension, and that our human predication must be
sought within the potentialities present in animal-being. It is therefore evident that
we can no longer limit ourselves to the game of opposites. It is now essential to have
a model capable of describing and explaining our ontological dimension within the
framework of animality. What must be explained within the dimension of animality
is our free will with respect to the possibilities offered to us, placing a distance
between us and the conditions of the world, i.e. the will that projects us into the
future and makes us dig into the folds of reality. We could summarize these concepts
in Heidegger’s existential statements, but we would have to attribute them to the
animal condition in general and not to the human being alone. In other words, it is
necessary to go from a “contralateral view”, which describes the animal as what we
are not, to a “subsumptive view” that sees the human as an expression of animality.
On the other hand, it is obvious that, if we follow this path, the generative dichotomy
that allowed humanists to derive the human through background oscillations—using
the animal as a counter-term—is no longer acceptable. We need new epistemological
operators and new discriminatory backgrounds.
Let’s start from the descriptive dimension: the simplest—though far from
obvious—aspect, which refers to the predicates. It is clear that awolf is different from
a bear, or a cat from a dog: they have different predicates. However, it is also clear
that there are basic needs—to reproduce, to learn, to find food, to escape potential
dangers, to monitor one’s environment—which do not concern belonging to a partic-
ular species, but the animal condition as such. One can say, then, that being a wolf is
nothing more than a “predicative conjugation” —a specific one—of the metapred-
icative condition of animal-being. Is this condition similar to the mechanism that
runs a clock or any other machine? In other words, the question that arises concerns
the relationship between an animal, as a systemic entity that acts performatively on
the world, and its single functional endowments. If, in fact, there were a total overlap
between the functional endowment and the performative result, it is obvious that the
difference between an animal—or a human being—and a clock would only exist
in terms of complexity. The species or individual conjugation does not solve the
problem of subjectivity, since the question concerns precisely an aspect that could
be seen as prior to the conjugation itself (hence its metapredicative nature). In other
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words, there is subjectivity only if there is an overlap (and therefore the expression
can be treated analytically andwithout presupposing a systemic emergent condition),
or if we are faced with a surplus that entails subjectivity.
Let us consider, then, the ordinary behaviour of any animal that conjugates its
presence in the interface with the world through its knowledge-competence, but does
not limit itself to functionally translating the contents of its endowment, as a machine
would. An animalmust not only correct the course of its action, butmust also have the
freedom to use its endowments, because reality creates ever-changing conditions, and
success depends on the animal’s ability to go deep into the world. An animal cannot
stop at appearances, butmust organize a level of reality—that is, transform the context
into a field of agibility—through a dialogical-reconfiguring action. The intersection
with reality therefore does not lie in grasping what is present or discovering what is
hidden, but it is literally a way to bring out what is possible, just like a sculptor does
not simply extract a hidden statue from the marble but realizes one of its possible
shapes. The intersection and the cognitive act are therefore nothing but one of the
many expressions of the interface: it is not a disclosure or an approximation, but an
actualization process referred to the range of virtuality present in a given situation.
The expressive singularity of an animal does not arise ex-nihilo, nor is it a mere
application of pre-existing contents: the singularity is a creative act just like a
sculptor’s statue, an act that is realized through the subjective use of one’s endow-
ments. If this is the case—i.e. the intersection is the actualization of a form taken from
the virtuality of reality—an animal can only do so because “it owns its endowments”.
In otherwords, it obviously uses them as “creative tools”, and is not “driven” by them.
When we stick to a descriptive analysis of the predicates (i.e. this is a bear or a bee),
and to an explanatory analysis of predication (i.e. whether it functions by association
of environmental triggers or by internal energy), we do not actually address what in
fact is an animal, as we assume the validity of the Cartesian paradigm. The appeal
to consciousness or to the different levels of awareness is no valid solution. Let me
be clear: I do not deny these states in other animals. I only say, taking up Brentano,
that these are “levels of intentionality”, that is, levels of “being aware that”: in a
word, levels of “shedding light on something that is in progress”. It is not the torch
illuminating the room that creates the furniture, so it cannot be consciousness (the
torch) that creates subjectivity (the furniture), only because it highlights its charac-
teristics. Subjectivity must therefore precede consciousness. Attributing awareness
to amachine can only allow it to shed light on its mechanisms, not give rise to the free
will and creativity that are the basis of subjectivity—let alone reveal its ownership
of its automatisms.
Hence the problem of subjectivity: what alternative do we offer to Descartes’s
paradigm? As a first step it is certainly indispensable to operate an emancipation
exercise and free the animal from the role of counter-term to the human. It must be
recognized that our animal-being does not lie in ancestral times or in some partiality
(the animal that is in us) but in our full adherence to the animal condition (the animal
that we are). This emancipatory process is the only premise to any serious reflection
on animal being, starting from the recognition of our total belonging to it: every-
thing we express is our animal-being. We may be as specific as we want, but we
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are not special. As long as we take refuge in ontological difference, attributable to a
thousand conceptual pretexts, we will not feel constrained or solicited to question the
algorithmic reduction of animality. And doing so means not only admitting a mental-
istic dimension with levels of intentionality—as Donald Griffin’s cognitive ethology
(Griffin 1992) has done in an exemplaryway—but re-examining the ontological prin-
ciple of animality. It is not enough to admit multi-level awareness or self-awareness,
if we then continue to explain behaviour with mechanistic explanatory models that
deprive the individual of any form of ownership of their own endowments.
This is the great challenge that confronts us, one that cannot be solved through the
appeal to consciousness or intellectual abilities, or in any case to any merely perfor-
mative quality. In fact, an animal’s being-there does not express itself in the adequacy
or power of the function, but: (i) in the ability to conceive the function itself; (ii) in
the continuous emergence of new functional shifts. But to face this challenge it is
necessary to acknowledge the animal’s ownership of its functions, itsmetapredicative
character—because it does not depend on the structural and functional predicates—
and the fact that we cannot find these inmachines (nor, for explanatory completeness,
are they part of mechanistic models). In this sense it is a question of overcoming the
machinic or algorithmic conception in all the expressions of animality—not to simply
recognize some functions of excellence. The background I will use is therefore the
mechanism which characterizes the concept of res extensa, albeit through a concep-
tual shift that includes the human being and is based on the non-overlap between
functional endowments and the resulting expressions. I will do this through two oper-
ations that are profoundly interconnected: (1) moving from a contralateral view of
animality to one that is inclusive of the human dimension; (2) using the concept of
res extensa or machine/algorithm, traditionally considered inclusive of the animal
condition, as a contralateral to define animality.
Indeed, it is a matter of “emancipating animality” (Marchesini 2017)2 from all
those prejudices, discriminative views, and biased interpretations that our culture has
built to misconstrue what animal-being really means and reaffirm the diversity and
superiority of the human being. It is therefore necessary to emancipate it from the
captivity of the prejudice that throws animality into shapelessness so as to exalt the
human. However, first I would like to make some methodological considerations.
I regard the background oscillation—which is used to focus on something so as to
make it stand out—an epistemic artifice, which therefore does not have the final word
in the discussion, but simply serves to better understand some significant emergent
differences that can be seen today. As I said, nothing prevents us from imagining a
machine with emergent characteristics such as to assign it some degree of ownership;
in fact, the guiding principle of mechanical philosophy, like the mathematization of
2Emancipating animality does not mean liberating the animal that is in us but rather the animal
we are, having understood the overall character of animality. Humanism has set itself the goal of
bringing out the human being and to do this it had to define animality as its opposite: therefore, any
liberation must be above all emancipation from prejudice. The emancipation of animality therefore
does not only involve the redefinition of a term or the re-recognition of non-humans, but above
all the liberation of the animality of the human being. I have discussed this concept in Marchesini
(2017).
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findings, is based on the control of the entity, i.e. on the exhauthoration of the owner-
ship characters. Thus, we are faced with a mechanical dimension that, while always
being in technopoietic evolution, never betrays the principle of the exhauthoration
of ownership and of certainty about the performative standard. If these presupposi-
tions change, the way in which animality stands out from the background will also
change. Furthermore, to focus on themetapredicates, it is essential not to be confused
by the performative conjugation analysis nor to follow the projective and assimila-
tive procedure: the point is not to humanize the heterospecific, but to animalize the
human.
A reflection on subjectivity must therefore reconnect the various conjugations of
animality, not in the name of banal anthropomorphism, but rather overcoming the
discontinuity prejudices which profess the special ontological relevance of human
beings. The first question to be asked cannot concern the description of the predicates
that characterize a given animal, nor can it refer to the explanatory principle of predi-
cation—dwelling, in the first case, on ethographic findings and, in the second case, on
behavioural explanation. The metapredicative issue refers to a prior question, which
one could simplify in these terms: what does it mean to be an animal?3 Generally,
we do not ask ourselves this question, which implies a philosophical reflectionì. We
implicitly assume the Cartesian dictate, i.e. that the animal is a “machine”, a set of
mechanisms that operate by trigger. On the basis of this assumptionwe usually define
our questions: (i) of a descriptive order, which refer to manifest or ethographic predi-
cates; (ii) of an explanatory order, concerning themodel called to explain predication,
such as behaviourism or the psychohydraulic paradigm. But my question precedes
these two, and it does so because it does not simply presume that Descartes’ view is
valid.
Besides, it is obvious that, if the animal were a machine—that is, a sum of single
automatisms that follow one another like domino pieces—subjectivity would be
pure appearance. No one today dares to express this view with Descartes’ clarity
and harshness. But then again, when one speaks of an innate automatism (instinct)
expressedwith energy consumption—pressure cookermodel—on a target predefined
by a Gestalt deterministic pattern, what does that amount to? And when one speaks
of a learned automatism (conditioning) expressed as a reflection of a stimulus—
light switch model—on an equally predefined association between input and output,
how is this different from the words of the French philosopher? A machine has
functions, but inevitably lacks subjectivity or “ownership of its functions”. Therefore,
the first prerequisite of subjectivity is not awareness of one’s functions, but ownership
of them. We often try to solve the problem of de-subjectivization (implicit in the
3The term “metapredicate” indicates the non-specific character of animal-being, i.e. what it means
to perceive, communicate, project and react, to resume the above examples. The analysis of the
metapredicate therefore indicates how we address the issue of animal being. The question “what
does it mean to be an animal?” is the starting point of any philosophy of animality that intends
to criticize the anthropomorphization of the animal and the Cartesian reduction of the animal to a
“machine”. Sentience, desire, subjectivity are metapredicates as they are transversally found in all
the conjugations of animal-being. See Marchesini (2016b).
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res extensa model as a mathematizable entity) by looking for the famous deus-ex-
machina to solve everything. Descartes appealed to the res cogitans to safeguard
subjectivity in the human being and could not have done otherwise; the res cogitans
only makes sense as the other side of the res extensa: without one, the other also
falls.
Personally, I am not too bothered by the idea of being, as an animal, nothing but a
machine. I justwonder: is this really the case?Many things - indeed toomany things—
do not add up. I cannot ignore the arbitrariness of animal behaviour and above
all its continuous creativity. Animal behaviour is not comparable to a mechanism,
although it has expressive prevalences, orientations towards the world, and a range
of ontogenetic possibilities. Reality is a source of never-ending unique challenges:
perhaps related by similarity, but never identical. Being creative is therefore not
a plus, it is not a luxury, but a basic condition. Ownership is the only condition
that allows one to implement the epistemic approach to reality that Konrad Lorenz
called a “working hypothesis”, i.e. not a passive expression of random attempts, but
the active implementation of problem-oriented heuristics which, precisely for this
reason, presuppose ownership of one’s endowments. In other words, it is not possible
to conjugate the paradigm of the automaton-animal with the conception of an animal
that approaches a problem in a hypothetical form and that, on the basis of the obtained
results, builds a singular perspective on the world: it is either the one or the other. But
let’s take a step back and examine the very concept of mechanized function, which
does not concern the level of complexity of the function itself, i.e. the number and
gradient of articulation of causal cascades, but the principle that informs it.
A machine summarizes all its possible functions, and not necessarily the ones
it has at a given moment: in fact, it is like a computer or smartphone, where it is
always possible to download new applications. This is because: (i) it is informed
by an external operator in terms of functional design; (ii) it has a close relationship
between structure and function precisely by virtue of the operational reliability that it
must allow, ie. its predictability of use. Amachine therefore lacks ownership because:
(i) it does not design its own functions, especially not in terms of setback emergence
or construction of the problem on which it has to operate; (iii) it does not separate
the functions from the structure, that is, it does not allow for functional emergence,
even if the latter is conceived in an evolutionary way, as in the case of the genetic
algorithm. In this sense it must be correlated to a context that does not have any
singularity—any unforeseen and non-objective setbacks—any predefined input and
output variables, and any performative variability, being based on the principle of
possible requests. We could say that a machine is a structure or a model that is based
on the functional assumption of potential operational completeness, but precisely
for this reason it is incapable of managing the singularity of reality. In other words,
a machine, even when implementing context-related or result-related functions, is
always self-referential: it does not need explanatory additions.
When we observe the way in which an animal intersects the world, we realize that
the surrounding environment does not simply represent a set of objective problems
that challenge the individual, called to give adequate resolvent answers to them.
For an animal, the world represents a field of action where, even before finding a
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solution, individuality manifests itself in the singular emergence of challenges that
are neither objectively given nor already present before the intersection occurs. A
machine is an entity called to address a problem through a function and to perform
a function through an endowment. An animal, on the contrary, is: (i) a problematic
entity, which conceives problems because it seeks opportunities that are not already
given; (ii) an entity that makes use of its endowments in an exaptive way, so as to
bring out new functional capacities that are not already given. Animal subjectivity,
unlike machine performativity, indicates a sort of executive suspension; it develops
a singular presence that brings out its functions—through the ideation of challenges
and functional exaptation4—and does not simply perform them.
The expression “to bring out a function” is loaded with meanings that require
explanation and that unfortunately often constitute a reason for explanatory circu-
larity. The risk, in fact, is that of falling into a sort of dualism or tautological appeal to
some coordinator,whichwould lead to infinite regress: this is the casewith the famous
homunculus. But there is no doubt that, for the individual to manage the singularity
of the here-and-now, there needs to be a continuous operation of emergentiality with
respect to the already-given. Indeed, the concept of functional emergence that char-
acterizes the animal condition implies further connotations, next to the two shown
above, which can only be partially found in a machine: (iii) every expression always
requires a preliminary “performative adaptation” of the system to be related to the
context; (iv) each expression determines a “configurative redefinition” in both struc-
tural and functional terms, so that no expression of the system can ever be considered
a mere function or output but rather an input, i.e. a process of reorganization of the
endowment.
The four principles outlined above—(i) ideation of the challenge, (ii) functional
exaptation, (iii) performative adaptation, (iv) configurative reconfiguration—entail
the system’s ownership of its functions. This assumption raises two forms of explana-
tory criticism: (1) the revisitation of the model called to explain the functions; (2) the
problem of the concept of ownership, avoiding dualistic drifts. As for point 1, it is not
the performativity-adequacy of a function that constitutes the litmus test of a mind
in action; however, to admit the subject’s ownership of its functions it is essential
to rethink the explanatory model of the behavioural endowments themselves. It is
necessary to switch from an “automated” view (given a structure I directly obtain
the corresponding function) to an instrumental one (a given structure defines a range
of possible functions, but it is the subject that prescribes the type of use). Obviously,
in order for the function to be adaptable to a given circumstance, the structure of the
endowment which is responsible for it must implicitly enable a functional plurality:
in a word, it cannot be a form of automatism.
4The degeneration of biological structures not only amortizes any dysfunctions of the system—for
example, our genetic system has three different triplets to encode the same amino acid—but also
allows for exaptation processes in the different organs. It enables their cooptation to new adaptive
territories, as is the case of the branchial peduncle of crustaceans,which translated into themultiform
varieties of organelles in insects, or of the swim bladder which, from a balancing organ, became a
structure in charge of gas exchange. Cf. Gould and Vrba (1982).
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The ownership argument requires a series of reflections on the expressive model
of animal being (point 1). Unlike the Cartesian principle, based on automatisms,
these inevitably lead us to the non-overlapping between endowment and expressed
function, because the former does not imply the function, but only enables it. In
my opinion, an endowment is a “virtual entity” from a performative point of view,
just like a map that virtually presents (and not simply subsumes) several itineraries.
An endowment, so conceived, is potentially able to carry out a particular range of
functions and to evolve on the basis of the results obtained. But above all, just like a
map, it has the ability to bring out from reality performative opportunities that were
not already given. If endowments, for example the a-prioris of a given species, were
automatic, they could not be “working hypotheses”, as they would lack the contribu-
tion of a systemic entity able to evaluate their respondence, approximation or creative
potential. The automatism model not only fails to envision any ownership, but also
struggles to evolve with respect to the task that Lorenz’s evolutionary epistemology
entrusted to it.
On the other hand, can we think of an endowment as an entity that rigidly super-
imposes the structure on the relative function and is trigger activated? I believe that
this is the fundamental question and, at this point, given my belief that the human
being is part of the animal dimension, I do not think it is inappropriate to reflect on
the way in which we ordinarily use our knowledge. Is it an automatism that guides
us or a tool that we use, even unconsciously, to bring out new opportunities? It would
be enough to observe a dog’s behaviour after learning the “sit” command: from that
moment on, it will be the dog who will use the new knowledge to obtain whatever
he wants from us. This, moreover, requires us to admit a surplus with respect to the
contents, without transcending them—a surplus which, however, must be attributed
neither to an external entity nor to consciousness, but to the systemic condition of
the mind itself. To speak of animal subjectivity it is therefore necessary to have the
courage to question the analytical model, otherwise the animal will continue to be a
puppet moved by strings, a device that may be very complex but is still essentially a
machine. I therefore propose to consider: (i) both innate and learned endowments not
as automatisms but as instruments, thus modifying the basic model of behavioural
explication; (ii) subjectivity as an emerging condition with respect to the factors that
determine it, so that subjectivity can only be a systemic result.
Let’s start with the first point. What is an automatism? It is a mechanism that
maintains a 1:1 ratio between “how it looks” (S= structure) and “what it does” (F=
function). In the face of this, it follows that: (i) S is exhaustive in the explanation of F;
(ii) S is imperative in the production of F; (iii) S and F are mutually predictive, i.e. “if
S then F” and “if F then S”. If this is the basic model that explains animal behaviour,
then the animal is de-subjectivized, even if a linear or recursive S-F chain is used.
And, as we have seen, consciousness (torch) does not help to create a subjectivity
(furniture) that does not exist. When we talk about “automatism” we inevitably
consider the endowment to be imperative for the function. In other words, it is the
endowment that drives the animal: therefore, the individual lacks ownership of the
endowment. On the contrary, considering an endowment as an “instrument” means
that S envisions a “range of Fs”, that is, S does not strictly imply F. And it is not just
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a question of considering the relationship between S and F in terms of the functional
multiplicity of S. The point is the virtuality of F with respect to S—just as a statue is
the result of atransformation of the marble, not an expression of something already
given.
For example, the map of a city (S) provides a range of routes (F), but does not
imply or reveal already given paths. Rather, it allows one to find some routes within
a given range of possibilities. The S:F ratio is therefore 1:range. A map is a tool
that the subject uses to create an opportunity within the virtual range of possible
routes. Of course, a map is not free of constraints, that is, it is neither absolute nor a
sort of apeiron containing all imaginable itineraries. This is because every range has
limits, somemore probable itineraries, and possible vicariances; but still, every range
potentially contains an infinite number of possibilities. This is why, functionally, a
map is much more economical than an itinerary. As mentioned, a dog that learns
the “sit” command will also use it to try new applications, that is, “new relational
routes with his human partner”. A map is a tool and as such it does not “activate
functions” but “makes functions possible”. A map is a “functional representation” of
a reality, that is, a utility, like a word processing software that allows for, but does not
imply, a given text. To claim that (innate and learned) endowments are tools—and
not automatisms—obviously requires a subject that uses them: the workshop needs
a craftsman, it does not run on its own.
Seeing behaviour as the result of single triggered automatisms is based on an
analytical conception—but also, one might say, on the presumed exhaustiveness
of the analytical explanation—which, moreover, negates the systemic structure of
the neurobiological apparatus. The latter, in fact, involves many systemic levels: for
example, synaptic connection orwireless neuromodulation. The systemic view, based
on instruments that can be brought together just like a network, not only grants the
different endowments a connective character at more than one compositional level,
but is also able to foresee, due to an emergent effect, events that supervene on the very
repertoire of endowments. On closer inspection, behaviour never resembles a light
switch: the link between stimulus and response, as Konrad Lorenz already pointed
out, denies everything that can be found around what is prejudicially taken into
account. A behaviour is more like a proposition, or the expression of a composition:
more like a painting, to be clear. Its components give rise to ever-changing compo-
sitional frameworks, interconnected in various ways. These compositions—which
involve the combination of emotions, motivations, representations, logical functions
and cognitive meta-components—give rise to “propositional attitudes” that then are
manifested (though not necessarily) in behavioural expressions. Subjectivity, there-
fore, is not given by a homunculus nested somewhere in the brain, but is the systemic
result of propositionality itself.
The mechanistic paradigm, on the other hand, in order to avoid the so-called ghost
in the machine, had to model said endowments (innate or learned) in such a way as to
make themautonomous in their functional causality, i.e. exhaustive in the explanation
of animal expressiveness. Ifwe analyze the constructs of instinct and conditioning,we
realize that they are designed for a sufficient explanation. The lordship of the subject
over its functions therefore implies a reviewof the explanatorymodel of endowments.
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Nevertheless, the theme of the subject’s ownership—point 2—also implies a complex
and articulated reasoning. It is, in fact, a dark and elusive lordship, which leads us
to a crossroads that we might consider aporetic, if it does not force us to choose a
path that punctually denies subjectivity itself. This is, in fact, what has happened
historically in the analysis of the predicates of ownership, such as, for example, free
will. Whatever the choice, in both cases, the requirement of inherent subjectivity
is not met: (i) the dualist view cannot but appeal to a transcendent principle like
the Cartesian res cogitans, if it does not want to fall into the infinite regress of the
homunculus; (ii) the full identification of subjectivity with its functions, instead,
inevitably leads to superimpose the individual on the machine and to transform its
expression into an articulated sum of mechanisms. As we can see, it is precisely with
regards to subjective embodiment5 that both explanations fail.
What I have defined as hesitation, uncertainty, approximation, bricolage, flex-
ibility, and functional co-optation in reality involves a plurality of expressions of
subjective adaptation, which we cannot exclude from the expression. Itdenies both:
(i) dualism, i.e. total detachment from one’s functions, and (ii) reductionism, i.e. full
identification of the subject with the functions expressed. In this sense, to speak of
subjectivity it is necessary to envision a third path that grants the animal being itself,
as a prerequisite condition, the ability to manage its here-and-now through a free,
flexible, exaptive and, last but not least, creative use of its endowments. On the other
hand, it is clear that it is necessary to take this path through a clear explanatorymodel,
avoiding any vagueness and tautology—these flaws become mortal when referring
to heterospecifics. Indeed, we can still feel the weight ofMorgan’s canon, which, like
a trap, leads to rejecting any appeal to animal subjectivity, even if in so doing one is
forced to adopt explanatory epicycles. As a result, animal expression is deprived of
all that does not fall within the reductionist canon.
The problem lies in askingwhether it is possible to formalize the animal condition,
i.e. whether the complete mechanization of the animal is really able to eliminate the
ghost from the machine. In my opinion, the answer is no. The concept of res extensa
is not able to stand on its own feet and needs the counterpart of the res cogitans: so as
long as wemaintain the Cartesian paradigmwewill be forever haunted by some kind
of ghost. The ownership principle tells us that an animal owns itself and is not owned,
it is the bearer of internal coherence and self-ownership, and we must inevitably face
this fact, even if we insist on denying it. A machine belongs to its function, it is a
passive entity, while when dealing with an animal it is always necessary to obtain
some consensus or involvement to induce it to do something. It is therefore essential
to ask the animal for permission, and this is not an ethical concern, but something
that regards the factuality of the animal itself. Indeed, an animal is the owner of
its own being, becomes the master of the knowledge acquired, and actively uses its
inherited a-prioris, making them available to its own free and creative way of being
in the world.
5Subjective embodiment is stretched between ideative somatization and the emergence of
singularity, the latter being understood as a unique identity that is unrepeatable in belonging.
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Moreover, animal subjectivity is not limited to this function of supervision over its
endowments, i.e. what I have defined as the “ownership principle”. Otherwise, one
would not understand the reason or need for such supervenience. In fact, subjectivity
manifests itself as an act of volition on the world, as the subject’s change of the
coordinates of reality on the basis of an imposition that starts from the individual.
Subjectivity is primarily the expression of one’s own projection, a sign of an intrinsic
teleology—not reducible to teleonomy6—that has its internal engine in “contentless
desire”.7 We could define this object-less desire as a sort of will to power, but we
would thus assign it a semantic value that barely grasps its scope. Any attempt
to focus on the oscillation of the desiring animal—whether as a primordial lack
or, on the contrary, as an exuberant-energy that asks to be consumed—has, in my
opinion, captured only a part of this a-finalistic desire, of this purposeless languor.
But, before addressing this concept, which is apparently contradictory or, if you like,
empties desire of its very meaning—as an act of projection towards something or
rather as a sense of lack inevitably referred to something—I would like to describe
this involvement which makes animals languid, passionate, involved, restless, and
nostalgic.
To be desiring means not to contain oneself, it means to have copulae or binders
that bring back and conjugate the individual’s here-and-now to external reality, giving
rise to propositional attitudes. This makes animality a “peripatetic dimension”. In
this sense, animality is: (i) a state of constant restlessness, an innermovement charac-
terized by the oscillation between languor and gratification, and a constant attraction
towards the world, whence wonder as the first emotional and cognitive condition
of animal being. At the same time, animality is (ii) an exploration in dialogue with
external reality, able to bring out a personal perspective through a process of actu-
alisation of reality, and also to transform the a-finalistic desiring condition into real
6For an overview of the teleology of nature after Darwin and in particular on the concept of “teleon-
omy”, I refer to the important work of the philosopher Francesca Michelini. For years, Michelini
has explored the territory of the philosophy of life proposing a bio-philosophical reflection that
deals with the crucial question of the nature of the living but also of “our nature” as human beings.
Cf. Michelini (2011) and Michelini and Davies (2013).
7Animality is an open dimension as it is characterized by the metapredicate of desire, by going
beyond itself, by inventing new predications, by placing itself in a state of non-equilibrium, and by
transcending causal proximity. This condition underlies and comes from the evolutionary process,
where there is no place for completeness—let alone perfection, a legacy of creationism. The animal
multiverse is made of pleasure that comes from languor, of anxieties that arise from a projective
redundancy: the animal knows no boundaries, it always pierces the bubble of its heritage. If, on
the other hand, we think that the human being is lacking compared to the completeness of other
species, we are simply talking nonsense. Indeed, being in a state of lack is the cornerstone of animal
predication, and the animal moves and breathes precisely because it is constitutionally desiring. To
be an animal means to realize one’s life in desire and one’s predication in referring in a given way
to something external. It follows that the full realization of the specific animal is also its peculiar
expression.
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desires. We are born with this remote inexplicable hunger, which is capable of satis-
fying the most concrete physiological needs, such as eating and reproducing, but at
the same time is unrelated to them. This is the case with a kitten that, despite a full
bowl, still needs to chase after any moving object: it is taken by amazement and
involvement in front of a rolling ball or a thread, as if eating were nothing more than
a consequence, a side effect, of something deeper, of a passion that makes its whole
being vibrate.
Being-desiring precedes the encounter with the world: it is what makes external
reality full of charm, attractive and mysterious in its multiple layers, which are
there for us to explore with amazement. Desire is what makes the outside world
a field of action: without it, the individual would have no reason to act. Desire is
also the cornerstone supporting the protagonism of animal-being. Being-desiring is
conjugated through a fractal of phylogenetic and ontogenetic legacies. This does not
happen in the form of teleonomies predisposed to a sequence of triggers towards
pre-established objectives, but as internal redundancy that asks to be unfolded, like
a leaf that opens up to the world and only then acquires a given positioning with
respect to the light. An animal’s being-desiring cannot be explained by the mere
reference to the stimulatory here-and-now, and its principle can only find explanation
in the physiological conditions of the body. Being-desiring is not a deprivation of
protagonism, a stunned condition that hinders one’s contemplation of the world: on
the contrary, it is what feeds the thaumàzein, what provokes that amazement and
thrill that underlie the cognitive process itself. Immersion in desire strengthens the
presence of the individual, its Dasein—it does not diminish it. Being-desiring is
therefore passion, involvement, languor, sense of insufficiency, which nevertheless
feeds our will, our exposure, our action, our perspective partiality. When we fall
in love, for example, what we feel is not a deterministic force that deprives us of
protagonism, but a condition that increases this protagonism, making our presence
stronger in the here-and-now.
Desire is the most immediate expression of subjectivity, a redundancy that creates
languor, a projection that goes beyond need and in a sense gives it meaning: I am alive
because I desire, I amalivewhen I feel involved, I amalive because I amprojected into
the outside world and not self-contained/referred, I am alive because I am taken by
amazement, because I am sensibly attracted to and awestruck by the world, because
passion invadesme and gives shape tomy presence. All the endowments of an animal
being are only tools for the unknown and obscure expression of a desiring being.
It is desire that gives colour to the world, that fills a child’s eyes with wonder, that
underlies the chaotic games of a puppy, that gives meaning to the events of the world.
If this condition disappears, life goes to waste in a colourless vegetative timelessness.
This is why we need a new philosophical ethology, one that reconsiders the hasty
formula of teleonomy with which the animal has been deprived of a leading role in
the intersection with the world, precisely by denying its desiring condition in favour
of an algorithmic cascade of drives.
For example, we are used to thinking of motivations as innate automatisms, But
what if they were more like the feeling of falling in love?What if they were passions?
Far from being already predisposed towards a given result, they recall copulative
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verbs, transitional coordinates—like chasing or gathering—that go into the world
to connect with specification contents. And how important is reasoning in such
conditions? Evenwhenwe fall in love, aswewell know, consciousness takes note and
reasoning seeks justification, but it is our animality that palpitates in us: we generally
call it the voice of the heart, but it is the animal being that vibrates throughout our
bodies. A playful puppy, a female who cares for her young, a predatory carnivore,
two males that rival each other: there are many examples of this passion that does
not annihilate subjectivity, but makes it emerge. We think because we desire, not the
other way around: and it is in the desiring principle that we find in every animal.
Therefore, research on the metapredicate is also a reflection on this condition, based
on the dialectic of three principles: projection, search and pleasure. Indeed, animality
is: (i) projection, i.e. continuous oscillation between languor, which arises from
projecting oneself beyond one’s state, and satiety-satisfaction in reaching the goal;
(ii) search, i.e. a tendency to look for opportunities, for which the animal being
embodies the peripatetic condition, because it does not passively find opportunities in
the environment, but uses an internal movement to actively build them; (iii) pleasure,
i.e. exposure to the dialectic of enjoyment and suffering, a continuous state of non-
equilibrium, based on the condition of being-a-body.
The three principles of desire presented above view animality not as a mechanical
expression of automatisms but as “involvement”, as a being-a-body that attends its
here-and-now. The animal “is present”, it has its own here-and-now.While amachine
is not positioned in time—its function is isochronous—an animal is the protagonist
of its present: it rises above the flow of time, presenting its expression. Translating
this into two concepts, we will see that: (1) an animal does not occupy a space but
takes a positionality; (2) an animal is not in time but builds its own time. Borrowing
a Heideggerian concept, one could say that the animal has a Dasein. And, perhaps,
the metapredicate that Heidegger sought in vain—the Being—is precisely animality.
It is in this protagonism, in this desiring condition about the world, that an animal
expresses its subjectivity.A fortiori, therefore, it is necessary to revise the explanatory
paradigm based on projection. When I say that a cat has a predatory motivation, I
draw attention to a trend-character that can be explained, taking up Niko Tinbergen,8
based on four explanatory lines: (i) what advantages it has produced in terms of
fitness; (ii) how it has evolved during phylogeny; (iii) how it has developed during
ontogeny; (iv) what physiological or environmental causes have provoked it. These
are four important explanations, without any doubt. However, we must also analyse
how that trend-character integrates with the principle of involvement and pleasure,
i.e., with the “feeling” of that particular individual.
8It is important to underline that first Ernst Mayr and then Niko Tinbergen had already made
a significant suggestion in explanatory or causal attribution terms: a motivation is present in a
subject of a particular species because it was able to increase its fitness or to fulfill a need (remote
or phylogenetic cause); a motivation is manifested by the individual because it is driven by an
elicitative need and because it is capable of producing pleasure through expression alone (proximate
or ontogenetic cause). We must never confuse these two causal matrices, since while the former is
regulated by the principle of natural selection, the latter is commanded by the pleasure principle.
See Mayr (1982).
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If one stuck to these four explanations when speaking of human falling in love,
one would not be strictly wrong, but rather not exhaustive: something would be
missing, because in the explanatory chain the act of falling in love would have
lost all its feeling, its involvement, its languor, its pleasure, assuming a mechanical
connotation. The emotional and motivational states of an animal determine a feeling,
i.e. an involvement, which is more like falling in love than the ticking of a clock. It
is on this point that we should focus our attention. A character is present because it
is the result of phylogeny and because it has passed the fitness test, that is, because it
has received the go-ahead from remote causes that have established its compatibility.
In the same way, a character takes a given conformation during development and is
affected by intervening physiological and environmental activations. This is also
true. But the feeling it produces arises on a different explanatory level, albeit based
on the underlying ones: it is a fifth supervening principle, which does not deny or
take away importance from the coordinates of the previous explanations, but should
be considered nonetheless.
As Konrad Lorenz said: life is made of physical and chemical laws, but it is not
just physics and chemistry! When analyzing complex systems we find that there
are various predicative levels: water is made of oxygen and hydrogen, but presents
different predicates compared to its ingredients, and the laws that govern the oceans
cannot be explained simply based on the qualities of water. Well, the same goes
for involvement! The variables, acting on the predicates present, create a “systemic
involvement level” that emerges from the background of its ingredients. A cat, in
its predatory dimension, expresses its subjectivity: its being-desiring. This condition
places it in a dialectic of languor-orientation and expression-contentment that has got
to do with pleasure and ownership. A cat does not hunt to eat, but to express its being-
in-the-world, the pleasure it gets from being there. Eating is just the consequence of
all this, which in the long run feeds back on its fitness.
It is not always easy to understand this undefined condition of a desire, which para-
doxically does not seek a given content, but creates it at the very moment in which it
languidly brings itself into the world. Traditionally, we have an ambiguous relation-
ship with the desiring principle, most likely because of the contralateral translation of
animality that has transformed the body, and its copulative capacity, into something
to be rejected or from which to take leave in order to achieve true humanity. On the
one hand, the languor of the body is considered something unseemly and lascivious,
often seen as the fundamental principle of our captivity in the telluric which, on the
contrary, we should overcome in order to follow the righteous process of ascending
emancipation. On the other hand, the desiring coordinate is focused on possession,
giving rise to a sort of existential bulimia centred on the consumer individual, so
that desire increasingly overlaps with its content, flattening onto the desired entity.
Apparently, these two directions seem to oppose and contradict each other, but in
reality they complement each other well in the attempt to annihilate the nature of the
human being, i.e., to deny the human copulative inherence, which is not based on the
desired entity but on the implicit restlessness of the animal condition. By gravitating
towards the thing—desiring an object or the object of desire—we lose track of the
very condition of desiring: that is, the projection and the movement, the verb-action
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that sustains the subject’s languor, which can only be satisfied by expression and
which is implicitly somatized in the act.
De-somatizing desire therefore means denying the body its projection, thus trans-
forming desire into need, i.e. into a void to be filled. It also means rationalizing
desire or turning it into ecstatic aspiration—something that does not provide for a
somatic sharing in its totality, since the body becomes the instrument that allows the
subject to reach the object of desire. There is no longer the pleasure of collecting,
i.e. the motivational involvement that is the purpose of the very act of “behavioural
expression”, as one could say in ethological terms. Instead, there is the projection of a
disembodiedmind onto the object of collection, which becomes the only explanatory
factor, i.e. the only reason justifying the action. In the same way, the behaviours of
help, assistance, nurture and care are no longer the expression of a body that expresses
its ephemeral languor, but the disembodied moral act of one who rationally acts for
the good of the other. Anthropocentrism, through the double action of compression
of the somatic expression of desire and of de-somatization of world-oriented proac-
tivity, traces a difference between the human being who desires because of rational
contemplation and the animal who is totally absorbed in its needs.
This is an important disjunction, not only for its marginalization of animal other-
ness, which cannot sit at the high table of the convivial dialogue with the human
being, but also for the very way in which human subjects perceive their own somatic
dimension and reflect on their ownanimality.On the one hand there are humanbeings,
rationally concentrated on the object and therefore separated from it, transforming it
into an extrinsic explanatory principle that denies the inherent need for a copulative
order. On the other hand there are animals, totally stunned in the object and there-
fore devoid of any desiring protagonism. Transforming desire into a non-copulative
act, that is, into contemplation or fruition, means de-somatizing the desiring condi-
tion in the human being and denying its cognitive aspect in the animal. If the body
is simply the place of need, it is evidently a prison, so that the disembodied mind
devotes itself to projection and wandering as well as to the pleasures of dreaming,
planning, realizing, participating. All verbs—i.e. acts—are de-somatized; the body
and animality are considered, at most, to be hostile to, and not the driving force
of, desire. Embracing this view also means misinterpreting the somato-expressive
meaning of desire, i.e. the body’s pleasure to unfold along the supporting axis of an
action that moves its internal flows.
The object of desire is just an excuse, like a ball for a cat: the ball is neither the
real target of desire nor the real source of pleasure, as demonstrated by the fact that,
if the ball stops moving, the cat hits it so as to set it in motion. The cat’s desire
lies in projecting itself along the axis of chasing-grabbing, and its pleasure comes
primarily from the act of stretching its body along that verbal and copulative coor-
dinate. Desire is therefore a somatic state of projection-expression, which produces
languor in projection and pleasure in expression. The body has a very precisemenu of
copulative modalities: these are assessed by the mechanism of phylogenetic compat-
ibility, but are not bound to the fitness aprioris in the expression, so that the subject
finds these axes of projection-expression to be the motors of their pleasure. For this
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reason, a verb—such as collecting or chasing—that is selected for a specific adap-
tive purpose can derive from play or from any other expressive occasion. Pleasure
lies in expression, in copulative somatization, and only secondarily does it concern
the object itself. A mushroom finder is more satisfied with the activity of searching
and picking than with a mushroom-filled basket, just as a boy enjoys picking and
collecting figurines more than owning a completed album. And that’s why a full bowl
doesn’t extinguish a cat’s predatory desire.
Tying the languor to the object of desire, i.e., reifying, rationalising and de-
somatizing the desiring condition, also determines a stunned state, because it leads
us to choose the shortest way to reach the given target, whereas we find greater
satisfaction if the target is hard to obtain. This entails a series of misunderstand-
ings and two very serious consequences (i) It increases the need for objects, which
become substitutes for actions in that they try to appease, though in vain, a languor
that can only be satisfied by expression. (ii) It prevents us from understanding the
vastness and multiplicity of the motivational triggers of the human being, in the
false belief that satisfaction can come from an external entity or be achieved through
appropriation-consumption. The reification of desire misleads us because it projects
our pleasure onto the object and not on the expression of the body, de-somatizing it
and thus denying it, maintaining us in permanent dissatisfaction and distorting our
very expressiveness, which ends up caged within a sort of straightjacket. This does
not mean that results achieved by action have no value and give no gratification, but
that this pleasure does not satisfy (appease) the languor, because the latter lies within
the expressive process or somatic expansion in the world, like the acts of chasing,
collecting, competing, imitating, caring, feeding, protecting, collecting, exploring,
patrolling, collaborating, etc..
If the achievement of the objective is placedwithin an expressive exploration, then
we will have three kinds of pleasure: (1) satisfaction, which can be traced back to
expressive satisfaction, i.e. satiety in the somatization of the action; (2) gratification,
which can be traced back to the enjoyment of the object-target; (3) self-efficacy,
which can be traced back to the assertion of the expansive will-capacity. On the
other hand, I would like to note that type 3 pleasure is much more connected to type
1 pleasure than to the mere fruition or attainment of the object, i.e. type 2. This is
demonstrated by the fact that the more arduous and tiring the process of reaching the
target, the greater the response in terms of self-efficacy. We can therefore say that
reducing desire to the desired object gives rise to a bulimia of discontent, with an
excess of objects trying to compensate for a lack of action. And the problem also
lies in understanding the somatic meaning of action as the “result of action”. In other
words, we believe that the propulsive thrust of our unfolding in an action is to be
found in an a-priori need of the body that activates the movement, or in an external
stimulus that drives it, according to a homeostatic conception of inherent quietness
of the body, where every movement would indicate a condition of disturbance.
In reality, the body is an expansive entity: it is not placed in space–time but
takes possession of space–time through its implicit proactivity. The body is action
for its own sake, i.e., it’s the need to express one’s own motivational potentialities,
regardless of the needs or targets that the action presides over.A catwants to engage in
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predatory behaviour—chasing andgrasping—but not necessarily because it is hungry
(need) or in view of an object to be achieved (target). A cat’s predatory behaviour is
therefore a somatic expansion or a conjugation of the body’s expressiveness on the
basis of its protagonism. No doubt, desire can be influenced by need and may lead to
achieving a target, and it has undoubtedly evolved because it brings fitness, that is,
adaptive results. However, being inherent in the somatic dimension of the subject, it
acts for itself, as a distension of the body in the world, because the body is yearning.
Anthropocentrism, on the contrary, is based on the denial of this somatic expansion in
the name of a de-somatization of the existential condition of the human being, based
on the absolute value of the results achieved and of the objects owned. Conversely,
the pleasure one assigns to results and things lies precisely in the expansive effort,
i.e. in the kinetic distention of the body. It is not the pedomorphic conformation of a
puppy that gives us satisfaction in expressing attitudes of care and protection towards
it: it is the epimeletic potentiality, the somatic distension towards care, that arouses
tenderness in us and gratifies us in caring for it.
We could consider taking care of a puppy as a value in itself, but that would be
misleading: it has value because our entire endocrine, neurobiological, metabolic,
immune body is inclined to spread somatically in the act of care. This means that, if
we do not express its epimeletic yearning, the body will look for ways to express it in
the world: not because the world needs our care, but because our body is overflowing
with it—it expands in this sense. Also in this case, assigning absolute value to care
means trying to outsource it from the body, de-somatizing the care-giving behaviour.
The reason for this attitude is easily explained. Ontological anthropocentrism is
based on the rejection of contiguity and somaticity: it does not accept the condition
of animality qua being a body and therefore refuses to hear the reasons of the body:
it refuses to remain within a full existential somatization. It therefore operates in the
two directions set out above. First, (i) it punishes the body in the name of something
spiritual, de-somatized, abstinent, so that desire is considered not as an ontological
expression but, on the contrary, as a prison for the self, a misleading magnet, a
receptacle of irrational and blinding passions. Secondly, (ii) it translates desire into
a result and an object-target, de-somatizing it and subtracting it from the expression
itself, from its verbality, from its expressive specificity, in order to project it onto
something external that can be subject to rational control. Once again, this process
shows an evident wish to make a clear distinction between animals, totally immersed
in their somatic dimension and in need of expressive consumption, and human beings,
driven, vice versa, by the rational choice of their objectives.
When I say that being-desiring is not basedon the contents preceding the projective
act, but builds the contents precisely in the epistemic-copulative process, I do not
mean that there are no orientative coordinates—referred to the what, how, where,
and when of the expression. Rather, I mean that the orientation defines the broadest
possible predicates, that is, a range of possible specific contents. In other words, a
cat’s running refers to “a moving entity”, and the human act of gathering is about
“an entity that emerges from the background for its iconic structure”. In the same
meadow, a cat is interested in butterflies, while a human being is interested in daisies.
Often, the orientativemodel also presents generalGestalts, such as a string that recalls
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the tail of a mouse for a cat or a ladybug that resembles a berry for a human being,
and we can also find references to places or to expressive choreograms. However,
as said, the orientative model does not define a specific content, but only a range
of possibilities, so that an animal, when expressing its copulative tendencies, is in
fact giving specific contents to the desire itself. This is a perspectival subjectivism
at the intersection with reality, that is, an a-priori protagonism, already foreseen in
the initial conditions of the animal condition-expression.
The events of desire therefore play the score of heritage as the basis for a repre-
sentation whose task is to go beyond the sheet music, because the relational subject
by definition cannot remain faithful to itself. So it’s not a question of denying the
heritage, but not even of remaining faithful to it, as if the predicates expressed were
nothing more than the emanations of an essence. The heritage is a virtual condition
of being, which however does not mean (i) an absence of form or total willingness
to assume the form imposed by the external world, as if it were water and the world
were a container. However, the heritage doesn’t entail either (ii) a power or complete
autonomy in the construction of the shape to be taken on each occasion. The virtual
condition contained in the heritage arranges the forms of the copulative process and
the field of possible outcomes in the definition of contents. Within it, however, there
are infinite possible conjugations. The virtual condition therefore indicates a will-
ingness to dialogue that is supported by the desiring condition of the subject, so that
each outcome always results from the integration of multiple copulative ls that are
unpredictable because they are the product of the creative and singular protagonism
of the individual.
Desire, therefore, is the glue, the tension towards dialogue with the world, the
push that makes such an encounter possible. To use the metaphor of the foliage
of an oak tree, one can say that the copulative process is what allows the oak to
translate a given part of the world into itself. The virtual condition, on the other
hand, is an expression of excess, of a projective process, and not of lack. Thus, desire
is first and foremost a tension that leads to the somatization of external reality; in
this sense, it is to be viewed as metapredicative yearning, a sort of generic libido
that projects itself in a centrifugal way from the subject to external reality, and as a
predicative conjugation that specifies different animals, including humans, through
the peculiarities of verbs-copulae. Thus, while cats are prevalently connected to the
world through the copula of chasing, human beings desire through the copula of
collecting. The object chased or collected is of relative importance and offers a very
partial gratification, because the true yearning lies in the expression of chasing or
collecting as a somatic projection of the subject in the world. I speak of somatic
projection because it is in the body that the copulative matrix is realized, even before
the action is weighed, thought or decided. Desire, therefore, is the expression of
our animality and also what transforms animality, in the all-inclusive sense, into
protagonism. At the centre of desire, therefore, lies bodiliness as a whole, and desire
is a process of somatization—not of emancipation from the body.
Animality, therefore, is an open, flexible, participatory, creative dimension whose
leitmotif is singularity, because it is characterized by the metapredicate of desire, by
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going beyond, by inventing new predications, by placing oneself in a state of unbal-
ance, by transcending one’s heritage.9 This condition is the basis and the outcome
of the evolutionary process: in it, there is no place for completeness—let alone
perfection, a residue of creationism. The animal plurivers is made of pleasure born
of languor, of anxieties that arise from a projective redundancy: the animal knows
no boundaries, it always pierces its Umwelt bubble. Animality is a metapredicative
dimension that does not differentiate us from other animals, but brings us together
with them, despite the different predicates that characterize us and connote every
species in a peculiar way. Animality, therefore, does not oppose our “becoming
human” through ontopoiesis, but rather makes it possible through predications, i.e.
verbs-copulae, that set the coordinates of our orientation. It is therefore precisely
in the phylogenetic heritage that we must look for those coordinates of orientation
that transform the desiring condition into acts of desire specified in their what, how,
where, and when. Once again, it is important to underline the direct proportionality
between phylogenetic heritage and ontogeny.
Placing oneself in a condition of languor—and therefore embracing a sensation
of a lack, which is indefinite (devoid of specific content) and actually results from
redundancy rather than deficiency—is the backbone of all animals, which live and
breathe precisely because they are constitutionally desiring. Desire as projection-
expansion of the body is one of the most important principles of the metapredicate of
animality. To be an animal means to realize one’s experience in desire and to realize
one’s predication by referring in a givenway to something external. It follows that the
full realization of the specificity of each animal is also the peculiar—or “somewhat”
copulative—expression of desire through that particular animal. We could say that
the heritage is nothing more than the manifestation, in that particular animal, of the
“vicissitudes of desire” that preceded it; on the other hand, the heritage is only the
starting point of desire, which necessarily leads the animal to take unknown paths of
predication. In belonging, that is, in adhering to the heritage, an animal realizes its
own singularity: it uses it to open up new existential paths. If we analyze the singular
positioning we discover that the here-and-now of the individual is nothing but the
result of a flow of somatizations that took place in different times and places through
copulative processes. What we consider a static adherence to a well-established form
once represented a singularity, a leap into the dark, an opportunity seized. However,
that singularity was reflected in the world, bringing out an existential possibility
through the tension of its own life, by making room for itself in reality. We are still
blinded by fixism and unable to understand that life flows in space and time precisely
thanks to its openness to the singularity that uses heritage to transcend it, and that
builds existential forms-conditions through desire.
The body desires because it is always projected onto another condition. By virtue
of desire, it does not only occupy space, but it makes room for itself in the world, and
9For a deeper understanding of the link between subjectivity and desire, see Marchesini (2016,
p. 63). Through bodiliness—the body being understood as an experiential field—subjectivity is
freed from the chains of the narcissistic self and stretches out towards the other. The driving force
behind this process is desire, conceived as the “urgency of participating” and the “hospitality towards
the other”.
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in doing so it inevitably gives rise to the creative process of singularity. Each heritage,
therefore, is the result of a daring desire, which in interacting with the world—in
predicating through relationship, since desire is a copulative act—has given rise
to a mirroring; we call it adaptation, for its performative value, but in reality it
represents the elastic mat for an animal’s leap into the dark. Rank, understood as the
occupation of a presence dimension, encompasses the habitus and the environment
of life, defining a correlation that is also a somatic mirroring: gills speak of oxygen
dissolved in water, while lungs speak of something else. Mirroring is the way in
which desire has transiently informed the animal form. One can say that heritage
reminds animality of its flow, its undulatory nature, its emergence from other forms,
its preceding the corpuscular birth of the individual. Animality, therefore, is the
continuous expression of a copulative process of somatization of one’s desire, of
feeling projected into the world, of perceiving an implicit lack.
The sense of deficiency, however, does not arise from a condition of poverty but
from the animal’s projective impulse to expand into the world, interpreting it freely
just as an actor does with a script. Animal metapredication is therefore a creation
of worlds that is expressed in predicative singularities. We feel lacking because we
want, not the other way around; we feel deficient because we are captivated, as
animals, by the unstoppable impulse to flow into the world. Heritage, as a prelude
to desire, is a boundary in that it defines a given copulative mode; however, there
is no doubt that being an animal is the act of going beyond it, of crossing every
possible barrier, condemning oneself to imbalance, to the expulsion from Eden, to
the suffering implied in the impossibility of returning to the initial condition, to
placing one’s desire in new dialectical conditions between body and world. For this
reason, I consider animality a metapredicate impossible to cage within a predicative
definition. For the same reason I define the animal condition as a perceptionof implicit
deficiency, which has nothing to do with the endowments one has but concerns one’s
projection into the world, experimenting with new situations.
Desire dictates the conditions of suffering and pleasure, which are ultimately two
sides of the same coin:when one grows, the other increases aswell. This perception of
deficiency is not necessarily a representation, nor does it require a process of action,
explanation or declarative emergence. The perception of deficiency is a languor that
takes place in different layers on every level of the body’s being. This dimension
concerns and at the same time transcends the individual, because it affects the entire
chain of prospective genealogy, including phylogenetic genealogy. Animals are not
only protagonists in defining their biographical structure, but also in determining the
phylogenetic course of their species. The animal that interprets its script and invents
new things is not a simple “receptacle of genes”, as the reductionist canon would
put it. Today, with the new evo-devo theories, we are increasingly aware of how the
choicesmade by individualsmodify the phylogenetic trajectory of the species, though
not as described by the Lamarckian simplification. Much remains to be discovered
in terms of epigenesis and niche construction, but the point is that even the term
“adaptation” seems outdated. Life is not a simple adaptation to regimes imposed
from the outside. Life works like an artist: it does not only reproduce what is already
there but it is always creating something new. Life is never stuck within a border but
always trenspasses it, goes beyond it, reinvents itself.
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A fundamental aspect, in order to fully understand subjectivity as the participating
presence of the individual in the moment, is undoubtedly the sentience principle,
which all too often is traced back to the ability to take charge—or to be aware—of the
findings concerning pain and sensory afferents. From my point of view, sentience is
not only superimposable to states of consciousness, but concerns the entire “feeling”
of an animal—a conjugation that cannot be ascribed to a single sphere and that should
be traced back to its “being-a-body”.We could say, then, that the body is a multilayer
of sentience, as it is interrelated to what it encounters in a plural way. The principle
that I am going to examine here concerns the multilevel dimension of conjugation
that the body establishes in its relationship with the world. Sentience is therefore
the vocation or the participatory foundation of the animal condition, its being in a
relationship. It follows that to admit animal sentience means to consider the body not
as a delimited entity, enclosed in a skin boundary or in a biographical space–time, but
as a threshold. Better still, the body is a set of reception thresholds, capable not only
of acquiring information from the world but also of attributing value to events and of
diachronically connecting the subject’s present experience to the past and the future.
Feeling, therefore, is not exposure, be it in the sense of Bentham’s potentiality10 or
Derrida’s vulnerability.11 It is a protagonism that is realized in the construction of
perspectives that the animal carries out in its intersection with external reality.
The character of being-sentient is expressed through multiple predications of
animality, among which nociception, in its conscious expression of pain, is particu-
larly important in the consideration of inherent interests that can be attributed to the
condition of animality. In fact, an animal cannot be viewed as an inert object or a
machine, because it is able to feel pain and to experience feelings in general. This is
the reason why, for example, utilitarianism considers animals moral patients, but it is
also the reason that leads to a different consideration of animals compared to objects,
recognizing that the former have “interests that concern them”. All animal welfare
proposals, starting from the Brambell commission,12 have followed the precept of
sentience, to the point that the concept of subjectivity often tends to overlap with
it. As we have seen, there are at least two other concepts—the ownership principle
and the desiring principle—that are indispensable to understand subjectivity. At the
same time, restricting the field of sentience to physical suffering prevents us from
fully understanding the sensibility of an animal being, which should be traced back
to conjugation rather than to exposure.
10Jeremy Bentham famously noted: “The question is not, can [animals] reason?, nor can they talk?
but, can they suffer?”.
11Derrida (2008). Here Derrida highlights that there is a level of existence that unites us and other
animals: the non-equilibrium and fragility-vulnerability of life.
12Written in 1965 by the Farm Animal Welfare Council (Fawc), the Brambell Report listed the
“five freedoms” that would ensure the “welfare” of farm animals, namely the freedom: (1) from
hunger or thirst, (2) from discomfort, (3) from pain, injury or disease, (4) to express (most) normal
behaviour, (5) from fear and distress.
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Being-sentient has got to do with the continuous encounter between animality and
the world, as a process that not only takes into account what is external, but contin-
uously translates what is external into internal content. In this sense, sentience can
be associated with a participatory motion of involvement or concertation. Sentience
undoubtedly means having access to the world through sensory windows, capable
of catapulting one’s interiority into the world and of stretching it along a particular
field of sensibility. This gives rise to the phenomenological participation of the indi-
vidual, who feels their presence as an interrelation along a coordinate of protention.
On the other hand,what the individual encounters in this process of extroversion gives
form to the perspective partiality that characterizes subjectivity. There is therefore an
important ontological link between perception and the metapredicate of being-there
since, as pointed out by Maurice Merleau-Ponty,13 perception is openness to the
Lebenswelt, an act which is implicitly endowed with intentionality. The perceptual
perspective can be clearly considered a principle “through” which the individual
takes control over the world. However, it is also true that it represents the “ontopoi-
etic engine” that allows it to build an inner world and to make space for itself in the
outside world. Perception is therefore primarily a dynamic process of involvement,
which aims to overcome the internal–external dichotomy through a distension of the
individual in its context and an introjection of the latter into the individual.
Every cell of an organism perceives its field of action, modifying it and modifying
itself to seek assonance. Feeling therefore means actively seeking the correct intona-
tion, lowering the dystonic gradients.One perceives theworld in viewof a correlation,
or rather, of a related action that creates the predications not within the individual but
on the “connection structures”, to quote Gregory Bateson.14 Here the predicate can
never be referred to some essential content but rather to a relational emergence. The
cell has thresholds of access to theworld, able towatch over the smallest gradient vari-
ations (that is, to be sensitive to fluctuations), as well as to amortize the oscillations,
(that is, to be sensible towards compensations). But this double-track sensibility, this
focusing on some gradients while overshadowing others, is already a form of world
13I believe that the question of subjectivity cannot be deciphered through specific predicates. The
latter, on the contrary, testify to the particular conjugation of intentionality of the animal body,
to take up Merleau-Ponty’s good intuition (Merleau-Ponty 2003). Following this line, one defines
subjectivity as a metapredicative condition which underlies the predicates and supports or realizes
them but does not correspond to them: it is a common and shared dimensionality in animal being,
beyond the particular and circumstantial onto/phylogeny states that a particular individual happens
to experience in the here-and-now. A careful view of the relationship between nature and life in
Merleau-Ponty can be found in Scotti (2015).
14Bateson (1980). Here Bateson, with the expression “connecting patterns”, has well highlighted
how it is not possible to understand the unstable magma of bios by enucleating the living individual
from the network of conjugations that express their vital breath. For Bateson, the living world is
filled with a series of links that connect «the crab to the lobster and the orchid to the primrose and
all the four of them to me?», p. 8. These relations are not fixed, internal and constitutive of the
subjects involved, but organize the whole biological world according to connections that fluctuate
in time (responding to a “stochastic” process), which Bateson sees as «a dance of interacting parts
and only secondarily pegged down by various sortS of physical limits and by those limits which
organisms characteristically impose», p. 13.
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construction. Being-sentient therefore indicates a protagonism in the emergence of
a level of reality that is not already given. And sentience is not a sensibility localized
on the plasmalemma of a cell or on the processes of intracellular transcriptase, on
the sensory organs or on the endocrine or immune mechanisms; it is not found in
the synaptic network, let alone in the metabolic neuromodulation. One is sentient
because this is the condition of being a body.
Sentience speaks to us, among other things, of the affective-emotional nature of
the animal being, of its continuous attribution of non-representational value to events.
Emotions, in this regard, not only mark events, assigning links of feeling between
states of the body and circumstances, that is, transforming the world into a collection
of conjugations of experience. They also connect the different phases of the genetic
chain of the individual. In other words, emotions construct a biography through a
network of locks marked by value seals. The individual, in fact, cannot be consid-
ered a mere temporal sequence of events that have followed one another, sedimented
by stratifications, but must be seen as a network of affective involvements present
or mobilized in the here-and-now. In other words, emotions transform memories
into present entities that are felt and participated in, just like experience. In so doing,
emotions give diachronic consistency to the individual, making it a biographic entity,
not a stratification. Emotions thus provide the individual with subjectivity in that they
are not fixed in the here-and-now but emerge from it: they are capable of experiencing
a here-and-now in that they are not entirely included in it. The distance that Martin
Heidegger identifies in human contemplation, as opposed to the animal’s stunned
state, should be seen in the emotional involvement felt by the subject in the intersec-
tionwith theworld. In fact, it is strongly connected along its genealogical-experiential
chain through the emotional glue that makes both experience and heritage present.
We have seen how being-desiring leads to copulative processes that give indi-
vidual content specifications to the projective act, defining expressive proposition-
ality in a singular way. We have also said that experience, through the process of
construction-solution of setbacks, is a fundamentally creative event in the redefinition
of knowledge endowments. These two aspects are obviously affected by important
consequences in the prospective emergence of animal subjectivity. At this point, I
wish to underline that the intersection between the individual and the world is never
passive—as photographic film is passive to the incidence of light—but implies an
attribution of value, on the basis of an emotional marking that involves the multi-
layer of feeling. Also in this case, we can notice how the metapredicate of subjec-
tivity concerns partiality, arbitrariness (in a way), and the protagonism of feeling.
Subjectivity is the result of the animal’s appearance on the proscenium of the world,
personally assigning connotations of value to it. In other words, an animal feels the
world through its own emotional state, in a process that can recall a concertive act,
bringing the body on a particular frequency of feeling. But this feeling is never an
objective translation of the contents of the world, nor is it a representation or the
attribution of a meaning to an event. Rather, it is the definition of an in-itself on the
basis of a subjective dialogical exchange.
The body stretches out into the world so as to participate in it. It is a body that
vibrates like a string instrument at the touch of the world. It transforms this touch into
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a singular sound that brings back to the present not only the ontogenetic experience
of the individual, but also the heritage of others that preceded it. In this sense, feeling
transforms individual life into a sort of resonance that makes remote things current,
as a kind of timemachine that fills the fossil heritage of ancestors with affective living
flesh. It is a body that stretches out to feel the warmth of the sun, taste the sweet
taste of a fruit, the turgidity of its own sexuality, the epidermal thrill of touching the
other, the exuberance that runs through its muscles, the proprioceptive tension in its
joints and tendons, its heartbeat, the transductions of chemical and electro-magnetic
currents that fill the surrounding space. It is a body that feels and transforms the
moment into an experience. But the body also transforms feeling into a resonance
capable of colouring a moment to come, turning feeling into a flow that brings back
and anticipates, and shaping the world on the basis of a sentient perspective.
To be a body means to be referred or refer to something external, i.e. to somatize a
need, to introject in amorphopoietic and functional way a previous relationship for or
in-view-of a relationship to come. The body is therefore arranged and prepared to be
completed through contributions from the outside, which are already presupposed
in its structure. Being a body means (i) being non-autonomous and impossible to
fully explain, from an ontological point of view, through internal reconnaissance
alone. It also means (ii) being non-placeable and inexhaustible in the here-and-now,
impossible to box within a synchronous frame. The body ultimately emerges from
the here-and-now, unlike a machine that, vice versa, can be placed in a functional
here-and-now. What characterises the body is precisely this circumvention of any
attempt to make it fully explicable, both from the point of view of self-sufficiency
(i), as if something was always missing in the explanation or something else had to
be referred to, and from the point of view of spatial and temporal positionality (ii),
because each somatic expression belongs to the past and yet is already in the future.
A sentient being, therefore, rather than being concerned with exposure to pain
(an aspect which of course I do not wish to deny or dismiss, especially in terms of
inherent interests), is a being-in-relationship. In other words, I wish to emphasize
the relational and not autarkic nature of subjectivity. Sentience indicates the preva-
lence of being-in-relationship in animal ontology, its undulatory nature alongside the
appearance of a disjunctive or identifying corpuscularity with respect to a presumed
background. Sentience is the predisposition of animal subjectivity to seek its own
predictive emergence in the encounter. The body brings the context to life, in the same
way in which it enlivens past resonances. As my body stretches out, my ancestors
come to life like ghosts, along an increasingly broad and remote basso continuo that
makes it possible to interact with other animals, even those that are very distant from
the taxonomic point of view. As Charles Darwin had already intuited, emotional
expression allows for a trans-specific dialogue (1872). In sentience, belonging to
the animal community becomes more evident than in a thousand other performative
homologies. At the same time, sentience is an opening towards heteronomy, that is,
the willingness to let oneself be organized by the world.
With respect to point “i”, one can say that the evolution of the body, in all its
phylo/onto-genetic temporal phases, is a predisposition to apparent deficiencies,
which it would be more appropriate to call redundancies aimed at complementation.
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The neurobiological structure, for example—but one can also refer to the foliage of
a tree or the distribution of a population—does not follow the logic of morphopoietic
autonomy, but that of the ability to acquire information about the external context.
The structure of the synaptic network as well as the development of foliage follow
fractal directives of redundancy, where the repeating morphological unity allows
for an introjection of organizational formation within it, so that it does not betray its
own internal logic while being shaped by the environment.We could then say, almost
symmetrically, that an oak reflects the world through its foliage and that the world
reflects itself through the oak. Mirroring is therefore an interpretation and a repre-
sentation that brings novelty. The structure of the body is far from being self-referred
autopoiesis, since the body is always normalized from the outside (heteronomy).
Likewise, it is far from being simply modeled on the environment, because the body
always imposes a precise fractal structure.
As to point “ii”, it is important to understand the body as a becoming entity that
creates the present and does not remain in a condition of explanatory isochrony. The
past echoes in the body, not like a fossil testifying to a past passage, but rather as a
beating heart that continues to claim its presence and is the engine of this presence. At
the same time, it is impossible to understand the act of presence through the enucle-
ation of instantaneousness, because presence in the moment is always a projection
into something to come and yet already implicit: the future is already implied in the
present, as if it had already happened. Its diachronic conformation, with a plurality
of intentional coordinates, makes the somatic dimension elusive and ambiguous
with respect to any attempt at a machinomorphic explanation or mathematization.
This has introduced the need to make use of several causal/explanatory matrices—
for example Ernst Mayr’s dichotomy between proximate and remote causation and
the four questions of Niko Tinbergen’s ethology—since each highlights a single
phenomenological position of the body. The problem is that, no matter how many
causal devices we add to our explanatory catalogue, we will never manage to grasp
the whole process of a body in its entirety, but only some elements of its intersection
with the here-and-now. One could then say that the body has a here-and-now because
it is not part of it.
The body seems to escape causal determination, folding in the creases of time
and hiding in the fractal illusion of internal/external dichotomies. By lending itself
to external completion and engaging in a game of references—i.e. by continuously
referring to something missing, something that no longer exists or is not yet there—
the body obtains its own self-ownership and is emancipated from the nomothetic.
In its predicative process, the body does not present a causality that can be said to
be exhaustive: it cannot be compressed into a formula, neither in a linear nor in a
recursive sense. Whence a surplus that renders every explanation partial by only
focusing on one of several possible explanatory levels. The sentience principle, as
affectivity and involvement that transcends the moment in its causal networks and in
manifesting a being-in-relationship, is the most interesting and most difficult aspect
to investigate, especially while sticking to the conception of res extensa, i.e. an entity
that is mathematizable through the Galilean-Cartesian synthesis.
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There is a principle in Darwinian thought that more than any other should prompt
reflection, not only for its counter-intuitive character, but above all for the onto-
logical consequences it opens up, which in some respects are contralateral to the
deterministic assumptions of 20th-century neo-Darwinism and to the claim that the
history of life on Earth can be compressed into an algorithm. I am talking about the
morphopoietic foundation: the view that a given organ has not developed for its func-
tion, but that its function is only the consequence of the event that brought it to light.
This thought, which views the function as a conjugation of the organ and not as its
morphopoietic cause, carries many consequences, including the principle of coopt-
ability of every character, i.e. the functional range of the predicate. In other words,
the emergence of a predicate does not ipso facto dictate a function, but paves the way
to a possible conjugative space. This means that an endowment is not binding but,
on the contrary, allows for the individual’s protagonism because it sets up a precise
conjugative perspective. Consider the hand: it is not bound to a specific function,
not even the one that sanctioned its adaptive fitness—and this is demonstrated by
the fact that, starting from a prehensile function, today it has taken on a performa-
tive multiplicity, from gesturing to typing. Likewise, any other character that enters
the stage of life opens up a range of sensibilities as well as performativity. Every
living being has margins of functional protagonism, that is, of ownership over its
own endowments, but also of protagonism in feeling, in stretching out towards the
world.
After all, it is precisely this protagonism that makes the animal a subject and not a
puppet moved by threads. But there is a further aspect behind this principle of func-
tional succession or conjugability of the predicate, a consequence that often escapes
those who pursue the determinist view or an essentialist conception of the living. We
tend to forget about sentience, i.e., the hedonic judge that regulates the expression
of every animal. The mistake that is often made is to think that the expression of
a predicate is bound to the performative fitness that caused its affirmation within a
given population. To take up Ernst Mayr’s dichotomy (1961), in so doing we mistake
the remote cause, the judge of replicative compatibility that calibrates the value of a
character on the reproductive dimension it enables, with the proximate cause, which
is always linked to the singular creativity of the subject and to the hedonic value of
the expression itself. The body does not follow the dictates of fitness, which instead
is always a long-term matter and must be considered a consequence, not the engine,
of expression.
The real judge of the expression is the sentience principle that, through pleasure
or discomfort, orients the choices made by the animal. To clarify: cats, as a species,
present a predatory character because this character has been positively evaluated in
terms of fitness, that is, it has given more reproductive chances to those who owned
it. But that particular cat, as an individual protagonist of its own here-and-now,
expresses its predatory inspiration in any possible conjugation, even in the form of
a game, simply because doing so gives it pleasure. The conjugability of predicates
makes the animal the subject of its choices on the basis of sentience feedback and
thereby allows the individual to be the protagonist of its own here-and-now. The
body ultimately connects the subject to the world through coordinates of feeling that
do not bind it to the past, but transform the past into fields of creative possibilities.
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The body is therefore a composite set of expressive protagonisms that have been
realized in different temporal phases, a concert of echolalias that claim their conjuga-
tive presence in the sensory dimension of the here-and-now. The body inherently
attends the ceremony of the moment, as it is part of it. The body is a reference to
something affective that is not only marked but undergoes a real ontological intro-
jection. The body is therefore a potential feeling, but a feeling that does not simply
monitor or dominate external reality, but that rather realizes a presupposed rela-
tionship in a singular way, through affective protagonism. Recalling Brentano, but
extending his view to all somatic dimensions, we can then speak of an intentional
plurality of the body, which does not exclusively concern the multilayer of somatic
geography, but also the diachronic dimension. The body therefore does not resemble
a workshop or a machine, made available by nature or a res cogitans capable of tran-
scending its extended condition through intentional flights. Through the sentience
principle, the body subsumes a multiverse of non-enumerable and non-explicable
intentions.
The body is an ever-changing entity, because its copulative engine continuously
creates new reception thresholds: its very being in the moment in a singular way,
its being there, inevitably builds new spaces of complementation that presuppose an
external contribution. It is then evident that Dasein is not revealed in distance but
in the creation of contexts of hospitality, mooring points, internalisation of needs.
The process of mirroring, trivialised in the concept of adaptation, is in fact more
of a reference or complement to an external presence, from the union of which
a predicative presence emerges. The germinative structure of a tree is an implicit
appeal to a given conformation of reality, so rather than adaptation we should speak
of reference or relational poetics. In this sense, mirroring has a copulative structure
or an implicative connection to the outside: the wings of a bird imply thermals, just
like the gills of a fish imply oxygen dissolved in water. Therefore, the body does not
have its own autonomy and does not develop along self-centered morphopoieses,
but just the opposite: the body has a conjunctive structure—it is an “if” or a “that”.
Whence its being predicative as intentionality.
The body represents the place where the relationship with the world is real-
ized, along with the dimension that defines the “epiphanic level” of otherness,15
the complicity inherent in the process of perception that not only unveils but also
15Thus, in the relationship with non-human othernesses, the human being discovers the highway
of their own desiring being, since otherness incardinates in an exemplary way the different
forms-opportunities of ontological expansion. The flight of a bird thus becomes the inspira-
tion/announcement of a possible existential dimension “within reach”, teaching the human being
“that one can fly” and only later how to do it. In that principle of ontological dimensional opening—
which we can define as “ontopoiesis”—lies the conjugation of desire that transforms the flight of a
bird from“other-from-oneself” into “other-with-oneself” or “other-in-oneself”.As a result, that exis-
tential action is not an external phenomenon observable with detachment, but rather the “epiphany”
of a condition of desire (“de-sidera”), that is, something distant, missing, longed for and therefore
achievable. On the other hand, such an epiphanic process would not have been possible without a
threshold of encounter with otherness, i.e., if birds were completely other from human beings and
therefore devoid of a different perspective or so distant or reifiable as not to trigger the identification
process in human beings (Marchesini 2017).
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reveals the entity. It does so through peculiar references: specific characteristics of
the somatic condition that could be defined “reception thresholds”,16 i.e. free ports
of hospitality. It is there that the magic of donation, both ontological and epistemo-
logical, is realized, igniting some predicates and overshadowing others. The body
is therefore a multi-level conjugation with other entities, and at the same time it is
intentionality referred to them. In authors like Bergson and Merleau-Ponty, the body
presents itself as the “chiasmatic centre” of a becoming that mixes together time
and space, structure and function, identity and otherness, past and future. The body
therefore is a plurality of coexisting conditions: it is the “how” of the manifestation
of mirroring events introjected at different times. Every dissertation on the body
in the humanistic tradition, instead, tends to propose a unidimensional image of it,
transforming the somatization of experience into a crystallized sediment instead of
energy to be spent or a virtuality to be actualized.
The transformation of the body into a res extensa implies that the somatic dimen-
sion is fully blind to the world. The body is regarded as a mere chain of triggers
that fall like dominoes without bringing anything new to the scene. Flattening onto
a single level of performance—which also means zeroing all meaning—the body
becomes a layer of intertwined elements, a fabric which stretches out on the same
phenomenological level as experience. The body, instead, involves several “inten-
tional levels”, multiple levels of reference or reception that are constantly combined
with the world, giving rise to new configurations of reality. Translating the body
into res extensa means ignoring the multiplicity of its resonances and the emerging
virtuality of its predicates. The humanistic body is poured onto the single level of
the histological slide, so as to reach the conclusion, already implicit in the premises,
of a dead somaticity.
In reality, the body realizes the principle of “coexistence” of different times as
described by Merleau-Ponty. One could define it as a flow of instances diachron-
ically located along matrices that can only apparently be attributed to the genetic,
epigenetic and environmental dimension, and which do not support the ontogenetic
diarchy. In fact, we must not consider these morphopoietic legacies as crystallized
structures, informed by deterministic or economically oriented elements. Diachronic
coexistence can be thought of as a creative energy or a virtual condition that, in the
multiplicity that it implies, allows the body to embrace a continuous process of onto-
logical singularity through the emergence of possible worlds. Here one can see the
common thread that binds authors such as Henri Bergson, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
and Francisco Varela. And it is precisely by seeing the body not as a scheme or
16Cf. Marchesini (1997), Il concetto di soglia (The concept of threshold). The term “threshold” is
ambivalent, but for this very reason it has a very useful heuristic function to understand how the
human is the manifestation of the non-human sign in humans. I have used the concept of threshold
to define precisely this explanatory inversion that sees human identity emerge in allowing for the
hybrid effect and not in placing an insurmountable limes between human and non-human. The
threshold represents a point of conjunction between different domains, able: (a) to circumscribe
them or tomake them possible because they are interfaced or not separated; (b) to give rise to a space
that becomes such only in the very act of crossing it, or rather to overcome it, since the threshold
is dialogical; (c) to define a limit-transition that by definition is boundless or not confined.
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an informed level, but as an opening to what is new, to something unpredictable
that escapes both determinism and the principle of causality, that the principle of
sentience is established.
The body dialogues with the world, it is positioned on a peripatetic level of
space–time, it chats with everything that surrounds it, it welcomes othernesses into
relational occurrences and introjects them to start subsequent dialogues. Of course, I
am talking about a dialogical dimension that is not only linguistic, but also involves
the intersection of meaning: meaning has got to do with sentience. It is neither
attributed nor assumed as it is by the thing itself, but is the product of the dialogical
process, that is, of the double flow of reciprocal donation-hospitality. The virtual
reality of the body—to quote Bergson—is therefore a sort of poietic redundancy or
conjugative potential that paves the way to the need for an external reference to find
a transitory configuration. Redundancy is therefore not a shortcoming or lack, but
an opening to hetero-organisation. The body is therefore autopoietic in heteronomy.
Its virtual nature, that is, its subsumption of an infinite multiplicity of actualizations,
realizes/makes possible: (i) its dimensional singularity, (ii) its mirroring of the world,
(iii) its continuous infidelity to the identity principle. The body has an identity status
only if it is “fixed”, as Deleuze would say.17
The body is always in a state of singularity—i.e., of emergence—with respect to
its contents and of unrepeatability with respect to its condition. It is singular in all
its elements, even in the intimate physiology of its genomic string. It is never a mere
translation, an algorithm or a compression of data: the body is not the result of a
project deposited by phylogeny or the sedimentary outcome of some organizational
information extracted from the environment. The body is always on the brink of
emergence. Every experience is something profoundly different from mere acqui-
sition or subjective construction. The body reflects the world through the previous
series of mirrorings. In so doing, it gives life to a sort of diachronic fractal. Let me
provide an example. The leaf of an oak tree reflects a set of adaptive correlations:
it is therefore a reflecting poetics. Each oak uses its own reflecting leaves—its own
poetics—to reflect, in the singularity of its foliage, the environment inwhich it grows.
But this is not a faithful reproduction of the surrounding world: rather, it is a subjec-
tive representation of the context carried out through heritage information, which is
also represented. Each predicate is projected into the world to dialogue and is the
result of previous dialogues: it expects a copula to be realized.
Sentience speaks of a living body, which does not only react, which is not moved
around by the world like a dead leaf by the wind, but which attributes value to the
context, and which in the first instance creates a biography in time… who knows! If
traumas are transmitted epigenetically, this means that sentience regulates more than
individual life. On the other hand, sentience speaks of subjectivity as a continuous
becoming, as implicit self-overcoming. This takes place precisely in the frenetic
succession of affective conjugations that turn the present not into the final result of
an arithmetic of the past, but into a network that allows or leads the individual to
continuously oscillate between different temporal dimensions. Sentience, therefore,
17G. Deleuze, Lectures on Spinoza, available at https://www.webdeleuze.com/cours/spinoza.
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is not a simple conjugation that presumes a dichotomy, but a plural relation that
invalidates the claim of any dichotomous explanation.
The body is never a fact, a res extensa that can be nailed on the space–time
axes and can be mathematically measured; even its here-and-now, as Merleau-Ponty
suggests, is a pseudo-present. A dead body is not a crystal, because it falls into
immediate degradation and this is a living process. The body rejects the identity
principle, it is unfaithful because of its founding character, it is for-the-other, it is
in becoming, but its state of infidelity does not mean that it is nothing. This, in my
opinion, is the legacy that the French philosopher left us as a workshop for future
reflections: the overcoming of opposing categories which, through the principle of
noncontradiction, have removed the possibility of fully developing a philosophy of
nature. The condition of the living does not pre-exist its continuous making. As
Bergson (1988) would say: the consequent cannot be explained by the antecedent.
The reasons for this, in my opinion, lie in the fundamental aspects of sentience:
the singularity of the condition of feeling, the mirroring or heteronomic character of
feeling, the infidelity of feeling, and the experiential progression of feeling. The body
is because it always presupposes an external contribution, it is a “matrix of relations”
with the world, and it is precisely from these relations that predicates emerge, so
that they can never be inferred through internal observation. Without reference to
implicit heteronomy, to a multi-layered intentionality, it cannot be comprehended.
Merleau-Ponty emphasizes the inseparability between being and phenomenon,
but this inseparability is based on the implicit partiality of the axis of feeling. If
feeling were nothing more than a view of the world, one would expect something
like an objective view, albeit oriented by the function of praxis. Yet this is not the case.
If what Lorenz suggested is true, namely that a-prioris are phylogenetic a-posterioris,
it becomes evident that feeling is the protagonist, which on the one hand denies the
Kantian disjunction, but on the other hand only reports the constraints encountered
in the perspective predisposition. Feeling is therefore a precise bond contracted with
the entity: in other words, the perceived cannot be foreign to the perceiver. Therefore,
the body cannot afford a general overview, a “bird’s eye” perspective; so, perception
is more likely to be an epiphany. But, on closer inspection, the epiphany is already a
recourse to a time that escapes the here-and-now. Epiphany is both a resonance and a
projection. Drawing a transversal line across very different authors, such as Darwin,
Proust, Bergson, Lorenz, Piaget and Bateson, we find that the sentient body contains
the Husserlian concept of institution/donation (Stiftung) which is the mark of chronic
implementation. The body is the place where time is recorded, or accumulated, for
the dialogues to come.
5.5 To Conclude
In order to talk about animal subjectivity, it is not enough to followDescarteswho, like
an illusionist, shifts the attention to the dichotomous interplay of opposites. It is not
enough to resurrect some res cogitans, or however you want to call it. It is necessary,
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on the contrary, to overcome the dualist conception and to reconsider the concept
of res extensa as an exhaustive paradigm. It is not enough to hypothesize animal
consciousness, if the underlying level remains attached to an explanation based on
automatisms and reactivity. Mechanism can be considered as a full identification of
the individual with the functions potentially available and inherent in it, i.e. as a full
overlap between the two terms.Overcomingmechanisms thereforemeans addressing
the individual as an entity that exceeds its endowments and has full protagonism.
The de-subjectivization of animality has been fully expressed by Martin Heidegger
in the concept of the animal as “poor in world” (1998),18 i.e. totally immersed in its
functions, and in this sense unable to emerge from its stunned state. Subjectivity is
therefore the admission of an animal Dasein, i.e. the intrinsic ability of the animal
condition to exceed its functions, in a conception that has nothing to do with the
judgement of the typology or of the predicative gradient of that function. It is not
the complexity of the function that proves the character of subjectivity, but rather the
capacity of the animal being to reinvent its presence in the world at any time.
This, in short, is Dennett’s true “dangerous idea” (1995)—a reminder that is diffi-
cult to digest. It is as if human beings rejected the idea of subjective otherness and
had to take refuge in determinism due to gnoseological necessity, as the latter is the
only condition that allows them to maintain control. The animal-machine is there-
fore de-subjectivized, transformed into a set of mechanisms which, like switches, are
directly and exhaustively responsible for the functions expressed. However, there is
no doubt that even under the coercive rigour of the res extensa, the animal seems to
escape from the autopsy table and exceed its limits, so that the mechanistic explana-
tion has to resort to tautological artifacts—real explicative epicycles—as it fails to
accomplish the main task it had set itself. It is no coincidence that both evolutionists
and ethologists have had to appeal to diachronic explanatory principles—such as the
concept of remote causality, teleonomy, motivation, etc.—to explain not so much the
“how” but rather the “why” of different behaviours.
On the other hand, when we see an animal bend external reality to its own
needs, adjusting its species-belonging to the emergence of its individual singularity,
charging the events with arbitrary semantic values, creating new solutions capable
of solving and managing novelty, we cannot fail to witness an overall condition
that has little to do with that of a machine. At most, one can explain a behavioural
endowment—be it a sequence of associative structures, a sort of processing utility,
a complex set of possible connections to form hidden entities—as a tool called to
perform a particular cognitive-behavioural function. However, there is no doubt that
18In this regard the German philosopher wrote: «For the animal is related to his circle of food, prey,
and sex in a way essentially different from the way the stone is related to the earth upon which it lies.
In those living things characterised as plant or animal we find the peculiar arousal of excitability,
by which the living being is “excited”, i.e., stirred to an emerging into a circle of stimulability on
the basis of which its drawers other living things into the circle of its activity No excitability or
stimulability of plants and animals ever brings them into the free in such a way that what is excited
could ever let the exciting “be” what it is even merely as exciting…Plant and animal are suspended
in something outside of themselves without ever being able to see either the outside or the inside,
i.e., to have it stand as an aspect unconcealed in the free of Being.»
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the individual uses their endowments as tools. The animal owns the endowments—it
uses them, they do not use it—and, consequently, it manifests sovereignty over them.
Animality is primarily existence, a very complex term that one could define, at
least in part,with the following characteristics.One is (i) the ability to position oneself
in a state that previously did not exist and could not be deduced from previous ones:
animality means not being contained in the already given world but continuously
creating worlds. Another characteristic is (ii) the property of presenting a quid in
addition to one’s functions or of exceeding one’s own endowments, i.e. not being fully
definable by one’s predicates. Animality means (iii) not being completely immersed
in one’s here-and-now, i.e. owning a present by being diachronically positioned above
it, or, again, being inexplicable by referring exclusively to the forces acting in the
here-and-now. Animality also means (iv) owning one’s endowments and using them
in complete freedom (flexibility, co-optation, redefinition), i.e. having expressive
sovereignty. Finally, it means (v) owning inherent expressive motives, which I have
defined as the principles of desire and sentience, and on the basis of these, having
interests.
Also with reference to the term “subjective”, used to define specific traits such as
singularity, partiality, arbitrariness—in the interface, in the orientation, in preference,
in judgment, in motivation, in representation, in decision—it is indispensable to
outline not only its different characteristics, but also and above all the assumptions
that make them possible. From my point of view, conscious access is nothing more
than one of the many expressions of animal subjectivity: it is neither the conditio sine
qua non nor the most striking expression of the individual’s subjective being. The
unconscious—if it still makes sense to practice this dichotomy—has proved to be a
powerful motor of subjectivity, much freer in the emergence of singularity than the
seclusion and censorship of the explanation. Subjectivity emerges from the whole
system, in its overall and dislocated expression, and in this sense I wish to avoid
any conception that appeals to transcendent entities, however they may be defined
or presupposed.
Therefore, when I speak of the protagonism of the subject—as the owner of their
endowments and the bearer of inherent interests—I do not refer to some control room
that decides how to use the endowments or to a level subsuming the desiring and
sentient principle. Protagonism is rather the result of three things. First, there is (i) the
systemic character of the body called to express its state in the here-and-now. Then,
there is (ii) the requirements of the endowments which, rejecting the mechanistic
conception, cannot be assimilated to automatisms;. Finally, there is (iii) being-a-
body, i.e. implicitly conjugated and copulated towards the world. On the other hand,
I would like to underline that the Darwinian revolution, in its ontological assump-
tions—the most obvious example being the scarcity of species-specific behaviours
in the ethogram of a species—does not allow us, in complete intellectual honesty, to
maintain the “human vs. animal” dichotomy, which by transforming animality into a
counterterm has depicted the animal condition as a dimension of being that doesn’t
directly affect us.
Subjectivity therefore does not concern species peculiarities or expressive gradi-
ents—what that particular animal is able to do—but rather the animal condition and,
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consequently, the model adopted to explain the dimension of animal-being. For this
reason, I think it is misleading to seek subjectivity in the complexity of predicates,
since each predicate can be traced back to the chosen model through explanatory
approximations. Only in thisway is it possible to speak of animal subjectivitywithout
getting lost in the description of the individual forms of subjectivity, the analysis of
which is inevitably a work in progress. Species characteristics are important to define
a style of presence, which can be described as a range of positional possibilities or a
level of practicability—and this is the complex task of ethological analysis—but are
not necessary to understand the paradigmatic sense of subjectivity. Subjectivity is a
metapredicate, just as the mechanistic explanation of animal behaviour is metapred-
icative, i.e. it relates to the explanatory model used to account for the general condi-
tion, not a particular function. When one talks about a mechanistic metapredication,
one means that, once we have chosen the explanatory model—the machine—any
function, no matter the type or gradient of complexity, will be interpreted in a mech-
anistic way. The metapredicate evolves over time not on the basis of ethological
descriptions but in accordance with the evolution of the model itself, as capable of
subsuming the functions. The “machine” model has changed along with the histor-
ical technological metamorphoses: first there was a hydraulic explanation, then a
thermodynamic one, then a cybernetic one and today a computer one. All were used
in their time to account for animal behaviour: the type of machine changes but the
mechanistic explanation stays the same.
Subjectivity is instead the recognition of a space of action for the individual
who, owning their endowments and possessing inherent integrity, is called to the
creative and participatory level. It is the admission of the animal’s existentiality, of
its being-there in the full sense as a “creator-of-worlds”, since animal being implies
not only the production of solutions responding to the singularity of reality, but
also the emergence (conception) of the setback itself within the fabric of reality.
The animal being must have a positionality in the here-and-now precisely because
it transcends the here-and-now, because it is involved in a gap that does not allow
one to explain the animal’s expression by exclusively referring to the causal matrices
acting at a given moment. To position oneself in a here-and-now means to also own
an elsewhere, so that one’s perspective—matured through the legacies of phylogeny
and ontogeny—is subjected to a continuous process of renegotiation of meanings.
The focus of interest and specific objective of this work is to show that animality is a
condition of full presence in the here-and-now precisely because it emerges from the
total immersion in the here-and-now. It is an existentiality that, in order to be able
to dwell in the fluctuation of reality and in the singularity of the situations it has to
address, must constantly be present in the immediacy of its intersection with reality.
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Chapter 6
Intus-Legere: Knowledge
as an Actualization Process
Roberto Marchesini
Abstract Despite its many possible interpretations, the Western tradition has
restricted the act of knowing to disjunction from bodiliness, in a sort of detach-
ment and contemplation of the world ascribable to the res cogitans and to the
exclusion of mere fruition. The observer becomes an entity other than external
reality, looking at the latter from the outside (albeit within their own perspective).
Knowledge, as a neutral and objectivizing act, as something neither participating in,
nor emerging from, the relational predicate, has marked a sort of divorce between
knowing and known: a dichotomy that is reflected in a fractal way and itself produces
other dichotomies. Far from being interpreted as a particular and partial gaze on the
world, the human perspective has acquired universal connotations: the perceived is
suspended, and the perception and connotation of reality are taken to be separate
things. This consecutio goes from the Cartesian doubt to the Kantian critique; then
Konrad Lorenz operated a first conjunction by connecting the aprioris to the adaptive
processes andmaking them phylogenetic aposterioris. Nowwe should ask ourselves:
(1) whether we can consider the epistemological perspective as a state of approxi-
mation to reality, which has an ultimate configuration even though the latter is not
necessarily knowable; (2) whether, on the contrary, we should accept a principle
of absolute relativism to deny any conformation to reality and theorize the latter’s
non-consistency, along with the total perspectival creativity-freedom of the subject.
There is also another option, though: perhaps (3) we can chose a third path, one
that presumes that reality per se is unknowable, not for a lack of conformability but
for its virtuality, and the only observed datum acceptable as a starting point is the
resistance to the actualization process. In this chapter, I shall try to elaborate on this
third option, referring to Lorenz’s view on the adherence of cognitive tools to the
configuration of reality. I will also try to understand how to conciliate an interpreta-
tion based on the animal being’s subjectivity, full of perspective protagonism in any
interaction with the world, with an epistemological framework that accounts for the
phylogenetic conjugation as a given dimension. This interpretation acknowledges
specificity but also takes into consideration the homological, analogic and universal
factors. I believe that Lorenz’s thought, and evolutionary epistemology in general,
have left us a legacy we cannot ignore. Instead, we should avoid Kant’s disjunctive
parallelism; indeed, in light of animal subjectivity, it is evident that we need to revise
both the concept of perspectival approximation and that of perspectival passivity.
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6.1 Premise
When we analyze the plurality of different species and their different ways of inter-
acting with the external world, but also when we explore our individual image of
the context going beyond the surface of the already known—hence intus-legere as
an act of searching in depth and beyond appearances—it is essential to start from
some preliminary considerations. First of all, we must ask ourselves if we can still
understand the intellectual act as a disjunction from the body, that is, an event that
takes place by virtue of transcendence or distance from feeling and acting, from
desiring and obtaining. And we must wonder whether instead, following Nietzsche,
knowledge should be seen as one of the many expressions-needs of being-a-body,1
which can be conjugated within the correlative canon of the evolutionary process.
The rational Self that knows by distancing itself from contact with or fruition of the
object of its knowledge, contemplating it with detachment while not being somat-
ically involved in it, is one of the most rooted prejudices of our culture. This view
prevents us from connecting knowledge to the multilevel of feeling, so that we are
led to consider the intellectual act as a sort of emancipation from the body. This
disjunction, in the de-somatization of the res cogitans that distances feeling from
knowledge, separates contact and involvement from intus-legere, and sees the innate
as stunning and passions as misleading. It transforms, by attribution, animality into
opacity.
This disjunction has transformed the epoché into a sort of negation of the conjunc-
tion between feeling and the structure of reality. Secondly, it is therefore fundamental
to ask oneself whether knowledge travels alongside reality—by virtue of reconstruc-
tive phylogenetic endowments, obviously not only of a perceptive order, but also of a
metacognitive and practical-gnostic one—or whether, as evolutionary epistemology
suggests, the endowments of knowledge, in their correlative partiality, already give
us information on reality. Also in this case it is a question of recognizing the reasons
of the body and the epistemic productivity of phylogeny. We all agree, in fact, that
the evolutionary process is a morphopoietic laboratory, capable of developing struc-
tural and functional solutions able to give rise to context-referenced performativity.
What, instead, is not always emphasized is the context-referenced epistemic value
produced by the phylogenetic atelier. The evolution of the living is not only a process
of building performativities—which, contra the essentialist vision, “emerge” (the
wing is an emergence and not the realization of an idea). Evolution is also a labora-
tory of epistemologies, which also “emerge” and are able to actualize a dimension
within a field of possibilities. This indeed is the case with the wing, which is only
the organization of a new image of reality. With respect to this, one could ask if
the Cartesian doubt should not annihilate the acknowledgement of the intersection
and only favour criticism, entrusting a particular “validity domain” to the particular
image obtained.
1In “The BestowingVirtue”, Nietzsche wrote: “In knowledge doth the body purify itself; attempting
with knowledge it exalteth itself; to the discerners all impulses sanctify themselves; to the exalted
the soul becometh joyful” (Nietzsche 1917: 81, modified translation).
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But what does the concept of “validity domain” mean? Can we consider epis-
temology as a part of this concept? I think so, because knowledge entails a certain
level of interrogation, a way to probe specific resistances of reality to test its organi-
zational opportunities. Sensory and cognitive organs, predisposed by phylogeny, are
undoubtedly the result of a dialogical-interrogation process with a precise context-
world, based on specific cognitive interests. Take the visual sensitivity of the human
being, able to disjoin two electromagnetic bands (such as green and yellow) that are
very close from the point of view of physical feedback, to the point of transforming
the finding into a chromatic and not tonal difference. This tells the story of an animal
that, in its phylogenetic path, has spent a lot of time among trees (hence the sensi-
tivity to a given light spectrum), in the daytime (hence the lack of hair), eating fruit
(hence the prototypical spherical shapes and yellow-red colours). The same can be
said about our cognitive characteristics of extraction of iconic structures, typical of
omnivorous gatherers, and about our sillegic orientative motivations, the same that
lead us to collect flowers, shells, mushrooms, or stones when we are in their respec-
tive environments. The third consideration is whether the knowledge that comes from
this epistemic dimension, elaborated by the phylogenetic craftsman, should in any
case be considered as an “approximation to reality”, as Lorenz’s considerations seem
to suggest. And we should wonder whether instead it is more productive to consider
reality not as a completed form to be discovered, but as a virtual field—that is, a set
of potentialities that the given epistemic intersection actualizes in a given way.
The fourth point is, in a sense, the consequence of the questions I have mentioned,
even if it poses a new question, namely whether knowledge can or cannot be framed
within a directionality. If it can, there are again two options. Either this direction
can aspire to give us a universal image of reality, albeit through long processes of
actualization—that is, by measuring the resistance of reality—or instead epistemic
pluralism can be subsumedwithin a single canon, on pain of losing its morphopoietic
richness. Thefirst question is aboutwhether pluralism translates into a sort of absolute
relativism or a relativism mitigated in the dimensional definition, or whether instead
we can glimpse a direction aimed at widening and deepening our view of the world.
With the second question, I ask whether this path will lead us to have a single image,
definitive and final, of reality. To explain my take on this, which I have developed
over the last ten years in my research on “levels of reality”, I believe that knowledge
has a direction in widening the field and in listing laws capable of subsuming events.
However, as a means of correlation and configuration of reality, knowledge cannot
claim to exhaust all that is possible in a single image, because knowledge is always
related to a style of involvement in the individual’s intersection with the context.
Claiming the opposite would be like demanding a performatively exhaustive organ.
The fifth reflection, which I would like to add in the introduction to this work,
concerns the role of the individual and, more specifically, of the here-and-now of
feeling and being there, understood as active protagonism in the intersection and in
the act of knowing. In fact, knowledge undoubtedly has the ability to go beyond the
already given, to seek new configurations among the folds of reality, and to bring
out new answers in a meta-cognitively innovative way, by virtue of the singularity
of interrogation that the individual lives in its protagonism. The wing, to take up
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the example of an anatomical functionality forged by phylogeny, is an entity at
the disposal of the individual, not a mechanical structure that directly imposes its
performances. Thewing is a conjugation of the body, it is operative and sensitive flesh
which adapts to the stimuli of the here-and-now—it is a morphopoietic dimension,
not a simple already-given structure. The individual has an epistemic dimension not
to limit its access to theworld, but to start froma collection of usefulmaterials in order
to give life to new contents. The epistemic protagonism of the individual therefore
does not prescind from the phylogenetic heritage, but the latter only establishes the
starting coordinates—not a finished epistemic product. The act of intus-legere, i.e.
the cognitive protagonism of the individual, is therefore not an accident or a surplus
with respect to the species-specific epistemic dimension, but the very meaning of the
latter.
Before addressing the various topics related to this important part of the singular
and subjective life of every animal, namely its ability to play an epistemically leading
role, I want to clarify these five points with further considerations that will then serve
me when dealing with the different levels of intelligence. The first question I have
highlighted emphasizes the indissoluble relationship between somatic dimension
and knowledge, not necessarily in terms of limitations, but rather in pointing out that
the act of knowing is a questioning process that, as such, arises from a perceived
lack. Knowledge comes with a tension that cannot in any way be de-somatized, but
that arises from a languor of the body that has its first movens in the motivational
and emotional coordinates. Often we speak of knowledge as an end in itself for the
human being, because perhaps it cannot be clearly traced back to or, in any case,
induced by any immediate applicative translation. The mistake lies in attributing to a
de-somatized dimension all that we cannot trace back to some practical application
or to a confirmation in terms of physical gratification. On the contrary, exploratory
pleasure as such, or the social recognition deriving from a discovery or a professional
title, also represent an involvement of the body.
On closer inspection, there is no overlap between the motivational drive and
a necessary-implicit practical application or the fulfillment of a need. As we know,
intrinsic motivations like “mental languors”—the propensities of our species include
the exploratory one, the epimeletic one, the syllegic one, the imitative one, the social
one, etc.—have developed in the human being along its phylogeny because they bring
fitness. In other words, they favour the satisfaction of particular needs (for example,
being led to explore and collect facilitates the procurement of food). On the other
hand, they act on the subject in a way that is independent of its needs, for example
in playful activities. When a scholar is passionate about a line of research, they do
not necessarily pursue a practical objective, but this does not mean that their cogni-
tive tension is separate from their bodiliness: they are following their motivational
coordinates, in one or more dimensions, participating in the act of research from
within their body, primarily with the active contribution of their emotions. Knowing
is therefore an expression of all the dimensions of the body.
The second question poses the problem of the multiplicity of points of view on
reality, which can be referred to different aspects. A first point is that (i) each species
lives in “different contexts”, where reality acquires a specific configuration, so the
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individual is not phylogenetically confronted with the overall field of virtuality but
with a precise conformation of reality that manifests its own opportunities and resis-
tances. Secondly, (ii) each species can also be considered a particular “life project”,
which therefore seeks opportunities and is confronted with specific and never abso-
lute resistances, developing a gaze on the world related to its existential project. This
means that we have to start from the epistemic dimension typical of each species,
which therefore not only brings out opportunities and resistances, but also builds
epistemic directions that are often epistemic artifacts.
This “epistemic artifact” effect is also found in the human being, in the so-
called “naive physics”2 since, for reasons of adaptive efficiency-effectiveness, each
species makes use of (heuristic or biased) shortcuts that have value in replicative and
not absolute computation, zeroing or obscuring the conformations or findings that
have no meaning or have proven irrelevant in terms of fitness. The questioning of
appearances—i.e. criticism—therefore has an undoubted epistemological value, not
because there is no correlation between epistemology and reality, but because every
epistemological dimension, as well as every theory, has a domain of validity. If we
consider the structure of a wing, we undoubtedly see findings about how to fly, and
therefore how to use the air currents to one’s advantage; a fin speaks of how to slide
in the water, that is, how to use the viscosity gradients for propulsion and, on the
contrary, to lower its resistance.
So what does the shape of a wing or a fin tell us? This is the third question I
would like to ask. Is a wing an approximation of air and a fin an approximation of
water, or are they something else? I think Konrad Lorenz is right when he points out
that phylogenetic endowments—and the so-called a-prioris in the epistemic act—are
connected with the dictation of reality, because they are forged by fitness as a result
of correlative results. However, this does not mean that they should be considered
approximations to the conformation of reality. In other words, the structure of a wing
summarizes the particular performative conformation of animals who want to adopt
a given lifestyle in the air. It is the conjugation or actualization of a life project, i.e.
flight, which is confronted with the opportunities and resistances of air. Flight is the
emergence of a level of reality that is realized through specific questions posed to
the context.
The fourth consideration concerns epistemic plurality as a necessary and
inevitable condition that neither denies an increasingly omni-comprehensive view of
2The studies inaugurated by Gestalt psychology show that the human being possesses a particular
perceptive cognition, beyond its sensorial interfaces, such as the amodal completion of objects,
the construction of illusory margins, and pregnancy. In the same way, the cognitive sciences have
highlighted certain interpretative or heuristic tendencies, useful to solve in a hasty or approximate
way certain problems, but equally fallible or leading to distortions, defined precisely by the term
“bias”. As a whole, we can speak of a phylogenetic epistemology that is characterized by interpre-
tative or resolvent methods that should not be considered absolute but adaptive specializations, and
therefore relative and endowed with a point of view strongly centered on the characteristics of the
species. Also defined as “naive physics” and described by Gaston Bachelard as an “epistemological
obstacle”, this epistemology gives rise to what I call “anthropocentric perspective”, which is not
relevant culturally but in terms of phylogenetic heritage. For the notion of “naive physics” Bozzi
(1998).
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reality, nor brings out some ultimate configuration: it rather highlights the resistances
that we gradually encounter when we broaden our view of the world. On the other
hand, knowing always implies asking a question, and it is not certain that there is
some final question capable of bringing out all the resistances of reality—personally
I don’t think so, but I am inclined to suspend my judgement on this point. I believe
that scientific knowledge is able to give us increasingly accurate information on
these resistances, through progressive amendment of the prejudices of our epistemic
dimension. Therefore, I do not agree with the Kuhnian paradigmatic disjunction
(1962), because I believe that every theory is deeply linked to the previous ones,
which is why a direction is more likely than another. However, every way of inves-
tigating reality brings out levels that cannot be subsumed by one another; it’s as
if reality were a skyscraper where each level shows us different aspects of reality,
without there being a level capable of summing up all the others. Each level rests on
the one that precedes it, but each level has its own epistemic legitimacy, as it shows
us a particular view on the world that has its own relevance.
This leads me to the fifth consideration: the epistemic protagonism of the indi-
vidual and the feedback that this protagonism has on the morphopoietic processes of
the living. We are used to considering evolution as a process that relieves the indi-
vidual of any responsibility for its phylogenetic trajectory, despite the considerations
made by Darwin, Lorenz, Waddington, Piaget, and Baldwin. The interpretation that
has been affirmed in the neo-Darwinian synthesis, in fact, regards phylogeny as the
product of two factors: (i) the randomness of the mutations that produce morpholog-
ical variants; (ii) the selection made by the environment on the basis of the replica-
tive potential. However, thanks to the theory of niche construction, migrations, and
epigenetic transmission, we know that—through its own action, and consequently
also through the discoveries it makes and the solutions it adopts in its behaviour—the
individual is able to determine some “shifts in the selective pressures”. Consequently,
even if indirectly, it can modify the fitness parameters within the population itself
and therefore the morphopoietic trajectory that in the long run will eventually codify
the species canon.3
One must also consider the protagonism of the individual in the act of knowing:
the subject starts from its own species-specific epistemic dimension, but does not
remain trapped in it, and apprehends new information and strategies also through
a creative singularity. It is not only the human being that is able to go beyond its
specific epistemic legacy: it is part of the animal condition in general to continuously
3I have had the opportunity to explore in depth the subject of the “shifting of selective pressures”
in the book Post-human. Verso nuovi modelli di esistenza where I wrote: “Every shift in evolu-
tionary pressure, achieved through technological mediation, actually inscribes that technology in
the genetic heritage of the species. Technology therefore becomes a sort of performative exter-
nalization that extends man’s operational domination over external reality, not impoverishing the
species but enriching it through its needs”, p. 32. The example that I used in support of my theory
was that of antibiotics: the introduction of that technology within the sphere of human identity has
made it possible to shift the selective pressure from man to the man/antibiotic combination: “Man
is no longer selected for his ability to produce antibiotics, on the contrary it is the antibiotic that is
selected for its ability to offer man antibiotic properties” (2002: 31).
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explore or interpret one’s intersection with the world, to seek new opportunities
of configuration of reality. The act of intus-legere is precisely this ability to read
between the lines, bringing out new images of theworld-context, so that the epistemic
heritage should be considered a sort of epistemological handbook that does not
exhaust the cognitive possibilities of the individual. Therefore, it is necessary to
put the individual back at the centre of the cognitive act, recognizing the animal
condition as a metapredicative dimension of this potentiality, through a fundamental
reconsideration of what it means to be an animal in the intellectual process.
6.2 Knowledge as an Expression of Being-a-Body
Interpreting animality as a condition that concerns us in the cognitive processes
means starting from some basic assumptions. First, we must: (i) reconnect the intel-
lectual process with the dimension of bodiliness in all its aspects, because knowledge
is dislocated on many levels and realized through all the somatic components. We
must abandon the Cartesian dichotomy to recognize the somato-emergential level
of epistemology. Secondly, we must (ii) admit an epistemic plurality, which is not
essentialistic but based on homological, analogical and, in some respects universal
similarities, just as happens with other physiological functions, avoiding the hierar-
chization of entities in the name of correlative specialization. Finally, we must (iii)
recognize the epistemic protagonism of animal subjectivity, capable of inventing
its own perspective on the world in a singular way and of intervening in its evolu-
tionary trajectory; i.e. we must view the epistemic act as one the causal factors of
morphopoiesis. The Cartesian disjunction that described the act of knowing as a
departure and emancipation from the bodiliness of the res extensa is a humanistic
leitmotif. This view goes as far as the Heideggerian notion of the stunned state or
opacity of the animal in its intersection with the world, and transforms animality into
a condition of contralaterality. Today, after Darwin and after Lorenz, it is no longer
possible to accept this perspective.
Animality and the body are thus at the centre of the epistemological debate, in a
logic of connection between a-prioris and the resistances of the world, acting as a
mirror or a posteriori of the demands that have calibrated their characteristics. The
somatic dimension of epistemology leads one to consider the centrality of animal-
being as the starting point for any reflection on cognitive processes. In particular,
one ought to recognize the phylogenetic role in the epistemic definition of the indi-
vidual, but also, recursively, one should acknowledge the morphopoietic value in
the epistemic singularity of the individual, which affects the phylogenetic trajectory
itself. In other words, the point is to place animal subjectivity back at the centre
both of existential singularity and of the phylogenetic process that transforms every
trajectory into a life project, where the latter is guided by an intrinsic teleology, at
least as a cofactor in the ontopoietic design process. Placing the body at the centre
means admitting a multi-level epistemology that goes beyond the characters prede-
fined by the heritage, because it contemplates the overall ontogenetic evolutions of
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the somatic dimension and also the here-and-now of the body itself. Therefore there
is a close correlation, notable at multiple levels of recursion, between heritage and
context, in a yin-yang dialectic of inclusions forwhich epistemology is a relationship.
On the other hand, admitting a connection between inherited epistemic disposi-
tions and the conformation of reality can give rise to some misunderstandings. One
of those is (i) the belief that the heritage epistemic dimension is a predetermination
that does not allow for any subjectivity or singularity in the epistemic protagonism
of the individual. Another mistake is (ii) to consider different species-specific episte-
mologies as non-overlapping entities, whence ThomasNagel’s observations (1974).4
Or else (iii) this connection between the phylogenetic investigative apparatuses and
the world is viewed as an approximation to the configuration of reality. In short, we
must take up the considerations made by von Uexküll and Lorenz, revisiting them
in the light of animal subjectivity. Thus: (1) the Umwelt is not a bubble that encloses
the individual within an epistemic dimension, but an elastic mat that allows for the
emergence of an epistemic singularity; (2) the different Umwelten are not separate
monads, as posited by the essentialist conception of the living, but present wide
epistemic overlaps due to homologies, analogies and universals; (3) the particular
epistemic intersection of the individual, in its phylogenetic and experiential deter-
minations, is not an approximation to reality but an actualization of reality, so that
the dictate of reality can only be partially deduced from the epistemic configuration.
The body is therefore a singularity in relationship, a predication that emerges in
the connection event thanks to “connecting structures”, to put it with Bateson, which
nevertheless are works in progress and not finished structures. In other words, these
structures exist in relations that are never impermeable, as each relationship modifies
them by virtue of a permeability that is already taken into account. Put differently,
the animal is not a machine created by an imaginary craftsman, be it a demiurge
who converts ideas, a creator who realizes them ex novo or natural selection that
brings them out from randomness. The animal is an entity that is made by expressing
itself. Placing the body back at the centre means shifting from a merely informative
view of knowledge to a relational and morphopoietic interpretation. In fact, there
is no such thing as a cognition that is not also a metacognitive enhancement of all
the components (such as memory or motivation) that are exercised in the very act
of knowledge. We never simply learn something—we transform ourselves in our
epistemic conjugation with that something. The knowing body is a growing entity,
in a continuous internal metamorphosis directed by the cognitive processes. And it
is illusory to think that knowledge takes place through perceptual and processing
channels, i.e. that it only has neurobiological value. Knowledge is achieved through
modifications of the endocrine, metabolic and immune systems, just to give a few
examples, and is already implicit in the conformation of the cell itself. The cognitive
impetus is not supported by an element that transcends the body, but by the somatic
reasons of the body itself and by the animal dimension as a flywheel (Rosenblum
2010).
4For him, the subjective experience that non-human animals have of their world is inaccessible to
us (Nagel 1974).
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The body summarizes several stories, i.e. the different stages of ontogeny and of
phylogeny—which is why many of our views still speak of a confused tetrapod on
the edge of the mainland. Whence our embryonic palpitations that are not yet split
from the mother’s body, the fetal experiences of dreams that precede experience,
the first jolts of the process of attachment and the journey along the path of our
relationship with the world. However, the various stages of phylogeny and ontogeny
are not the result of stratification, which still gives rise to the idea of a reptilian
backdrop, but of subsequent reconfigurations of the past, so that the phylogeny of
the past is no longer ancestral. The body clearly shows that the conception of animal
inertia, which we have translated into the behaviourist view of ontogenesis and into
the neo-Darwinist view of phylogeny, is totally wrong. The animal actively intersects
the world, continuously reconfiguring its access threshold to external reality through
a plurality of somatic dimensions, so that knowledge is never positional on a single
somatic level, but is the emergence of a multilayer where each one contributes to
shape, or rather to realize, a given configuration of reality. Therefore we cannot speak
of approximation, because epistemic subjectivity is not a process of approximation
to an ultimate form, but the construction of a form on the basis of a life project,
exploring the opportunities and resistance of the context.
Animality thus becomes the core of a reflection that questions the passivity of the
living in the face of the morphopoietic—and therefore also epistemic—forces that
claim to have the environment as their only configurative agent (whence the concept
of approximation). Instead, a conception based on the somatic subjectivity of the
animal, which evidently translates into the protagonism of intus-legere, speaks of an
animal that actively constructs its own epistemic configurations during phylogeny.
Despite being endowed with an a priori epistemic dimensionality, the animal does
not blindly reiterate an intersection with the world that is already predisposed, but
uses its apparatuses of world image to give life to its own epistemic singularity.
In other words, we need an epistemological view that is evolutionary and not only
evolutionistic: that is, a view that considers the individual as a “work in progress”
from an epistemic standpoint.
The body summarized in the phylo/onto-genetic process is not a sediment but an
entity that reshuffles and subsumes a singular project. The phylogenetic handbook is
therefore to be considered as “constructionmaterial”, not a backdrop that definitively
predetermines the intersection. In the same way, it is indispensable to recognize that
this protagonism does not have a role that can be circumscribed to the being-there of
the individual, but rather is itself a morphopoietic driving force in phylogeny. In other
words, we need to shift from a view of the animal as passive, forged by the world
through selection and enclosed in its epistemic bubble, to a view of the animal as
endowed with double epistemic protagonism, both in the construction of a singular
perspective on the world and in influencing the fitness dynamics by shifting selective
pressures as a result of every epistemic emergence, be it due to discovery or creation.
But let’s take a step back.Admitting animal subjectivitymainlymeans overcoming
the prejudice of non-existence and non-presence without this turning the non-human
into an entity that can be placed in the past, already completed in the process of
intersection with its own context. In other words, it is necessary to question the
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humanistic tradition that considers non-human otherness as an entity incapable of
rippling the surface of the already given. To use Heidegger’s metaphor, we must
therefore overcome the prejudice of epistemic opacity, which leads to the belief
that the animal is stunned in the already given and “poor in world”. It is therefore
essential to acknowledge the principle of intus-legere in animality, that is, the ability
to engrave the epidermis of appearance in order to construct one’s own vision of the
world, being present in one’s own here-and-now. I think that this point is essential, not
only to understand non-human animality, but also to explore the very concept of intus-
legere, by discussing the disjunctive and computational assumption that today seems
to prevail in the interpretation of the intellectual act. If we start from a Darwinian
conception and take into consideration neurobiological and ethological findings, it
is very difficult to accept a discontinuist view, even if we admit that some human
aspects—such as language, writing, techne, science itself—may have favoured the
dimensional widening of the epistemic sphere.
In my opinion, an evolutionary view, which aims at analysing the performative—
and therefore also epistemic—context of different species, should treat the act of
knowing in the same way as all the other functions or endowments of the animal
being. Evolutionary continuism leads us to consider the great animal family as a
set of presences characterized by predicates that are different but still shared, as
part of a common heritage or as the result of adaptive convergences. This paradigm
speaks of similarities and differences, but in a logic that does not contemplate gaps or
discontinuity. Phylogenetic processes are based on the somatic correlation to a given
environment/lifestyle, i.e. they are specialization events, which therefore cannot be
framed in hierarchical terms, but only in terms of performative specificity. The latter,
however, does not prescind from the common heritage, i.e. from the fact that many
predicates of a species are not exclusivebut sharedbecause they emerged in a common
ancestor.
Specialization is therefore a correlation that somehow reflects three aspects. First
(i) a history of sharing by succession of predicative emergences, so that the similarity-
difference operator does not grant anything to disjunctive essentialism or to the
hierarchy of entities. Secondly (ii) the specific life-context on the basis of the rela-
tionship between the life project of a given species, and therefore performativities
requiring given epistemic coordinates, and the resistance-opportunities presented
by that context. Finally, specialization reflects (iii) the type of reproduction—for
example the “r” or “K” strategies5—which also defines the ontogenetic adaptation
needs of the species and therefore its virtuality gradient in the phenotypic conver-
sion. In the face of all this, we must therefore expect that, just as there are many
somatic morpho-functional organizations, there is a perspectival plurality of inter-
section typical of each species in the construction of an image of the world. On
the other hand, the greatest mark of the phylogenetic success of a character is the
5The “r” reproduction strategy is found in all insects, almost all amphibians, reptiles and some
bird species. Except for some important exceptions, these species give birth to a great quantity of
offspring which is not cared for by the parents. The “K” reproduction strategy, on the contrary, is
found in many bird species and in mammals, which have few cubs that are cared for by one or both
parents.
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principle of fitness, or replication, so it makes no sense to think that knowledge is
detached from somatic involvement.
To this day, a profound dichotomy still separates our species from all the others.
This is precisely because of our denial of the subjectivity of the non-human, which is
reduced to a res extensa governed by mechanisms in a deterministic way, no matter
how complex it is. Instead, we believe that the human being is free and to some extent
independent of biological laws. One hundred and sixty years after the publication of
The Origin of Species (1859), wemust recognize thatDarwinian thought is struggling
to permeate the upper salons of our culture, so that the view of other species as
categorically opposed to the human, who claims to carve out its identity in opposition
to non-human beings, is a philosophical leitmotif that is still difficult to dismiss.
Ernst Mayr rightly points out that Darwinism is on a collision course not only with
the monotheistic tradition of the West but also with the three pillars of Western
philosophy, namely Plato’s essentialist conception of entities, Aristotle’s hierarchical
vision of categories, and above all stoicism and its interpretation of the human (Mayer
1997). When, in his essay The Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872),
Darwin draws an interspecific comparison of behavioural motives, he challenges not
only theCartesian idea that compares the animal to amachine, but awhole humanistic
vision that claims to see man as the expression of a dimension that is opposed to and
distant from all other species.
Indeed, the Cartesian interpretation does not only separate the human being
from other species, but also indelibly separates the mind from the body. In this
sense, placing animality at the centre as an “epistemic principle” means placing the
body back at the centre of cognitive processes. Thus, doubt, imagination, reference,
desire—just to give a few examples—can no longer be seen as de-somatized or
ecstatic acts that can be attributed to: (i) an entity that has nothing to do with the
condition of being-a-body; (ii) a process of delaying, suspending or aligning the
body’s reasons. This means overcoming the interpretation based on abstraction and
computation that has always characterized the humanistic tradition. The latter, in
pursuing the Promethean myth in the genealogical attribution of the human being,
has transformed man into a kind of trickster who tries to circumvent the Epimethean
principle through the intellectual process. The dualism of the founding myth of the
two Titans is the root of the dichotomous thought that has de-somatized the act
of knowledge. Also, this prejudice makes it impossible to understand the motives
of intus-legere, because it makes it look as though the cognitive propensity of the
human being were detached from human nature. This is why, in pedagogy and espe-
cially in teaching, we do not take into consideration children’s intrinsic motivations,
but we either appeal to a deontological factor or to a supererogatory one, at most
dispensing compensations that, however, have nothing to do with the cognitive act
itself. The results, incidentally, are under everyone’s eyes, because a child learns only
if involved, i.e. if interested and eager.
But, then, there is a question that needs to be answered: what is the act of knowing
and, more generally, what is intelligence? In the 17th century, ThomasHobbes wrote:
“When man reasoneth, he does nothing else but conceive a sum total, from addition
of parcels” (1909); if we followed him, we would have to answer that intelligence
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amounts to “computational skills”. In reality, this is a question that has probably never
been fully answered, becausewehaveoften takenhuman rationality as amodel, trying
to construct a computational entity that simulates its performativity. Reproducing
thought through an algorithmmeans completing the reductionist parable started with
Galileo and followed by Descartes’ analytic geometry. What these thinkers did was
try to “mechanize” reasoning—an aspiration that would then be taken up by Leibniz,
an advocate of the need to describe the world by means of symbols, according to his
symbolic logic. Indeed, as early as 1679, Leibniz imagined a calculating machine
whose opening/closing principles—albeit in the form of holes for marbles—were the
same as those used today in electronic microprocessors. Leibniz’s thoughts would
thus resonate in Charles Babbage’s computer projects, in George Boole’s logic and
even in Alan Turing’s machine.
But it was not only reasoning that was subjected to the logic of the great god
of calculation. Science fiction, as it was delivered to us by authors such as Isaac
Asimov or Philip Dick, has often presented a dystopian panorama with androids and
cyborgs able to replicate emotions, desires and memories, because even the most
intimate aspects of feeling were assimilated to a computational order. These visions
reveal a profoundly anthropocentric way of understanding intelligence, based on the
Promethean principle of de-somatization, that is, of expunging the Epimethean prin-
ciple of being-a-body from epistemic performativity, adopting an interpretation free
from the biological dimension of intus-legere. However, knowledge is born from a
tension between the state of the subject, whose here-and-now is a perpetual oscilla-
tion between languor and gratification, and the objective resources they encounter
based on the evidence coming from the epistemic intersection. It is inevitable, then, to
consider intus-legere on the basis of the somatic dissatisfaction experienced between
the oscillating state that projects the individual into a desire—i.e. a condition that is
either not present or not achievable—and the cognitive resources that it possesses.
Knowing is therefore the attempt to bridge this gap and soothe this languor.We could
say then that an animal is brought to knowledge by the problems posed by its desire.
Now, the world is not made up of objective problems that the individual must
solve, but of subjective goals that the individual wants to achieve. The concept of
intus-legere, that is, of “reading-into” from which the term “intelligence” derives,
therefore indicates the act of knowing how to look in depth and beyond appearances,
in a condition of cognitive languor that involves the whole somatic dimension of
the individual. It is in the body that we find the desire sustaining both the effort and
the risk involved in sailing beyond the already given, beyond the clear appearance
provided by one’s epistemic condition. Deprived of desire, the body, in all its aspects,
would not be led to set sail towards unknown lands: it would have no reason to do so.
The act of knowing is the result of a tense relationshipwith theworld that, even before
being a solution to a problem, is immersion in a problematic condition that becomes
a breeding ground for the creation of a problem. Computational machines are able to
solve problems but, in fact, they do not have problems, because they lack the desiring
tension that motivates the posing of a problem. A computer may be able to solve
even complex problems and perhaps in a performatively superior way compared to a
human being, but it solves the problems that we pose to it: the machine is devoid of
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desires and therefore has no tensional immersion in the problematic condition that
brings out problems.
On the contrary, each animal is constantly immersed in problematicity, for one
simple reason: because it desires. Desire is the result of one’s relational history
with the world; one could say that desire arises from the series of detachments that
characterise one’s phylo/ontogenetic emergence. In ontogeny, for example, a child
constructs his own profile in the relationship with his mother, but then separates
from it, retaining the emotional desire of conjugation within himself. In the same
way, any species-specific character comes from dependencies introduced along the
phylogenetic path, such as a predator’s need to chase after a body in motion. An
animal being emerges by recreating introjected conjugations that express themselves
in desire, as if its heterotrophy extended beyond metabolism and characterized all
the dimensions of animality, including cognitive ones.
I argue that the animal is structured by heteronomy because I believe that this
aspect of relational dependence is the foundation of animality. In this sense, the
languor that makes the animal oscillating and peripatetic underlies the need to go
beyond, i.e. to overcome oneself as a tension that is discharged into epistemic singu-
larity. To understand the act of penetrating reality, it is therefore necessary to focus on
this tension that induces the subject to re-organize the structure of reality according
to a different matrix for the conjugation of entities. We could say, then, that intus-
legere means flexing reality according to one’s own scheme of action, reconfiguring
the given level of reality just as a perceptive Gestalt creates a morphology through an
internal scheme for the conjugation of findings and the completion of the perceived.
Intus-legeremeans, therefore, to bring out a new level of reality, to discover a possible
configuration of the real—an opportunity hidden between the lines of appearance.
The concept of intus-legere involves going deep into the reading of reality,
searching between the lines, not stopping at the already given—i.e. on previously
structured reality layers—but building new organizations with respect to the virtual
condition of reality. Intus-legere, therefore, is not only the act of extracting something
that already exists, even if encrypted between the superficial meshes of appearance,
but also the act of bringing out what could be, assigning a particular form to virtuality.
An animal never dwells on the surface of the given: it connects different elements in
the great sea of givenness, and prunes it singularly in order to discover—or rather “to
bring out”—opportunities that are not only unknown but come only after the animal’s
epistemic act. An animal therefore understands reality by assigning it a form that
does not precede the epistemological act: it does so by bringing out new organiza-
tions of reality, i.e. by carrying out processes of singular actualization. Well, to do
this it is necessary to have an internal motivational system, i.e., inherences. Indeed,
the animal “goes deep” into reality, which is a metaphor to say that it does not settle
for appearances, because it desires. Now the question is this: can we consider a non-
desiring entity to be intelligent? Is intelligence a computational skill or, vice versa,
a creative organization of reality by virtue of a desiring condition?
I think that intelligence, as a dialogic-emergent act which treats reality as a range
of possibilities to be discovered or probed, is never achieved without a motive, i.e. it
is not the result of an objective process, but the outcome of an innermost desire. In
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other words, we think because we desire, not the other way around: it is desire that
pushes us far beyond the veil of appearance to seek new opportunities, it is desire
that transforms the world into a territory dotted with problems to be solved. This
means that without desire it is unthinkable for any problem to emerge. Desire is also
connected to feeling, to the pleasure felt in involvement, to the deeply somatic sensa-
tion of thaumàzein, where the epistemic dimension slips away from the coordinates
of the already given and shows us an unexpected and unimagined continent. We
cannot ignore this emotional participation in the cognitive process, which also feeds
on the adrenaline and endorphin thrill caused by the vertigo of exploring unknown
lands. Knowledge is an aesthetic act, nourished by beauty, by the serotonin effect
of a cliff, and by the adrenaline sublime of infinity. Intus-legere takes place in the
body, it is a conjugation of the reasons of the body sustained by feeling and by desire,
which are the foundations of our animality.
Animals are endowed with intellectual abilities, that is, they all practice intus-
legere, albeit in their plural way of knowledge, because they all desire. In other
words, they have a dispositional system characterized by emotions and motivations
that solicit the projection of an objective and, consequently, put them in a condition
of constant existential problematicity. All species, including humans, conjugate their
being in the world through motivational structures (chasing, collecting, searching,
exploring) and states of feeling (fear, joy, thrill, excitement, curiosity). They define a
tensional condition in their relationship with the world, which one could simplify as
objectives to aim for, objectives which allow animals to experiment with creativity. It
is in this emergent and intellectual act that the individual discovers new causal links,
new temporal correlations, new categories. Going deepmeans putting things together
in an unexpected way, and this is what the intellectual act amounts to: the subject has
objectives because it is a body in continuous redefinition and in a relationship with
the world. In order to understand the act of intus-legere, it is essential to enter the
workshop of life, so as to clarify the behavioural mechanisms underlying activities
such as the formulation of objectives, the evaluation of opportunities, involvement
in the here-and-now, judgement of value, the relationship with otherness, curiosity
and so on… i.e., the set of properties that allow one to widen one’s epistemic space.
When one builds an entitywith computational skills butwithout desires and calls it
intelligent, one is actually operating a semantic-conceptual stretch with respect to the
principle of intus-legere. My impression is that wewant to build a house starting from
the roof, with the result of creating a big calculator, yet unable to really read reality,
let alone go deep into it, beyond appearances. To get closer to intelligence, conversely,
we will need to better understand the reasons behind desire, before venturing into the
continent of thought. Perhaps we should dismiss the disjunctive and computational
approach typical of humanism and build a sort of “ethology of robotics” that starts
from the simplest motivational systems to understand how to create an artificial entity
capable of desiring in its relationship with the world. At this point, it is important
to note this: only a machine that really desires is able to intus-legere, that is, to go
deep into reality and build problems to be solved. But a desiring machine would
inevitably take ownership of itself: it could no longer be defined as an instrument at
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the disposal of the human being, because it would be endowed with inherences that
require forms of consent and negation, not absolute power.
6.3 The Somatic Multilayer of Knowledge
What do we normally mean by intelligence? In general, in order to talk about intel-
ligent performance, we presuppose some functions or performativities in decoding
the interface landscape. These include: (i) the ability to learn or to modify the perfor-
mativity on the basis of one’s experiences; (ii) the decision-making principle, i.e.
ownership of the choice between one or more possible options on the basis of given
criteria; (iii) competence in solving or overcoming problems posed by the context.
They also include: (iv) the inductive or deductive inferential capacity, i.e. the ability
to draw logical conclusions or laws from information available or in the process of
being acquired; and (v) the ability to construct possible alternatives on the basis of
probability indexes through operational biases. Finally, more such functions are: (vi)
the flexibility to deal with situations of potential singularity, exploiting conditions
of uncertainty to invent new operators; (vii) readiness to extract useful data in the
intersection with the context, by means of logical operations of distinction and cate-
gorisation, but also through the emergence of orientation keys; and (viii) the ability
to use concept maps to create new representative endowments.
Obviously these few examples do not claim to define the main chapters of intel-
lectual activity, nor do they aspire to any degree of exhaustiveness, but it is clear that
when we speak of artificial intelligence most of the time we focus on these performa-
tive guidelines (Bostrom 2014).6 The tendency to favour the resolvent and computa-
tional character has made it possible for some performances—such as playing chess
or demonstrating theorems—to be considered as leading intellectual skills when, on
the contrary, they have proved to be easy to reach, even with programs that are, after
all, quite simple—unlike others, such as orientation and decision-making. On the
other hand, the approach to intelligence remains stuck in the field of performance,
that is, in the evaluation of the ability and level of competence in carrying out a
pre-established task. Also from the point of view of executive ownership, what is
taken into consideration is the level of operational autonomy—the ability to conduct,
continue or complete a pre-established task without guidance from a human oper-
ator—but not creative autonomy or operational involvement. When we then tried to
obtain expert performances, capable of extracting objective-referenced information
or finalised procedures, we did not at all approach the act of intus-legere, i.e. the
act of flexing reality according to unprecedented coordinates. Rather, we operated
through solutions that one could define as the exact opposite, because they are based
on heuristics obtained from human knowledge.
6Bostrom shows that once we reach a level of intelligence comparable to the human one, it will only
take a small step for machines to be equipped with a “superintelligence” that will be unattainable
to us.
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It is true that what we call artificial intelligence can easily outperform humans
in some processing functions. However, AI does not deviate in any way from the
preconditions that govern all machines: it is a set of features built to offer services for
the use and consumption of the human being, but it has nothing in common with the
intelligence of a living being, namely, the ability to build perspective singularities on
the world. It is not easy to identify and define the property that allows a living entity
to intus-legere—unlike a machine, which does nothing but calculate and simulate.
Perhaps we will never be able to do so coherently and completely, precisely because
we inevitably evaluate the process from within. However, we can at least say that
somatic involvement is essential to it, because one does not learn in order to solve
problems, demonstrate theorems or win a game of chess: each of these actions, in
life, hides a deep volition, which is not implicit in its performance but transforms
the context into a problem and only then seeks a solution. When we analyze an
animal’s intersection with external reality, we find that the act of intus-legere is a
very common and, if you like, banal phenomenon, in its simple ordinariness. Even
if (or precisely because) it produces maladaptive solutions, this involvement yields
creativity because it can reconfigure the already given.
While amachinehas horizontal functional levels and isochronic states, this is never
the casewith an animal. The reason for this is very simple, though extremely complex
to analyze: an animal has a body, that is, a multi-layer intersection with the world.
The body does not just investigate the context with sensors linked to a data processor,
but grows by supporting or reflecting its various levels of intersection with it and
creating interactive-emergent events between these different levels. For example,
immunity knowledgemirrors the antigenic catalogue experienced through the relative
lymphocyte population, but this level of intersection does not stop here because,
through the cytokine medium, it intervenes in the neurobiological intersection with
the world. And it is not only a matter of complexity, but of a different ontological
principle, already in force in the simplicity of a cell.
The tendency to confuse intelligence and computation arises, as I said, from a
claim that originatedmainly fromDescartes, but that had distant roots and is probably
the most likely or most intuitive outcome of our way of perceiving the intellect as
de-somatized. In my opinion, the de-somatization of the intellectual act stems from a
number of reasons that should not be underestimated. First, there is (i) the fear of death
or the need to desperately attach oneself to an existence that goes beyond transience
(this, in this sense, justifies an immaterial presence that inhabits and drives the body).
Secondly, there is (ii) the evident fact that the mind has a different degenerative
process compared to the body, i.e. that a decrepit body can correspond to a young
mind, especially in those who have exercised their intellect during their lifetime—
including thosewho debated suchmatters and created a tradition about them.Another
reason is (iii) the impression that, as we age and distance ourselves from the somatic
impulses of youth, we become wiser and more rational, that is, there is a sort of
purification of the mind. Then, we tend to have (iv) the sensation that the body, with
its needs and impulses, diverts us from objective evaluations, i.e. that the somatic
dimension, immersing us in impulse and fruition, obscures the mind and is a sort of
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prison for rationality and contemplation, so that in order to think clearly we need to
distance ourselves from the body.
And there are also other reasons why we tend to de-somatize the intellect. There
is (v) the idea that the explorative and perlustrative tendency, which is a phylogenetic
characteristic of omnivores, has instead an ecstatic connotation and can be ascribed to
a primordial nostalgia towards an ethereal condition lost in the fall into the telluric,
because it is a “de-sidera” or lack of the existential hyperuranial dimension. We
should also remember (vi) the prejudice that the ability to doubt and the practice of
counter-intuition, as well as the use of tools, techniques and theories, are Promethean
products (i.e., a way to go against nature) and not Epimethean (following the imita-
tive and introjective nature that characterizes primates, a phylogenetic connotation
emphasized in the human being). Finally, there is (vii) the need to mark a distance
between the human and the other species, a need which is also the result of a perspec-
tive distortion—much like seeing all non-Hellenic populations as barbarians—but
which is justified in the progressively growing need to exploit other species.
If on the one hand I understand the reasons for the de-somatization of the mental-
istic dimension, on the other hand it is necessary to acknowledge the misleading
results of an immanent view of the res cogitans—results that still accompany us
today. The dualist paradigm, in fact, creates two different and disjointed domains,
and tries to extract the entity or phenomenon through “oppositional enucleation”,
that is, by dichotomous operations. This means that in order to shed light on some-
thing it is necessary to identify a contraposition: what-is, and presents particular
predicates, as opposed to what-is-not and lacks these predicates. Quantum physics
is often difficult precisely because it breaks this claim of a supposed still-image for
which an entity emerges by detaching itself from a background. The res cogitans, in
fact, can take on different dualist conjugations even in a non transcendent view, for
example in the idea that subjectivity is consciousness (i.e. an entity detached from
the reasons of the body, called to oversee its processes), or that it is an undefined res
informatica running in the embodied hardware of the brain. These perspectives also
follow the tradition of de-somatization: they do not consider the intellectual act as
the result of the dimensional plurality of being-a-body, i.e. a “multi-layer of intersec-
tion” with external reality, but seek intus-legere in something external to the body,
dichotomously seen as opposite to it. Somatizing the intellectual act does not mean,
however, assuming a sort of horizontal intersection, but on the contrary admitting
multiple levels of somatic relationship between the individual and the world, each
with its own cognitive specificity and equally able to interact with other levels or to
make other levels possible through emergent qualities.
Somatizing knowledge means recognizing this plurality of the body in giving rise
to a multiplicity of landscapes, which are interrelated in providing us with emer-
gent levels of knowledge. If we take consciousness, for example, we immediately
realize that it rests on other pre-conscious, unconscious or not necessarily neurobio-
logical dimensions; it does not arise out of nothing, as a disjointed entity. Somatizing
knowledge therefore means two things. It means (1) recognising this “dimensional
multiplicity”, where each interface layer determines precise fields of actualisation,
that is, of organisation of reality in order to give life to orientative, evaluative and
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operative meanings. And it also means (2) admitting the “non-prior”, that is, present,
referred, situated and non-dichotomous/disjoined character of every level of knowl-
edge, by virtue of the predicative relationship (the predicate is born of the very act
of being-in-relationship) and not of a supposed predicative essence. Every piece of
knowledge is therefore a form of growth and metamorphosis of the level in question
and, consequently, of themultilayer. It is not a simple elaboration.Moreover, no level
can exist without the underlying one, which entails relational predications giving rise
to qualities that supervene on the characters of the level itself. In other words, it is
impossible for consciousness to emerge from nothing, for the unconscious not to be
situated on precise metabolic dynamics, and so on. Consciousness is therefore not
a separate entity, a software that runs on somatic hardware: it is a state of the body,
one of the many possible presentations of bodily knowledge.
At this point, I would like to underline that most of our views on intelligence
are still strongly connected to this dichotomous-disjunctive vision, not allowing us
to fully understand the plurality of cognitive processes in the body and between
different bodies. First of all, intelligence is seen as a universal parameter, unlike all
other expressions of the body, removing it, in fact, from the Darwinian paradigm of
specialization. Banally, we would never ask ourselves if a bat is more locomotor than
a dolphin, if a bear is more endocrine than a wolf, if a pig is more gastrointestinal
than a cow, or if a cat is more immune than a rat, yet there are countless studies and
articles that claim to identify the most intelligent animal. This implicit denial of the
adaptive character, and therefore of the specialization, of the intellectual act, this need
to consider knowledge as universal and not in a logic of plurality, is certainly the fruit
of de-somatization, that is, of the habit of not considering intus-legere as an epimeletic
dimension. In this sense, even when we refer to other species, almost forgetting the
humanistic imperative, we still continue to apply anthropocentric prejudices, seeking
in the heterospecific not their peculiarities but some kind of approximation to us, the
holders of the cognitive universal.
A second consequence, also referable to this disincarnated view of knowledge,
is the idea that the mind can be transferred, exactly as if it were a digital sequence,
from one container to another. In other words, there is the idea that one could poten-
tially implement the so-called “mind up/down-loading” that has been so popular in
science fiction, starting from Philip Dick’s narratives. This sort of techno-mediated
metempsychosis, in the mirages of the new digital dualism, animates a thousand
projections. A first example is (i) the grafting of false memories or the compression
of mental time and the possibility of livingmonths of experience in the space of a few
seconds. Then there is (ii) the creation of back-up copies that are always available,
capable of giving us a second chance or perhaps of turning into slaves to be inserted
into computer supports at our service. Another example is (iii) the transfer of mental
content into strings of compressible data for interstellar journeys, with potential time
travel ifmoving faster than the speed of light. Thenwe have (iv) teleportation à la Star
Trek, so that it is no longer necessary to carry the body, because one can reconfigure
it at any time and place; as well as (v) the source of eternal youth and immortality
by means of clonation, with the risk of potential duplications of one’s Self. Another
instance is (vi) the emergence of new transcendences, where the true death of the
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individual only occurs if the corresponding file is damaged, since the body, provided
it has any meaning at all, is only a container that can be reconstructed. Then there is
(vii) the possibility of living within the Internet and giving rise to super-organisms,
where several individuals can merge together or enter into non-human bodies; a
finally (viii) the development of new risks and the consequent need of measures to
avoid the potential hacking of the mind.
But is this really the case? I find these narrative fantasies extremely amusing,
especially in terms of psychological analysis; in them, in fact, we see a liquid iden-
tity pushed to such an extent that the very concept of individual becomes rather
blurry, leaving Pirandello’s perplexities on a remote background. These are transre-
alist experiments, interesting because they bring to the fore doubts and fears that we
are already feeling in the current excess of virtual experiences and in the immersion
in a reality which, as underlined by Zygmunt Bauman (2000), is becoming more and
more fluid and therefore open to possibilities. However, from the point of view of the
intellectual and intentional presence of the subject, i.e. of what the mental identity
of the individual actually means, these projections differ little from the humanistic
tradition of Cartesian dualism. They also pave the way for hypothesizing a bodiless
or artificial intelligencewhich, inmy opinion, totallymisses the target of intus-legere,
i.e. that particular propension-ability to penetrate the epidermis of reality by creating
a problem, before finding a solution. The anthropocentric absurdity lies in recog-
nizing intelligence in a computational machine, while denying it to other animals,
still considered “reactive machines”.
If, on the contrary,we consider intelligence as the ability of the body to construct its
own reality dimension through actualization processes, thingswill appear completely
different, for the following reasons. (i) No entity knows the world through a disjunc-
tion or along a well-defined boundary of “understanding”: knowledge, along the
various somatic layers, is a process of heteronomic growth, exactly like the devel-
opment of a tree’s foliage along the evolutionary matrix offered by light. So, the
resulting form is a reflection of the context and the latter is an interpretation operated
by the heritage contents of the tree itself. (ii) We cannot define sensory accesses as
simple channels that convey objective information present in the world, since each
sensory organ can carry out several intersections with the world and always works
systemically with the whole body and with the other sensory accesses. So, each
experience modifies the proximal plane of intersection, and therefore knowledge is
not the simple processing of objectively given inputs. (iii) There is no cognition that
is not also metacognition because, even if knowledge can recall a performance or an
elaboration process, in reality it is also always an exercise, that is, a growth differ-
ential, of all the cognitive meta-components called to carry out that activity, be they
the type of attention, the motivational structures, memory in its various forms, or the
internal organization of the system. Finally, (iv) every cognitive process implies an
effort that must be compatible with the motivational and emotional involvement felt
by the individual in its here-and-now, that is, by the whole state of the body, since
knowledge is always born from a somatic projection, even when it seems to be an
end in itself.
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Therefore, the body is not the instrument of knowledge, but knowledge is the
expression of the body. We experience our bodiliness within a precise dimension,
even if our heritage is not a bubble that imprisons us but an elastic mat that allows
us to jump onto new levels of intersection with reality through multiple paths, for
example with the help of new technologies, theories, techniques, or hybridizations
with other species. By observing the behaviour of other animals, just to give an
example, the human being has not only been able to trace an ethographic profile,
but has also understood the specificity of the human perspective. Doubt, which has
always played a major role in the cognitive processes, has been fed by anthropo-
decentring processes that have been possible thanks to the epiphanic encounter with
animal otherness and to the shift of intersection brought about by the advent of new
technologies. We are led to believe that a new technology is only an enhancement of
the intersection: sometimes it is, but most of the time it looks more like a virus than a
probiotic. New technology tends to reorganize our image of the world, contributing
to fuel in us that sense of partiality or, if you like, that awareness of our “domain
of validity”, which is the basis of counterintuition and research, transforming our
heritage into a sort of “epistemological obstacle”, to use Bachelard’s words (2002).
But this does notmean that knowledge is a departure from our phylogenetic nature
or that our legacy is simply an obstacle to the most daring scientific hypotheses, such
as Einstein’s physics or Darwin’s evolutionary theory. It is thanks to our nature that
we have been able to identify, from the heritage perspective, a domain of validity and
not an absolute, however paradoxical such a statement may seem. Where, then, does
doubt come from? Perhaps from the fact that we have taken leave of our bodiliness?
From our nostalgia for our supposed ancestral sidereal dwelling? From our ecstatic
access? I do not think so. Doubt arises from the experience of going beyond, from
the aesthetic dimension of the Aristotelian thaumàzein, where the human being feels
overwhelmed, thrilled and amazed in front of their own smallness. We could say that
doubt is akin to the sense of the sublime, with the languor that leads us to leave our
native country to venture into unknown lands. Doubt arises from dealing with an
overpowering nature that fascinates and frightens us, with the experience of the gap
between our resources and the desiring openness. It is a feeling that is strongly rooted
in the body and cannot be disembodied in any way. More than a cause for reflection,
an epoché of the already given, a fantasy about the possible, or a hallucination…
doubt is a thrill.
As such, it is an oscillation that shakes the entire foundation of the body. Long
before being rationalized into what we call critical thinking, the intersection has
undergone a shift, an excentralizationwith respect to the given orbit; it has undergone
the “clinamen” with respect to the gravitational pull so dear to Epicurean thought. It
is neither a coincidence nor a necessity that dictates its coordinates, but an encounter
that takes place on a precise threshold. Doubt arises from an epiphany, from the
appearance of the non-already-given possible, which only on the edge of the connec-
tion can have its own predicative value. The body is a relational structure, an entity
that already foresees in itself the heteronomic deviation operated from the outside.
Knowledge is therefore precisely this act of forcing the meshes of the already given
through the relational emergence, a deviation from the predetermined trajectory,
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which is therefore neither accidental nor necessary. One can say, then, that doubt is
the manifestation of a condition of uncertainty and the testimony of a decentraliza-
tion that has taken place: therefore, it is not detachment from the body, but a state of
the body itself, so that the dubitative act always has its deepest reasons in the somatic
dimensions of the emotional and motivational involvement.
It is therefore necessary to consider the process of decentralization, that is, to
investigate the somatic movements that remove the individual from the gravitation
of the past, and take themaway fromalready travelled roads. Inmyopinion,we cannot
ignore the motivational principle that, in human beings, is expressed in curiosity, in
the interest to probe and test, in the imitative propensity, or in the need for social
affirmation. No research is ever an end in itself, just as no one ventures into unknown
territories without emotional support. Intelligence is born from the global involve-
ment of the body, albeit through different levels of intersection with external reality.
And it is precisely at the relational threshold with the world, and not in reflexive
detachment, that decentralisation occurs: this eccentric and deviated trajectory is
made possible not in a solipsistic and epurative closure, but in the participation in the
symphony of the world. Therefore, there can be no decentralization in self-reference:
only a hybridation, i.e. a decentralization from the outside, can lead this centrifugation
to move away from the heritage. Doubt, therefore, is nourished not by a sublimation
of the human spirit from bodiliness, but by giving strong voice to the somatization
of otherness, in that process of projection into the other that allows us, for example,
to fly with the wings of a bird and to project ourselves into the motion of the planets
through a telescope. Doubt arises when we suddenly try to change the fixed point of
our epistemology and realize that reality consents.
I believe that all this is part of human nature: we are naturally inclined to question
our perspective, because, once again, we are naturally inclined to build hybridizations
with other beings. Knowledge passes through hallucinations that often derive from
psychotropic effects, related to substances that we introduce with food or that are
transmitted to us by states ofmetabolic alteration attributable to diseases or infections.
Phylogeny has given us a brain that has incredible functional and structural plasticity,
a redundancy that allows it to introject everything around it. I am astonished when I
still hear people say that the human being is an incomplete, partial entity, endowed
with primitivisms, because saying such things means fully ignoring the anatomical-
physiological findings of the human being. This brings Darwinism back to the fairy
tale of Epimetheus and Prometheus, so as to continue to live within the comfortable
humanistic mansion. And it is not just about a structural evaluation, so to speak, of
the human being—involving, for example, the complexity of the brain, the particular
specialization of the eye and of the oculo-manual coordination, the adaptive structure
of the pelvis or of the occipital hole, the differentiation between posterior and anterior
train (also the result of a specialization), or the neoteny and the loss of the mating
season.Rather, the point is to acknowledge a precise ethological heritage due towhich
we are a species that can be well represented in terms of prevailing motivations,
communicative and interactive patterns, parental and social structures in various
rituals, and feeding methods modified by the agricultural revolution, but still well
traceable in some practices.
192 6 Intus-Legere: Knowledge as an Actualization Process
Just to give an example, what has always amazedme is the total absence of serious
studies on the motivational structures of the human being—obviously I mean the
intrinsic propensities, like the predatory instinct in a cat—except for some praise-
worthy exceptions which, all in all, seem not to fully grasp the specific character of
the human being. First of all, the motivations are mistaken for the objectives, that is,
for the external causes capable of arousing a motivational behaviour or of acting as
targets in the expression of the motivation. It would be as if an ethologist believed
that cats are motivated by balls instead of their propensity to chase everything that is
in motion. In order to list the motivations of a species, i.e. the copulative tendencies
which characterize it, one must not focus on the target or the accidental elicitor, but
on the type of expressive orientation—one could say the transitive-verb underlying
a given behaviour. In order to teach a dog something, for example, it is common
practice among dog educators or trainers to use motivational involvement, perhaps
within a playful framework but still in a motivational key, starting from good knowl-
edge of these aspects about dogs. If I work with an animal like a cat, I will try to
act on the predatory instinct, whereas with a dog I’ll focus on the collaborative or
competitive one (as well as the predatory one), and with a rabbit I will certainly not
choose the predatory one. Why, then, in psychology and pedagogy, is there no strict
and detailed analysis of the motivations prevailing in the human being? The answer
I give myself is that we do not even contemplate that human beings might have
intrinsic motivations, especially if we remain attached to the humanistic framework
of Prometheanism.
Working with school children (Marchesini 2016), I realized how important moti-
vational involvement is: teaching should rely on these intrinsic motivations if it
cares for children’s interests and acknowledges their active role in knowledge. In
the 1990s I noticed that kids had no problem learning the name and corresponding
images of thousands of Pokemons, yet they struggled to learn the far simpler things
they were told in class. When I discussed the issue with the teachers, I was told: “it’s
because they have fun with Pokemon”. Of course, I thought, but this is no answer,
because I could have said: “Yes, that much is obvious, but why do they have fun
with that?”. The basic point is that in Pokemon-didactics—let me call it that—chil-
dren are completely involved because they are doing things that are deeply rooted in
the motivational prevalences of the human being. Children have fun because there
is coherence between their inclinations and the activities that lead them to acquire
information—which, alas, in this case is related to Pokemon.
If we consider human beings in their most frequent activities, if we do not dwell on
the target of the given action but on the verb-copula of the action itself, wewill realize
that the acts of gathering, putting together and collecting represent a motivational
coordinate that underlies many human occupations, and is the prevailing conjugation
of the intersection between individual and context. A child will pick daisies in a
meadow, shells on the beach, stones in a riverbed, mushrooms in a forest, berries
or fruit from a plant, and so forth. We can put in brackets the what and the where,
as well as the way of performing the action; what remains is one same verb: to
collect. Even as adults, this motivational coordinate is an integral part of our hobbies
and our work; it is a source of both commitment and fun for us, since the two
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things are not mutually exclusive. We collect spontaneously—almost by internal
motion—withstanding efforts, nuisances and burdens, because desire prevails over
the expressive cost, and in so doing we learn. And we do so by putting the whole
body at the service of knowledge: from the necessary perceptual specialisations to
the emotional markings, which are the foundation of the memories that will define a
given experiential horizon and a relative biographical characterization.
So, I decided to try to list ten motivational coordinates that predominate in human
beings, adopting a properly ethological approach. These are the motivations that I
have found to be prevalent in children:
1. sillegic: a tendency to collect, gather, catalogue, put together by similarity,
compare, pay attention to differences;
2. epimeletic: a tendency to take care of and help others, encourage growth, care
for and protect, clean and groom, reassure, adopt, put in order;
3. mimetic: a tendency to imitate, re-produce, represent, get infected, be fascinated
by diversity, transform each phenomenon into an inspiration;
4. social: a tendency to form a group, conform to common styles, desire the
recognition of others, seek consensus and accreditation, participate in shared
tendencies;
5. exploratory: a tendency to go beyond appearances, to look in depth, to evaluate
the opportunities of a context, to widen the space of knowledge, to look for
the requirements of a problem;
6. introjective: a tendency to incorporate external elements in order to achieve
one’s objective, to use objects as tools, to use external phenomena in a
predictive sense;
7. collaborative: a tendency to build team dynamics in order to achieve results,
to create systems of belonging, to think in a cooperative and reciprocal way;
8. perlustrative: a tendency to discover new territories, to move nomadically in
order to seek new opportunities, to venture outside known places;
9. possessive: a tendency to defend one’s resources, to seize new ones, to put in
place mechanisms of subtraction from others, such as hiding or threatening;
10. competitive: a tendency to implement competitive behaviours, to compete
with others, to try to win or surpass others or to excel, to emulate the best
performances.
When I speak of somatic involvement, I mean to underline that the body as a whole
participates in the process of projection-hybridisation with the external world which
is the basis of decentralization, doubt and problem creation, i.e. the systemic state
that pushes the individual to intus-legere. If, for example, we take into consider-
ation the epimeletic projection, which is the basis of all care behaviours—such
as dedication, diligence, completeness, order, empathy, organization—we imme-
diately realize that cognition is not only the cold processing of incoming data, but
it is endocrine, affective, tactile, parental (just to make some examples). The much-
reproached aggressiveness is actually a fundamental resource in the stubbornness,
competition, and fighting that play a large part in all research activity and which
feed on adrenal surrenal and gonadic flows, but are also affected by the immune and
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metabolic system. Indeed, it is not possible to understand the intellectual work of
research by separating it from the desire for social affirmation, and this in turn is
affected by sexual and affective coordinates. Experience is not introduced through a
data deposit, but on the basis of matrices of differential growth in the body, so that
even the senses are not already-given channels but, like the foliage of a tree, respond
to the coordinates of light that determined their morphogenesis.
6.4 Cognitive Plurality in the Animal World
If intelligence is the manifestation of being-a-body, it naturally follows that there
is cognitive plurality among different species. Of course, plurality does not mean
discontinuity, if one understands Darwinian evolutionism, because every species
shares some characteristics with other species by homology (common heredity) and
by analogy (adapted convergence). In other words, it is necessary to abandon the
concept of “cognitive universal”, so dear to the promoters of the computational
vision. Talking about animal intelligence also means abandoning other interpretative
keys of animal behaviour, including: (1) the analytical view of behavioural motives,
which is found in the concepts of instinct and conditioning; (2) the deterministic
view of these motives, inherent in the idea that given a drive there is an instinct or
given a stimulus there is a response; (3) the timelessness of the animal’s positioning,
i.e. the negation of its here-and-now and its telos; (4) the exclusively sensory vision
of its interface with the world.
The 20th century was a time of counter-reformation with respect to the Darwinian
revolution, bringing Cartesian mechanism back into fashion. The legacy of the great
English naturalist, in fact, urged the overcoming of the “human vs non-human”
dichotomy, leading instead to a comparative view based on similarity-continuity in
difference. The goal was to refute the absurd dichotomic disjunction between the
human and other living beings, and to sanction the groundlessness of such categor-
ical separation. However, the affirmation of interpretive mechanism carried out a real
humanistic restoration, which aimed to undermine—but I would rather say to anni-
hilate—the philosophical assumptions and ontological considerations put forward
by Darwin. The aim was to confine his work within well-circumscribed fields so as
to prevent it from overflowing and upsetting the anthropocentric system on which
the humanistic tradition was and is founded. First, we tried to subtract the human
being from the coordinates of phylogeny, with a very successful operation carried
out by Arnold Gehlen through the idea of the human being’s biological poverty
or incompleteness, thus relegating the Darwinian explanation within a very narrow
field. Contiguity with other animals was then projected into a past from which man
allegedly emancipated himself thanks to his exonerative power, and was therefore
linked to concepts such as those of ancestrality or partiality.
The subsequent move was to use the Cartesian automaton to explain three things.
First (i) the interface of non-human animals: this was reduced to Jakob von Uexküll’s
Umwelt, that is, the total immersion and clouding of the non-human in the elicitative
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universe, as opposed to man’s sole access to full perspective, in Heideggerian terms.
Second (ii) the innate, which was explained through the determinism of instincts,
as prefigured by Niko Tinbergen’s psychoenergetics: in this view, the non-human is
denied foreshadowing-reflection-decision so as to reduce its expression to consump-
tion mechanisms. Finally (iii) learning was explained through the associationistic
concepts of stimulus-reflection structured by the idea that the non-human does not
build knowledge but develops conditioning mechanisms, as claimed by Skinner’s
behaviourist school. Based on these three coordinates, the anthropocentric restora-
tion closed the gap opened by Darwinian thought, shifting the dichotomy onto other
differences.
These three operations have held up for almost a century, and even today we insist
on explaining the non-human in terms of closed interface, deterministic imperative
of instincts, and cogent conditioning. And these three interpretative coordinates are
the best that Descartes could have hoped for to support his idea that the animal is a
machine. In fact, the puppet-animal that comes out of these postulates is not open to
external reality, lacks an internal world, is devoid of a behavioural system, is driven
by switches and, with the ultimate paradox, functions like a cybernetic machine, i.e.
through feedback mechanisms. Which means that, in this paradigmatic logic, any
computer machine has a much more complex functional-explanatory matrix than an
animal organism, which is reduced to the status of a behavioural thermostat. In fact,
both psychoenergetics and behaviourism explain the animal through switches, based
on a 1:1 structure-function ratio, by which the structure translates into its function in
an algorithmic way. The drive released by the energy inherent in the consuming act
and the reflex triggered by the stimulus of the associative explanation imply that other
species lack the presuppositions of the intellectual faculty, which relegates them to
the status of a trigger-based mechanism.
My approach, instead, attributes a series of abilities to the animal:
1. the ability to construct a prefigured objective, emerging from the dialectic
between one’s motivation and the range of possibilities offered by the external
conditions;
2. the ownership of a positional state that is internal with respect to the external
context and is systemic, therefore not based on disjoint elements;
3. the continuous relationship with everything that surrounds it, adapting its
responses not to the modulation of already-given performativities, but to the
realization of new endowments;
4. presence, i.e. being able to be present in the moment not by being completely
immersed in the here-and-now but presenting a diachronic structure;
5. the ability to conceive problems or go beyond appearances to bring out new
opportunities;
6. the capacity for problematization or evaluative immersion in a problem, which
requires an evaluation of the gap between the current condition and the pursued
one, but also full understanding of the structural requirements of the problem;
7. the ability to solve or reduce the scope of a problem through creativity and
flexibility.
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If we address the expressive and evolutionary question within a problematic model—
the animal as a creator of problems and not as a reflex-driven consumer—we give
back to the non-human its full power of expression. This power, in fact, arises from a
subjective experience in the here-and-now, based on a properly biographical heritage
and projected into an inherent telos revolving around individuality, i.e. the diachronic
singularity of the heterospecific. To acknowledge “animal intelligence” means to
modify the explanatory coordinates of behaviour, interface and learning in non-
human species, and not to simply place the mentalistic explanation side by side
with the current paradigms. With respect to this, one can say that considering the
heterospecific as a subject endowed with a mind means several things. It means (i)
having a systemic approach to animal ontic, i.e., considering the different behavioural
components—whether or not they are phylogenetic—as parts of a system that evolves
as a whole and creates a dialogical environment between the components. It also
means (ii) having a monistic-emergential approach that considers intelligence as an
expression of the body as a whole. Likewise, it involves (iii) considering heritage
components as multi-functional endowments: maps and not threads that give the
subject freedom both in the present experience and in its projection into the future,
but also in its way of recapitulating or giving meaning to the past. Attributing a
mind to animals means (iv) considering the mind as an internal world that has a
precise positioning in time, and therefore a here-and-now, and as a project that has
to do with a biographical structure.7 Also, this involves (v) evaluating the internal
world as an interface that makes the subject partial to the world, but not closed-
off in a predetermined way within an Umwelt established by phylogeny. Rather, the
interface is a mobile threshold that changes continuously on the basis of the subject’s
experience and state in the present (proximal threshold of experience) in a logic of
non-fixity of, and power over, the interface.
In the light of these considerations, it becomes evident that the modification of
the explanatory paradigm in the cognitive sense does not only concern the problem
of consciousness, which is important but not decisive and does not disambiguate
the reflection on intellectual activity as a whole. Indeed, consciousness is one of the
many levels of intersection between the body and the world, probably specialized in
focusing attention on particular states of the body (suffering, well-being, functions,
pain), on somatic markers (emotions, motivations, arousal), on representational or
reflexive structures, on external events obtained through sensory windows (sensa-
tions), and on the overall biographical state or self-consciousness. This function or
7 Here biographical structure or being the “subject-of-a-life” does not mean the banal unravelling of
the ontogenetic process, but ownership of one’ s present (how to live one’s here-and-now), projec-
tion into the future (what objectives to prefigure and pursue), and the memory of one’s past. The
expression “subject-of-a-life” was used by TomRegan. According to him, «individuals are subjects-
of-a-life if they have beliefs and desires; perception, memory, and a sense of the future, including
their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; preference- and
welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of their desires and goals; a psychophysical
identity over time; and an individual welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or
ill for them, logically independently of their utility for others and logically independently of their
being the object of anyone else’s interests». Regan (1983: 243).
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state of focus allows the subject, in certain situations, to engage as many cognitive
resources as possible within a specific cognitive function, wherever the novelty of
the situation-problem requires it. In fact, the best cognitive performance, when one
requires access to the entire database of the brain and has to perform serial oper-
ations in parallel or in a flow diagram, finds an impediment in the apparatus of
consciousness, precisely because of its processual module based on perimetration
and sequentiality. If wewant to have an insight or remember a wordwe are struggling
to find, the best way is to sleep, walk, or think about something else, which means to
exclude consciousness from the problem. It is not correct, therefore, to circumscribe
the act of intus-legere within the domain of consciousness.
The problem of knowledge raises some important questions: (i) what kind of
intelligence is present in different species?; (ii) is it possible to measure different
intelligences or should one stick to comparisons, as in anatomy? and if so, what kind
of comparisons can be made?; (iii) is it possible for a human being to know “what it
is like to be a bat” or to empathize with a different intelligence? To the first question
I’d answer that each species necessarily has its own intelligence, because it is called
to dwell in its own problematic spaces. To the second question I reply right away
that it is not possible to make a sort of hierarchical assessment of the intellectual
performances of different species, but it is possible to compare them with respect to
individual intellectual functions, using the operators of homology-analogy already
used to evaluate other anatomical-functional structures. As for the third question,
I think that the far-too-rhetorical doubt proposed by Thomas Nagel is misleading.
Animals have species-specific peculiarities, but they are not aliens that come from a
universe completely different from our own. The diversity of each species is also a
function of similarity and, once again, Darwin can help us here, with his book The
Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals. If it were impossible to understand the
intus-legere of an animal, not only would it be impossible for us to relate to any other
species than the human one, but ethologists would have to find another job, as the
analysis of animal welfare would be vain talk.
The basic assumption of cognitive ethology is that mental performance is an
adaptive function just like any other organic performance, and is therefore calibrated
to the specific needs encountered along a species’ phylogeny. As such it is based
on the concept of fitness, i.e. of reproductive advantage related to the lifestyle and
environment of a species. From this point of view it does not make sense to speak
of mind and cognitive processes in the singular, using the human being as a measure
of the variability of cognition in the world: intelligence, as a complex set of trends
and cognitive properties, cannot be subjected to a comparison referred to a model,
but must be considered in a plural way. Intelligence is a biological function that—
like sensoriality, the anatomy of the limbs, or digestion—presents itself in the animal
universe through amultiplicity of vocations and attitudes,most of the time so different
that they cannot be superimposed on each other. However, these various attitudes also
bear a similarity that descends from three things. First, (1) from the universality of
the physical characteristics of the context, which is why a dog playing frisbee must
know how to calculate its trajectory exactly as a baseball player does with a ball.
Secondly, (2) from the phylogenetic closeness between two species, i.e. from the rate
198 6 Intus-Legere: Knowledge as an Actualization Process
of trans-specific homology, so that the parental and social attitudes of chimpanzees
and bonobos have characteristics in common with human beings for the simple fact
that such predicates descend from a common ancestor. Finally, the similarity comes
(3) from sharing the same fitness selectors, i.e. from the level of analogies or adaptive
convergence, since all arboreal animals must know how to perform a detour, if they
do not want to perish when a given branch no longer has any use.
Studying the multi-shapedness of living beings, even in terms of cognitive vari-
ability (similarity-difference), is good training to understand that diversity is not
inferiority and that it is always misleading to face multiplicity with an obsession
with hierarchies. Cognitive activities are therefore not excellences that bring other
animals closer to the human being, but functions that are strictly related to the adap-
tive setbacks, be they simple or complex, and which for this reason tend to give each
species a particular idea of the world and of its own being in the world. Therefore
it is necessary to refer to them in the plural, but also to admit that they are a further
biological tool to realize the diversity of phylogenetic heritage, just as the sensorial
multiplicity endows each species with a peculiar way of immersing itself in reality.
However, despite the apparent simplicity of this statement, admitting that cognitive
performativity has plural expressions means suspending two of the most important
clichés on the mind, i.e.: (1) that man represents the measure with which to judge
other animals; (2) that man sums up all the cognitive faculties present in the world
of non-human animals.
When analyzing the different morphology of the limbs, the specialization of the
fur, the various eating peculiarities, the different kinds of access to theworld operated
by the senses, etc. we have no prejudices or difficulties in applying Darwin’s dictate
of comparison by homology (common descent) and analogy (adaptive convergence).
Yet this is not the case for cognition, which appears as the only performance that i:
(i) denied to animals altogether, by those who consider them driven by automatisms
and wish to maintain a clear ontological separation between human beings and other
species. Alternatively, cognition (ii) framed in terms of graduality, so that between
the human being and all other species there would be quantitative differences, with
man being the peak. Finally, cognition is sometimes only (iii) attributed to other
species by projection through trivial anthropomorphisms. I personally disagree with
all three of these options, because I believe that each species has its own intelligence,
comparable but not measurable in hierarchical terms with that of others. If we accept
that human cognitivity is a point of view, adaptively calibrated in terms of peculiar
selective coordinates, then we can understand that the universe of the living is made
up of a multiplicity of species-specific intellectual qualities.
Cognitive plurality, in other words, means that the paths and specializations taken
by different animals in “knowing the world” have followed various adaptive logics
through several paths, made of divergences and convergences, so that the intellec-
tual perspective is a further instrument called to actualize a particular configura-
tion of reality. This view admits that an animal’s performativity in its interaction
with reality fully responds to the risks and opportunities that the particular adaptive
situation presents, in relation to the singular evolutionary trajectory of its species.
Therefore, there is a cognitive plurality because the challenges faced by different
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species are plural. The intelligence of a species is therefore not a function that brings
it closer to the species Homo sapiens, but a characterization of its intersection with
reality calibrated to its specific needs, just like all other functional devices. The
mind is called to reorganize reality and bends it according to peculiar configuration
coordinates. Cognitive performativity therefore increases perspective partiality: the
mind reinforces singularity as the unrepeatability and irreversibility of the individual.
Cognitive plurality means, therefore, that two species facing the same situation will
problematize it in a different way, leading to experiences, ideas, solutions and lessons
that cannot be superimposed.
Wemust therefore conclude that both the denial of animal cognitivity and the attri-
bution to other species of a quasi-human cognitivity (the animal asminus habens) are
the result of anthropocentrism, a paradigm that does not leave room for an objective
and selective evaluation of the intellectual function. When we talk about cognitive
performativity we mean precise ways of “reading reality” or different “perspec-
tive configurations” able to give ad hoc adaptive rewards, which are not valid in
an absolute sense but only in relation to the lifestyle and context of the species.
Therefore, every cognitive performance, being a vocation, always carries strengths
and weaknesses with it: in fact, if we transport the cognitivity of a species outside
its context/lifestyle, i.e. outside its cognitive demand, most of the time a strength
becomes a weakness. For example, a dog’s cognitive ability to focus on its objective
and pursue it regardless of context variables sometimes makes its behaviour appear
stubbornly stupid. If we take one species as the cognitive model of another, we
will inevitably condemn the latter to insufficiency. There are no quantitative differ-
ences when it comes to adaptive correlation, but there are differences in terms of
specialization and functional constraints.
Intus-legere is never unrelated to a certain way of being, that is, to the cognitive
system characterising a particular species and denoting a peculiar form of intelli-
gence. The ability of dogs to interpret relationships and to operate like sophisticated
politicians within the dynamics of a team makes them capable of consultation and
collaboration: this makes them appear gifted with great intelligence in our eyes,
and we are bewitched by how they place themselves at the service of the group.
Cats, on the other hand, being operational soloists, present a resolvent intelligence,
different from the social one typical of dogs: they are better at solving puzzles, but
less inclined to learn collaborative or obedient practices. Therefore, analysing dogs
and cats through the anthropocentric lens, we will alternately reward the former or
the latter But this evaluative metric is simply wrong: if we do not use it for the
sensory apparatus we should refrain from doing so for the processing apparatus.
The different ways of reading reality—experiencing, learning, resolving, evaluating,
judging, etc.—can be considered nothing more than different ways of “asking ques-
tions to the world”. In the same ion, the subject’s propositional attitudes towards their
here-and-now—how to fear, believe, hope—come fromcompositions of endowments
that are strongly correlated to their species, for example, type of emotional structure,
motivational coordinates, the orientative, evaluative and operative representations
involved, etc.
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A species’ intellectual peculiarity lies precisely in the fact that, according to the
specific cognitive endowments, the mind will ask specific questions to the world
and will make use of equally adaptive biases in cataloguing the problematization
patterns; consequently, it will construct propositional attitudes that are affected by
its phylo/onto-genetic history. A prey animal, such as a horse or a rabbit, is no
less intelligent than a predator, such as a dog or a cat: it simply has a different
processing ability. Both the questions asked and the propositional attitudes used
are different: there is no doubt that a prey species has been adaptively rewarded in
the proposition “fear that”, i.e. a state of mind of distrust, rather than one of “dare
to”, which is indispensable in a predator. The different cognitive activities refer
to: (1) questions endowed with a specificity of their own, therefore very often not
superposable between one species and another; (2) ways of undertaking actions that
relate to the style of a particular species in relation to other variables, such as social
character, bodily characteristics, biorhythm, etc.
Each species has its own “order of questions”, i.e. it is urged to respond to different
challenges because these are given by the context and lifestyle, i.e. they are elements
of the adaptive profile. If therefore the functional universal (to experience food)
is common to all species, the order of the question (the challenges encountered
when trying to get food) is different depending on whether the animal is folivorous,
omnivorous, carnivorous, nocturnal or diurnal, whether it lives in a forest or in a
savannah and so on. Each species faces different problems also in relation to its type
of sociality and level of intraspecies competition, but also to its position inside the
trophic chain of an ecosystem, depending on the type of competitors, predators, para-
sites, environmental risks, the size of its territory, seasonal variability, fluctuations
in the environment, migratory or sedentary tendencies, reproductive modalities, etc.,
(just to give some examples). Therefore, there are different solicitations not only
in the parameters of cognition but also in the metacognitive exercise, so that some
species are perlustrative, others are more skilled in distinctive abilities, and others
rely more on their map memory than on the kind relative to social rank. The lifestyle
and the environment of a given species, in their multiform characteristics, therefore
identify very different “setback horizons” that raise different orders of questions—
i.e. different problems to which each species must respond. Predators, for instance,
are much more inclined towards resolvent and prefigurative structures, while herbi-
vores are specialized in kinesthetic and orientative cognitivity, and omnivores acquire
articulated and flexible distinctive and categorical repertoires. Social animals develop
complex relational structures with strong empathic and communicative vocations,
while solitary animals are more inclined to the areas of solution and reflection.
It is not only the orders of questions that differentiate the cognitive structures
of different species, but also the specific “modes of undertaking” of the cognitive
performance required. In fact, a relational question can be realized through an artic-
ulated communicative production or by facilitating the empathic dispositions and
therefore the circumstantial structures. In the same way, a question can be solved by
expressing the heuristics or by working ad hoc on the problem (insight). In the end,
what follows are different cognitive performativity structures—specific collections
of cognitive activities, i.e. vocations and cognitive attitudes that differ from species to
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species, which together identify a specific way of knowing the world. Some species
tend to develop complex performances of practognosis or manipulation of the world,
especially in the case of primates; others are able to build communication networks so
superindividual as to give rise to collective intelligence or cognitive superorganisms.
The undertaking of the inventive capacity also presents marked differences in
different species, as demonstrated by research on the intelligence of crows compared
to that of primates, also in relation to problem-solving activities that require the
manipulation of tools. It is not possible to pose a problem which presents particular
operational challenges to two different species—perhaps favouring one for opera-
tional consistency compared to the other—and then to conclude that the former is
more intelligent than the latter. Even when we offer operational tools to an animal
or prepare a particular setting for it, we should always keep in mind the animal’s
modality of undertaking, which does not only concern the conformation of its body,
but also the way in which that species faces a given problem. To put a chimpanzee in
front of a mirror means to put it in a good condition to achieve perceptive intersec-
tion. The same cannot be said for a dog, who investigates reality through olfactory
monitoring. To conclude that the chimpanzee has self-awareness because it passes
themirror test and the dog does notmeans failing to account for this important aspect.
Both the different orders of questions and the different modes of undertaking
give rise to only partially overlapping knowledge structures, which can be defined
as “species intelligence”; these are characterized by the prevalence of some cogni-
tive activities both in terms of presence and in terms of relevance, i.e. in terms of
effectiveness and expressive efficiency. Animals that live in herds and that entrust
their survival to the concertative context—e.g. baboons—have developed relational
cognitive activities and therefore present a cognitive identity based on the decoding
of the interactions between active referents (social intelligence). Conversely, solitary
animals or lone predators—like many felines—have developed problem-solving-
type cognitive activities and therefore have a cognitive identity based on the manip-
ulation of passive referents (enigmatic intelligence). From the different presence
and specialization of various cognitive activities we can deduce the type of overall
intelligence of the species, in a plural evaluation of the intellectual character where
it makes no sense to speak in quantitative terms. The “plural intelligences” model
I proposed (2008)—reinforcing Howard Gardner’s concept of multiple intelligence
by applying it to phylogeny—starts from a very performative view of the cognitive
function; cognitivity is not a luxury, but a function like any other, which rewards
the individuals of a species and as such must be consistent with the other biological
characteristics of the species under examination.
There is no doubt that it is impossible to talk about risks and opportunities for
the subject in a non-specific way, i.e. without referring to the species dimension.
An individual’s objectives are closely related to its species-specific motivational
system, so that a predator might aim at reaching a moving target while a collector
is probably more interested in collecting objects to carry to its den. If it is true
that natural selection specializes different animals by giving them a body structure
capable of adapting to particular ecological niches, it is also true that it predisposes
them to specific behavioural styles, and an important role in the definition of a style
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is precisely a species’ type of intersection. This is given by several factors. There
are (i) perceptual specificities, i.e. the way in which that animal views the world
through its type of sensory channels and the use it makes of them. Then there are (ii)
motivational coordinates, i.e. the interest and sensitivity towards particular entities-
events that occur in a given context. There is (iii) the emotional structure, i.e. the type
of participation that the subject presents in the face of the events. Finally, one must
consider (iv) the elaborative and representational endowments, i.e. the orientation
maps and the appraisal resources, and (v) the cognitive meta-components, especially
attention, curiosity, and memory in the process of intersection with the context.
Adopting a neurobiological conception according to which the neural set is medi-
ated by specific neuromodulators, one can see the orientation in two ways. First, as
(1) a propensity for particular activities (collecting, preying, building a nest, looking
after the offspring, etc.) that are expressed in a preferential way and with a strong
intrinsic component. Second, as (2) an electivity towards particular targets, able to
evoke the motivational expression through specific conformations. The orientation
defines, therefore, the type of involvement that the subject feels in its intersection
with external reality, specifying elective sensibilities, degrees of satisfaction, orienta-
tions with respect to the world, expressive tendencies: in other words, the objectives
of every species. An opportunity, therefore, is never objective, but always referable
to the specified objectives and, more generally, to the species-specific orientation.
In the same way, risks have a very different shape for a chick, a cat or a seal, so
there is no such thing as an overlap in the analysis of challenges. We may also find
opposite situations where, for one species, a situation counts as a risk, whilst for
another species the same situation indicates an opportunity. This is not as far-fetched
a possibility as one might think.
As for the type of challenge, the analysis of the structural requirements of a
problem is inevitably species-specific because it implies an assessment of the diver-
gence between the present and a potential situation. Animals used to searching under-
ground (e.g. a dog or a pig) will not hesitate to consider the problem of the object
hidden under a cup, unlike other animals that get food by collecting or simply chasing.
The nature of the obstacle to be removed should therefore be framed through a series
of parameters. For example: (i) the target could be under a lid or inside an object,
whence a totally different perception of the obstacle. Alternatively, (ii) the target
needs to be reached through a deviation or a detour, in this case the obstacle is
perceptible differently by arboreal species compared to non-arboreal ones or, in any
case, to species that live in particular contexts, like polar bears. In a different scenario,
(iii) the obstacle could be a constraint on the target or a constraint on the subject’s
body: in this case there is a profound difference between species inclined to practice,
species that use tools and species that reach the target in a direct way. Finally, one
could make it so that (iv) the obstacle imposes a given practice to be overcome: this
would present different levels of coherence in different species.
The concept of gap-distance also varies from one species to another: for example,
animals that move differently in space have a different conception of reaching their
target. If for an arboreal species reaching a hanging object defines a gap of a vertical
order, for a species which has another life dimension the gap may not even exist or
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may be thought of according to other geometries. This becomes even more striking
if the setback is a risk related to an opportunity, since in this situation it is more
likely that high arousal will lead the animal to express innate defaults of a generic
order rather than context-referred responses. In this case, some species present innate
behaviours which, in our eyes, appear more reflective than others, but only because
of our anthropocentric evaluation: a frightened animal emits an alarm sound which
seemsmore intelligent to us than another one which simply runs away, but both could
be acting by impulse.
What about the level of intersection of the stimulus? Every ethologist knows
that what is relevant for one species in terms of urgency or non-derogation can be
irrelevant and therefore not even activate the arousal system in another. If a species
is not used to looking directly at its counterpart we should not be surprised if it fails
the mirror test, but this does not mean that it does not have self-awareness. Likewise,
if for a species olfactory orientation is more important than the visual one, for these
animals a mirror will be irrelevant. How would we behave in the face of a test of
olfactory specularity? Surely the experimenters would conclude that we have no
self-awareness. What I want to underline is that the theory of the stimulus-response
association rests on an erroneous assumption, i.e. that there is an objective stimulus
condition capable of triggering the responsive system. In reality, different conditions
are never objective setbacks: it is the species dimension that defines the presence of
setbacks. For a prey, the activation of a setback is more significant in the panorama of
risks, while for a predator it is the opposite: for this reason, to us humans, predators
seem more intelligent than prey, but this view has no foundation. If then a setback
condition determines high arousal, it is easy for the subject to lean towards irreflexive
behaviours, and once again the level of intersection, responsible for the emotional
activation, varies from one species to another.
One aspect that is closely related to the setback problem is the way in which
a species normally achieves its objectives. The species that face problems through
practices have totally different practognostic styles—think of the manipulation of
primates with respect to the use of the mouth in canids or of the hooked grip of
felids, as well as the refined use of the nose in suids or of the beak in corvids and
in psittacidae. The use of instruments also differs from one species to the next, as
demonstrated by the use of sticks in anthropomorphs compared to other techniques
found in shrikes, otters, etc. The strategy used by various species therefore does not
respond to a universal canon, and the learning processes follow paths of approxima-
tions that cannot be superimposed. The setback-response link uses a system of coping
techniques that are strongly defined by the species dimension, and learning cannot
be dissociated from the initial response style. By relegating the innate and the species
dimension to the sphere of prefigured and therefore unalterable behaviour, we have
created an unacceptable division between learning (seen primarily in the light of a
simple associative grammar) and species-specificity. In reality, a learning process is
nothing more than the evolution of the innate modules, following species-specific
interpretative (appraisal) and operational (coping) styles. Therefore, the species
dimension cannot simply be considered as the binding perimeter within which it is
possible to acquire an individual identity, nor can it be reduced to an apprenticeship
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which, through social relations, gives the individual standardised competences: the
species dimension is part of all learning processes because it provides the individual
with the evolutionary matrix that produces the different experiences and learnings
of ontogeny.
6.5 Dialogical Epistemology and Layers of Reality
Science rightly speaks of a world that contradicts our common sense and our natural
interpretations: the decentralization of theEarth inverts our relationshipwith the stars,
objects lose their appearance of solidity to break up into force fields, the living are no
longer brought back to a repetitive genealogy but to a mutant creation of new forms,
the dimensional ellipses envisioned bymathematics annihilate the ternary fundament
of experience, and time itself seems to rest on a spatial sheet instead of being the
simple flow of before and after. How did this come about, and why? How did this
counter-intuitive reality emerge, andwhat does it mean?Are there real predicates and
apparent predicates as Galileo claimed, or are there primary and secondary qualities
as Lock supposed? It is fundamental to know the human epistemic apparatus and the
basic coordinates that have decided its functions in order to investigate the concept
of stability of knowledge, which today seems to be anything but stable.
Every living being inhabits its own world, made up of specific risks and equally
peculiar opportunities, which is why its way of questioning reality has conformed
to specific needs and not to an objective or neutral assessment. Life is essentially a
partial perspective: being a predator is different from being a collector or a grazer, just
as being prey requires special measures of interface with reality. And these are but a
few examples of the complexity of the intersections of the living within the flow of
life. The emergence of a living form is always a definition of a specific immersion in
the context-world, both in a perceptual and in an operational sense. Uexküll defined
this immersion asUmwelt, but to all intents and purposes it is better defined as a layer
of reality, i.e. a specific way of interrogating reality and weaving it according to a
specific organizational matrix. Every living being must therefore rest its presence on
a seabed of stability as a background of risks and opportunities, i.e. those elements
that have consistency and relevance with respect to the replicating potential of the
subject.
Every event, in order to be understood, must therefore be transformed into its
kinetic, metamorphic, and epiphanic dimension—that is, in terms of appearance
and presence in a well-determined temporal range—but the evaluation of movement
requires a still background, that is, it relies on a presupposition of stability. As much
as we are aware of the Copernican revolution, we continue to say that the sun rises
at a given time and sets at another, just as despite Darwinian nominalism we still try
to understand the essence of “cats” by differentiating it from other species. Stability
is what is intuitively given to us by our apparatuses to understand the world, and
these apparatuses, obviously, are not only sensorial but also cognitive and metabolic.
The canvas of stability is essential to be able to question reality, i.e. to bring out
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what interests us, otherwise everything would vanish in a continuum of energy fields
that would be very unhelpful in terms of bringing out risks and opportunities. The
question that might come up is whether we therefore construct what we call external
reality or whether there is some effective correspondence between what appears to
us andwhat there is. Epistemic foundations are undoubtedly prerequisites to grasp an
event, representing its cliché. Should we therefore be satisfied with an instrumental
vision of epistemology?
My answer may seem ambivalent, and perhaps it is: I think that the world as it
appears to us is the result of organisational arbitrariness, but at the same time it is
not mere illusion or invention; it is the result of the particular organisation that we
have imposed on the virtuality of reality. When I speak of virtuality, I do not mean
an empty and amorphous entity which can be subject to any imposition of form,
but rather a content which can be organized into several schemes, but which also
presents a degree of resistance, and therefore cannot take all conceivable forms. In
this sense, I speak of species-specific image apparatuses as dialogical structures and
not as functions capable of inventing completely relative worlds.
In this sense, dialoguing means asking specific questions that involve correlated
answers on the part of reality—answers that therefore are not universal. The world
thus appears to us according to our specific questioning and presents us with a
partial view of itself. Indeed, the very act of asking questions implies some actions
of partialization such as: (i) overshadowing some findings; (ii) giving relevance to
others; (iii) conjugating them in a certain way. Our questions can be regarded as
organisational information packages that impose a specific configuration on reality.
Having said this, it is also evident that questioning does not happen in dissociation
from the questioned, as if the dialogue were taking place on a threshold of mutual
impermeability. To use a metaphor, one could say that a question is more like a
recipe, where reality provides the ingredients and the image we get from it is the
cake. Intus-legere is therefore a dialogue that harmonizes with the answers that the
questioner receives from reality, and it is the dialogue itself that brings out the layer
of reality where each organism is positioned.
The world appears to us as a collection of predicates that we acquire through
our sensory organs: the texture of a piece of furniture, the taste of a strawberry, the
colour of a flower, the smell of freshly cut grass. So it seems, but we know that
the predicate perceived does not belong exclusively to the object—for example, not
everyone agrees on the predicates of a particular body/event, and different species
always detect different predicates in the same phenomenon. On the other hand, the
predicate is not even a total invention of the organs that interface us with reality:
indeed, one can easily rely on the semiology of predicates to answer one’s needs.
Moreover, we experience synchronic or diachronic relations between predicates,
and we can infer norms that, even if not necessarily stable, give us a good predictive
probability: often the acquired correlations offer us the possibility of favouring the
occurrence of a phenomenon as well as knowing how to anticipate it. On the other
hand, we know just as well that often our image apparatuses lead us into error and
illusion, when we move away from the phylogenetic operative field that marks our
fitness.
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Now, if predicates neither fully belong to the world nor are not fully the product
of our sensory organs, one can say, with a good approximation, that they are the
emergent outcome of the interaction between our interface peculiarities—how we
face the world—and some overall qualities of reality. This emergence, our way of
“seeing” reality, is therefore not an expression of the world itself, but of our particular
dialogue with the world. And why do we dialogue with the world? For a very simple
reason: we need answers to live, we need order to stabilize our improbability. Any
living being is a thermodynamically unstable system—a dissipative structure, as
Prigogine put it (2015)—which owes its temporary maintenance in the complexity
of the non-equilibrium to its openness, to its interface functions. The comings and
goings of a plasmalemma, of an intestine, of a luxuriant arboreal foliage or of a blood
vessel are in fact an emergence of the world, whose dialogue is capable of delimiting
an environment, a domain of metabolic validity, through interchange thresholds. We
must therefore stabilize our presence on a layer of reality, as we need this no more
and no less than a plant needs to take root.
A living being is not autarkic: it must dialogue if it wants to preserve the internal
order that characterizes it, and information is the most precious resource for it to
trade. On the other hand, information is not about the world, it is not an objective,
manifest or cryptic reality that can be accessed; information is found in dialoguewith
theworld, at the point where a particular domain intersects a field of possibilities. The
answers do not lie outside our exposure to the world, which would be tantamount to
saying that they are of the world, nor do they emerge from imaginative or projective
constructions, which would be like saying that they are simply ours: the answers are
the result of precise questions, that is, of ways to reassemble the world around a flow
of key words. Dialogue therefore has its own ecosystem structure and it is there that
the living dwells and finds its true nourishment: information. I would like to make
it clear, however, that this information does not ultimately or even roughly define
the consistency of reality, but rather reveals the organisational possibilities available
to the dialoguer. The dialogue is therefore always creative, not because it invents
reality but because, through the possibilities that reality offers, it is able to bring out
an unprecedented form in reality, just as a sculptor carves an unprecedented statue
out of marble.
A question does not show what is, but what is possible; it does not show a ques-
tioning face that is objectively foreign to me, but reflects my own way of sketching
a profile within the list of possible ones. Therefore, information is not something
detached from the operational content of the interrogating entity; in other words, it
always requires a scale or gradient of information that brings out the correlated clues
and causes required of the particular operational space of the epistemic entity. This
space indicates the fitness field of the questioner, whose success does not depend
on a generic or absolute presentation of reality, but on a precise catalogue of risks
and opportunities to reveal. In other words, the questioner lives on a precise layer
of reality, given by a specific organisation of reality where the organisation itself
produces binding effects and emergences, i.e. qualities that cannot be subsumed by
other organisational levels. Human common sense is therefore a way of inhabiting
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reality; it is neither a projection nor an invention, but it is not even the only possible
reality.
CharlesDarwin has shown us that reproductive success is the key to understanding
the form, thehic et nunc of natura naturata, because only thosewhohave successfully
replicated themselves are now here to show off their characteristics. But reproduc-
tive success, capable of giving rise to perfect coherence between form and func-
tion, between organism and environment, between ecological niche and behavioural
style, between anatomy and physiology—a coherence that is above all congruity and
adherence to a style, an admirable balance between the demands of effectiveness and
efficiency—has precise questions for the world. Any living being needs the acquired
information to maintain its internal order, its negentropy: and that is its life, i.e. its
expression of its here-and-now, its replication and evolution. Can the energy a living
being feeds on be reduced to an epistemic function? The questions asked by a living
being concern the events that intersect the living being’s specific order and therefore
require a correlated epistemic foundation, that is, a peculiar dialogue with the world.
We can therefore consider the epistemic apparatus of a species as the layer of stability
that allows it to grasp only the events that are important to it from the point of view
of its fitness.
It is dialogue that defines the epistemic apparatus, so we should not be surprised at
its partiality—the given dialogue reflects the subjectivity of the question, the specific
choice of the event to be recorded, the type of information that is required—but this
does not justify falling into epistemic relativism or into the total disarticulation of the
functional result from the texture of the world. For example, we are led to view an
entity inmotion against its background, sowe say e.g. that it is the lion that approaches
and not the savannah that recedes. However, this preconceived interpretation is not
true in absolute terms—hence the illusion that the moon, and not the clouds, is
what moves in the sky, as reported by Eibl-Eibesfeldt (2017). Rather, this way of
seeing the world makes sense in the context in which we live and, moreover, it has a
significant adaptivemeaning. The epistemic apparatus calibrated by natural selection
does not respond to a need for absolute knowledge of reality but for “species-specific
action towards reality on the basis of strongly characterized needs”. The epistemic
apparatus, therefore, does not reflect reality, but the needs and the setbacks related
to the reproductive success of the subject.
Nevertheless, the epistemic apparatus has been calibrated on the resistances of
reality. The wings of a bird speak of ascending currents, the fins and silhouette of a
fish reflect the viscosity of fluids, and gills testify to the presence of oxygen dissolved
in water: likewise, epistemic apparatuses are the result of the peculiar adaptive needs
of a species in its interface with external reality. Epistemic apparatuses are not,
therefore, simple means to access reality that, like glass, owe their functionality to
transparency, to the ability to reflect reality in the most objective way possible, but
they are instruments that act on the world, just as a wing has a particular function
related to the element (air) with which it deals. And yet, though confronted with
a particular predicate of resistance—not all the resistances of reality have acted as
selectors—the epistemic apparatus reflects setbacks caused by processes of negation
or constraints caused by reality.
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Epistemic apparatuses therefore respond to two selective pressures. The first lies
in (i) the particular needs for information related to that living being, within a well-
defined “living environment” (living in the trees of a rainforest poses different infor-
mation needs compared to living in the open space of a savannah) and a “lifestyle”
(being a predator attentive to motion is different from being a gatherer, which comes
with a need for gathering-related information). The second is (ii) the counterpart
with which the subject must deal, i.e. the world as made up of discrete and solid
entities and not as constituted by force fields. As such the world is characterized by
two things. On the one hand, there are (1) “common norms”—such as the law of
gravitation, the surface-to-volume relationship, the common motion of parts—due
to which it is probable that several species will deal with it using the same epistemic
strategies. On the other hand, there are (2) by “specific layers”, because each species
needs different backgrounds against which to move its actors: hence the “plurality
of dialogic levels” that we observe in different animal species.
Therefore it is necessary to recognize not the fallacy of the senses but the meaning
of the phylogenetic dialogue. The processes of cutting out, connecting, attributing,
ordering, asking—which together constitute the manifestation of the phenomenon,
its emergence from the virtual domain—must be traced back to the adaptive ontic
that is based on partiality in terms of entitlement over reality. Both sensory access,
i.e. phenomenal virtuality, and the actual intersection with the event and the actu-
alization of the phenomenon, can rely on a contextual cushion to the extent that
they partialize reality. If we think in creationist terms we inevitably tend to sepa-
rate between the “how of knowledge” and the “what of knowledge”, falling into the
inevitable dichotomy between inductive regimes and deductive regimes, with the
aporetic drift that comes with it. In my opinion, this dualism results from an anthro-
pocentric view of the epistemic praxis and from a failure to embrace the evolutionary
view of the cognitive process. The interrogation is never positioned on a polarity but
is always the product of the dialogic interaction between the two poles: dialogue
gives rise to a mirroring, so we must recognize the recursion of the process where
the what determines the how and vice versa.
If, in fact, we recognize not only the partiality of the intersection with reality,
which derives from phylogenetic specialization, but also the introjection of the very
predicates responsible for this partiality—just as the gills reflect the water environ-
ment of fish—we will realize that the “how of knowledge” is the result of a prior
introjection of the “what of knowledge”, even if the latter is not achieved through an
individual evolutionary process. The image apparatuses of every species partialize
reality, organizing it according to a given matrix of use of the world, but they them-
selves are forged by the world and not by a capricious demiurge—let alone by a
demon who has made fun of the living by building an illusory reality around it.
Knowledge is always a way to build partiality within the totality of reality, so it is
not possible to achieve absolute knowledge of reality, but always only of a single
level of it. Still blinded by the scientific revolution of the 17th century, we are led to
believe that science offers us an objective mirror image of the world when, on the
contrary, it does nothing but establish domains of validity referring to the particular
technologies of interrogation of the world developed by technopoiesis.
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Knowledge therefore implies an epistemic apparatus that is “capable of” or “called
to” making the life context of a given entity partial or usable. Two things are clear
in this respect. First, (1) it is impossible to intersect the world without questions
and theories; second (2) any intersection, in its emergence, is in turn a source of
questions and theories of a different order. The how and the what of knowledge are
only apparently two separate realities because each individual, called to the epistemic
act, already in its first intersections with the world is provided with an apparatus of
philological heritage. This “how” results from a previous selective exposure to the
context, i.e. to the “what” of knowledge, in its predicates of resistance and influence.
The way (how) of knowledge has therefore already introjected certain predicates of
the object (what), namely those involved in the adaptive process, so that the how
reflects the what. However, it does not reflect it in its being as such, but in the
predicates which are influential from an adaptive point of view, thereby inevitably
constructing a phenomenal partiality. The how is therefore an a priori what, redefined
and partialized on the basis of the adaptive meaning of some of its predicates, just
as breathing only captures the oxygen part of the air.
Therefore, the first organizational dimension of the epistemic apparatus refers to
phylogeny and can be traced back to a process of partial or distorted configuration of
knowledge. The how of knowledge is thus not an a priori transcending the object of
knowledge, but is the result of the selective dialectic between the object itself and the
ontic style of the knowing subject. And this process refines the ability to partialize
the thing on the basis of relevant predicates, introjecting them like a key into the
corresponding lock. The epistemic apparatus is therefore the result of a dialectic
function that intersects the objectives of the taxon in phylogeny and the resistances-
influences that are virtually present in the context and can be identified through
precise predicates. The epistemic apparatus is ultimately a resolvent organ, called to
solve the problematic contents encountered by the subjects of a given species.
6.6 Layers of Reality as Aspects of Virtuality
Dialogue is therefore a way of organizing reality, and epistemology is a way of
positioning oneself on a layer of reality in order to draw useful information from it.
This means that it is not an approximation but an emergence: it is not an arbitrary or
paradigmatic construction, but a way of eliminating noise and bringing out certain
contents. Mental categories and sensory organs are wired together to organize a
layer of reality that is consistent from an adaptive point of view, as it can support that
species in its daily need tomaintain a highly improbable internal organization.A layer
of reality is therefore a single aspect of reality, which is not invented, not illusory,
not commensurable. Rather, it is the answer to a precise question, an answer that
necessarily has to cut corners, fade out inappropriate details, arbitrarily put together
different points into prearranged Gestalts, bring out correlations, hypothesize causal
relations by cutting off third variables, and operate background oscillations. In short,
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the answer can never be exhaustive; on the contrary, the very nature of the answer is
elective.
The order or, if you like, the predictability of a description-explication depends
on the scale of observation, that is, on the layer on which our epistemic apparatuses
rest. To quote Zbilut and Giuliani: “The universe can therefore be seen as a picture
with different levels of apparent determinism and noise depending on the scale of
observation” (Giuliani 2009: 72). This scale-dependence essentially tells us that if
wemodify our access, for example through a technological apparatus, by positioning
ourselves on a different layer of reality, we will be faced with a different organization
of reality and this will require that we modify our descriptive-explanatory structure.
Organizing reality does not mean inventing it but extracting scale emergences
within “a field of defined or resistant possibilities”. In this sense, I find Maurizio
Ferraris’s concept of “the resistance of reality” (Ferraris 2002: 139–165) particularly
appropriate. This notion,moreover, helps us understand an important epistemological
principle, that is, that there are many ways to read reality, but only one way in
which reality falsifies your assertions. This also means that an instrument is not
an amplification of the phylogenetic endowment, but a transformation of the same,
capable of modifying the access scale and therefore the gradient of determinism
and noise that we find in it, i.e. the type of information that we can obtain. It also
means three things: (1) even if reality exists, there is no privileged layer of reality
nor one layer capable of subsuming others; (2) it is not possible to access more than
one level of reality at the same time; (3) human beings cannot reduce reality to a
formal scheme. In this sense, I agree with Hilary Putnam’s “common sense realism”
in saying that what exists is independent of its knowability (…) and that there can
be many correct descriptions of reality (Putnam 1992).
On the other hand, if reality can be organized into several binding-emergent struc-
tures, each one endowedwith particular resistances, it is evidently impossible to reach
a single and objective knowledge of reality—one can only broaden the information
space. Basically, it is not possible to say that a given description of reality is true in
the absolute sense—and this is part of a long epistemological tradition—but only that
one can broaden one’s field of information about reality by multiplying the number
of questions, that is, by accessing several levels of reality, where each tells some-
thing about the entity-event. I believe that every layer of reality defines domains
of validity, so we are not faced with approximations but with a plurality of views
on the world. Every questioning progression, whether it has a theoretical basis or
results from the advent of a new technology—I don’t see much difference between
the two—increases our ability to access new levels of reality and therefore offers us
new opportunities to broaden the horizon of our knowledge.
So let’s go deeper into this concept-project of actualisation of reality. As I said,
I call these different organizations of reality, each incomplete from an explanatory
point of view if analyzed on the level of components, (Deacon 2001) “layers of real-
ity”. Each layer of reality can only be explained as a centrifugation from the same,
which implies the explicative self-insufficiency of all epistemic layers. The organi-
sation behind any reality level depends on the potential of reality and on the type of
question that is being asked. In this sense, if wewanted to find an absolute conception
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of reality, we could define it not as a specific state but rather as a space of virtuality,
one within which the different levels of reality are all admissible. Every layer of
reality brings out phenomenal predicates that, despite being emergent entities, are
not to be considered projective.
Epistemology. therefore, is not a way of “inventing a context” but a particular
intersection with reality on the basis of a temporary dwelling in reality. In order to
act on a particular context, it is necessary to define correlation gradients and therefore
to emphasize some aspects and to encrypt others. Assuming a positioning scale, the
questioner brings out an order that is not illusory or invented, but that nevertheless
depends on the relational space in which the observation-dwelling is positioned. This
hunger for well-defined answers therefore leads to the emergence of a dialogue or
information exchange, electing a specific interface level that actualizes one of the
many possibilities of reality, coagulating one of its possible organizations within
the field of virtuality. The subject is situated in its species and individual dimension
precisely because of this positioning of the interface, which allows the subject to
detect only those events that have some relevance to its problem.
On the other hand, it is wrong to believe that only the experiential level or the
direct observation level—common sense or phylogenetic epistemology—are enti-
tled to define reality, as is often stated by those who profess common sense realism.
A scientific theory is as entitled as direct experience to describe reality: it has the
same ability to bring out predicates that tell us something more about a given field
of virtuality of reality, and the same ability to deal with the fields of resistance of
the external world. Moving away from phylogenetic epistemology, new phenomenal
predicates and new resistances of reality will emerge through anthropodecentra-
tive mechanisms—the counterintuitive character of science refers precisely to this
centrifugal process. Every time the questioner hybridizes their logical endowments
with a tool, every time they gain particular knowledge, every time they open up to
new existential dimensions through animal epiphany, they modify their dialogical
structure with reality. Decentralizing themselves from common sense, the questioner
receives a different organization or scale gradient, giving rise not to a construct, but
to a new level of reality.
The concept of “layer of reality” recalls a passage from Aristotle referring to
Speusippus’ theories: “Speusippus starts from the One and adopts principles for
each of his levels of reality.” The concept of multiplicity of principles implies a
positional choice on the part of the questioner. Following this indication, in a dialogic
conception of the descriptive-explanatory experience, the phenomenal predicates
depend not only on the intersection between the properties of the observer and those
of the observed, but also on the layer of reality on which the observer stands. One can
summarize what has been said so far in three points: (1) not only does the observed
adhere to reality, but it was built on the basis of reality itself; (2) a level of reality
depends on both the field of virtuality of reality and on the characteristics of the
observer; (3) a level of reality also depends on the type of interrogation that the
observer poses at a given time to the field of virtuality of reality.
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We access and recognize a status of reality through the partiality of its appearance,
its giving itself to us in a circumstantial way. Therefore, we intersect reality’s pred-
icates of resistance to, or influence on, our specific way of being. But even within
this limited access, what we define as a phenomenon or phenomenal predicate is
ultimately an aspect of reality, a possible expression of it. The truth/falsehood of any
statement depends on the questioning structure, in other words on how I intersect
reality or on what level of reality I ask the question, that is, on “what interests me”
and “how I ask it”. If the question for some reason does not intersect some specific
resistances, these do not emerge: our epistemic apparatus is not structured to bring
out the Copernican universe because the type of interrogation that could make it
emerge is not pertinent to the “epistemic positioning” of our species. It is necessary
to hybridize this epistemic apparatus to bring out new interrogative structures, which
means initiating new dialogues through the aid of otherness or by becoming other-
ness, and this happens whenever the human being constructs anthropodecentrative
mechanisms.
On the other hand, there is no doubt that in order to question reality it is essen-
tial to position oneself on a precise level, to stabilize certain parameters of noise
and determinism, and to use a scale gradient that brings out specific findings. The
anthropodecentrative mechanism—for example, observing the sky through a tele-
scope—does not allow a structure of reality to emerge, but rather brings out a new
organization of it, showing us new resistances and thus widening our observation of
reality. Therefore, theories are not approximations, but specific questions that allow
new resistances to emerge, providing more information about reality and allowing
us to formulate new questions. The predictability of a theory thus has to do with
the congruence between the questioning structure and the type of phenomenon to be
investigated, so that the level of predictability can be referred to the space of proba-
bility in which we are operating. Each interrogative structure necessarily intersects
some resistances and not others: this depends on the type of scale positioning adopted
by the questioning, that is, on the ability to bring out and order only some events.
Common sense is therefore nothing more than one of the many possible views
of reality, capable of providing our phylogenetic trajectory with the support level on
which to formulate the questions about reality that are useful to us. This means that
common sense is not “reality” but a presentation of it, that is, a layer of reality—one
that has intersected our species’ questions. A fortiori it is not an illusory projection
or construction, let alone an approximation. One could say that the level of reality
occupied by common sense experience represents the small observatory on reality
that has been indispensable for us to solve the problem of our species-specific fitness.
Therefore, phenomenal predicates certainly do belong to the observed object, i.e. they
are not constructions, since they have acted on the epistemic apparatus to calibrate
its “experiential how”; however, their phenomenal peculiarity emerges from the way
in which we question reality, i.e. from the horizon and the depth of field of our
observation.
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6.7 In Conclusion
The proposal that I have put forward in this essay can be summarised in a few basic
points, which I list below.
i. Reality does not have an ultimate-defined configuration, but is characterized
by a “virtual field”, which is finite but indefinite in terms of possibilities, and
therefore presents very precise limitations, i.e. resistance points, but allows
for many possible configurations.
ii. Each act of knowledge is a precise organization of this virtuality, giving life
to a “layer of reality”, much like carving a statue starting from the virtuality
of marble—it is a process of actualization.
iii. Each level of reality is the result of a specific dialogue between the subject and
reality, i.e., it is the emergent outcome of a “dialogical mode of intersection”,
i.e. a given question posed to the world.
iv. Every living being, on the basis of its own somatic and ecological condition,
is not confronted with the field of virtuality of reality, but with an “epistemic
dimension”, i.e. a more restricted virtual field, so that every epistemological
perspective is necessarily constrained to the specific dialogic process of that
body with its world-context.
v. Every epistemicdimensionnecessarily determines the emergenceof a species-
specific layer of reality, because no species can prescind from the phylogenetic
and somatic heritage that defines its intersection mode—whence “intellectual
pluralism”.
vi. Given this restriction due to phylogeny, every individual is able to go beyond
the already-given, namely to intus-legere or go beyond appearances, building
a “singular intersection” with reality.
vii. Every time an entity organizes its own intersection, through processes of
experiential singularity, it actualizes a level of reality that did not exist prior
to the epistemic act. It does so through a “predicative emergence” that gives
rise to reality predicates of which the subject is an active protagonist, just like
a sculptor.
viii. All that the individual encounters as an immutable law is a “resistance of
reality”: not what is given to it as a possibility, but what is denied to it, that
is, what and where it is unable to actualize.
ix. Knowledge is not detached from the other dimensions of subjectivity, but is
affected by the ownership, desire and sentience that characterize animality,
so that there can be no knowledge without the full involvement of the somatic
multilayer.
x. Cognitive processes can progress not only byvirtue of the creative and singular
action of intus-legere or of the multiplicity of points of view, able to bring
out new resistances of reality, but also by widening the epistemic dimen-
sion through two main avenues, namely: (1) modifying the dialogic level of
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intersection, for example through new technologies, and (2) using counter-
intuition, for example by questioning some assumptions taken for granted
only because they are the result of a given phylogenetic heritage.
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Part III
Ethical Dilemmas Beyond the Borders
of Species
Chapter 7
Contributions of Ethology to the Birth
of a Post-Anthropocentric Ethics
Marco Celentano
Abstract From the time of Aristotle until the first half of the twentieth century,
with rare exceptions, the Western tradition has excluded non-human animals from
the community of beings worthy of an ethical consideration, assigning them the role
of “animated tools” of the human will (Aristotle, Politics: 1254 b 10). Only from
the 1960s did an anti-speciesist, post-anthropocentric, bio-centric ethics begin to
spread. This chapter documents the role played in promoting this ethical revolution
by ethological research, the important discoveries it has led to and the changes in
perspective they generated. What these pages are trying to focus on is, therefore,
the link between the scientific revolutions introduced by ethology (daughters of
the Darwinian revolutions), with its various stages and articulations, and an ethical
revolution: that of contemporary anti-speciesism.
7.1 Introduction
Thefirst section frames the singular relationship that the dominant currents ofmodern
Western thought established with “the animal”, declined in the singular and intended
as any non-human animal, starting with the century of scientific revolution. Since
the Cartesian turning point, animals began to be considered a non-sentient, and
even unthinking natural “machines”, breaking with the Aristotelian tradition which,
while reducing them to the role of human instruments, at least recognized in them a
“sensitive life”.
Despite the transformism that began to spread in the eighteenth century, the
Darwinian revolution that marked the nineteenth century, and the birth of ethology
in the early twentieth century, this reductionist approach characterized the prevailing
orientations, both in the philosophical and the scientific sphere from the early mid-
seventeenth to the first half of the twentieth century. The section concludes by
showing how, in the 1960s, new teaching techniques experimented on apes, while
remaining theoretically, methodologically and ethically in the wake of Cartesianism,
led to an anthropocentric self-refutation, thanks to their surprising results.
The second section focuses on an epochal turning point, even more radical and
significant from an ethical and theoretical point of view: the one also introduced in
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the ‘60s by field studies of apes and the beginning of a hard fight for their protection
and the defence of their natural environment. A turning point and a struggle that
found their emblems in the faces of the “three angels of Leakey”, the three young
primatologists sent by the anthropologist Louis Leakey to carry out the first field
research on the life of the three great apes, our “sister” species (chimpanzees, gorillas,
and orangutans): Jane Goodall, Dian Fossey and Birutè Galdikas.
The third section focuses on the rediscovery of the pathic, affective and cognitive
dimension of animal existence, that is, of its rejoicing and suffering, of the affections
and forms of thoughts, introduced by the pioneers of cognitive ethology, and on the
important impulse it gave to the birth of anti-speciesist ethics. Particular attention
is paid to the essay Have Animals an experience?, published by Konrad Lorenz in
1963 (Lorenz 1963), which, by discussing the question of “pleasure” and “pain” in
non-human animals, anticipated issues that would come to the fore in the scientific
and ethical debate only in the following decade, with the birth of cognitive ethology,
as promoted by Donald Griffin (1976), and the publication of the first contemporary
anti-speciesistmanifesto, namely, the bookAnimal Liberation (Singer 1975) by Peter
Singer.
7.2 Modernity and “The Animal”
The teaching of Aristotle, according to which the “sensitive life is common to the
horse and the ox and to every animal” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, I, 6, 1098a),
reaches modernity modified and expanded by important thinkers, such as Bernardino
Telesio, Giordano Bruno and Tommaso Campanella, for whom the ability to feel
sensations is, indeed, widespread in every kind of material entity.
The century of the scientific revolution marks, however, with respect to this tradi-
tion, a drastic caesura. The paragraphs IV and V of the fifth part of the Discours
de la method by René Descartes served as a symbolic watershed introducing the
idea that non-human animals are a sort of natural “automatons” (Descartes 1637, V,
4) and do not actually experience real “feeling”, “passion” or “thought” (Descartes
1637, V, 5). Then, 41 years later, the scientist, philosopher and theologian Nicolas
Malebranche, heir to the Cartesian tradition, will formalize this approach by stating
that “animals do not feel” because they are machines “devoid of soul and completely
incapable of perception” (Malebranche 1678). This theoretical obliteration of the
sensorial, emotional and volitional dimension of animal life, and in particular of
animal suffering, was to be met, in the following centuries, with a great success in
the philosophical and scientific field, also for its ethical and practical implications. In
fact, it favoured a removal of the spontaneous empathy that the suffering, and more
generally the expressiveness, of other animals can raise in human beings (it is known
the anecdote according towhichMalebranche, while conversingwith a friend, kicked
a pregnant whining dog justifying his act by such a conviction). Precisely for this
reason, it offered legitimacy both to the traditional forms of exploitation and to the
use of non-human animals and to a research method that, starting from that time and
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for more than three centuries to come, would not have stopped marking a dizzying
increase: experimentation on living animals. Nicolas Fontaine, after observing some
experiments carried out at the Jansenist seminary in Port-Royal, wrote in his memo-
rial, published posthumously 99 years after the Cartesian Discours: “They dealt
blows to the dogs with perfect indifference, and they made fun of those who pitied
the creatures believing that they felt pain. They said that animals were like watches
[…] but that the body could not feel anything. They nailed the four legs of the poor
animals to boards, in order to vivisect them and see the blood circulation, which was
an important topic of conversation” (Fontaine 1736, II: 52–53).1
Regarding the specific problem of animal sensitivity and intelligence, the era of
the scientific revolution inaugurated a kind of approach that, in the philosophical,
anthropological and psychological fields, would have survived, despite Darwin and
the birth of ethology, at least until the first half of the twentieth century. It consists in
measuring the cognitive and communicative abilities of non-human animals on the
basis of a single parameter, explicitly anthropocentric and logocentric: their ability
or inability to articulate discourses, their aptitude or ineptitude to understand and
reproduce the sounds and rules of human languages. For Descartes, the hypothesis
that even the most “idiotic and stupid” men surpass in intellect the most intelligent
animals appears confirmed, a priori, by the fact that the first ones “know how to
combine together differentwords and compose a speech to be understood” (Descartes
1637, V, 5), while, in his opinion, magpies and parrots would speak but not “think
what they say” (ibid.). This conviction leads the father of rationalism to reject the
ancient idea, again defended by Michel de Montaigne, “that the beasts speak to each
other, but we do not understand their language: since, if this were true, they, having
several organswhich correspond to ours, could be understood equallywell by us as by
their fellows” (ibid.). It may be surprising that, at the time, not even the philosopher
of “methodical doubt” was touched by the doubt that, in a scientific investigation into
animal communication skills, the burden of deciphering and learning the language
of the other should fall on the scientists and not on the animals. But it is even
more surprising to notice that, for about three centuries, the hypothesis that the
anthropomorphic apes, and other non-human animals, are capable of thinking and
using symbolic languages were to be discarded starting from approaches, methods
and arguments similar to the Cartesian ones.
In the first half of the twentieth century, several failed attempts to teach some
chimpanzees to reproduce human language through the phonic medium followed
one another. American psychologist Robert Mearns Yerkes was to be, in the first
decades of the century, one of the pioneers in this field (Yerkes 1916, 1943). In the
following years the studies of Kellog and Kellog (1933), Hayes (1951), Hayes and
Hayes (1952) were to confirm the failure of this kind of attempt.
A different kind of experiment was instead to begin, in 1967. While remaining
in the Cartesian perspective of measuring the intelligence of non-human animals
assuming by as its parameter their ability to learn human languages, it was to lead,
thanks to the new techniques adopted, to surprising discoveries and to a progressive
1The volume was published posthumously, Fontaine died in 1709.
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dismantling of the Cartesian assumptions. To obtain this result, it was enough to
stop asking of chimpanzees a performance that is impossible for them, like the vocal
articulation of words and phrases drawn from human languages, and let them learn
the sign language commonly used by deaf-mute people in the USA: the American
Sign Language (ASL).2
Allen and Beatrice Gardner, two psychologists of the University of Nevada,
launched these experiments by starting to teachWashoe, a young female chimpanzee,
to learn this language. Washoe, thanks to the extraordinary efforts of Roger Fouts, to
whom she was later entrusted, learned to properly use about 250 different signs and
to compose with them meaningful sentences, as well as teaching the same language
to other chimpanzees, with no human incentives and mediation (Fouts 1997: chap.
X). Many similar experiments, supported by different techniques, were successfully
performed from the early 1970s onwards, with chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and
orangutans.3 Even the self-recognition tests in the mirror (mark test or mirror self-
2As it is known, already many human populations that have not used writing, and among these
different tribes of North American Indians, invented and adopted manual languages that functioned
as a sort of universal language through which different tribal members or linguistic groups could
understand each other.
3I will limit myself here to mention some of the most well-known experiments in teaching human
languages to apes produced since the 1970s:
• The case of the chimpanzee Nim Chimpsky, instructed, in the 1970s by Herbert S. Terrace of
the Columbia University, who learned, over the course of 44 months, to communicate using the
sign language and combining 125 different signs.
• The new interactive communication technique introduced in 1972 by Sue Savage-Rumbaugh
and Duane Rumbaugh of the Yerkes Primate Center of Atlanta (Georgia), based on the use of
lexigrams, usable through a portable keyboard with buttons marked with different geometric
symbols, each of which reproduces the sound of a given word. The chimpanzees Lana, Austin
and Sherman were among the first apes to be trained with this technique, then also applied by
Rumbaugh to bonobos (Savage-Rumbaugh and Lewin 1994).
• The studies conducted by David Premack with the chimpanzees Sarah, Peony, Elizabeth and
Nim instructed the use of plastic signs (Premack 1986) and the paper he published together
with G. Woodruff in 1978 entitled Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?. In it the
authors introduced, the hypothesis that very intelligent animals such as chimpanzees possess “a
theory of mind”, here understood as the ability to attribute, to other individuals, mental states,
expectations and desires and to use these hypotheses or information to adapt their behaviour to
the other, basing on their own experience. The application of this concept of the theory of mind
to the study of animal behaviour has proved to be of great use when, from the 1980s onwards,
ethological research began to document, in a conspicuous manner, phenomena of concealment
and deception in apes and in social birds like crows.
• Thework led byGary L. Shapiro between 1973 and 1975with the orangutan Aazk using training
techniques similar to those of David Premack.
• The performances ofKoko, a gorilla trained fromayoung age to use theAmericanSignLanguage
(ASL) by Francine Patterson, current director of the Gorilla Foundation, located in California:
after a few months, Koko began to invent, for the objects that were unknown to her, new names
composed of two words, such as “match bottle” to name a lighter, “baby elephant” to indicate
a wooden Pinocchio, “hat eyes” to characterize a mask. The young ape has also developed the
ability to lie through this form of language. Patterson reports, among others, the case in which
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recognition test: MSR),4 introduced in the ‘60s by Gordon Gallup (1970), while
arousing a long and heated debate concerning the interpretation of the performances
observed, confirmed ability to recognize their own mirror image in chimpanzees,
bonobos, orangutans and gorillas.5 The logocentric, anthropocentric and at the same
time mechanistic and reductionist approach introduced back-then by Cartesianism
will finally reach its auto-confutation after over three centuries. In the new millen-
nium, the ability to recognize one’s own image reflected in amirror has been attested,
through the Mark test, also in Asian elephants (Plotnik et al. 2006), rhesus macaques
(Rajala et al. 2010), horses (Baragli et al. 2017), bottle-nosed dolphins (Reiss and
Marino 2001), orcas (Delfour and Marten 2001), in birds such as magpies (Prior
et al. 2008) and in cartilaginous fish like the mantas (Ari and D’Agostino 2016), in
a tropical cleaner fish like the Labroides dimidiatus (Masanori et al. 2019) and even
in social insects such as ants (Cammaerts and Cammaerts 2015).
7.3 The Discovery of “Anthropoid”
and “Anthropomorphous” Cultures and the Fight
for Their Survival
The studies based on the teaching of human made languages to non-human animals
and on the mirror test, although leading to innovative and surprising results, still
remained linked in various aspects to the Cartesian tradition; in fact, they appeared:
• marked by the anthropocentric criterion of considering our ways of expressing
intelligence as the only possible ones, or at least superior to all others;
• oriented to a priori assume the hypothesis that the average linguistic skills of an
adult man, belonging to a civilization that has codified his own communication
system in written rules, constitute the only channel, or the only form, through
which thinking and reasoning beings can manifest and articulate themselves;
• set up, theoretically and methodologically, starting from the conviction that
removing an animal from its environment and imprisoning it in a laboratory, to
Koko, caught gnawing a pencil by an instructor, responded to his reproach by making the sign
corresponding to the word “lips” and simulating putting on lipstick (Patterson 1978, 1987).
• The results obtained by the orangutan Chantek who, trained by the American anthropologist and
primatologist LynnMiles (Miles 1994), assimilated the understanding of spoken English and the
active and passive use of ASL, coming to understand and use about 150 signs to communicate
desires, coin new terms, ask questions and lie.
4In its typical form, the mark test consists in marking the face or another part of the body of an
animal with a spot of colour which it can see and touch while it is sedated and, when it wakes up,
verifying if the animal locates, examines and tries to remove the spot by looking in the mirror.
5Unlike other apes, gorillas, in which individual recognition is based more on olfactory factors than
on visual factors, show greater difficulties and often fail in the mark test. However, there are studies
that attest that some individuals belonging to this species have passed it (Posada and Colell 2007;
Allen and Schwartz 2008).
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impose on it experiments conceived with parameters and motivations completely
unrelated to its own nature, is a way of making science more rigorous than the
observation of its behaviour in a natural environment.6
If today most scholars have dismissed the dogma that, from Descartes to
behaviourism, forced scientist to see in animal intelligence a mere mechanicalness,
and if the behavioural sciences were at least partially detached from the lazy arro-
gance and the reiterated violence implicit in the traditional methods of studying
behaviour in the laboratory, this was due to a synergy between the type of research
we have mentioned and a very different way of studying animal behaviour: field
research combined with the commitment to the protection of wild animals and of the
environments in which they live.
A first important step in this direction had already derived from the birth of clas-
sical ethology, whose method was based on the idea that to understand the valences
and functions of animal activities, it is necessary to observe them in their natural
environment. Finally, animals were no longer uprooted from their environment and
forced to live in laboratory enclosures. Instead, it was the scientist who went to the
places where his study “objects” lived, to dive or climb with them, to spend days,
months and years observing them, learning their languages and discovering their
meanings and functions in the species-specific ecological and social context. The
achieved results opened up an entire world to scientific understanding, that of animal
intelligence, emotionality, sociality and communication, for centuries invisible to
most Western scientists and writers, too concentrated on the effort to reduce every
element of nature to a human instrument. From the ‘50s, ethological research would
have crossed the borders of Europe, beginning to spread throughout the world.
These developments also led to an increasingly interweaving of the anthropolog-
ical and primatological studies and to the possibility of for the first time launching
projects for a long-term observation of apes in their natural environment. The main
promoter of the latter was Louis Leakey, the most authoritative paleoanthropologist
of the time. The trio of young primatologists to whom the scholar entrusted the
arduous task would have contributed to irreversibly modifying the perception that
the human world had of apes and, more generally, of non-human animals.
In 1960, Jane Goodall began to study chimpanzees at the Gombe Stream Chim-
panzee Reserve, in the western Tanzania, a place that, thanks to her efforts, would
have become since 1968 a protected area and no longer a safari destination.
Having already mentioned, in the third chapter of the volume, the scientific
merits of Goodall, I will here briefly dwell on the ethical commitment in the anti-
speciesist, environmentalist and humanitarian field that this indomitable woman has
demonstrated for over half a century now.
6These critical findings do not apply to the path taken by Roger Fouts who after being compelled
for a long time to study chimpanzees in unsuitable conditions for them, fought hard over fifteen
years, finally succeeding in 1993 to fund the Chimpanzee and Human Communication Institutes,
in whose natural reserve Washoe has been able to live happily, together with the other chimpanzees
of the group that Fouts has cared for, for the last fourteen years of its existence.
7.3 The Discovery of “Anthropoid” and “Anthropomorphous” Cultures … 223
Working in the field for decades, Goodall soon became aware of the problem of
the gradual destruction of the natural environments and of the risk of extinction to
which apes, other mammals, many other animal and plant species, and even several
human cultures, were and still are exposed, in Africa as elsewhere. This awareness
led her to become, from the 1970s, one of the most well-known activists for the
defence of the natural environments, of the organisms that inhabit them and of the
human populations in need, damaged by a development model, like the one still
dominant today, which is blind to the environmental, biological and social damage
which it itself produces.
In 1977, Jane founded the Jane Goodall Institute (http://www.janegoodall.org/):
a structure that, through a wide range of activities and projects, aims to practice,
spread and teach respect for and the protection of the environment, living organisms,
human populations and cultures exposed to the “collateral damage” of the current
development model. In fact, if the primary mission of the institute is the conservation
and/or re-insertion of chimpanzees in their natural environment, and the improve-
ment of their living conditions in the cases of individuals or groups that cannot be
legally freed from captivity, the “holistic” approach promoted by the JGI implies that
this objective is always pursued in close intertwining with projects of development
of the human communities present in the places where the institute operates, of the
education of young people to environmental sustainability and of sustenance and
start-up education and work of the most disadvantaged. In short, the commitment
to get to know and protect chimpanzees and their natural environment is under-
stood by the founder and members of the JGI as an important segment of a broader
commitment aimed at spreading the awareness of the interdependent relationships
between man and the rest of nature, at introducing young people to the discovery and
respect of animal minds and cultures, and at safeguarding the entire community of
the living, men included, by the devastating effects of anthropic impact and capitalist
development.
I will limit myself to mention five of the international projects on which the
Institute, that now has offices in 26 countries, works:
• the Jane Goodall’s Institute Center for Primate Studies, mission of which is the
non-invasive study of the behaviour and cultural traditions of primates in their
natural context of life, based in the Gombe National Park, Tanzania;
• the Tchimpounga Chimpanzee Rehabilitation Center, also known as the largest
wildlife oasis founded in Africa to fight against illegal trafficking in chimpanzees,
which is located in Congo and has another recovery center dislocated in South
Africa;
• the ChimpanZoo International Research Project, aimed at studying chimpanzees
in captivity to improve their living conditions.
• the TACARE project, funded by the European Community, which provides
support to the populations of 30 African villages through reforestation programs,
environmental education, water purification and health care;
• the “humanitarian and environmental” program Roots & Shoots, now active in
more than 80 countries, goal of which is to educate young people about respecting
224 7 Contributions of Ethology to the Birth …
the environment, knowing and understanding other cultures, about the importance
of an individual commitment to rediscover the affective and social bond between
man and other animals and the fight against exploitation and social inequalities.
Today, around 290 great apes, including chimpanzees and gorillas, are housed in
natural “sanctuaries” managed by the JGI and about 130 African human commu-
nities are assisted by institute volunteers with education and training programs for
environmental protection activities, or start-up to the eco-compatible management
of agricultural works. About 5800 school projects related to Roots & Shoots are
currently underway in the most diverse areas of the world.
Jane Goodall, who was named Messenger of Peace for the United Nations and
awarded the UNESCO Gold Medal, today, at the age of 85, still travels for most of
the year, to promote such projects and find the funding needed to support them.
Dian Fossey, the first contemporary “martyr” in the fight against the exploitation
and killing of the wild animals, was also a primatologist and ethologist. In the early
1960s, Fossey started, with the gorillas of the Rwandan forests doing work similar to
that of JaneGoodall with chimpanzees in Tanzania. In 1967 she founded theKarisoke
Research Center, an institute that still exists today, based in the Volcanoes National
Park of Rwanda. Its mission is to protect and study mountain gorillas, an endangered
species. Dian’s commitment in the fight against the illegal suppression and trade
of gorillas led, in 1985, to his barbaric killing by poachers, probably covered by
the complicity of politicians or businessmen linked to the illegal trade in gorillas.
The film Gorillas in the Mist, released in 1998 and based on the book by Fossey of
the same title (Fossey 1983) and some other volumes (Gordon 1993; Mowat 1987;
Nienaber 2006), made his story known to the world, even though his murder remains
unpunished until now. The Dian Fossey Gorilla Fund International, an institute that
aims at raising funds to safeguard gorillas and their natural environment, was founded
after his death.
BirutèGaldikas, the thirdwoman sent byLeakey to discover theworld of our sister
species, dedicated herself to the protection and study of the orangutans in nature by
going, in 1971, to Borneo, to the almost uncontaminated territory of the Tanjung
Puting Reserve, working in the field for more than thirty years.
Galdikas founded the Orangutan Foundation International, an institute aimed at
finding funds and volunteers to support a center for the recovery and reintegration
in nature of captive-living orangutans and for the protection of the orangutans of
Borneo and the rainforest where they live.
Still, this ethologist-zoologist-activist, who is currently a professor at the Simon
Fraser University in Burnaby, British Columbia, and a Professor Extraordinaire
at the Universitas Nasional in Jakarta, Indonesia, continues his anti-speciesist and
ecological efforts.
Thanks to the courage, passion and talent of these researchers, to the enormous
discomforts and dangers they had to face, man began to discover and protect the
cultures and the expressiveness of our sister species, todaymore andmore exposed to
the risk of a complete destruction, due to deforestation, climate change and poaching.
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The commitment of these women was at the origin of all the main projects of protec-
tion, rehabilitation and re-insertion in nature of the primates born from the ‘60s
onwards and, more generally, it contributed to promoting a new sensitivity to the
environmental problems and to the protection of animal and plant species at risk,
and biodiversity.
Another ethologist-primatologist who has dedicated his life to the study and
protection of the great apes, and should be mentioned here, is Roger Fouts. I have
already discussed in the first section of the chapter some of the results that Fouts
achieved in his work with Washoe, the first ape trained in the use of the American
Sign Language. I would now like to highlight some of the ethical implications of
his work and the important impact it had on global public opinion. In the preface to
the book in which Fouts recounts his experience (Fouts 1997), Jane Goodall focuses
on the “indissoluble bond” between him and Washoe, which lasted until the latter’s
death in 2007, and on the fact that Fouts, in order to protect the young chimpanzee,
sacrificed “his career prospects”. After a battle that lasted fifteen years, Fouts finally
succeeded in saving Washoe and other chimpanzees from living out their lives the
experimental laboratories and transferring them to a place suitable for their natural
characteristics in which they could spend the rest of their existence; it was the nature
reserve annexed to the Chimpanzee and Human Communication Institute of Central
Washington University, founded in 1993 by him and his wife Deborah Fouts. As
Goodall writes it was one of the “most extraordinary events of our time”, because
Fouts was a pioneer in the fight against another crucial aspect of the human exploita-
tion of non-human animals and animal testing and has become one of the best-known
animal rights advocates in the world, focusing on the legal rights of great apes and
organizing, along with Jane Goodall, a worldwide campaign for their protection
which has had a wide echo.
Finally, I would like to mention Ruth Harrison, a pioneer in the fight for the rights
of farmanimals,who, althoughnot an ethologist, has becomeapoint of reference both
for anti-speciesist movements and for those involved in the applied ethology (van de
Weerd and Sandilands 2008). In 1964, 11 years before Peter Singer’s book Animal
Liberation (Singer 1975) that would become the first manifesto of contemporary
anti-speciesistism, Harrison was among the first to denounce, in the book Animal
Machines (Harrison 1964), the atrocious living conditions of animals locked up in
intensive farms and to launch the fight, still in progress, for their disposal. Three years
later, in 1967, Harrison founded the Farm Animal Care Trust (FACT) and began to
work as a consultant for many committees, institutes and associations dedicated to
combating the exploitation of meat animals. Her pioneering commitment helped
spread the message all over the world. Her complaint shocked global public opinion
by stimulating, among other things, also the drafting and approval of the European
Convention for the Protection of Animals Kept for Farming Purposes, a document
drafted in 1976 that gave basic principles for the keeping, care and housing of farm
animals, especially in intensive breeding systems, and inspired the current national
and international legislations on the subject.
In short, as I have tried to demonstrate in this section, all themain battles promoted
the anti-speciesist movements and ethics born in the 1970s (from the protection of the
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biodiversity and endangered species to the fight against animal experimentation and
the daily harassment of billions of farm animals) have taken a fundamental impulse
from that journey to the discovery of animal minds, societies and languages which
began with the birth of ethology. In particular, most ethologists, from the 1960s
onwards, have conceived the study of animal ethology and the commitment for the
protection of animal life and well-being as an inseparable unicum. More generally
ethologists have had, and still have today, the merit of collecting, sometimes in
extremely difficult conditions, an enormous amount of empirical knowledge related
to the behaviour and psyche of animals, which new technologies such as sound and
film recordings have made possible starting from the twentieth century onwards.
This way, they made accessible to the scientific community and to the general public
the data that show, with immediate evidence, the cognitive resources, the social
complexity, the individual and cultural differences, the ability to suffer and rejoice
for causes not only physical but also social and emotional, that are widespread in the
world of non-human animals.
Anyonewhoobserved, albeit only in a documentary, a couple of grebes performing
their wedding dance, or a chimpanzee mother help her cub learn to open coconuts,
will have no doubts about the priceless value of these contributions. Anyone who
watched themovie of the liberation of the chimpanzeeWoundawhich, removed from
human exploitation, rehabilitated by the volunteers of the Jane Goodall Institute, and
finally brought back to its natural environment and liberated, first makes a small
run, then stops, turns back, hugs Jane Goodall closely for several seconds and then
finally goes away, will have an immediate confirmation of the ethical and theoretical
importance of this kind of documentation.
Anyone who watched the shots of the female gorilla Koko expressing the pain
for the death of her kitten friend first through the American Sign Language, and
later, alone in her shelter, with a heartbreaking crying, immediately understands that
between this kind of animals and human beings there are profound similarities that
also invest the plane of social and emotional ties.
7.4 From the Evidence of Animal Pain to the Discovery
of the Animal “You”: A Journey That Has Just Begun
As it iswell known, promoters of the anti-speciesistmovement,whichbegan to spread
in the 1970s, first and foremost focused their attention on the matter of animal pain,
insisting that contemporary society could no longer go on denying its existence.
That is, to behave as if the suffering systematically inflicted by men on the animals
kept in intensive farms, in the many places used for their commercial use and in
the scientific laboratories, did not exist. It was no coincidence that these develop-
ments towards meta-specific and anti-speciesist ethics were emerging precisely in
the years in which a new area of ethological research such as cognitive ethology
placed at the center of its research programs the question of animal “sentience”,
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“consciousness” and thinking. Rather, it was a historical conjuncture, a synergy
between a scientific orientation that affirmed the need to recognize to at least the
so-called “higher animals” a volitional capacity and a cognitive life and an ethical
movement that demanded respect for their ability to suffer or rejoice. Even in this
case, ethological research offered ethical reflection with the materials on which to
reason in the first place, as well as the empirical evidence of what it was postulating.
Ethical and scientific reasons were undoubtedly intertwined in the reflection of the
scholar who was the main promoter of cognitive ethology: Donald Griffin (1976).
His radical critique of the model of Cartesian ancestry which equated “the animal”
in general to a natural automaton, offered those who rebelled against the exploitation
of animals, their killing for commercial purposes and the destruction of their natural
environments, the first scientific support on which to base their claims.
However, one of the pioneers of this turning towards a post-mechanistic ethology,
willing to attribute to non-human animals an “experience”, a qualitative reception
of their physical states and an ability for thought, had been, even before Griffin,
Konrad Lorenz, founding father of comparative ethology together with Nikolaas
Tinbergen. Lorenz came only at a late age to the environmental commitment of which
his “spiritual testament in defense of man and nature”, collected in the volume of
talks with Kurt Mündl Rettet die Hoffnung (Save hope), bears witness (Mündl 1988).
Furthermore, the father of classical ethologywas not a vegetarian and his contribution
to the birth and development of anti-speciesist ethics was, therefore, only indirect.
It derived primarily from its activity as a popularizer and from the capacity that all
those who knew him, or read his books, found in him: his ability to understand and
describe animals “from within”, as Frans de Waal observed (de Waal 2001). That is:
grasping and explaining their internal “motivations” (a term that in ethology has both
physiological and psychic values) that lead them to behave in one way or another.
Secondly, Lorenz contributed to the diffusion of a new sensibility and a greater
attention towards non-human animals, as early as a dozen years before the official
birth of cognitive ethology, he introduced and anticipated many of the themes that
would have been at the centre of research programs in this area of study. His essay
Haben Tiere ein subjektives Erleben? (Do animals have a subjective experience?),
initially written for a radio conference (Lorenz 1963), inaugurated the reflection on
a subject that was at the time considered taboo in the field of behavioural sciences:
animals’ experience, “subjectivity” and thought.
After illustrating the limits of both the separatist and anthropocentric approaches
and of each model that limits itself to anthropomorphically homologating the feeling
and thinking of other animals to those of the humans, Lorenz affirmed that the
anatomical and neurophysiological comparison represented, in his opinion, the most
promising way to obtain, at least indirectly, clues to the existence, or non-existence,
in non-human animals of the capacity to have “qualitative” experiences and on the
possible degrees of similarity between their feelings and ours. At the same time,
the ethologist surprised his listeners and readers by confessing that for him, the
decisive proof of the existence of an internal experience in the higher animals did
not come from anatomical, physiological, or morphological findings, but from an
intuitive experience. He had noticed “evidence” for an animal “you” the first few
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times he had found himself playing or interacting in non-constrictive conditions
with intelligent creatures like mammals and birds, spontaneously and incontestably.
As the scholar said: “The knowledge of the subjective experience of my fellows and
the belief that even a superior animal, like a dog, has its own experience have grown
in me at the same time” (Lorenz 1963. It. transl.: 63).
But, ultimately, what response did Lorenz offer to the question posed in the title of
the essay? According to his approach, do all non-human animals have an experience?
Do they experience forms of pleasure and pain, pleasant and unpleasant sensations,
motions of attraction or repulsion? Do they have emotions like fear and curiosity,
mental states such as expectations or desires, feelings of disappointment, frustration,
discomfort orwell-being, bonds of affection like family ties or friendship?Doanimals
remember, imagine, dream, think?
The ethologist’s answer, despite the title of his essay seemsg to rule out a positive or
negative response concerning the entire animal kingdom, was not generic. It sounded
indeed like: not all!
Lorenz specified that we will never be able to say anything certain about the
experience of another living being, because even the sensations of another human
being remain, for each of us, strictly speaking, unattainable. But, in his opinion,
comparative anatomy and physiology enable us to identify at least some organs, and
a level of systemic complexity, in the presence of which we can consider extremely
probable this type of experience. A condition of the possibility of having feelings
and perceptions, and experiencing emotional and mental states, is, in fact, according
to the hypothesis that the ethologist had already proposed in his Russian Manuscript
in the ‘40s, “a relatively very high organization of the central nervous system and
sensory organs” (Lorenz 1992: 201). A level of organization that, in his opinion, we
can find only in “a small part of the living beings”, that is, in the so-called higher
animals, endowed with a central nervous system (CNS).
We understand “at a glance that a dog is sad, even if we do not knowhow to explain
its motivation”, Lorenz wrote, we recognize as such the “crying” of a mammalian
puppy, or the chirp of an abandoned chick. Regardless of their species, these animal
calls, like children’s voices, can empathically involve us and induce us to behaviour
of parental care. In other words, towards this kind of animals, we tend to behave,
spontaneously, aswe dowith humanbeings:we interpret their experiences, behaviour
and languages, imagining that they are at least in part like ours; we actually establish
emotional and social relationships with them through these models. However, the
ethologist pointed out that this “analogical conclusion” (inferring from the similarity
of the organs a similarity in the basic sensory and emotional experiences) becomes
more unlikely when the differences between our sensory and cognitive apparatus
and those of the organisms we observe increase: “The more the structure of their
perceptive organs and nervous system are different from that of mine, the more their
functions will be different. How the experience associated with these functions may
present itself is basically impossible for me to know. The «evidence of the you» leads
me to attribute to my dog an experience somewhat similar to mine, but the more we
enter in the lower steps of the organic realm, the less it is possible to apply these
analogical conclusion” (ibid.: 64).
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In fact, just by comparing our perceptive and cerebral apparatuses with those
of other mammals, we already discover both surprising similarities and significant
differences. Realizing that a dog is feeling affections and emotions and establishing
with it an empathic and affective bond are experiences that spontaneously mature in
children and adult human beings, if they have not undergone the effect of intraspecific
traumatizing relationships. Men and dogs can socialize and understand each other in
many areas. And yet, we will never experience the olfactory world and the complex
scented maps, for us ineffable, that ‘our’ dog discovers at every corner of the street;
all the more so, the ways in which the external environment may be perceived or
mentally represented by organisms phylogenetically more distant from us escape us
completely or almost completely.
The problem is then made more complex by the fact that the similarities between
species, as Lorenz liked to remember, can be the result of homologies, or of the deriva-
tion from common ancestors, but they can also derive from a convergent evolution,
that is, from a mutually independent adaptation to similar functions. Convergent
evolution can, in turn, give rise to very similar performances in organisms which are
phylogenetically very distant and morphologically very different (for example the
flight in insects and birds) and therefore it can produce similar results with appa-
ratuses, organs and neurophysiological activities that are enormously different. The
eye of a bee, anatomically very different from ours because, like that of any other
arthropod, it is composed of many small photosensitive units, allows a tri-chromatic
vision analogous to ours, but more extended because it also perceives the ultraviolet
light. On the contrary the eyes of many mammals, incomparably closer from the
phylogenetic point of view and more similar to ours in many aspects of anatom-
ical organization, being adapted to other environments and functions, only allow
dichromatic vision.
What does Lorenz mean when he says that the superior animals have their own
Erleben? What meaning is attributed here to the word “experience”?
The ethologist does not avoid this question and, referring to Wilhelm Busch,
suggests that “the primary form of every experience” is the “capacity to feel pleasure
and pain” (Lorenz 1963. It. transl.: 88, 89). Lorenz here referred to a character-
istic of the animal organisms that the later cognitive ethologists would have called
“sentience” (Griffin 1976, 1984): the ability to perceive the changes in the physical-
chemical states and energy gradients of one’s own body and their relationship with
some environmental factors and that to respond to themwith behaviours of distancing
or approaching, avoiding or searching for certain external stimuli. The basic form of
the experience is, in short, according to Lorenz, the alternation between the “mes-
sage of pain”, or of the unpleasant feeling, which intimates “do not do it again”,
and the voice of pleasure that suggests “do it again” (Lorenz 1963. It. Transl.: 63)
or, more simply: “stay in this situation”. Basing on this dialectic, well before the
appearance of man, animals began to build, through the different ways and degrees
of individual and social learning, a baggage of acquired “knowledge” that was going
to be added to their hereditary endowments, making their behaviour more flexible
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and modifiable. Through this basic form of experiencing, animals capable of asso-
ciative learning begin, in fact, to experiment resources and explore their environ-
ment, memorizing what is learnt not in a conceptual form, but in terms of implicit
memory and behavioural attitudes. Precisely in this sense, according to Lorenz, it is
correct to attribute experience “even to the higher animals”: there are, without doubt,
pre-human and pre-conceptual forms of experience of pleasure and pain, sensa-
tions such as nervous excitement and relaxation, emotions such as fear or attraction,
emotional and social needs such as receiving parental care and being accepted by
the reference group, and forms of thinking older than rationality, which are widely
widespread among the “higher” animals. Therefore, according to him, both anthropo-
morphic homologation of perceptive and cognitive forms of other species to human
ones and the anthropocentric supposition that can be no analogy between our basic
sensations, perceptions and emotions and those of another mammals, or birds are
completely misleading. In other words, the concept of experience must be under-
stood, for Lorenz, in a way that is at the same time as less anthropomorphic and
less separatist as possible. Thus, in a nutshell, according to the approach proposed
by Lorenz in 1963, the similarities between their neurophysiological organization
and ours, widely attested by comparative anatomy and neurophysiology, force us
to recognize at least in the animals that have a Central Nervous System the ability
to feel pleasure and pain, attraction and repulsion. The anatomical, physiological,
and experimental evidence in favour of this hypothesis accumulated by neurophysi-
ological research in the following years means that, today, it is widely shared in the
scientific community.7
However, the thesis that the possession of a centralized nervous system is a
conditio sine qua non of the possibility to experience suffering and its opposite,
sketched by Lorenz in that essay, seems to reveal itself, in the light of the research
carried out in the last decades, if not fully overcome, at least too restrictive and
prudential. Scholars who have given important contributions to the development of
cognitive ethology, such as Donald Griffin or James and Carol Gould, anti-speciesist
intellectuals such as Peter Singer, Italian ethologists such as Danilo Mainardi and
Giorgio Celli, have argued that this approach arbitrarily traces a border, based more
on our inability to recognize experiences and thoughts in organisms that are very
different from us than on the actual lack of empirical or experimental evidence
of their existence. Already at the time of Lorenz, neurophysiological research had
shown that animals traditionally classified as “inferior”, like social insects, are in
7This positionwas re-launched just a year later in the bookAnimalMachinebyRuthHarrison (1964),
which contained a passionate denunciation of the living conditions of animals kept on intensive farms
and which was to give rise the current trend of contemporary animalist ethics. The attribution of the
experience of pain to mammals, birds, reptiles, amphibians and fish, animals endowed with a real
Central Nervous System, is today almost unanimous among scholars of biological formation and
new studies continue to accumulate evidence in this sense. For example, confirming and completing
research produced in the previous decade by other researchers, biologist Victoria Braithwaite of
the University of Pennsylvania has collected a neurophysiological, ethological, experimental and
comparative documentation, which can be considered exhaustive in showing that fish experience
pain (Braithwaite 2010).
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fact capable of creating cognitive maps and, therefore, forms of representation of
their environments that are not only perceptive, but also mental and mnemonic, used
to communicate information to other con-specifics and to locate nutritional sources.
Over the past thirty years, based on a growing corpus of studies, the belief that “even
mollusks like octopus and cuttlefish, or insects like bees and ants, possess a mind
[…] and have developed sophisticated communication systems and thinking skills”
(Mainardi 2010) has been spreading among cognitive ethologists. This conviction
first of all concerns the very large group of animals like arthropods (insects, arachnids,
crustaceans), annelids and molluscs which, even if they do not possess a Central-
ized Nervous System, are equipped with a metameric system, formed by chains of
ganglia that allow highly complex performance. Less investigated, with respect to
the topic of cognitive maps, is the more subtle question posed by Lorenz, concerning
the possible existence, in these organisms, of forms of experience of pleasure and
pain. But new elements have also emerged in this field in recent years. For example,
it had already been pointed out, years ago, that the nervous systems of some insects
produce analgesic opioids when tissue damage is taking place, similarly to higher
animals. More recently, in the drosophila fruit fly that was the protagonist of the
major biological discoveries of the twentieth century a receptor, known as TRPA1,
has been identified that plays an important role in decoding painful stimuli. It seems
to be present also in all other animals and to originate, almost identical to its current
form in an organism that lived about half a billion years ago and from which all
existing invertebrates and vertebrates derive (Kang et al. 2010).
In short, with our current knowledge, we can with Cartesian certainty no longer
exclude that our neurophysiological and cultural limitations prevent us from seeing
in creatures so different from us as wasps or octopus traces of experience, sensation,
emotion or thought, which instead exist. This could depend on the fact that their
expressiveness is too different from ours, that they lack, for example, bodily warmth,
voices, mobility of the gaze, facial mimicry and expressiveness, having in their place
hormonal, chemical, electrical messages and other forms of communication that we
do not grasp. The cognitive barrier could also depend on emotional barriers. Not only
with insects, arachnids, crustaceans, worms and mollusks, but also with animals that
are more complex and closer to us in the basic neurophysiological organization, such
as fish, amphibians and reptiles, it may seem impossible for us to develop anything
more than a simple habit of mutual presence, or a mere ability to interact. It seems,
in other words, to be missing the possibility of establishing a bond of affection that
in mutually non-stressful conditions, we can instead easily establish with animals
belonging such as birds and mammals.
It is, in short, really difficult to understand in which cases, in spite of what
Descartes thought, it is the limits of our cognitive and communicative channels and
our prejudices and presumptions preventing us from recognizing that in animal life
other forms of experience and representation of reality may occur, and conversely, in
which cases, as seems to happen for in the vegetable realm, life takes place without
mediation of sensations and experiences, as pleasant or unpleasant as they may be.
As we can see, these are questions in which philosophy has always been committed,
in which the effort to understand the resources and limits of our mind is intertwined,
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for its own internal need, with questions aimed at investigating the characteristics of
“other minds” that differ from ours without having to be considered “inferior” to it.
Developments in neurophysiological, ethological and psychological studies seem
today to substantially confirm the critical value of the approach that Lorenz took in
1963, recognizing in many non-human animals a sensitive and affective life and an
ability to think (Allen and Bekoff 1997), but at the same time they suggest that it
would be a mistake to suppose that animal thought can manifest itself only in the
anthropomorphic (and culturally Eurocentric) form of the conscious elaboration of
projects and their subsequent execution.One of the hypotheses that Lorenz, following
a tradition which went fromHelmholtz to his friend von Holst, proposed in this essay
has been in the meantime widely corroborated: the animal and human brain contin-
ually perform a series of extremely complex calculations, on which all phenomena
of perceptual constancy are based without these entering the threshold of awareness.
In addition to the phenomenon of “unconscious deductions” (as Helmholtz called
them) or “ratiomorphic” processes (as Lorenz, following Egon Brunswick, preferred
to say)more recent research has also confirmed the hypothesis launched by vonHolst
and Mittelstaedt and resumed from the ethologist in Haben Tiere ein subjectives
Erleben?, that our brain elaborates, from time to time, a sort of planning of the motor
activities that the body is about to accomplish, building an anticipatory scheme of
action, without us being aware of it. Accurate studies like those presented by Christo-
pher Frith in the book The Cognitive Neuropsychology of Schizophrenia (Frith 1992)
confirm, in keeping with what von Holst, Mittelstaedt and Lorenz maintained, that
the production of this “efferent copy” of an incipient action “does not happen on
a conscious level” (ibid.). And yet, according to Frith, this unconscious process is
indispensable for a thinking subject to recognize themselves as an executing agent of
their own behaviour and precisely the jamming of this process would be one of the
causes of the inability to think of themselves as subjects responsible for their own
actions, often manifested by schizophrenic patients.
As we have seen, even today, the ideas that then Lorenz put into play, and the
knowledge he was spreading are intertwined with the questions that empirical and
experimental research raises for a theoretical reflection and conceptual elabora-
tion that identifies the points where the intersection and critical exchange between
scholars of different backgrounds and the removal of disciplinary boundaries are
required by the characteristics of their own objects of study. That is, from the internal
complexity and the unexpected reciprocal relations that these “objects” reveal. To
conclude, the possibility of a further deepening of our knowledge of animal minds,
cultures and societies today more than ever depends on two aspects:
• a concrete commitment aimed at safeguarding their survival and independence
and, therefore, the natural environments that host them;
• the development of a philosophical and ethical reflection oriented towards an
eco-centric vision, which considers the community of the living as a whole and
which does not separate itself with a disdainful gesture from the empirical and
natural sciences, nor does it submit to them, but challenges them and allows itself
to be challenged by them in a practice of knowing capable of adapting itself to its
7.4 From the Evidence of Animal Pain to the Discovery … 233
object, to the places where it exists, lives or manifests itself and does not pretend
that the object came to our laboratory or computer, to our desk or just in front
of our chair by itself. All the more if the “object” in question is another perhaps
sentient living being, perhaps like us, moved by attractions and fears; perhaps
thinking, certainly less harmful and dangerous for all the living species, thanMan
and his contemporary society.
7.5 Cognitive Ethology and Anti-Speciesist Ethics: Two
Revolutions in One
As its title makes clear, this chapter is aims at documenting the role ethological
research has played in promoting the birth of contemporary post-anthropocentric and
anti-speciesist ethics. Its purpose is to show the links between the scientific revolution
introduced by ethology and the ethical revolution which began with current anti-
speciesist movements. On the contrary, an illustration of the enormous andmultiform
developments of the latter that have taken place in the last decades, precisely because
of their vastness and internal complexity, remains outside the intent of the chapter.
Although, the brief notes that follow cannot of course overcome this struc-
tural limitation, they should offer a small glimpse on the intertwining of cognitive
ethology, ethological philosophy and anti-speciesit ethics since the 1970s, which
results obviously incomplete and oriented to report only some exemplary cases.
But, above all, I would like to attract the reader’s attention on an aspect that has
perhaps not been emphasized enough in the previous pages: if ethology has offered
the nascent anti-anthropocentric ethics a good part of the empirical and scientific
documentation on which they base their claims, pioneers of anti-speciesism like
William Russel and Rex Burch (the first to introduce the well-known criterion of the
three Rs),8 Ruth Harrison, Jane Goodall, and later Peter Singer in turn played a very
important role in promoting an emancipation of the ethological thought. They in
fact promoted, its connection to the great emancipationist tradition that historically
emerged from the long wave of Enlightenment, and becoming at the same time an
extension, and a problematization, of this tradition. In this respect, the philosophical
and ethical revolution introduced by contemporary anti-speciesism and the scientific
revolution introduced by cognitive ethology, both still in progress, embody two faces
8The Three Rs principle, formulated for the first time in the volume The Principles of Humane
Experimental Technique (Russel andBurch 1959), aims at providing guidelines for the least invasive
and least extensive use of animals in scientific research that technologies make possible. The Three
Rs indicate, respectively, the concepts of:
Replacement: methods that avoid or replace the use of animals in research.
Reduction: use of methods that enable researchers to obtain comparable levels of information
from fewer animals, or more information from the same number of animals.
Refinement: use of methods that alleviate or minimize pain, suffering and distress in the
animals and improve their living conditions.
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of the same epochal revolution that has profoundly, and positively, changed the way
in which human beings relate to other animal species.
From the second half of the seventies, the anti-speciesist-environmentalist-
humanitarian commitment of Jane Goodall, the spread of Singer’s libertarian ethics
and the descent into the field of numerous other scientists and activists gave a more
general contribution to the inclusion of ethological knowledge in the field of ethical
and philosophical reflection. They brought out, in fact, in both its problematic nature
and indisputable significance, the connection between speciesism and phenomena
such as racism, sexism, homophobia and discrimination against the “disinherited”
of the earth. This in turn linked the question of human oppression against the animals,
and the need of its overcoming, to all the great ethical and social struggles for
emancipation that have crossed modern and contemporary history.
In other words, the scientific revolution launched by cognitive ethology and the
ethical revolution triggered by anti-speciesism have been intertwined since the begin-
ning. Peter Singer, the philosopher who perhaps more contributed to spreading the
anti-speciesist issues internationally, used in his first book,Animal Liberation (1975),
much data and several references taken by some of the major ethologists of the time:
Konrad Lorenz, Niko Tinbergen, Irenäus Eibl Eibesfeldt, Jane Goodall and George
Schaller. The following year, he published the volume Animal Rights and Human
Obligations (Regan and Singer 1976) with his colleague Tom Regan. In that same
year,DonaldGriffin,with the bookTheQuestion of Animal Awareness (Griffin 1976),
began to revolutionize the science of animal behaviour by proposing a new research
program focused on the study of different forms of “sentience” (the ability to feel
and memorize sensations) and intelligence, widespread in the animal world.
As Colin Allen and Marc Bekoff observe, these two events were meant to interact
with one another since the beginning: “In Animal Liberation, Peter Singer sought
to revolutionize societal treatment of nonhuman animals by arguing that animal
agriculture and animal experimentation cause conscious pain and suffering that is
real andmorally significant.With TheQuestion of Animal Awareness, Donald Griffin
sought to revolutionize the science of animal behaviour by insisting that questions
about animal consciousness should be placed firmly in the foreground of a new
program of research he labelled «cognitive ethology» . Both proposals immediately
evoked a range of reactions, from enthusiasm to virulent attacks. In the ensuing
three decades, little consensus has been reached about either. Although Singer’s
arguments about ethical treatment of animals preceded Griffin’s arguments about
scientific understanding of animals, it is obvious why ethicists concerned with the
former should be interested in the latter. Singer himself based the case for animal
liberation on scientific evidence of behavioural and neurological homologies between
humans and other animals. Cognitive ethology, by rejecting behaviourist strictures
against attributing subjective states of awareness to nonhuman animals, offered the
prospect of increased scientific support for the claim that animals are conscious in
the ways that matter ethically” (Allen and Bekoff 2007: 2).
Soon after, these developments would, in turn affect the birth of new sectors of the
ethological research. In Chapter 2 of the collective book Animals and us. 50 years
and more of applied ethology (Newberry and Sandilands 2016), Ruth Newberry and
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Victoria Sandilands observe that Harrison, Russell and Burch and Singer’s works
contributed to create the scientific and cultural milieu in which the first pioneeristic
forms of applied ethology oriented to increase an “animal welfare” developed.9
In 1993, Singer himself, together with the philosopher Paola Cavalieri launched
theGreat Ape Project (GAP): an international organization of primatologists, anthro-
pologists and ethicists who elaborated a United Nations Declaration of the Rights
of Great Apes (chimpanzees, bonobos, gorillas and orangutans) aimed at conferring
them with basic legal rights.
Subsequently, theAustralian philosopher continued to dealwith antispecies issues
but also extended his commitment to questions like environmental emergency, the
growing imbalance between rich and poor, anti-Semitism, exploitation of the less
industrialized countries and the damage and social imbalances caused by capitalist
globalization. Books as The Expanding Circle (Singer 1981), Ethics into action
(Singer 1998),One World: The Ethics of Globalisation (Singer 2002), Pushing Time
Away: My Grandfather and the Tragedy of Jewish Vienna (Singer 2003), The Life
You Can Save: Acting Now to End World Poverty (Singer 2009), The Most Good You
Can Do (Singer 2015), Ethics in the Real World (Singer 2016),Why Vegan?: Eating
Ethically (Singer 2020) attest to the continuity and breadth of this commitment.
Meantime, the utilitarian approach to anti-anthropocentric ethics that he intro-
duced was reworked and re-proposed by various scholars and thinkers. Among these,
American philosopher James Rachels (1942–2003) made important contributions to
the development of an anti-speciesist ethical orientation. Discussing the issues of
ethical vegetarianism and animal rights, he adopted an approach according to which
human choices and actions are to be evaluated on the basis of their effects on both
human and non-human beings. Furthermore, in many of his writings, from the short
essay Do Animals Have a Right to Liberty? (1976) to the volume Created from
Animals (1990), he fully grasped the historical and conceptual link between the
Darwinian revolution, which also runs through the entire history of ethology, and the
development of a new ethical sensitivity towards non-human animals.
According to Rachels, animals—like some human beings with disabilities that
render them unable to understand and respect certain ethical rules—cannot be
subjected to moral duties and constraints, but despite this they should be recog-
nized as bearers of moral rights: “like the retarded person, they lack characteristics
9An accurate account of the positive but at the same time always problematizing influence exerted
in the following two decades by this intertwining of animal welfare ethology and “animal rights”
commitment was offered in 2009 from the issue 118 (3) of the scientific journal Applied Animal
Behaviour Science, entirely dedicated to the topic. The issue illustrates inter alia the main changes
in the national and international legislation that these ethical battles had inspired. In one of the
papers, entitled Ethology applied to animal ethics, the biologist and professor of Animal Welfare
HannoWürbel emphasized what he considered themost important aspect of this turn: “According to
modern animal welfare legislation, animals should be protected from suffering and lasting harm not
for the benefit of us humans as in earlier anthropocentric conceptions, but in their own interest. […]
Moreover, from an ethological perspective, protecting animals in their own interest represents true
altruism which places considerable ethical demand on us” (Würbel 2009: 118). In 2016 the volume
Animals and Us. 50 Years and More of Applied Ethology offered further updates and reflections on
the subject.
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necessary for having obligations; but they may still be proper beneficiaries of our
obligations. The fact that they cannot reciprocate, then, does not affect our basic
obligations to them” (Rachels 1976: 223).
Since the 1990s and even more so in the new millennium, the intertwining
between cognitive ethology, philosophy of ethology and active commitment in the
fields of wildlife protection, “animal rights” and ecological commitment has become
increasingly thicker.
In the first two decades of this newmillennium, ethologist JonathanBalcombewas
one of the scholars who gave important contributions to the study of animal sentience
offering extensive documentation on the ability to experience pleasure and pain in
vertebrate and invertebrate animals. From2015 to 2019Director andAssociate Editor
of the “Interdisciplinary Journal of animal feeling” Animal Sentience, he dedicated
to these studies books as The Use of Animals in Higher Education: Problems, Alter-
natives, and Recommendations (Balcombe 2000), Pleasurable Kingdom: Animals
and the Nature of Feeling Good (Balcombe 2006), Second Nature: The Inner Lives
of Animals (Balcombe 2010), The Exultant Ark: A Pictorial Tour of Animal Pleasure
(Balcombe 2011),What A Fish Knows: The Inner Lives of Our Underwater Cousins
(Balcombe 2016), Super Fly: The Unexpected Lives of the World’s Most Successful
Insects (Balcombe 2020).
Among the scientists who havemade important contributions to the developments
of both cognitive ethology and anti-speciesist ethics in the last twenty years, it is there-
fore impossible not tomention ethologist and activistMarc Bekoff. Since the nineties
he has been offering significant empirical and theoretical contributions to both our
understanding of animal experiences and minds and their protection and defense. In
1997 his collaboration with the philosopher Colin Allen led to the joint editing of the
volume Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology (Allen
and Bekoff 1997). In 1998 he was editor of Encyclopedia of Animal Rights and
Animal Welfare (Bekoff 1998) and co-editor with John Byers of the book Animal
Play: Evolutionary, Comparative and Ecological Perspectives (Bekoff and Byers
1998). In 2000 he co-founded the association “Ethologists for the Ethical Treatment
of Animals” with Jane Goodall, the purpose of which is “to develop and maintain the
highest of ethical standards in comparative ethological research that is conducted in
the field and in laboratory” (Bekoff and Goodall 2000: 277). A few years later they
published the book The Ten Trusts: What We Must Do to Care for the Animals We
Love (Goodall and Bekoff 2002).10 In 2007 his collaboration with Allen gave rise to
a new fruit: the still much quoted paper Animal minds, cognitive ethology, and ethics
(Allen and Bekoff 2007). His commitment to both the areas of scientific research
and ethical reflection continued uninterruptedly in the following years. Recent testi-
monies of it are the volumes The Animals’ Agenda: Freedom, Compassion, and
Coexistence in the Human Age (Bekoff and Pierce 2017) and Canine Confidential:
10Even in a recent text, co-edited with Dale Peterson, The Jane Effect: Celebrating Jane Goodall
(Peterson andBekoff 2016), Bekoff returned to highlight the enormous ethical impact that Goodall’s
research and commitment have had.
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Why Dogs DoWhat They Do (Bekoff 2018), as well as his participation to the collec-
tive paper Recognizing animal personhood in compassionate conservation (Wallach
et al. 2020).
The meaning and the ethical relevance of the debate arisen in those decades from
the intertwining of ethology, philosophy and ethics was well understood and exposed
in the collective book Animal minds and animal ethics, edited by Klaus Petrus and
Markus Wild (Petrus and Wild 2013). In the introduction, titled Big issues in animal
philosophy, the authors wrote:
“What may, in very general terms, be called ‘the animal issue’ has drawn wide
academic and public attention in the past thirty years. The issues at stake are our
(Western) perception of animals, our interaction and involvement with animals, the
differences between ourselves and other animals, our moral obligations towards
animals and the practical consequences that a moral standing of animals would
have. After the turn of the 21st century, animal ethics are very much on the mind of
philosophers, ethicists, professionals who use animals, politicians, lawmakers, pet-
owners, and the public. A related phenomenon is the explosion of research into the
cognitive abilities of animals, as seen in the inspiring work being done on the science
of animal cognition and behaviour. This development has not remained without a
direct influence on philosophy, especially regarding not only the philosophy of mind
but also the moral philosophy. Clearly, the animal issue has engaged philosophers in
two related but distinct ways. On the one hand, there has been a growing interest in
the question of animal minds. Can we attribute mental states to non-human animals?
If so, what kinds of mental states? What does the mental life of a non-human animal
look like? On the other hand, there has been a growing interest in the question of
animal ethics.Dowehave directmoral obligations towards animals?Do animals have
rights? Should states enact strong legal policieswith regards to animals? Philosophers
working on questions of animal ethics usually draw on research into animal cognition
and subscribe to strong positions regarding animal minds” (Petrus and Wild 2013:
7; 8).
An overall reflection on this debate, on the studies that supported it and on the great
questions it has raised is finally proposed in the very recent Judith Benz-Schwarzburg
volume Cognitive Kin, Moral Strangers? Linking Animal Cognition, Animal Ethics
& Animal Welfare (Benz-Schwarzburg 2019). In the preface, Benz-Schwarzburg
presents her work with these words:
“This book is an interdisciplinary study at the intersection of the humanities
and natural sciences. It deals primarily with questions of animal ethics, animal
welfare, and cognitive ethology, but it also includes, for example, insights from
evolutionary anthropology, cognitive archaeology, comparative psychology, devel-
opmental psychology, theoretical philosophy, linguistics, and veterinary medicine.
Based on the results of empirical research in the area of mental ability and perfor-
mance, the book is intended to explore something that has been under investigation
since the introduction ofDarwin’s theory of evolution: namely, the possibility that the
difference between people and animals is only gradual. This entails an examination
of crucial aspects of the evolutionary relationship between humans and animals and
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their practical importance for human-animal relations today” (Benz-Schwarzburg
2019: IX).
7.6 Conclusion
Naturally, as clarified at the beginning of this section, in the decades that sepa-
rate our time from that of the birth of cognitive ethology and anti-speciesist ethics,
many ethologists, philosophers and groups of activists have contributed, together
with those mentioned, to enrich these international debates and social movements.
For philosophical contributions, just see the works of scholars such as Gerald J.
Massey (who coined the term “philosophical ethology”. See: Massey 1999), Elliot
Sober, Mary Midgley, Christine Korsgaard, Luisella Battaglia, Roberto March-
esini, Massimo Filippi, Martha Nussbaum and Bernard Rollin.11 Unfortunately, it
would have been impossible to follow the threads of all these developments in this
work, given their richness and complexity. Nonetheless, with this book the authors
hope to have been able to give to the ongoing debate related to this contempo-
rary ethical-scientific revolution, fuelled by a historical feedback between cognitive
and cultural ethology, evolutionary and developmental studies, ethical reflection and
philosophical ethology, a small contribution.
To conclude: in this era of global ecological crisis, the possibility of a further deep-
ening of our knowledge on animal behaviour, languages,minds, cultures and societies
that is the object of ethology is inextricably linked to a concrete commitment aimed
at safeguarding their survival and independence and the natural environments that
host them, just as it is linked to the struggle for the abolition of intensive farming—
which is still one of the main causes of pollution—and of other forms of exploitation
suffered by animals today.
The situation makes the development of a philosophical and ethical reflection
oriented towards an eco-centric vision that considers the community of the living as
a whole and does not separate human communities from the environments in which
they live, necessary and urgent.
Ethology has certainly offered all disciplines that deal with living organisms, their
environments and their societies, a lesson in humility that even a part of the philo-
sophical community has begun to assimilate: when the “objects” of our research
are other, definitely sentient living beings moved, like us, by attractions and fears,
perhaps thinking and certainly less harmful and dangerous than man and his contem-
porary society, it is necessary to develop a practice of knowing capable of adapting
itself to the object and to the places where it lives, capable of respecting its autonomy
and protect its survival, and to not, on the contrary, authoritatively and lazily expect
11For a first approach see: Massey (1999), Sober (2000), Midgley (1978, 1983, 1984, 2010), Kors-
gaard (2006, 2018), Battaglia (2009, 2011, 2016), Marchesini (2008, 2011, 2018), Filippi (2011,
2016), Nussbaum and Sunstein (2004), Rollin (1981, 1995, 2006). In turn, I have dealt with these
issues in some essays. See: Celentano (2000, 2011, 2013, 2017a, b, c).
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the object to appear in our laboratory, on our computer, our desk, or just in front of
our comfortable chair, to be examined.
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Chapter 8
A Re-evaluation of Animal Interests
Starting from a Critique of Maslow’s
Pyramid
Roberto Marchesini
Abstract In this essay, I wish to demonstrate that, in order to understand the interest
of the subject as an intentional entity, it is not enough to refer to sentience, to welfare
parameters or toMaslow’s Pyramid. Similarly, it is not enough to refer to compassion
or sympathy, interpreted in the etymological sense of “being in the same dispositional
feeling”. In order to preserve the interests of non-human animals as subjects, it is
indispensable to: (1) accept their existentiality and avoid the mechanism of heritage;
(2) carry out an empathic approach, that is, the ability to reproduce a condition or
an inclination different from our own, which requires a suspension of anthropomor-
phism. It is possible to know the intentional dimension of non-human animals only if
we apply Darwin’s criterion of adaptative resemblance and distinction. But in order
to do that, it is necessary to strengthen both the scientific knowledge and the ethical
reflection, because neither of the two approaches is able tomake the interest of animal
subjectivity emerge.
8.1 Premise
Being an animal means having two inherent qualities: (i) feeling, that is, the ability
to live events in an emotional way, somatizing them, i.e. transforming them into a
state of the body and advocating them for oneself; and (ii) desiring, that is, being
projected towards the world, through interest and curiosity, i.e. the desire to act-
operate on the world in a proactive way, through intrinsic motivations. The sentient
and desiring condition of the animal is at the centre of the inalienable character of its
subjectivity for which events involve it in the first person. Emotions and motivations
endow the animal-subject with “interests that concern it”, which is not the case with
the innumerable mass of objects, even if they are performative (e.g., a machine).
Owning a “for oneself” means assuming a condition of self-ownership, and this
is a predicate that we find immediately when we interact with an animal: in fact,
an animal is never passive, but rather surrenders or gives itself. The “for-oneself”
establishes, therefore, some inherent characters that beg to be fulfilled, for which the
subject appears to us as a patient that is exigent with respect to what happens or can
happen to it. On the other hand, this very core of inertia makes us understand the
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subjective expression (that is, the condition of partiality and infidelity, of adherence to
a here-and-now), which we normally translate with phrases such as “it wants/doesn’t
want to” or “it’s in a good/badmood”—states that clearly do not apply to the universe
of things or machines. This core of subjectivity is therefore expressed through the
dispositions of feeling and desiring, that is to say of intrinsic pre-reflexive entities
that we call emotions and motivations.
Hence the need to consider this sentient and desiring nucleus as the engine of the
reactive-proactive action of the animal, the flywheel of its “inevitable protagonism”
on the stage of existence. For this reason, the emotions and motivations that bring out
animal expression must also be considered the “motives of subjectivity”. Owning
an internal here-and-now, however counterintuitive it may seem, means not being
completely at the mercy of the external here-and-now. So far, it’s all quite clear:
the same event can be experienced in totally different ways, but above all it may
be more than what the animal is experiencing in the here-and-now: in other words,
an animal can be above its own momentary condition. This means that an animal
is never repetitive, but singular in its expressions, so that every piece of knowledge
always gives rise to a unique and unrepeatable behaviour. Both innate and learned
endowments therefore are tools, and not automatisms, that animal subjectivity uses
to reach its projections of feeling and desire. So, subjectivity also manifests itself
through the ownership of its endowments.
An animal does not wait for a stimulus or an event to ignite its movement, because
the peripatetic character is its inner quality: it moves, it is not moved, and it is in
motion even when it is stationary. The motivational character of animal subjectivity
constantly leads it to go into the world to carry out activities that are part of its nature.
Each animal brings itself into the world through coordinates of actions, i.e. verbal
propositions—such as chasing, collecting, owning, etc.—which represent acts: the
act of chasing, collecting, owning. In other words, the interaction that the subject has
with the world is never generic, but always takes place in the name of precise acts
that are part of the animal’s species-specific characteristics. The acts foreseen by the
identity of a species represent a sort of set menu, which contemplates the type of
“expressive consumption” that that individual wants to achieve.
Motivations are internal entities, what is outside is only the target towards which
the motivation projects the individual and the space-time where the action is carried
out. Placed in a meadow, a child will pick daisies while a cat will chase butterflies:
the practicability of a context is assigned first of all by the motivational prevalences
in place in a given species. This allows us to understand that experience is something
very different from the passive exposure to stimuli: it is rather a way to explore the
objects present in the external context—obviously those that can be perceived—to
achieve some very precise results. The motivations are like “copulae”—conjugative
elements—that lead us to particular targets through very specific acts: chasing, in
fact, is very different from collecting, and not only from a postural or kinetic point
of view, but also as a disposition towards the world.
The desiring condition—as projection towards something and proaction in an
activity, not yet formalized in a real desire—is therefore to be considered as the first
movens of animality, a need to act that is independent of the specific objective and
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the result of its action, which are simply contingent: a cat does not want the string,
but wants to project itself towards the string’s movement and to act by chasing and
grasping it. This is an expressive need that arises from a character of exuberance
that does not allow the animal to remain imprisoned in the here-and-now, but always
makes it tend towards a desirable something, engaging in some activity so as to bring
out its intrinsic industriousness. Not understanding this, thinking that the only needs
of an animal are those related to comfort or welfare, means locking up the soul in a
golden prison.
8.2 The Desire of Self-Expression
The expressive appetence that arises from the motivational condition is undoubt-
edly a driving force directed towards the world, a languor of active life that seeks
consumption through: (i) orientation, (ii) expression, (iii) conjugation. It is obvious
that bringing oneself into the world implies the formation of objectives as a conse-
quence. But the cat’s string, as an objective, is the consequence of the cat’s desire
to chase, not the cause of that desire: we can therefore speak of “expressive exuber-
ance”, not of lack. It is important to understand this. It is not through comfort or
replacement (I will be the one who cares about you and gives you what you want)
that the languor can be extinguished, because it is not a “lack of something” but an
“excess of expressive resources” that require to be spent. For this reason, we can say
that the objective emerges, rather than being given objectively, whenever a motiva-
tional appetence is brought into the world and searches the context in search of an
opportunity that can make that expression possible. Being desiring also makes the
subject susceptible to the appeal exercised by the entities that make up the external
context, provided that they have some consistency with the motivation aroused. Ulti-
mately, the objective is nothing more than the outcome of the encounter between an
attractive entity and a present entity that provides an expressive opportunity.
Proactivity indicates the tendency of an animal to actively interact with the outside
world, taken by a state of uneasiness, restlessness, projection, as if it had to bring
out an internal energy exuberance. While in reactivity the subject is invested with a
stimulating element to which it responds, in the proactive case we see a real search
process, like a languor that leads it to seek specific targets so as to express certain
behaviours. However one may define them in exemplifying or metaphorical terms,
motivations are not to be considered as the lack of something—as if the subject acted
because it lacked something—but as expressive desires that overflow into the indi-
vidual and set them in motion. This can be clearly seen in play, an activity governed
by motivational appetence, where it is not the lack of something that counts, but
the possibility of expressing one’s proactive coordinates. It is therefore necessary to
speak of expressive needs, which arise from innate predispositions to perform certain
actions under the pressure of precise endocrine and neuromodulation structures.
In order to understand the phasic and homeodynamic system of the motivational
state, i.e. its being correlated, i.e. sensitive to different influences, but at the same
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time autonomous with respect to physiological needs on the one hand and represen-
tational needs on the other, let’s try to understand the links that bind it to these two
factors. With respect to the relationship between motivation and need, we can note
two aspects: (1) the link of remote causation, because motivation is a dispositional
character that has been affirmed in phylogeny within the population of a species,
since it is able to give fitness to its carriers, in the sense of favouring the fulfilment
of a particular physiological need; (2) dependence on internal factors of somatopsy-
chic influence, since a given motivation is physiologically related to a given need, so
that any dystonia of the need produces variations in physiological gradients that can
make the subject more susceptible to motivational calls. Therefore, there is no doubt
that although it has its own phasic cyclicity, held within the relationship between
appetence and satisfaction, in any case the physiological need retains its elicitative
influence.
As for the relationship between motivation and “desire in the strict sense”, that
is to say, desire accompanied in a modal sense by the specifications of what-where-
how-when, whatever the level of intentionality evolved in representational terms, we
can say that the definition of a target, of a context, of an operative module, conjugated
in planned actions and in development times, can also be a factor of elicitation, acting
in the opposite sense to the canon described so far. In other words, it is true that the
propensity to collect can stimulate these activities in a spontaneous way, bringing
out a post-experiential modal based on the potential action offered by the context.
However, in the same way, a person who has developed the passion of mushroom
picking can be induced to start an activity of searching-harvesting mushrooms only
because it is part of a context that presumably offers the same potential actions. In this
case, it is a thought that leads the subject to activate their motivational dispositions
in activities related to previous experiences.
Ultimately we can say that despite being different—(i) need, understood as a
physiological necessity, (ii) desire, understood as a projection towards something
very precise or towards an equally well-defined activity, (iii) motivation, understood
as a desiring projection, definable in an act but not specified in the contents—these
three factors of the individual’s “operational opening” on the world are undeniably
connected. However, if it is true that need, motivation and desire—this is the most
correct sequence to define these factors—are undeniably connected and exert recip-
rocal influences on each other, it is equally true that they respond to mechanisms
of homeostasis that cannot be superimposed. This is easy to see in the relation-
ship between food needs and the motivations related to them in the “motivational
system of foraging”, the one, to be clear, that has established itself within a species
because it has helped find food resources. In the predatory expression of cats the
relative autonomy between motivation and physiological need is very evident: a cat
continues to chase, and to look for opportunities to exercise this projection-proaction,
even after having satisfied its food needs.
We can say, in the final analysis, that the two homeostatic mechanisms of hunger
and the related motivational expression (chasing), although connected, respond each
to their own or partially independent homeostatic systems, so for a cat it is not enough
to eat to turn off the desire to chase. Most probably, if the cat did not have food at its
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disposal and had to find it using the activities for which it is motivated, well, certainly
the need for food and the need for expression would find simultaneous satisfaction.
On the other hand, even if that were the case, it is not certain that there would be
no exorbitant motivational resources left to spend on playing a game or simply on
a pastime. This is a situation that can easily be seen in wild animals. Of course,
if the need is extinguished when the body has re-established certain physiological
gradients, as far as the motivational aspect is concerned, the appetence decays thanks
to the fact that the subject has put in place those particular behaviours up to reaching
a state of psychological satiety called satisfaction.Wemust therefore admit that there
are such things as expressive needs.
The same can be said of the relationship betweenmotivation and desire. If it is true
that a desire that is well represented on its target contents recalls some motivations,
however, even in this case, we can notice that it is not the “desired”, i.e. the desired
object or result, that turns off the motivational projection, but the activity that allows
one to reach it. This is the reason why, if the target is too easily reached or if the
expressive appetence exceeds the action carried out, the object is not able to turn off
the appetence and bring the individual into a condition of satisfaction. If too easily
caught, a mouse does not extinguish the cat’s predatory desire, so it seems to us
that the kitten indulges in the art of sadism when, on the contrary, it does nothing
but try to extinguish its expressive desire. In other words, it is not objects that give
motivational satiety, but the actionswe perform to reach them. The desiring condition
can, therefore, be defined as a proactive projection regulated not by the result of the
action, but by the effort put into the action itself. Often, indeed, we notice that easy
gratifications, or those not achieved through action, stimulate the longing languor
instead of soothing it, in a vicious mechanism that makes the subject more and more
dependent on repeated doses of gratification.
This leads to some important considerations about the expressive needs that dwell
in the human soul and that are often bypassed and neglected, because of the mistaken
idea that reaching a goal can extinguish our desiring restlessness and that comfort
is the best we can expect from life. A comfortable bed, an abundance of food, the
feeling of security, the ability to protect ourselves from the elements, in other words
all the factors of welfare are certainly important, but they cannot compensate for the
frustration of an inactive life. We appreciate them, that is, if we have earned them
with the sweat of an active life. Just as rest has true value and refreshes us after we
have grown tired, but otherwise becomes boredom, in the same way a world full of
objects within reach that denies us the projection, the languor, the effort of reaching
soon becomes a golden prison. Motivations, therefore, are undoubtedly affected by,
but also prescind from, both the fulfilment of needs and the achievement of results,
determining expressive appetences that can only be understood by admitting the
expressive needs of specific species.
Each species is therefore equipped with a well-circumscribed menu of these basic
verbs that I have calledmotivations, which support the different propositional expres-
sions that an animal belonging to a species can produce through multiple composi-
tions andmodal declinations. Themotivationalmenu, togetherwith other parameters,
gives ethological recognisability to a species, making it identifiable not only from
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a morphological point of view, but also in terms of this basic proactive tension. On
the other hand, being the bearer of a certain menu of proactive acts addressed to the
outside world, not only offers a further element of ethographic recognisability, but
also establishes the projective and proactive appetences that the subject manifests,
defining a system that bases its homeostasis on activity, that is, on being able to give
voice to those particular expressions of operativeness on the context. This aspect is
generally ignored because of the mistaken view that the desiring condition is not a
projection but a lack, so it is believed that the target, in itself, is able to turn off the
desire and provide satisfaction.
Instead, I would like to underline the difference between the concept of projection
and that of lack. Projection, in fact, indicates the subject’s tension towards something,
a tension that implies an action on the context and a proactive exuberance to support
the effort put into the action. On the contrary, lack indicates an element of which the
system is deficient and the addition of which would bring the system into a condition
of balance. In a condition of absence I have to add something to turn off the languor,
while in exuberance it is necessary to open up the system to allow for expression to
calm it. If, in fact,we consider the desiring condition only in terms of lack,wemiss the
importance of this tension, the soothing meaning of action as such, the gratification
that comes from having discharged proactive exuberance. In other words, the target
or result is undoubtedly gratifying, but it is not at all sufficient to calm the desiring
languor; on the contrary, gratification (the achievement of the target), if lacking in
satisfaction (expressive satiety), does nothing but increase the desiring conditionwith
all that follows. It is a gross error to believe that our projections towards the world are
governed by a principle of absorption, a mistake fraught with consequences when
we look at the state of pleasure that an individual derives from their life.
Let’s consider this aspect: the more I gratify myself through cheap targets-results,
which do not require effort along the motivational coordinates, the more the desiring
languor will increase instead of fading out. In other words, a sort of vicious circle is
created that breaks the homeostatic mechanism, so that the more the subject receives,
the more they feel the languor. If pleasure is limited to gratification without ever
achieving satisfaction, which vice versa depends on action, the individual will soon
suffer from a sort of addiction to the target, that is to say, it will increasingly depend
on receiving gratifications in this sense and will increasingly need larger doses of that
particular rewarding entity, be it an object or a result. The target, in fact, will have
acted on the subject as a gratifying and implementing factor, without ever satiating
its projective condition, i.e. its link with action and only secondarily with the implied
goal. This is what we are unfortunately witnessing in our society, where people are
increasingly psychologically bulimic in relation to resources to consume, even if
they seem to be disinterested because they are completely dependent on gratifying
sources and totally out of touch with any possibility of true satisfaction.
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8.3 Reviewing the Concept of the Hierarchy of Needs
In 1954, American psychologist Abraham Maslow conceived his principle of “hier-
archy of needs” based on the fact that there is a sort of progression in the satisfaction
of individual needs. In this hierarchy of needs, each level of the lower order requires
to be satisfied so as to access the higher level: first comes the need for food and only
after is there the need for security. In this view it is therefore necessary to speak
of a sort of path from the bottom to the top, where the first level is reserved for
basic physiological needs, while the peak is represented by self-realization, passing
through intermediate stages such as security, belonging, or the esteem profused by
one’s social microenvironment. The image that Maslow offers us is thus a pyramid,
where the different stages must find progressive response. And at the bottom of the
pyramid there are the physical needs that we could define as essential, such as eating,
drinking, resting, reaching physiological homeostasis and correct homeothermia.
In other words, according to this view, if the body is compromised in its general
functions and therefore does not find satisfaction in its needs, all other needs lose
importance.
The second step identified by Maslow is the sense of security, that is, a predomi-
nantly emotional condition that involves feeling safe in the usual context and therefore
free from fear, conflict, precariousness, anxiety, anguish, anger, or panic. We can see
the principle of security as freedom from fear caused by entities that put our lives
at risk, from anger that forces us to fight against the entities that disturb us, from
sadness so as not to feel the burden of abandonment that also in this case creates
a sense of precariousness and insecurity. Now, there is no doubt that the need for
safety is important, but are we really sure that it only comes after the physiological
needs have been met? An animal that is afraid usually stops feeding and when a
negative emotional condition bothers it, it can even let itself die. In human beings,
too, we see similar situations, especially in cases of depression, grief, panic attacks
and borderline cases. In my opinion, rather than a hierarchy between the needs of
first and second order, there is a correlation, which causes the lack of one to affect the
other, creating varying priorities depending on the actual lack in place at any given
moment.
The third step consists of whatMaslow indicates as belonging, that is to say, being
inserted into a microcosm of social acceptance, that is, of bonds of friendship, family
affection, sexual intimacy. This step could be interpreted, in a more all-inclusive
sense, as feeling part of a group and not abandoned to oneself or in any case not
marginalized. The last two steps—that is to say: the fourth relative to esteem and
the fifth to self-realization—are easily attributable to the social relationship extended
beyond the affective and affiliative microcosm and, above all, to the last step, i.e.
the idea-project that the subject builds of themselves, as well as affirmative feedback
from others. When people speak of realization, I immediately think of the desiring
condition, which Maslow puts at the apex of his pyramid, as a less urgent need that
only emerges if all the others have been satisfied. There are some aspects whose
validity undoubtedly goes beyond the human being and that can be applied in the
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investigation of basic needs related to animal welfare. It is no coincidence that when
we talk about animal welfare we refer to the five freedoms listed in the Brambell
Report (Brambell 1965), which basically refers to the first two steps of Maslow’s
pyramid. But also in this case, the observations we can make deny the idea of a
hierarchy and a linear progression of needs.
There is, in fact, much that does not add up in Maslow’s vision. Indeed, in nature
there is no hierarchical staticity of needs, but there are different priorities depending
on the specific situation in which the animal is found. For example, in the mating
season, social affirmation, which Maslow places at the top of the pyramid, comes
well before safety and often also before the fulfilment of basic physiological needs.
The individual is not a static entity that is always in the same condition, but a fluctu-
ating entity that, case by case, dictates its changing priorities. What Maslow places
at the top and which, with a good approximation, represents the free expression of
individual characteristics, has a strong influence on the animal’s physiological char-
acteristics. For example, a dog that cannot express its motivations and therefore fulfil
its natural talents enters a state of restlessness that undermines its sense of security
and alters its mechanisms of physiological homeostasis. Maslow’s pyramid is incor-
rect, in that it considers each level as unidirectional, as if every step simply rested
on the previous one, whereas, on the contrary, the different needs of an animal have
bidirectional or, better, multidirectional relationships between them. In other words,
the different needs seek a reciprocal equilibrium, so that, just to give an example,
the relationship between physiological needs and self-expression must find a specific
point of balance. For an individual to experience wellbeing, very often they should
lower their level of comfort and increase their level of expression: one can never
improve one’s condition by increasing comfort in spite of expression.
By criticising the hierarchy of needs andMaslow’s pyramid, I wanted to underline
how incorrect it is to think that needs proceed in one direction only. I also wished to
point out that in reality they interact with each other in a multidirectional flow, so that
the lack of satisfaction of one area affects all the others. Speaking of motivations, this
aspect becomes particularly evident. An individual who is kept in a condition of non-
exhaustion of their motivational tendencies will inevitably manifest compensatory
behaviours in this field. However, their discomfort will also spread on their emotional
aspects, on their sense of security, on their ability to adapt to the environment, on
their socio-relational propensities, sometimes leading to alterations of a physiological
order. The expressive need and the consequent discomfort deriving from a lack of
expression have become even more striking today, in an age that tends to increase
the fruition power of the subject through the practice of consumerism and comfort,
while eliminating the expressive possibilities of the subject, who as a result is in a
constant state of restlessness.
The expressive need can be framed as the need to bring out or give fulfilment
to an interaction with the external world that comes from the inside and where
the external reality offers only the opportunity or the pretext for implementation.
It is therefore an expressive need that, if not fulfilled, places the subject in a state
of restlessness. This is an exuberance that, if not satisfied, puts the subject in a
condition of non-equilibrium due to inactivity, as the individual is always oriented
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and projected towards the outside. Themotivations therefore indicate this “movement
towards the world”, which we could represent as a verbal structure that puts the Self
in contact with everything that surrounds it. We should not, however, think of the
expressive need as the need to perform an action that is already predetermined in all
its components, because a motivation always produces an open behaviour which is
structured in the expression itself. The motivational orientation needs to be specified,
that is, it is not a closed-off action: on the contrary, it introduces a creative event, that
is it puts the subject in a condition of experiential experimentation.
So, back to our exemplary cat. Being endowed with a predatory motivation, i.e.
the verb to chase, means: (1) being conjugated to a large number of targets and
therefore experiencing different entities in terms of the characteristics they present
as opportunities and challenges; (2) trying out a large number of motor choreogra-
phies and kinaesthetic expressions, which allow the subject to experience not only
the bottom-substrate but also their own body; (3) knowing different environments,
knowing how to distinguish the different areas of agency and the constraints that they
present, what they are like and what can be found in them; (4) having an idea of the
durations, synchronizing in actions, assuming reaction times, openings and closures.
The expressive need therefore affects all the others, in a process of progression that
is far from unidirectional.
Therefore, each need is interrelated to the others and there is no hierarchy of
needs because the most important need, at a certain moment, is the one that finds
the least possibility of being satisfied and becomes the most urgent according to the
particular physiological and psychological condition of the subject. This means that
it is not possible to understand the interests of a species by pretending to draw up a
table of “priority and propaedeutic” needs through a universal canon, because it is
a question of recognizing different interests among the various species, which vary
between individuals and according to the particular moment. The expression of one’s
subjectivity is certainly the pivotal point of any discussion of animal ethics, which
can only be done by abandoning anthropocentric universalism. The latter, even when
it seeks to include other species in the list of moral patients, always risks extending
rights to the different, so to speak, while failing to recognize different rights.
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Chapter 9
Behavioural and Cultural Epigenetics:
Social Biologisms Refuted
by Developments in Biology
Marco Celentano
Abstract Developments in evolutionary studies, focused on the discovery of epige-
netic inheritance and the social-environmental factors influencing it, have led to
epochal turning points in the last three decades. Faced with these important changes,
we can now consider the genocentric models that guided evolutionary studies from
the last decades of the nineteenth century to the early ‘70s of the twentieth as obsolete.
In fact, today we can demonstrate that, in the course of phylogenesis, at least three
other kinds of selection, heredity and variation, respectively epigenetic, behavioural
and cultural, operated alongside the slow processes of genetic variation, producing
adaptive or maladaptive effects in a much more rapid way than that implicated by
genetic mutations. Thanks to very young research areas such as behavioural and
cultural epigenetics, we can now refute old and new social biologisms, ancient, ever
re-emerging forms of biologistic determinism, with the tools of biology itself . We
can indeed show that, through the methylation and demethylation processes, a lot of
socio-environmental factors contribute to inhibit or re-activate gene expression, influ-
encing fundamental aspects of the individual’s health, emotional, social and cogni-
tive development with effects that are often transmitted to descendants for several
generations. This essay discusses some of the most recent and representative results
of these emergent areas of the epigenetic research and eco-evo-devo studies. This
analysis reaches the conclusion that it is now anachronistic to hypothesize “human
nature” being rigidly codified at the genetic level and substantially unchangeable in
its fundamental mental and behavioural propensities.
9.1 Introduction
Within the theoretical framework of the “synthetic theory” developed in the first half
of the twentieth century (Huxley 1942), it was excluded that living conditions and
social context could, over a few generations, cause hereditary modifications of the
phenotype and of its physiological, psychic and behavioural propensities. In fact,
the phenotypic conformation was considered as the result of a faithful execution
(except for “random transcription errors”) of a program entirely written in DNA
and scarcely modifiable by the environment. Significant phenotypic changes were
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considered, therefore, possible only in the long time required by significant genetic
or even genomic mutations that were estimated as millions of years (Riedl 1980).
However, different kinds of phenomena verified by the biological and behavioural
sciences remained difficult to explain within this theoretical framework: the ability of
organisms to adapt to rapid environmental changes, the evident influence of environ-
mental and social stimuli on cognitive and relational development of human beings
and other animals, the problem, discussed since the days of Darwin, of explaining the
surprising speed with which the evolutionary process took place after the appearance
of the metazoans. According to the most accredited theories, in fact, the differenti-
ation of organisms began very slowly but, as of the last phase of the pre-Cambrian,
underwent a strong acceleration. In other words, as Steven JayGouldwrote, for about
2.5 billion years, “the seaweed carpets remained carpets of algae” (Gould 1977: 114;
121), then,within about a billion or at least 600million years, the evolutionary process
led to the appearance of the incredible variety seen in past and present multi-cellular
species. In 1867, F. Jenkin had already pointed out that the solution proposed by
Darwin to explain this process, the slow accumulation of random favourable heredi-
tary variations produced by natural selection, hardly justify the genesis of a so wide
flowering of phyla, species and varieties and the appearance of complex organs such
as the eye or the brain in such a short time (Jenkin 1867). All the subsequent reformu-
lations of the Darwinian theory cantered on binomial mutations-selection, “chance
and necessity”, proposed from then on have been dragging behind this problem.
But as I have briefly reconstructed in the Sect. 2.8 of this volume, the birth of the
evo-devo approach and the turning towards an “extended synthesis” of theDarwinism
have led, in recent decades, to a substantial overcoming of the theoretical framework
ofmodern synthesis and to a solution of this problem.Developments in these research
fields have in fact shown that three other kinds of hereditary transmission have
cooperated with the genetic one in determining the effects and times of phylogenesis:
epigenetic, behavioural and (at least among “higher animals”) cultural inheritance.
Three forms of inheritance the effects of which manifest themselves much more
rapidly than those implied by genetic mutations.
These changes of perspective have considerable repercussions on at least three
issues that have crossed the entire history of post-Darwinian biology:
• the aforementioned debate on the “dilemma” of the speed of evolution;
• the problem of explaining the ability to quickly adapt to environmental changes
that all organisms capable of associative learning manifest;
• the vexata questio on the degree of influence that, respectively, genes and socio-
environmental stimuli have on human experiences, activities and propensities.
As I recalled in the second chapter, the new version of Darwinism emerging from the
extended synthesis implies, in fact, that any drastic change in living conditions can
trigger “large amounts of […] hereditary variations” (Jablonka and Lamb 2005: 443),
that “some hereditary variations are non-random in origin” and that some acquired
information can be inherited. In other words, it implies that evolutionary change
can result “from instruction as well as from selection” and that genetic changes can
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often come as “followers” of evolutionary divergences started at the epigenetic and
ethological level (Jablonka 2006; Callebaut et al. 2007; Pigliucci and Müller 2010)
and, therefore, that in various cases the “evolution can be very rapid” (Jablonka and
Lamb 2005: 442; 443).
In this chapter, I will discuss the results of numerous studies which demonstrate
that ontogenetic development of mind and behaviour, in humans and other social
animals capable of learning, is decisively influenced, through epigenetic inheri-
tance and cultural tradition, by early and subsequent experiences, social context and
living conditions. Mental and behavioural propensities and preferences can there-
fore develop significant, useful or harmful changes in the rapid times in which social
and cultural selection operate. Therefore, to “explain the socio-behavioral status quo
in terms of genes” appears, within this new theoretical framework, incorrect and
anachronistic (ibid.: 473). In short, according to the emerging perspectives, environ-
mental stimuli, social constraints and cultural heritage channel and largely constrain
the gene expression: the exact opposite of what the genetic determinists have always
supposed and supported.
9.2 From the “Selfish Gene” to the “Altruistic” One: Moral
Innatisms and Evolutionary Psychology
In the fourth chapter of The Descent of Man (Darwin 1871), like the third dedicated
to a comparison between the human mental faculties and those of other animals,
Darwin exposes his conception according to which human morality sinks its remote
roots in the social instincts of the higher animals, especially primates. The great
naturalist introduces here an approach that could be defined proto-ethological, then
developed in the work The expression of emotions in animals and humans (Darwin
1872), starting to locate a series of emotional, cognitive, behavioural and expressive
patterns that our species shares with others.
In the final pages of the chapter, there is a passage quoted from the letter thatHebert
Spencer had written to John StuartMill, and that Alexander Bain had published in his
Mental and Moral Science (Bain 1868): “Our great philosopher, Herbert Spencer,
has recently explained his views on the moral sense. He says: «I believe that the
experiences of utility organised and consolidated through all past generations of the
human race, have been producing corresponding modifications, which, by continued
transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intu-
ition»” (Darwin 1871: 102). Darwin initially seems to align himself with Spencer’s
moral innatism and intuitionism: “There is not the least inherent improbability, as it
seems to me, in virtuous tendencies being more or less strongly inherited” (Ibidem).
In the following passages, however, he raises perplexities, essentially dictated by the
fact that the moral traditions have often preserved and handed down norms which, in
his eyes, appear neither useful nor adaptive: “My chief source of doubt with respect to
any such inheritance, is that senseless customs, superstitions, and tastes, such as the
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horror of a Hindoo for unclean food, ought on the same principle to be transmitted”
(Ibidem: 103).
In other words, it would be necessary to admit, as Nietzsche was later to do, that,
for millennia, social and cultural selection has in many cases rewarded, preserved
and venerated even the “un-adapted”, here understood as a melting pot of beliefs and
behaviours that damage those who enact them, reducing their vital chances.
The theoretical oscillations between concessions to themoral innatism and critical
reservations against it, emerging in this Darwinian text, will cyclically recur in the
subsequent biological and philosophical debate, up to our days.
In the last twenty years, in particular, two different models of “moral Darwin-
ism” (Pennock 1995; Wiker 2002; Attanasio 2010; Hodgson 2013; Ruse 2017) have
emerged, in which this polarity returns to show itself.
The first model, which I would call “strong”, postulates the existence of a series of
“innate” instincts, principles and moral judgments, dependent, more or less directly,
on our genetic code. This model found some of its best-known supporters in evolu-
tionary psychologists1 as Jonathan Haidt, Steven Pinker andMarc Hauser, and in the
biologist and science popularizer Richard Dawkins.
The second model, which I will define “weak”, is instead centered on the hypoth-
esis that “we are not born with any specific moral norms in mind, but with a learning
1Evolutionary psychology was born in the early nineties of the twentieth century. Its approach
was outlined in the collective volume The Adapted Mind (1992), edited by Jerome Barkow, Leda
Cosmides and John Tooby. As the title of the work suggests, the first assumption of this branch
of psychology is that the human mind and brain are, in their basic architecture and mechanisms,
products of the adaptation of the human species to the environment in which it has evolved. The
second basic assumption of evolutionary psychology is that the human mind and brain function,
according to themodel suggested byFodor, in amodularway (Fodor 1983), that is: through cognitive
and physiological circuits which are mutually independent. Evolutionary psychology is presented
by its supporters as an area of research aimed at finding a mediation between the reductionist
and deterministic positions of the genocentric sociobiology and the culturalist approach of the
traditional sociology (Adenzato and Meini 2006: XIII). Indeed, it advocates, at least in theory, the
overcoming of every innate/learned dichotomy (Cosmides and Toby 2006). However, the positions
of its best-known exponents often appear more as a diplomatic and rhetorically “soft” repurposing
of sociobiological genocentrism than as a theoretical or experimental overcoming of it. Ultimately,
according to their approach, it is possible to explain the origin and motivation of every human
psychological attitude, including moral, religious and political ones by discovering the genes they
depend on.
These psychologists like to call themselves “Darwinians”, but their beliefs diverge profoundly
from the Darwin’s one. In the concluding chapter of The Descent of Man, Darwin stated that “the
moral qualities are advanced, either directly or indirectly, much more through the effects of habit,
the reasoning powers, instruction, religion, &c.”, which means through a social and cultural selec-
tion, rather “than through natural selection” (Darwin 1871, II: 404). Therefore, the moral innatism
promoted by the main exponents of contemporary evolutionary psychology supports a thesis oppo-
site to that of Darwin. It is no coincidence that it refers to two theoretical models that are extraneous
to Darwinism: Chomskyan linguistic innatism, which still lacks any adequate genetic and/or neuro-
physiological evidence from the 1950s to the present day, and the modularistic approach launched
by J. Fodor in the 1980s. Moreover, in the new millennium the latter approach underwent extensive
criticism and revision by its own author, who has argued that the thesis according to which the
human cognition is mostly or totally modular is “devoid of empirical plausibility” and borders on
“incoherence” (Fodor 2000).
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agenda that tells us which information to imbibe” (de Waal 2006: 166). This leads
us to “internalize the moral fabric of our native society” (de Waal 2006: 166; Simon
1990) and rework it according to our experiences. From the 1990s onwards, etholo-
gist and primatologist F. de Waal has offered the most consolidated and documented
exposition of it.
We will start our analysis by examining the positions of some supporters of the
“strong”model, according to whommoral principles oriented to favour the conserva-
tion of “altruistic” behaviour are innate in our species or even fixed on a genetic level.
Among these, I will first mention an apparently “unsuspicious” scholar to whom, a
few decades ago, no one would have attributed the defence of this model: Richard
Dawkins. When he published his bestseller The Selfish Gene in 1976, Dawkins
seemed to have questionable but very clear ideas about our hereditary inclinations:
“If you wish, as I do, to build a society in which individuals cooperate generously
and unselfishly towards a common good, you can expect little help from biological
nature. Let us try to teach generosity and altruism, because we are born selfish”
(Dawkins 1976: 3). These statements did not leave much room for doubt regarding
their interpretation: they asserted that our innate tendencies lead us to be selfish and
not generous. They echoed, renewing its form but not its substance, the position
assumed in the previous century by Thomas Huxley in which “altruistic” choices
contrast with a natural tendency to protect one’s own survival and an unyielding
part of our ereditary kit. However, about thirty years later, in the volume The God
Delusion (Dawkins 2006), he went to reverse this position, though without explicitly
admitting it. Indeed, in the sixth chapter of the book, entitled The Roots of Morality:
Why Are We Good? he wrote: “Where does the Good Samaritan in us come from?
Isn’t goodness incompatible with the theory of the ‘selfish gene’? No. This is a
commonmisunderstanding of the theory - a distressing (and, with hindsight, foresee-
able)misunderstanding” (Dawkins 2006: 215). This very self-denial, whichDawkins
minimized by presenting it as a simple misunderstanding, had precise historical and
cultural causes. In those years, in fact, the hypothesis that some altruistic behaviour
has a very strong innate basis in our species had found wide diffusion in a new field
of research born in the nineties: evolutionary psychology.
One of the best-known popularizers of this approach had been the cognitive
psychologist Steven Pinker. Based on the model of Chomskyan linguistic innatism,
and on the neo-intuitionist approach proposed by psychologist JonathanHaidt, Pinker
had launched, in the volume The Blank Slate: The Modern Denial of Human Nature
(Pinker 2002), the idea of a “Darwinian moral innatism”, then re-proposed in the
paper The Moral Instinct (Pinker 2008).2 This approach had been then reworked
and developed by Marc Hauser, also an evolutionary psychologist, who in the essay
Moral minds. How nature designed our universal sense of right and wrong (Hauser
2006) had proposed the hypothesis that our “moral sense” is inscribed in the human
brain, based on a “universal moral grammar” and determined to a large extent by
genetic factors. According to Hauser, it is therefore correct to talk about a very
2As he himself affirms, Pinker adopts a “weakened”, or semi-strong, version of the moral innatism,
believing that in our brain there is likely no list of “you must”, but only some “if-then” rules.
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“moral instinct” which is innate and “immune” to the conditioning of social and
cultural factors as authorities and religions (Hauser 2006: xviii).
Hauser’s approach, in turn, referred to the Haidt’s one which in the article The
emotional dog and its rational tail: a social intuitionist approach to moral judgment
(Haidt 2001) had hypothesized the existence of two separate systems of evalua-
tion that guide the human mind: “moral intuition”, phylogenetically older, and the
younger “moral judgment”, which appeared only after verbal language was affirmed.
Indeed, his “intuitionist social model” postulates that it is the phylogenetically older
brain functions that are at the basis of the intuitive, quick, automatic and emotional
responses we give to questions of a moral nature. According to this approach, there-
fore, reasoned ethical judgments play, in themental processing of our ethical choices,
only a secondary role, used more to construct a posteriori rational justifications for
our evaluations than to identify the conclusions they reach. This way, while not
being able to deny that moral judgments are individual re-elaborations of values
transmitted by a specific cultural tradition, Haidt tends to minimize the effects of
our cultural formation on our emotions, and those of reasoning on the moral judg-
ments, substantially equating both to a posteriori justifications of innate behavioural
patterns.3
For its part, Hauser, referring to the Chomskyan innatist model, Haidt’s intu-
itionism and John Rawls’s neo-transcendentalism, had proposed the hypothesis that
there is a “universal moral grammar”, based on a “moral instinct”, which matures
naturally in the brain of each child (Hauser 2006: xvii).
While not going as far as denying the undeniable, that is the influence of cultural
differences on the codes of conduct and values internalized by individuals, he postu-
lates the existence of universal “innate principles” ofmoral judgment only our species
is endowed with.
In short, Hauser’s theses outline, albeit with some caution, a very strong model
of moral innatism, stating that we possess an “innate moral faculty”, characteristic
and exclusive to our species, that there is a “universal moral grammar”, analogous
to the universal grammar that Noam Chomsky postulated to explain the learning of
verbal language, and finally that these innate devices are impervious to conditioning
from social, political and religious authorities.
What kinds of data supports these theses?
Hauser examines the contributions of various disciplinary fields, but the argument
he considers decisive does not derive from genetic, neurophysiological, ethological,
or historical evidence, but from a study which consisted in administering a “Moral
Sense Test” via Internet (see: http://www.moralsensetest.com) to more than 60,000
volunteers from 120 different nations. The test related on some “moral dilemmas”
and mental experiments that Hauser himself, along with two of his collaborators,
had instructed.
3In more recent years Haidt has argued that also political and religious preferences are attributable
to genetic factors. See Haidt (2012).
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Both Hauser and Dawkins interpret the results obtained from this telematic test—
that is, the fact that most of the interviewed people provided similar answers, regard-
less of their culture of origin, religious affiliation and social status—as an indica-
tion of the universality of basic human moral principles and of their substantial
impermeability to social and cultural influences.
This procedure has raised several criticisms aimed to emphasize an evident
inconvenience and disproportion between the poor reliability of the data collection
method used by Hauser and collaborators, the kind of data analyzed, and the extreme
generality of the conclusions which the author claimed to have been able to reach.
Even a scholar like Philip Lieberman who has made important contributions in
both cognitive psychology and studies on human psychic evolution, has attacked the
exasperated “adaptationism” that characterizes the approach of these evolutionary
psichologists, denouncing the spread of research based on data collected, exclusively
or almost, among the WEIRDOs. The acronym indicates the “people of Western
cultures, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic” that constitute the majority
of “the subjects who played the highly constrained mind-games experiments that
form the «empirical» data of Moral Minds” (Lieberman 2013: 182) and of its “Toy
Experiments”.
The result thatHauser andDawkins interpret as a proof of the existence of an innate
universal morality appears, according to Lieberman’s pertinent observations, more
credible as an indicator of the high degree of cultural homologation now achieved
in a globalized world, within a circle of people which is westernized enough to be
familiar with telematic questionnaires and online games. In any case, it certainly
cannot refute the results confirmed by all the countless archaeological and historical
studies which had attest to very profound differences developed by past and present
human cultures in terms of moral rules and lifestyles in a period that covers (and
most likely exceeds) the last ten thousand years.
But, as we have already shown in the previous chapters with specific examples
and as this final section will further demonstrate, the developments reached in the
past three decades by an emerging discipline such as epigenetics, and the profound
renewal it has brought to the field of evolutionary studies finally allow us to dismiss
“strong” moral innatism as a dogmatic doctrine now refuted by an increasing amount
of experimental results and statistical analyses of historical and empirical data.
9.3 Experience Creates Difference: Studies on Monozygotic
Twins
Physical and behavioural similarities between monozygotic twins (MZ) have always
been among the arguments that the supporters of genetic determinism try to exploit
in favor of their own thesis. For example, evolutionary psychologist Steven Pinker,
in an article entitled “Why nature & nurture won’t go away” (Pinker 2004), tried
to prove, drawing on some studies on mono-ovular twins, a thesis characterized by
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extreme biologistic determinism: “Setting aside cases of extreme neglect or abuse,
whatever experiences siblings share by growing up in the same home in a given
culture make little or no difference to the kind of people they turn into” (Pinker 2004:
15); “the shared family environment has little to no lasting effect on personality and
intelligence” (ibid.).
A thesis that has always been disputed by the psychic and social sciences and that
received, the following year (2005), a resounding denial precisely in the research
areas to which Pinker most insistently appealed: behavioural genetics and the study
on the development of epigenetic characteristics in mono-ovular twins. This refu-
tation was offered by an article published in PNAS, the magazine of the American
Academy of Sciences (Fraga et al. 2005). The paper, signed by twenty researchers
operating in different countries,was based on a research project coordinated byManel
Esteller and focused on the study of 80 monozygotic male and female twins aged
3–74. It showed that the perfect genetic and epigenetic identity as found inMZ twins
immediately after their birth does not prevent the punctual maturing in them, over
the course of their lives, of significant epigenetic, attitudinal and behavioural differ-
ences.Differences deriving from their lifestyles, from the different environments they
have lived in, or different roles they have occupied in a common environment, from
biographical circumstances or pathologies which involve the regulation, and there-
fore the expression, of their genes. The authors of the study found themost significant
differences in terms of immune system, organic function, brain micro-conformation
and behavioural propensities precisely betweenmonozygotic twins raised in different
environments and when different pathologies changed the “epigenetic landscape” of
a sibling. “We also established”, they wrote, “that these epigenetic markers were
more distinct in MZ twins who were older, had different lifestyles and had spent less
of their lives together” (ibid.: 10608). Conclusions that, contrary to those taken from
Pinker, fully confirmed “the significant role of environmental factors in translating a
common genotype into a different phenotype” (ibid.) and the relevance that the life
context has for the dynamics of the brain development and personality formation.
For these reasons, according to Esteller and his collaborators, “MZ twins are an
excellent example of how to genetically identify individuals can exhibit and there-
fore provide a unique model for the contribution of epigenetic modifications in the
establishment of the phenotype” (ibid.).
Another paper, published in Science in 2013, shows, instead, that even mono-
ovular twins grown in the same environment develop, from early childhood, different
preferences, attitudes and abilities, and related differences in the respective brain
micro-geographies, if the environment in which they live is sufficiently stimulating
(Freund et al. 2013). Particularly interesting is the fact that the study reveals these
differences not in human beings, which many scientists consider as the species
endowed with the greatest cerebral and behavioural plasticity, but in a model species
such as the mouse.
In fact, it offers an experimental account of the development of different
behavioural propensities and corresponding differences at the level of neural
networks in 40 monozygotic mouse twins raised in a “large enriched environment”
which gave them the opportunity to differentiate their activities. Monitored 24 hours
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a day by a microchip for three months, the twins developed different propensities,
attitudes and abilities. The use of imaging diagnosis showed that their brains also
underwent different kinds of micro-modifications. The mice had in fact increased
the number of neurons in different areas of their hippocampus (an area of the brain
that is very important to the learning ability, procedural memory and the encoding
of information), and the mice “who explored their habitat more broadly also grew
more new neurons” (ibid.: 758) in this area.
Experiments like these show that, to adequately appreciate the incidence of the
social and natural environment on the formation of cerebral, psychic and behavioural
differences in monozygotic twins, both environmental and biographical differences
must be taken into account. They demonstrate that, even in genetically identical indi-
viduals, experience creates differences, not only on a cultural but also on a biological
level, by modifying their self-regulation systems.
9.4 Experience Transfers Difference: Influences
of Maternal Lifestyles and Parental Care
on Descendants
The developments of behavioural and cultural epigenetics, a research area “which
includes both the investigation of the role of behavior in shaping developmental-
epigenetic states and the reciprocal role of epigenetic factors and mechanisms in
shaping behavior” (Jablonka 2016: 47) already allow, about twenty years after its
birth, to corroborate the following statements:
• It is established that amother’s diet, experiences and lifestyle influence embryonic
development from its earliest stages and that parental care plays a no less crucial
role in the development of the mental and behavioural attitudes of children.
• The effects of these embryonic and childhood experiences persist, in forms that
are modulated by subsequent experiences, throughout children’s and adults’ lives
and can be transmitted for some generations to their descendants even in the
absence of a reiteration of the external stimuli that caused them.
• These influences, both in human beings and other social mammals, invest all
main aspects of development: from the immune system to resistance to stress,
from levels of neophobia or exploratory propensity to the development of psychic,
cognitive and relational attitudes.
• They induce a series of experimentally verifiable changes in the epigenetic
regulation of genetic expression and cerebral microcircuits.
As found in various animal clades, the effects of a mother’s diet on her offspring’s
preferences appear particularly significant in placental mammals, where the zygote
lives its prenatal development constantly immersed within the maternal uterus. Bilkó
and some collaborators, in a well-known study (Bilkó et al. 1994) fed pregnant,
laboratory-grown female rabbits with juniper berries obtaining the development of
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a clear preference for this food both in offspring bred by their natural mother and
in those entrusted to adoptive mothers early. Similar effects on food preferences
have produced experiments in which adoptive mothers fed with these berries suckled
puppies born ofmothers fedwith normal laboratory feeds (Jablonka andLamb2005).
In both cases the preference for that food was then passed on to the next generation.
Does maternal diet also have direct influences on the dietary orientation of human
children? Experimental evidence has been accumulating over the past few decades.
Often cited are the studies coordinated by the biopsychologist Julie Mennella that
demonstrated the transmission of a preference for carrot juice in children of women
who had drunk it regularly during pregnancy, or just during its first two months
(Mennella et al. 2001). More recently, other studies have clarified that the diet
followed by a mother during her pregnancy influences a wide range of organs
and systems in offspring and can also affect the biological and health profile of
their descendants. Finally, a very recent study deals with a topic to which we
will return in the concluding pages of the chapter: the trans-generational effects
of undernourishment (Aiken et al. 2016).
But it is now known that the uterine environment not only influences food prefer-
ences, but also other temperamental and behavioural traits. For example, in a rodent
such as theMongolian gerbil, the period in thematernal uterus can exert strong inher-
itable effects on the development of the female offspring. In this animal species, in
fact, “amale-biased sex ratio and aggressive female behavior is perpetuated, probably
because the mother’s phenotype reconstructs a testosterone-rich uterine environment
that induces the same hormonal and behavioral state in her daughters” (Jablonka and
Lamb 2007: 359)
There are thus many studies on animal models that highlight the direct influ-
ence between mother/offspring, or reference adults/offspring and interactions on the
latter’s psychic and relational development. Lorenz and his collaborators already
showed decades ago that it is enough to deprive an anatidae chick of the “greet-
ing” ritual to make it an asocial adult, unable to weave “normal” relationships
with conspecifics (Lorenz 1988). More recently, a series of experiments with rats
coordinated by Frances Champagne (Weaver et al. 2004; Champagne and Rissman
2011) testified that puppies raised by mothers who donated a low quantity of licking
and grooming subsequently showed lower levels of stress resistance, and a higher
propensity to neophobia, than those who received greater amounts of care. The
females raised this way, when becoming mothers, enacted behaviours similar to
those received, obtaining the same effects, which were thus perpetrated from gener-
ation to generation (Weaver et al. 2004). Champagne and her collaborators found that
these trans-generational effects depended on the fact that the donation and the non-
donation of care triggered, respectively, methylation or de-methylation processes of
certain portions of DNA.4
4Methylation is an epigenetic modification of DNA that allows the formation of a bond between a
methyl group and a nitrogenous base (one of the bases of which the DNA and RNA nucleotides are
composed). In mammals, methylation plays a fundamental role in the development of the zygote,
making possible the formation of the chromatin, and therefore of the chromosomes, and then the
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They have indeed detected “that increased pup licking and grooming (LG) and
arched-back nursing (ABN) by rat mothers altered the offspring epigenome at
a glucocorticoid receptor (GR) gene promoter in the hippocampus. Offspring of
mothers that showed high levels of LG and ABN were found to have differences in
DNAmethylation, as compared to offspring of ‘low-LG-ABN’mothers” (ibid.: 847).
In simpler words: the pups that had received scarce care presented, in the succes-
sive phases of their development, a tendency to stress and a neophobia significantly
greater than those raised with more care. The females bred by mothers who gave
little care also presented “the same epigenome as the mothers and therefore repro-
duced the same ‘unloving’ behavior with their children” (Bottaccioli and Bottaccioli
2012: 331).5 In fact, the methylation process induced by the lack of parental care
prevented the development and functioning of an adequate number of glucocorticoid
receptors, hormones that allow individuals to adapt to stress, alleviate anxiety and
to relax. Individuals who had undergone poor treatment ended up becoming perpet-
ually stressed subjects and females raised in such conditions procreated offspring
with similar propensities. Therefore, the greater or lesser donation of parental care
was revealed, in this case, as a factor capable of inducing epigenetic modifications
that have significant effects from an emotional, psychic and clinical point of view,
for both first generation children and their descendants.
Subsequently, to demonstrate even more rigorously that these effects were mainly
due to the behaviour of the mother, and not to her genes, Champagne and her
colleagues had mothers who gave abundant care bred rat pups born of mothers
who gave them few and vice versa. The causal links suggested by the results of
the first experiment found full confirmation in the second one: the pups born to
“caring” mothers but raised by inattentive mothers developed in their hippocampus
low levels of glucocorticoid receptors and behaved more anxiously. Those born to
inattentive mothers but bred by mothers who gave wide care showed high levels of
glucocorticoid receptors and a more sociable and relaxed behaviour (Iversen 2014).
9.5 Trans-Generational Effects of Traumatic Experiences,
Privations and Social Inequalities
Several experiments have proved that also in human beings, “psychic stress has
trans-generational effects” (Jablonka 2016: 49). For example: “using blood cells, a
study in Gambia found that individuals conceived during the nutritionally-stressful
gene transcription and the differentiation of cells, tissues and organs. The DNA methylation allows
the cells to regulate the gene expression by silencing certain genes, i.e. inhibiting their expression.
De-methylation is instead a process that has the opposite effect: it fixes, so to speak, the gene in an
“ON” position and therefore allows it to perform its functions. Both these processes are strongly
influenced by environmental stimuli.
5This and all the other quotations from essays contained in this chapter that have not been translated
into English are my translations.
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rainy season had significantly higher methylation at several important gene loci than
individuals conceived during the more plentiful dry season” (ibid.).
More generally, over the last twenty years, the cross results of many studies have
shown that for us as for other animals, “stressful or traumatic experiences such as
social defeat, a strong or enduring mental shock, physical and emotional abuse, or
deprivation of early parental care can have deleterious longterm, trans-generational
effects that are mediated by molecular epigenetic mechanisms” (ibid.). In other
words, according to the new insights of behavioural epigenetics, “traumatic experi-
ences in our past, or in our recent ancestors’ past, leave molecular scars adhering to
our DNA. Jews whose great-grandparents were chased from their Russian shtetls;
Chinese whose grandparents lived through the ravages of the Cultural Revolution;
young immigrants from Africa whose parents survived massacres; adults of every
ethnicity who grew up with alcoholic or abusive parents - all carry with them more
than just memories” (Hurley 2015).
In 2008, neurobiologist Michael Meaney and molecular biologist Moshe Szyf
published, together with other researchers, the results of a study in which they
compared the brains of 13 people who had been sexually abused and died by suicide
with those of people who died suddenly due to other causes. The former presented an
excess of methylation (silencing) of the hippocampal genes, a region of the brain that
plays a fundamental role in stress regulation, but also in the fixation of mnemonic
data and in spatial orientation (McGowan et al. 2008).
Then, in 2012, Szyf and his collaborators published the results of a study based
on the analysis of the methylation rates of most of the genes present in the genome
(obtained from blood samples) of 40 people born in England in 1958 (Borghol et al.
2012). These were people who had lived, from childhood, or from a certain phase of
their life onwards either in conditions of extreme poverty, or in conditions of great
wealth. Overall, Szyf and his colleagues analyzed the methylation status of about
20,000 genes. “Of these, 6,176 genes varied significantly depending on poverty or
well-being. The most surprising thing, however, was to notice that methyl changes
were more frequently found if the impacting event” that had drastically changed
the economic life of those people had occurred “in the early childhood rather than
as adults” (Iversen 2014).6 The authors, presenting the study, wrote: “We aimed to
establish whether childhood SEP” (socio-economic position) “was associated with
differential methylation of adult DNA” (Borghol et al. 2012: 62). Their conclusions
were equally clear: “Disadvantaged socio-economic position (SEP) in childhood is
associated with increased adult mortality and morbidity” (ibid.).
In another study, published in the same year, Elena L. Grigorenko, Moshe Szyf
and other researchers compared the overall methylation levels of 14 children raised
in Russian orphanages with those of 14 Russian children who grew up with their
natural parents (Naumova et al. 2012). The experiment confirmed that in the orphans
many genes involved in important functions, such as the neuronal communication
6This and all the other quotations from essays that have not already been translated into English in
this chapter are my translations.
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and the brain function development, had a level of methylation, and therefore of
inhibition, significantly higher than those found in the control group.
“The study of social and cultural epigenetics is still in its infancy, sowe do not have
detailed studies of the relations between socio-cultural conditions and epigenetics. It
is well established, however, that social inequality (e.g., poverty) in geographically,
politically, and economically diverse populations is correlated with an increased risk
of cardiovascular diseases, cancer andpsychological disorders, and that all these dele-
terious conditions have epigenetic underpinnings. […] The disposition to develop
such deleterious effects can be transmitted to the next generation and contribute to the
difficulty of escaping poverty” (Jablonka 2016: 50), thus triggering a “vicious cycle
of political-social action” (ibid.). Very clear, in this sense, is the data on the trans-
generational effects of social catastrophes such aswars, famines and persecutions. “A
2008 study was first to show in humans that early-life environmental conditions can
cause epigenetic changes that persist for life. It investigated long-term effects of the
Dutch hongerwinter (hunger winter) of 1944–1945, a seven-month famine imposed
by Nazi rationing” (Powledge 2009: 738; 739). The study (Heijmans et al. 2008)
showed that individuals conceived during this period, in which the Nazi occupiers
reduced daily food rations to less than 700 kilocalories per person, “had, 6 decades
later, less DNA methylation of the imprinted IGF2 gene compared with their unex-
posed, same-sex siblings” (ibid.). This led, for them, to an increased incidence of
diabetes, obesity, schizophrenia and coronary heart disease, significantly higher than
that of the siblings of the same sex born in less hard times. A study published by
Yehuda and some collaborators (Yehuda et al. 2015) illustrates, instead, the trans-
generational effects of different kinds of traumatic events, showing that the experi-
ences of war, segregation, degradation and humiliation influence the disposition of
descendants to develop several neurophysiological and psychological pathologies.
Indeed, all 22 children of the 32 Holocaust survivors examined were more likely
to develop post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) than control groups, related to the
methylation of the cytosine within the gene encoding the FKBP5 protein, which
plays an important role in controlling stress sensitivity.
9.6 Conclusions
Summarizing what has been discussed in this chapter, developments in evolutionary
biology and behavioural sciences have now proved that the ability of organisms
to adapt to rapid changes in the environment depends, to a significant extent, on
epigenetic regulatory mechanisms capable of deactivating or reactivating certain
genes, or their influence over certain processes, and that these forms of self-regulation
are transmitted to descendants through the epigenetic inheritance. According to these
emerging models, biological evolution is based not only on the slow processes of
accumulation of genetic mutations and natural selection, but also on these rapid
changes in epigenetic regulation, behaviour and survival strategies, which allow
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living beings to cope with the changes that continually arise in their environmental
and social contexts.
This alsomeans that, particularly among animals as the socialmammals and birds,
the development of individual and collective reactivity, preferences, attitudes and
capacities is mainly regulated by inputs coming from the intraspecific environment,
that is, from the social context in which individuals live. We already knew that this
happens through training and learning processes, but we can now state that it is
also through epigenetic inheritance. This means that the effects of the experiences
of immediate ancestors are transmitted to descendants not only because they take
relatives and parents as amodel, and/or react to their behaviour, but also because each
parent transmits to their children an entire functional and self-regulatory structure
that works, above all, at a cellular level and this structure, as we have seen, regulates a
lot of aspects related to health, behaviour, cognitive activity and social relationships.
This is all the more true for humans, who live in an environment which, even
from a material point of view, is almost entirely anthropic, or built and regulated by
humans themselves. This means that the biological history of man is also a social
history, that its developments, ever since ancient times and even more so today,
are channelled towards certain directions by the ways in which human relations are
organized within the society. This is true both for aspects relating to emotional and
physiological self-regulation, as well as for those relating to psychic, attitudinal and
intellectual development.
Furthermore, a wide range of studies attests that every form of traumatic or
stressful experience and any kind of social discrimination leave in our minds and
bodies molecular and cellular “scars” which cause physical and psychic discomforts
and can be transmitted to our descendants. What these studies bring to light is, there-
fore, a vicious circle, existing for millennia, in which social discrimination produces,
through inhibitory, stressful or disabling effects that are transmitted from generation
to generation, a continuous strengthening of inequalities. They demonstrate, in other
words, that social discrimination produces biological discrimination and tends to
perpetuate the conditions of their arising and increasing.
But, fortunately, these studies also demonstrate the possibility of the reverse effect.
They show in fact that:
• the inclusion of subjects with previous deficits or disorders, caused by epige-
netic inheritance or individual experiences, in a social and material environment
which is appropriate to them, enriched, stimulating, and non-stressful, can produce
considerable compensatory effects and forms of rehabilitation (McGowan et al.
2008; Freund et al. 2013; Ball et al. 2019);
• such improvement effects can concern both the health profile and themanagement
of emotions, the social relationships and the learning abilities (Schneider et al.
2006; McGowan et al. 2008; Freund et al. 2013; Ball et al. 2019);
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• in some cases, these positive effects also occur in individuals who have inherited
from their parents genetic anomalies that hinder learning, emotional management
and social relations (Arai et al. 2009; Arai and Feig 2011).7
What are the meta-ethical repercussions of these discoveries on theories regarding
the innate or learned, genetically or socially transmitted nature of moral imperatives,
prohibitions and orientations in human beings?
In short, the thesis of both old and current genetic determinism according to which
organisms are essentially mere executors of instructions encoded in their genes, and
the current human moral and socio-economic systems ultimately the effects of an
almost unmodifiable “human nature” produced by natural selection, are now proving,
thanks to the progress and tools of genetics and epigenetics, developmental biology
and evolutionary studies themselves, groundless and anachronistic. What has been
discovered in the last decades on the processes of epigenetic inheritance and on
the trans-generational effects of personal and historical experiences, allows us to
understand that human social history has shaped, and is still shaping, not only the
psyche and behaviour, but also the biology of human (and not only human) beings,
and the self-regulating systems of every individual.
In other words: biologisms have been refuted by biology itself .
The data discussed in this essay may be useful to highlight at least three aspects
related to this issue:
• the endless disasters produced, since the dawn of “civilization”, by the processes
of social manipulation of the human propensities and reactivity, implemented by
every political and economic regime based on the coercive induction of behavior,
the monopoly of information, the gender, class and ethnic discrimination, the
thirst for power, conquest and profit;
• the enormous power of mind and behaviour manipulation that the current biolog-
ical and media technologies and the enormous inequality in the access to the
resources that characterize our societies deliver into the hands of restricted
economic groups and political institutions. A power of manipulation that is
fuelling processes of degradation of the human critical capacity and ethical
sensitivity in an increasingly penetrating, incisive and pervasive way;
• the beneficial effects that any attempt to let the formsof humanandanimal sociality
mature from below, creating non-oppressive living environments, capable of
offering to everyone a range of life chances, development and expression, could
produce if it were socially supported.
Today we can say that the epigenetic landscape that humans inherit from their closest
ancestors and develop throughout their lives is, like every other aspect of the human
7For example it has been proved that a stimulating environment “can compensate for a learning-
deficiency inmutantmice” and “also improves learning in the F1offspring that inherit the deleterious
gene” (Jablonka 2016: 50). Of course, if these forms of compensation are possible for the mice,
there is no reason to think that it wouldn’t be the same for human beings, all the more so if supported
by their social context and by the means it can offer, provided the political wish of the leading class
to do so.
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world, to a large extent, a social product. In our species, moreover, innate behaviour
patterns often manifest not as a set of rigid sequences of movements, but as a set
of learning programs: “we are born not with any specific social norm, but with a
learning agenda that tells us which information to imbibe and how to organize it”
(de Waal 1996: 36). That leads us to assume behaviour patterns and reaction norms
from the environment in which we live, initially in a completely unconscious way,
interiorizing emotional patterns and customs, values and traditions. Epigenetic regu-
lation of gene expression plays a key role in this process because it makes inheritable
some effects of experience and propensities. Social learning, and especially early
learning experiences, have in turn very strong long-term effects, and may therefore
play a role that is even more important than that of epigenetic inheritance in shaping
human personality.
Genetic, epigenetic, behavioural and cultural inheritance cooperate, thus, among
themselves and with the experience and environmental stimuli to construct the
whole neuro-physiological condition, the patterns of reaction, the preferences and
propensities which every human being develops over a lifetime.
In short, social life, from the most embryonic of its phases, the one that a fetus
spends in the maternal body and in symbiosis with it, moulds individual biological
and behavioural expressiveness, inhibiting or enhancing its potential and attitudes
and, just like a gardener with their plants, can make them flower or wither.
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